

Demythifying Cybersecurity*

A glimpse of a secure cyber future

Edward B. Talbot

Tom M. Kroeger




Sandia National Laboratories

Livermore, CA

* - <http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2010.95>

Sandia has been dedicated to national security since 1949



A Mission-Driven Laboratory:

- Design and development of nonnuclear portions of US nuclear weapons
- Production of advanced components
- Safety, security, use control
- Treaty verification, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation
- Advanced military technologies and applications
- Energy and environment
- Homeland security and countering weapons of mass destruction

On the Internet nobody knows you're a dog...





...or an adversary!

The problem: we can't trust our machines and we can't live without them.

Information systems have become too complex and too interconnected at all scales to ensure that they do not contain vulnerabilities.

- Multi-scale: micro (3 lines of code) -> human -> macro (Internet)
- Multi-discipline: device physics -> electronics -> computer architecture
-> software -> human factors
- Multi-medium: photons -> electrons -> RF

- Wafer
- Mask
- Programming
- Die



- Servers
- Routers
- Switches
- Fiber
- Firewalls
- Desktops
- Users

...we are behind and falling further behind.

Cybersecurity Manifesto

- The Situation
 - Current cyber security approaches are fundamentally broken.
 - Current cyber security strategies are reactive and asymmetric.
 - Vulnerabilities in current implementations are virtually limitless.
 - Threats are exploiting these vulnerabilities faster than we can detect and counter them.
 - Current cyber security implementations compound the problem by creating the illusion of security.

“We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.”

- Albert Einstein




“The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie, deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the myth, persistent, persuasive and unrealistic.”

- John F. Kennedy

- Some Myths
 - **Myth 1:** More layers of defense are better.
 - **Myth 2:** Burdensome security is good security.
 - **Myth 3:** Running my executables on my data on my system is secure because I control my system.
 - **Myth 4-....:** ???

We need to move cyber security from a craft/lore/myth to a scientific discipline.



“The highest priority should be assigned to establishing research protocols to enable reproducible experiments...There is a science of cyber-security.”


- Science of Cyber-Security, JASONs report dtd November 2010.

Myth 1: More layers of defense are better.




Layered defense is great for
physical assets

Myth 1: More layers of defense are better.



Layered defense creates the illusion of impenetrability

A common perception of the threat



Myth 1: More layers of defense are better.

Many threats are not obvious





Myth 1: More layers of defense are better.


Response 1: Science-Based Cyber Security

VHDL

FPGA – 500k logic elements



Lots of states, lots of flexibility,
lots of trouble.



C compiler



Few states, testable, **provable**.

“Direct-to-gates” compiler

Myth 1: More layers of defense are better.

Response 1: Science-Based Cyber Security

Myth 2: Burdensome security is good security.

- Increasing security burden
 - User-selected passwords to constrained passwords
 - 2 factor: constrained passwords *plus* HSPD-12 badge
 - 3 factor: constrained passwords *plus* HSPD-12 badge *plus* fingerprint
- Are we more secure?
 - Can we *PROVE* that we are more secure?
- Looking forward:
 - Identity 2.0: Human-Badge \equiv Machine-Environment
 - Identity 3.0: Human \equiv Environment



e.g. Strong Kerberos



Myth 2: Burdensome security is good security.


Rethinking our security approach.

A CRYPTO NERD'S IMAGINATION:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
LET'S BUILD A MILLION-DOLLAR
CLUSTER TO CRACK IT.

NO GOOD! IT'S
4096-BIT RSA!

BLAST! OUR
EVIL PLAN
IS FOILED!



WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
DRUG HIM AND HIT HIM WITH
THIS \$5 WRENCH UNTIL
HE TELLS US THE PASSWORD.


GOT IT.




Myth 2: Burdensome security is good security.

Continuous, adaptive identity authentication

- **Event-based identity authentication** is momentary (event-based)



- **Continuous, adaptive identity authentication** is a continuous process
 - Probabilistic (not deterministic)
 - Approach: Multi-sensor fusion (example: Kalman filter using GPS, IMU, control laws, galvanic skin response, real-time DNA analysis, etc.)



Effective authentication requires unambiguous identity.

Myth 2: Burdensome security is good security.

Continuous, adaptive authentication provides unambiguous identity regardless of dynamics.




If a control system can be built that enables this aircraft to return to base...



...a control system should be able to authenticate me despite changes in my dynamics

Myth 2: Burdensome security is good security.

“Cell phones show human movement predictable 93% of the time”*




- INTEGRATION of existing sensors
 - ✓ Eyes
 - ✓ Gait (feet, waist)
 - ✓ GPS location
 - ✓ Voice
- to provide
 - ✓ Continuous
 - ✓ Real-time
 - ✓ Adaptive
 - ✓ Unambiguous
- identity authentication

* - <http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/02/cell-phones-show-human-movement-predictable-93-of-the-time.ars>

Myth 2: Burdensome security is good security.

Response 2: Unambiguous identity as certain and intuitive as in the physical world.

Myth 3: Running my executables on my data on my system is secure because I control my system.



Cyber-attackers exploit complexity

- **The asymmetry:**

- **Defense:** protect against every possible exploit (hard).
- **Attack:** find one unprotected vulnerability (easy).
 - Linux kernel: 25 year old bug in the kernel was found two years ago.
 - Vista rewrite: 6 major vulnerabilities identified in the first 3 months.

Woo-Hoo!!



- **Response 3: Reverse the asymmetry**

- **Defense:** easy.
- **Attack:** hard

??!!??



- **Approach:** tailor complexity for defense.

“We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” - *Albert Einstein*

Myth 3: Running my executables on my data on my system is secure because I control my system.

Response 3: Reversing the asymmetry



Data Encryption:
Fragile, Incomplete,
easy to detect, crack

Data Obscuration:
("Concealment")
Robust,
computationally hard

The Myth:




"First, there are three general types of secrecy system:
(1) concealment systems,...
(2) privacy systems,...
(3) cipher, code..."

The Reality:



- From *Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*, 1949, C. Shannon



Myth 3: Running my executables on my data on my system is secure because I control my system.

Monoclonal implementations share security holes.

```
243
244 void ProgramManager::RecallProgram() {
245     string name;
246     bool searching = true;
247     while (searching) {
248         cout << "Enter name of program: ";
249         cin >> name;
250         if (ProgramNameIsValid(name)) {
251             if (ProgramFileExists(name)) {
252                 Program thisProgram;
253                 thisProgram.SetName(name);
254                 Read(thisProgram);
255                 WriteToScreen(thisProgram);
256                 searching = false;
257             }
258             else if (ProgramNameExists(name)) {
259                 WriteToScreen("Programs[" + ProgramIndex(name) + "];");
260                 searching = false;
261             }
262             else if (EndingRecall(name))
263                 searching = false;
264         }
265     }
266 }
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Myth 3: Running my executables on my data on my system is secure because I control my system.

Multiple implementations randomize security holes.




Multiple-version codes enable security improvement statistics.


Multiple computing implementations can randomize security vulnerabilities.



Multiple communication paths can randomize security vulnerabilities.



Multiple storage locations can randomize security vulnerabilities.



Myth 3: Running my executables on my data on my system is secure because I control my system.


Response 3: Reverse the asymmetry



A Challenge

From the “Einstein-Roosevelt” letter:

“Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness and if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations...”



Demythifying Cybersecurity

| Myths | Responses |
|--|--|
| Myth 1: More layers of defense are better. | Response 1: Provable, science-based cyber security Move cyber security from a trade craft to scientific discipline. Limit complexity to enable provability |
| Myth 2: Burdensome security is good security. | Response 2: Unambiguous identity. Continuous, Adaptive Authentication |
| Myth 3: Running my executables on my data on my system is secure because I control my system. | Response 3: Reverse the asymmetry Turn complexity against the attacker Attacker faces a combinatorially hard problem |

For further information:

- <http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2010.95>

Sandia National Laboratories



Livermore, CA
Albuquerque, NM

Edward B. Talbot

ebtalbo@sandia.gov

Manager, Information Assurance Department
Sandia National Laboratories
Livermore, CA

Tom M. Kroeger

tmkroeg@sandia.gov

Information Assurance Security Department
Sandia National Laboratories
Livermore, CA

“Exceptional service in the national interest”