

Addressing the Insider Threat A Call to INMM Community Action

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Standing Committee on
International Security of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials
Nonproliferation & Arms Control Technical Division**



Outline

- The Insider Threat
- Setting the Stage
- Particular Challenges Associated with
 - The Insider and Illicit Trafficking
 - The Insider and Transportation Security
 - Performance Testing for the Insider
- Working Group Discussions
- Recommendations – The Call to Action



Who/What is the Insider Threat?



The Insider Threat

- **Anyone with access**
 - Employees
 - Managers
 - Vendors
 - Cleaning Crews
 - Others
- **Anyone with a role**
 - Policy
 - Licensing
 - Design
 - Implementation
 - Operations
 - Inspections
 - Research and Development

Everyone is a potential Insider Threat!



Stetting the Stage

Three Key Questions

- **What are you willing to give up to prove that you are not a threat?**
- **What do you need to keep you from becoming a malicious insider?**
- **What do our organizations need to do to**
 - **identify vulnerable employees?**
 - **prevent coercion that might exploit our vulnerabilities?**
 - **support us if we are targeted?**



Challenges in Illicit Trafficking

- Many of the purveyors of illicit trafficking are insiders
- These insiders have access and authorization to get at nuclear materials
- Many cases discovered only after the material has left the facility and been detected elsewhere



Challenges in Transportation Security

- Increasing amount of materials being transported due to expansions in nuclear energy
- Exposure of nuclear materials outside the layers of protection in a nuclear facility
- Continuous tracking of materials while being transported
- Information protection during transport



Challenges in Performance Testing

- The need to analyze physical protection systems and material control systems for the insider threat
- Determining the standard against which insider threat analysis is conducted
- Measuring the organizational performance in nuclear security culture and overall organizational excellence



Working Group Discussions

Three Key Questions

- **What are you willing to give up to prove that you are not a threat?**
- **What do you need to keep you from becoming a malicious insider?**
- **What do our organizations need to do to**
 - **identify vulnerable employees?**
 - **prevent coercion that might exploit our vulnerabilities?**
 - **support us if we are targeted?**



INMM Call to Action

- **Support your people!**
 - Supportive programs to address potential employee vulnerabilities
 - Healthy compensation packages
- **Minimize the potential for undetected insider malevolent acts**
 - Process analysis for material movement activities
 - Transportation analysis
- **Continue working toward global system of**
 - Tracking of material containers
 - Detection at borders
 - National response teams
- **Develop standard for measuring system performance against the insider threat**



Conclusion

**The insider threat is a systemic threat
requiring a systemic solution**



Next Steps

- **Sixth workshop in planning**
 - 7-8 February 2012
 - Washington DC
- **Theme – Finding Solutions for Prevention, Detection, and Response for Addressing the Insider Threat**



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Workshop Committee Members

Ruth Duggan, Chairperson

- Galya Balatsky
- Steve Bellamy
- David Lambert
- Steve Mladineo
- Deb Pederson
- William Severe
- Larry Satkowiak

If you have an interest in this topic, please let me know if you would like to participate in this committee or in the next workshop.



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