

Planning for Emergency Worker and Public Radiation Protection

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Sixth Annual Radiation Measurements Cross Calibration
(RMCC) Workshop,
Amman, Jordan

June 14, 2011



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


Emergency Planning Purpose

Failing to PLAN means PLANNING to Fail?



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Useful Reference Documents

- NCRP Report No. 52, *Cs-137 from the Environment to Man: Metabolism and Dose*
- NCRP Report No. 109, *Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Aquatic Organisms*
- NCRP Report No. 116, *Limitation of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation*
- NCRP Report No. 154, *Cs-137 in the Environment: Radioecology and Approaches to Assessment and Management*
- NCRP Report No. 159, *Risk to the Thyroid from Ionizing Radiation*
- NCRP Report No. 161, *Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides*





Useful Reference Documents (cont'd)

- **Commentary No. 10, Advising the Public about Radiation Emergencies**
- **Commentary No. 19, Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism**





Topics to Address

Texts should be available to convey basic facts, *i.e.*, potential hazards and options for radiation protection. Other recommended topics include the following:

- description of radiation types
- radiation sources
- interactions of radiation with matter
- radionuclide generation
- radioactive decay
- environmental movement of radioactive materials
- modes of exposure (external, inhalation, ingestion)
- behavior of radiation radioactive materials within the body
- levels of measurable effects on humans and the environment
- limitation of exposure by time, distance and shielding





Exposure Pathways

(Data Collection Objectives)

(Not all pathways may be of concern. Prioritize target pathways to fit budget.)




FIGURE 1.1 Exposure Pathways Considered in RESRAD



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Exposure Pathways


(Data Collection Objectives)

- **Direct exposure to external radiation from the contaminated soil material;**
- **Internal dose from inhalation of airborne radionuclides, including radon progeny; and**
- **Internal dose from ingestion of**
 - Plant foods grown in the contaminated soil and irrigated with contaminated water,
 - Meat and milk from livestock fed with contaminated fodder and water,
 - Drinking water from a contaminated well or water body,
 - Fish or shellfish from a contaminated water body, and
 - Contaminated soil.



Related Input Parameters Needed

- **Seafood Consumption Rates**
- **Meat / Dairy / Vegetable Consumption**



- » Many Others (RESRAD provides default values than can be overridden by user.)
- » <http://web.ead.anl.gov/resrad/home2/>



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Example of RESRAD Parameters

Ingestion Pathway, Dietary Data

Fruit, vegetable, and grain consumption:	160	kilograms/year
Leafy vegetable consumption:	14	kilograms/year
Milk consumption:	92	liters/year
Meat and poultry consumption:	63	kilograms/year
Fish consumption:	5.4	kilograms/year
Other seafood consumption:	.9	kilograms/year
Soil ingestion:	36.5	grams/year
Drinking water intake:	510	liters/year

Contaminated fractions	Drinking water:	1
	Household water:	1
	Livestock water:	1
	Irrigation water:	1
	Aquatic food:	.5
	Plant food:	.1
	Meat:	.1
	Milk:	1

Source

Radiological Units	
Activity:	Dose:
<input type="button" value="p"/> <input type="button" value="Ci"/>	<input type="button" value="m"/> <input type="button" value="rem"/>
Basic Radiation Dose Limit: 25 mrem/yr	

Nuclide Concentration:	100 pCi/g	Nuclide List:
Ac-227	0	Pu-241
Co-60	100	Pu-242
Cs-137	100	Pu-244
H-3	100	Ra-226
Pa-231	0	Ra-228
Pb-210	0	Rb-87
Pu-239	100	Re-186m
Ra-226	100	Re-187
U-235	0	Rh-101

Perform Uncertainty or Probabilistic Analysis on Transfer Factor

Cover and Contaminated Zone Hydrological Data

Cover depth:	0	meters
Density of cover material:	1.5	grams/cm ³
Cover erosion rate:	.001	meters/year

Density of contaminated zone:	1.5	grams/cm ³
Contaminated zone erosion rate:	.001	meters/year
Contaminated zone total porosity:	.4	
Contaminated zone field capacity:	.2	
Contaminated zone hydraulic conductivity:	.10	meters/year
Contaminated zone <i>b</i> parameter:	5.3	

Humidity in air:	8	grams/m ³
Evapotranspiration coefficient:	.5	
Wind Speed	2	meters/s
Precipitation:	1	meters/year
Irrigation:	.2	meters/year
Irrigation mode:	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Overhead	
Runoff coefficient:	.2	
Watershed area for nearby stream or pond:	1000000	square meters
Accuracy for water/soil computations:	.001	

Occupancy, Inhalation, and External Gamma Data

Inhalation rate:	8400 m ³ /year
Mass loading for inhalation:	.0001 grams/m ³
Exposure duration:	30 years
Indoor dust filtration factor:	.4
External gamma shielding factor:	.7
Indoor time fraction:	.5
Outdoor time fraction:	.25
Shape of the contaminated zone:	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Circular <input type="radio"/> Non-Circular





Source Term Considerations

- Bushehr Reactor in Iran 400 km N
- Braka Reactors in UAE 240 km miles SE
- Ocean Currents?
- Meteorological Patterns?
- Source depletion with distance?
- Water release?
- Air Release?



Nuclear Facilities in Gulf Region



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A Real World Example

The M9.0 Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami of 11 March 2011
Impact on the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station




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Fukushima Overview

A. Japan Faces an Unprecedented Challenge (Enormous Earthquake, Tsunamis and Nuclear Accident)



Earthquakes:

- M - 9.0 quake (March 11)
- M - 7 class 5 times
- M - 6 class 72 times
- M - 5 class 423 times

1. Casualties : over 27,000

Dead	over 13,000
Missing	over 14,000

2. Evacuees : over 136,000

(As of April 17th)





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



Tsunami Generation


Note: These are **WEST** coast U.S. schematics. Reverse for Japan Tohoku quake.



Earthquake starts tsunami




Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake




- ▶ **Vertical Displacement**
 $D \approx 7 \text{ to } 10 \text{ m}$
- ▶ **Peak Displacement**
 $D_{\max} \approx 17 \text{ to } 25 \text{ m}^1)$
- ▶ **Rupture Zone**
 $A \approx 500 \text{ km} \times 100 \text{ km}$
- ▶ **Hypo Center Depth**
 $Z_H \approx 20 \text{ to } 25 \text{ km}$
- ▶ **Crack Velocity**
 $v \approx 2 \text{ km/s}$
- ▶ **Water Depth**
 $Z \approx 8 \text{ km}$
- ▶ **Rough Estimate of Water Volume Involved**
 $V \approx A \cdot \frac{1}{4} D \approx 500 \text{ km} \cdot 100 \text{ km} \cdot 2,5 \text{ m} = 125 \text{ km}^3$
- ▶ **Consequence:** Sudden displacement of a huge water volume ► **Tsunami.**

Seismicity Animation



Map View of Area

Areas affected by the quake





Tsunami Statistics

- Original Design Basis was ~3 meters based on 1900 Chile earthquake/tsunami
- Upgrade in 2000 to 6 meters based on more modern data
- Actual 3/11/11 tsunami was 14 meters!
- Ground level at Fukushima Dai-ichi in 10 meters.
- You can't out guess Mother Nature?





Fukushima Event Evolution



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“Before Earthquake” Photo



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All Emergency Shutdown Systems WORKED (Initially)

- Reactors Automatically Shut Down
- Emergency Core Cooling Initiated
- All Systems Under Control

Post-quake Tsunami Hits Coast

- Massive Damage
- Destroys Electric Power Grid (which supplied power for “routine” plant operations)
- Emergency Diesel Generators Started, as Designed
 - HOWEVER, tsunami washed diesel fuel storage tanks away! Pumps ran ~ 8 hrs on battery backup.



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Height of Tsunami




Press release at April 9

Fukushima Daiichi

Assumed highest tsunami water level
O.P. +5.7m

Site level
O.P. +4m

Base level
O.P. 0m



O.P. : Onahama bay construction base level



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Incoming Tsunami



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Tsunami Floodwater



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The Nightmare Unfolds

Had the (electric) ventilation fans been working, most/all of hydrogen gas generation would have gone out the tall stack shown in the following picture(s).



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View of explosion / Steam venting


5:06

津波情報

STV NEWS

福島第一原発
午後3時半ごろ

福島第一原発
炉心 溶融の可能性



道路

小牧市錦岡一室蘭市東町【37号】長万部町長万部一黒松内



Monday, March 14

Monday's blast destroyed the containment building but the reactor is still intact. Japanese officials also said cooling systems have failed at a third reactor.



In this image made off NTV/NNN Japan television footage, smoke ascends from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant's Unit 3 in Okumamachi, Fukushima Prefecture, northern Japan, March 14. The second hydrogen explosion in three days rocked Japan's stricken nuclear plant Monday, sending a massive column of smoke into the air and wounding 11 workers.

NTV/NNN Japan/AP

View of explosion / Steam venting



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**Emergency Generator
Diesel Tanks GONE!**

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
Before Explosion



After Explosion



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
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Explosion Damage



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110411_1f_14.avi

(Open Video OUT of Slide Show mode)




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Explosion Damage



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


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3. Nuclear Power Stations

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station

Before the Earthquake and Tsunamis



TEPCO

After the Earthquake and Tsunamis




Air Photo Service Inc (Myoko, Niigata Japan)



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FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI



Fukushima Daiichi, Reactor Unit 5 and Reactor Unit 6,
no blast or fire damage observed

➤ The Government took measures such as taking shelters or evacuation as follows based on the reports from Fukushima Daiichi & Daini

Fri, 11 March

14:46 The earthquake occurred
19:03 Emergency Declaration by the Gov't (Daiichi)
21:23 3 km radius evacuation (Daiichi)
10 km radius taking shelter (Daiichi)

Sat, 12 March

5:44 10 km radius evacuation (Daiichi)
7:45 3 km radius evacuation (Daini)
10 km radius taking shelter (Daini)
17:39 10 km radius evacuation directed by the PM (Daini)
18:25 20 km radius evacuation directed by the PM (Daiichi)

Tue, 15 March


11:00 20-30 km radius taking shelter (Daiichi)

Thu, 21 April

11:00 20 km radius is designated as "Restricted Area" (Daiichi)

Fri, 22 April

9:44 20-30 km radius taking shelter has been lifted (Daiichi)
Establishment of "Planned Evacuation Area" and "Emergency Preparation Area"



Source: NISA website



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Fire Trucks



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EOC Field Staff Preparation



EOC Staff Activities



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EOC Staff Activities



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Radiation Worker Dose Limits

- **50 mSv/yr (routine operations)**
- **250 mSv (once-in-lifetime Voluntary Emergency Exposure)**
- **Most-exposed emergency workers (3) received ~170 mSv**



Health Effects of Radiation from Japanese Reactor Leaks

By Blaine N. Howard, Radiological Physicist

There are two types of health effects of radiation -- short term and long term.

The **short term** effects include **radiation sickness** and **death**.

The **long term** effects include **cancer**.

The Japanese emergency workers are the only people who receive significant amounts of radiation. For this emergency, the exposure limit has been raised from 100 mSv to 250 mSv which still prevents them from the danger of short term radiation effects. See Figure 1.

Thus, there should be no short term radiation health effects in Japan.




Figure 1. Emergency Worker Limits and Short Term Effects

Some claim that all radiation increases the risk of getting cancer. This is not in agreement with good radiological science. The General Accounting Office states it this way.

"According to a consensus of scientists, there is a lack of conclusive evidence of low level radiation effects below total exposures of about 5,000 to 10,000 millirem." [50 to 100 mSv]




Figure 2. Emergency Worker Limits and Long Term Radiation Effects.

The emergency workers are likely to be at an increased risk of dying from cancer. See Figure 2. The Linear No Threshold (LNT) model may be used to calculate an upper limit of the expected risk. This calculation for a worker exposed to 250 mSv gives a 0.5% increase risk of dying from cancer. Since cancer deaths normally account for about 25% of all deaths and vary each year, an additional 0.5% would probably not be observable.

At the current levels of radiation, it is unlikely for persons outside the exclusion area to receive 50 mSv even if the levels persist for a year. This includes external radiation and internal radiation from ingestion or inhalation of radioisotopes. Japanese officials are monitoring these levels. About April 12, they expanded the evacuation zone to include areas where there is a risk of more than 20 mSv annual dosage.

Thus, no significant increase in cancer risk among the public is expected.

The danger of low dose radiation is very much exaggerated.

If the Japanese should not worry, why should we?



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Cancer Thoughts

- **25% of people alive will GET cancer in lifetime**
- **20% of people alive will DIE from cancer (all causes)**
- **Additional risk of dying from cancer for most-exposed workers went from 20% to 20.1%**





Civilian Radiation Dose Limits


- 5 mSv/yr (routine operations)
- 20 mSv (Emergency)



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3. Nuclear Power Stations

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station



20 km radius of the plant and other designated areas

→ to evacuate

20 to 30 km radius of the plant

→ to shelter indoors



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Aerial Measuring System (AMS) [NNSA]





In the event of an accident or incident involving radiological materials, NNSA, in consultation with state and other federal agencies, will deploy AMS immediately to the incident site and operations are as follows:

- Fixed-wing aircraft is deployed with the radiation detection system to collect information and determine the location of ground contamination.
- Helicopters to perform detailed surveys of ground contamination.
- NNSA scientists are then able to rapidly develop maps of the radiological materials deposited on the ground and the potential radiation exposure to personnel in the affected areas. This information gives emergency response officials information necessary to effectively respond to the emergency.




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Fukushima Environmental Radiation Contours

2012年3月11日までの推定積算線量の分布図
(2011年4月21日までの実測値から推定)



Dose Contours = mSv/year


Assumes 8-hr/day outdoor exposure




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Readings at Monitoring Posts out of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Readings at Monitoring Post out of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP



Radiation in Daily-life



2. Contain the Spread of Radioactive Substances (sea, soil and atmosphere)

Experts are making the utmost efforts to prevent dispersing radioactive substances contained in dust, debris and vapor.

Spraying synthetic materials on the surface of the ground and debris to prevent radioactive substances dispersion



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Emergency Water Pumping



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Utility Service Repair



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Utility Service Repair



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Cooperation with the IAEA

1. Information Sharing

- (1) Japan has been providing facility-related and other relevant information to the IAEA.
- (2) Nuclear Industry Safety Agency (NISA) provided updates on situations of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station at the IAEA Technical Briefing (21st March) and at the side event of the Fifth Review Meeting of the Contract Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (4th April).

2. IAEA Expert Missions

- (1) The IAEA has extended to Japan upon the request of the Government of Japan, in connection with the incidents involving the nuclear power plants in Japan by dispatching a series of the IAEA experts to Japan mainly in the field of radiation monitoring. Such dispatch of experts includes :
 - (a) Radiation Monitoring Teams, totaling up to 16 members who have been taking measurements mainly in Fukushima since 19 March;
 - (b) one marine expert from the IAEA's laboratory in Monaco, who boarded Research Vessel "MIRAI" during 2 -4 April to observe and provide advice for Japanese experts on their method of collection and analysis of seawater samples; and
 - (c) A Joint FAO/IAEA Food Safety Assessment Team, who met with local government officials, farmers etc. in Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi and Gunma prefecture.
- (2) In addition, IAEA experts in BWR technology met with Japanese officials and operators including NISA and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and visited the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant on 6 April.

Roadmap Towards Restoration

- By bringing the reactors and spent fuel pools to a stable cooling condition and mitigating the release of radioactive materials, we will make every effort to enable evacuees to return to their homes and for all citizens to be able to secure a sound life.

< Roadmap for Immediate Actions (Issues / Targets / Major Countermeasures) >

		Current Status	STEP1 (around 3 months) "Radiation dose is in steady decline"	STEP2 (around 3 to 6 months after achieving Step 1) "Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down"	Mid-term Issues
I. Cooling	(1) Reactors	Injecting fresh water	Nitrogen gas injection (Unit 1・3) Flooding up to top of active fuel Examination and implementation of heat exchange function (Unit 2) Sealing the damaged location	Stable cooling Flooding up to top of active fuel	Cold shutdown condition Prevention of breakage of structural materials, etc.
	(4) Spent Fuel Pools	Injecting fresh water	Enhance reliability of water injection Restore coolant circulation system (Unit 4) Install supporting structure	Stable cooling Remote control of water injection Examination and implementation of heat exchange function	Move stable cooling Removal of fuels
II. Mitigation	(3) Accumulated Water	Transferring water with high radiation level Storing water with low radiation level	Installation of storage / processing facilities Installation of storage facilities / decontamination processing	Secure storage place Expansion of storage / processing facilities Decontamination / Desalt processing (reuse), etc.	Decantation water Installation of full-fledged water treatment facilities
	(4) Atmosphere / Soil		Dispersion of inhibitor Removal of debris	Installing reactor building cover	Installation of reactor building cover (container with concrete) Solidification of contaminated soil, etc
III. Monitoring / Decontamination	(5) Measurement, Production and Monitoring	Monitoring of radiation dose in and out of the power station	Expand/enhance monitoring and inform of results fast and accurately	Sufficiently reduce radiation dose in evacuation order / planned evacuation / emergency evacuation preparation areas	Continue monitoring and informing environmental safety

Survey Inside Reactor Buildings by Robot

- Measured a dose of radiation, etc by remote control robots “inside the double doors” in reactor buildings of Units 1-3 where were inhibited to enter due to high radiation dose assumed.
- Examining how to utilized the robots for field survey such as measuring radiation dose indoors or not.



Opening a double door (April 18)

<measurement results>

	Unit 1	Unit 3
Measurement area	Reactor building 1 st floor From northern double doors to elevator	Reactor building 1 st floor Around southern double doors
Radiation dose	49mSv/h(Maximum) 10mSv/h(Minimum)	57mSv/h(Maximum) 28mSv/h(Minimum)
Temperature	About 28~29°C	About 19~22°C
Humidity	About 49~56%	About 32~35%
oxygen density	About 21%	About 21%

(provisional figure)

<The list of provided robots>

maker	Robots by iRobot		Robots by QinetiQ	
name	Packbot	Warrior	Talon	Dragon Runner
Monitoring function	image	Image only	image	Image only
	Radiation etc.	—	Radiation etc.	—
Arm keeping function	○	○	○	○



Robot3.jpg (579)



**Robot on
Obstacle Course**

photo: Wataru Umehar



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Robot-Controlled Backhoe



**Robotically Controlled
Track Vehicle**



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
Robot Controller Command Center



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Robot Entry



Robot Entry

Quick Upload




Robot Entry
Reading

PC-100 Surveys (1).jpg (449 x 336)



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(Open Video OUT of Slide Show mode)



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Final Thoughts

- **Strengthen Interagency Coordination and Cooperation**
- **Develop a Strategy for International Engagement**
 - Why? Who? How?
- **Phases of Engagement**
 - Introductory
 - Intermediate
 - Advanced





Regional Training Workshops

- Bahrain 2007 and 2008
- Qatar 2008
- Jordan 2007 and 2008



The NAVRUZ Experiment: Cooperative Monitoring for Radionuclides Central Asia Transboundary Rivers



Training on sample collection, Chirchik River, Uzbekistan



Negotiations during project workshop in Tashkent

Radiation Measurements Standards in the Middle East

- Radiation Measurements Cross Calibration (RMCC) Project
 - Develop a network of scientists and labs that can devise indigenous solutions to issues such as proliferation monitoring, environmental assessments, emergency response, and radioactive materials smuggling
 - Partnered with the IAEA, DOE/MAPEP



First RMCC Workshop, Kuwait, October 2004



Fifth RMCC Workshop, Doha, Qatar, May, 2010



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U.S. Response Timeline

$T = 0$ to 1 Hour

- Local Authority and/or Nuclear Facility will implement its Emergency Response Plans
- State and Local Officials will be notified.
 - Local First Responders will be first to arrive on the scene.
 - First Responders will begin responding to the emergency and evacuation of local area based upon Emergency Response Plans.




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
CM Resource Response

Timeline T = 1 to 6 Hours

- NNSA's Radiological Assistance Program Teams (RAP Teams) begin to arrive.
- Department Of Energy activates National Consequence Management Assets upon request of state.
 - CM Home Team Activated and providing assessment within 2 hours of activation.
 - CM Response Team assets in route within 4-hours of activation.
- NNSA's Plume Dispersion Modeling underway.



100 and 500 uSv Dose Contours



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Radiological Assistance Program Teams Arrive




CM Home Team Is Activated



- Objectives:
 - Provide Technical Assessment and Plume Map support before CM response team assets arrive at the event site
 - Provide a resource for local authorities early in an event
- Resources
 - National Lab personnel
 - Assessment tools
 - Plume modeling



Field Team



Assmt Experts



Plume modeling



Emergency Operations Center



CM Response

Timeline T = 24 to 36 Hours

- CM Response Teams arrive (approximately 150 - 400 additional personnel in 3 teams).
- Provides experts to support the operations:
 - Sampling Experts
 - Lab Analysis Experts
 - Health and Safety Experts
 - Assessment Experts
 - Radiological Technicians
- All of these individuals take on specific roles as defined in pre-event planning/training.



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Consequence Reports

- **Standardized report integrating effects predictions with Geographical Information System (GIS) provides consequence information in a format more directly useful to decision makers**
- **Reports are customized for different Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenarios or accident situations**
- **Different levels of detail can be selected**
 - summary, full report, full report including background and reference information





Thank You!



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


EXTRA SLIDES



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Boiling Water Reactor System




A BWR reactor: The schematic above shows the torus at left, which is doughnut-shaped.



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Fukushima BWR




How a Reactor Shuts Down and What Happens in a Meltdown

The operating reactors at Fukushima Daiichi power station automatically shut down during the earthquake. But after subsequent cooling failures, two of them went into partial meltdown.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **NEXT ►**

Inside a nuclear reactor, fuel rods are tubes made of zirconium alloy containing uranium fuel pellets. These rods are immersed in water, and heat generated by the nuclear reaction inside the rods turns the water into steam, which drives turbines to make electricity.



By MATTHEW ERICSON, XAQUÍN G.V., DYLAN McCLAIN, TOMOEH MURAKAMI-TSE, GRAHAM ROBERTS, ARCHIE TSE and JOE WARD | [Send Feedback](#)

Sources: Nuclear Energy Institute; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Tokyo Electric Power; satellite image by Digital Globe via Google Earth

[RECOMMEND](#)


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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **NEXT ►**

In a shutdown, control rods can be placed between the fuel rods to stop the nuclear reaction. After the earthquake near Japan, control rods deployed correctly.



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
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **NEXT ►**

Though the reaction stops, fuel rods continue to give off enormous amounts of heat. To keep the rods from getting too hot, they must be kept submerged in water.



WATER

FUEL RODS

By MATTHEW ERICSON, XAQUÍN G.V., DYLAN McCLAIN, TOMOEH MURAKAMI-TSE, GRAHAM ROBERTS, ARCHIE TSE and JOE WARD | [Send Feedback](#)

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RECOMMEND

 TWITTER

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **NEXT ►**

In Japan, there was no electricity to run the cooling system. Operators added water, intending to vent the steam and replace the water as it evaporated. But the water began boiling away faster than they could replace it.



By MATTHEW ERICSON, XAQUÍN G.V., DYLAN MCCLAIN, TOMOEH MURAKAMI-TSE, GRAHAM ROBERTS, ARCHIE TSE and JOE WARD | [Send Feedback](#)

Sources: Nuclear Energy Institute; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Tokyo Electric Power; satellite image by Digital Globe via Google Earth



Used Nuclear Fuel Shipping Cask



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Fuel Rod Schematic

Fuel rod


Thousands of thin, 180cm-long fuel rods, made of zirconium alloy

Fuel pellets

Uranium dioxide or mixed oxide (MOX fuel) - blend of plutonium and uranium

Washout

If rod cladding cracks, fuel pellets fall out. Radioactive isotopes in fuel - iodine and caesium - could escape into the atmosphere




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How a Reactor Shuts Down and What Happens in a Meltdown

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **NEXT ►**

In a full meltdown, fuel pellets would drop to the bottom of the reactor vessel; they might burn through it. An outer containment vessel with steel and concrete walls may or may not hold the melted fuel and prevent it from escaping the reactor building. Worst case: Molten fuel breaches all structures and releases enormous amounts of radioactive material, but physicists question whether this is possible.



By MATTHEW ERICSON, XAQUÍN G.V., DYLAN McCALIN, TOMOEH MURAKAMI-TSE, GRAHAM ROBERTS, ARCHIE TSE and JOE WARD | [Send Feedback](#)


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
The rods were exposed to air, heating up quickly. As temperatures spiked, the zirconium casings cracked, releasing radioactive gases and hydrogen — probably the cause of Saturday's explosion. It is not known if any of the uranium fuel has melted.



By MATTHEW ERICSON, XAQUÍN G.V., DYLAN McCLAIN, TOMOEH MURAKAMI-TSE, GRAHAM ROBERTS, ARCHIE TSE and JOE WARD |

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DOE/NNSA

Consequence Management (CM)

Program Overview

Prepared by:

Thomas Laiche, CHP

Nuclear Incident Response Programs
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, NM


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under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.



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Large Quantities of Radioactive Material can be Found Throughout the World

- Nuclear Reactors
- Nuclear Weapons
- Medical/Industrial Applications
 - Therapy Equipment
 - Sterilization Equipment
 - Density Gauges
 - Well Logging
 - Radiography
 - Thickness and Level Gauges
 - Power Generation
 - Radioisotopic Thermal Generators (RTG)




Radiotherapy Unit



Nuclear Power Plants



Nuclear Weapons




RTG

Idaho National Laboratories



History


- **March 28, 1979: Three Mile Island**
- **Event highlighted inadequacies in planning for a large-scale Nuclear Emergency**
 - **Evacuation Plans for the nearby cities inadequate**
 - **Significant confusion about protective actions**
- **An Executive Order was issued mandating federal preparations for radiological emergencies**
- **Preparations focused on nuclear power and weapon accidents**



**Three Mile Island
Nuclear Power Plant**



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New CM Program Focus

- The events of September 11, 2001 resulted in a philosophical change:
 - Terrorists may strike with no warning
 - First knowledge of nuclear terrorism attack may be the explosion/dispersion
- DOE/NNSA CM Program transitioned focus to preparations for intentional terrorist attack(s)





Mission

Develop and maintain rapidly-deployable equipment and technical expertise for world-wide response to nuclear and radiological terrorism events as well as nuclear/radiological accidents or emergencies




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DOE/NNSA CM Expertise

Research – Explosive Dispersion of Radioactive Materials



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DOE/NNSA CM Expertise

Equipment – Fixed Wing and Rotary Aircraft,
Radiological Monitoring Equipment,
Communications, Mobile Laboratories



DOE/NNSA CM Expertise

Models and Software – Develop and Use the most up-to-date Software, Databases, and Effect Models



Turbo FRMAC - Test

File Tools Help

Turbo FRMAC

Navigation

New Open

Turbo FRMAC

Test

- Predictive Analyses
- Action Level Concentrations
- Deposition DRLs
- Test**
- Ingestion DILs
- Ingestion DRLs
- Worker Protections

Samples

Event-Level Items

Advanced Parameters

FRMAC RAMS - Radiological Assessment and Monitoring System - 'Unlicensed'

System Home Products Equipment Measurements Samples Action Items Upload/Download

Welcome Thomas Laiche. You have 2 Action Items and 23 Work Products awaiting your review.

Detonation has been updated to 5 kilotons at 1000ft

Event: ISCMW

Featured Work Product(s): Briefing Products @ T+24h

Briefing Products @ T+24h



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DOE/NNSA CM Expertise




Personnel – Staffed with Personnel with Various Technical Expertise





What is FRMAC?

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is a federal asset available upon request to respond to nuclear/radiological incidents as described in the [National Response Framework \(NRF\)](#) and the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex



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What is the Purpose of FRMAC?

- Assist the state, local and tribal governments in their mission to **PROTECT THE HEALTH AND WELL BEING OF THEIR CITIZENS**
- Integrate multiple Federal agencies into one center where the Federal government can act and speak with **one voice**



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
FRMAC/CM Assets

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) includes:

- Data Analysis/CM Home Team
- Field Monitoring Teams
- Mobile Laboratory
- Radiological Assessment
- Aerial Measurement System
- Effects Models



CM Program/FRMAC Help Provide Coordinated Radiological Emergency Response



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


Who Makes Up FRMAC?

- **Department of Energy**
- **Environmental Protection Agency**
- **Department of Homeland Security**
- **Department of Health and Human Services**
 - Center for Disease Control
- **Department of Agriculture**
 - Food and Drug Administration
- **Nuclear Regulatory Commission**
- **And at least 10+ other Federal Departments and Agencies**
- **State, Local and Tribal Representation**



FRMAC within ICS




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Elements of FRMAC

- CM Home Team
- Assessment
- Health and Safety
- Monitoring and Sampling
 - AMS
- Laboratory Analysis
- A Team
- GIS
- Document Control
- NARAC



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Elements of FRMAC



- **CM Home Team -**
Provides technical support to event response while CMRT is enroute
 - Used as a reach-back resource
 - Used for expertise that may not be available in the field



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Elements of FRMAC

- **Assessment** - Provides decision makers with radiological information that can be used to issue Protective Actions



- Interprets radiological information in terms of EPA, FDA, or State/Local/Tribal Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
- Uses FRMAC-approved methodology to calculate potential dose consequence



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Elements of FRMAC

- **Health & Safety** -
Responsible for the H & S
of all FRMAC personnel
involved in operations
 - Determines appropriate Emergency Worker Protective Action Guides
 - Determines Stay Times
 - Determines if Respiratory Protection is needed





Elements of FRMAC

- **Monitoring & Sampling** - Coordinates efforts to provide scientifically defensible data of acceptable quality




- Develops sampling plans that include:
 - Monitoring point locations
 - Sample volume and types





Elements of FRMAC

- **Aerial Monitoring System (AMS)** - DOE's aerial-based radiation detection platform used to verify initial plume



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Elements of FRMAC

- **Laboratory Analysis** - Provides in-the-field radioanalysis of samples
 - Maintains ability to ship samples off-site to contract laboratories



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Elements of FRMAC

- **Advisory Team**
(A Team) - Federal Agency entity that makes recommendations to State, Local, or Tribal Decision Makers
 - Provides approval to deviate from standard assessment calculations



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Elements of FRMAC

- **Geographic Information System (GIS)** – A Computerized Database Management System that provides for the capture, storage, retrieval, analysis and display of spatial data
 - Assists in the development of the Data Products
 - Most visible of FRMAC assets
 - Interacts closely with NARAC for Data Product development





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Elements of FRMAC

- **Document Control** - Every off-site environmental radiological data point stored for long-term retention in FRMAC Data Center
 - Uses RAMS Database to electronically collect and store Field Data, Laboratory Analyses, etc.




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Elements of FRMAC

- **National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC)** - Provides models, tools and services that plot the probable spread of radioactive materials laid over a map of the affected area

- Uses the plots as part of both the Briefing Products and Data Products
- These Products are used by Decision Makers to determine appropriate Protective Actions as well as disseminate information





DOE/NNSA CM Program Overview Conclusion

- Legislated Federal Program to prepare for and respond to nuclear and radiological terrorism events as well as nuclear/radiological accidents or emergencies
- Rapid, World-Wide Deployable Equipment and Personnel
- FRMAC established to provide the resources to State, Local and Tribal governments to assist with emergency response



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
DOE/NNSA CM Program Overview Conclusion

- **FRMAC** comprised of multiple Federal Agencies working together to speak with one voice
- Resources include personnel, communications, data analysis, models, monitoring, laboratories






Questions



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