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Title: Interim Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack

Abstract

The Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) program is a collaborative, interagency effort co-chaired by the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense aimed at improving the nation‘s ability to respond to and recover from a large-scale, wide-area, domestic attack involving the release of an environmentally persistent biological warfare agent. The program is focused on understanding interactions between the civilian and military sectors, and in building mutual support to carry out such remediations. This Interim Consequence Management Guidance document provides guidance for decisionmakers in executing activities required to respond to and recover from a biological incident affecting a wide urban area insofar as information is currently available. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis is discussed as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the key threat agents. Most other biological threat agents are much easier to remediate, and in many cases, inactivation would occur naturally within days as a result of environmental exposure; however, the framework and operational questions that need to be addressed are expected to remain the same. The guidance in this document is applicable to (1) enclosed facilities, such asmore » commercial, residential, and continental U.S. military facilities; (2) semi-enclosed facilities, such as subways and public transit facilities; (3) outdoor areas (both localized and wide area), such as building exteriors, streets, parks, and other open spaces; (4) drinking water facilities; and (5) drinking water sources. This document follows an interagency framework [Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents (DHS and EPA 2009)]—which considered Raber et al. (2002) in its development—but takes the framework to a more operational level and provides guidance at key action and decision points.« less

Authors:
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  1. Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
  2. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1122193
Report Number(s):
LLNL-TR-484706
DOE Contract Number:  
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES; 99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Citation Formats

Raber, Ellen, Kirvel, Robert, MacQueen, Don, Love, Adam, Dombroski, Matthew, McGrann, Thomas, Richards, John, Melius, Carl, Bunt, Thomas, Hibbard, Wilthea, Greenwalt, Robert, Miles, Robin, Dillon, Michael, Mancieri, Sav, Harris, Steve, Michalik, Richard, Wheeler, Richard, Hoppes, Bill, Tucker, Mark, Krauter, Paula, Knowlton, Robert, Yang, Lynn, Franco, Dave, Einfeld, Wayne, Brockman, John, and Betty, Rita. Interim Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack. United States: N. p., 2011. Web. doi:10.2172/1122193.
Raber, Ellen, Kirvel, Robert, MacQueen, Don, Love, Adam, Dombroski, Matthew, McGrann, Thomas, Richards, John, Melius, Carl, Bunt, Thomas, Hibbard, Wilthea, Greenwalt, Robert, Miles, Robin, Dillon, Michael, Mancieri, Sav, Harris, Steve, Michalik, Richard, Wheeler, Richard, Hoppes, Bill, Tucker, Mark, Krauter, Paula, Knowlton, Robert, Yang, Lynn, Franco, Dave, Einfeld, Wayne, Brockman, John, & Betty, Rita. Interim Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/1122193
Raber, Ellen, Kirvel, Robert, MacQueen, Don, Love, Adam, Dombroski, Matthew, McGrann, Thomas, Richards, John, Melius, Carl, Bunt, Thomas, Hibbard, Wilthea, Greenwalt, Robert, Miles, Robin, Dillon, Michael, Mancieri, Sav, Harris, Steve, Michalik, Richard, Wheeler, Richard, Hoppes, Bill, Tucker, Mark, Krauter, Paula, Knowlton, Robert, Yang, Lynn, Franco, Dave, Einfeld, Wayne, Brockman, John, and Betty, Rita. 2011. "Interim Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/1122193. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1122193.
@article{osti_1122193,
title = {Interim Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack},
author = {Raber, Ellen and Kirvel, Robert and MacQueen, Don and Love, Adam and Dombroski, Matthew and McGrann, Thomas and Richards, John and Melius, Carl and Bunt, Thomas and Hibbard, Wilthea and Greenwalt, Robert and Miles, Robin and Dillon, Michael and Mancieri, Sav and Harris, Steve and Michalik, Richard and Wheeler, Richard and Hoppes, Bill and Tucker, Mark and Krauter, Paula and Knowlton, Robert and Yang, Lynn and Franco, Dave and Einfeld, Wayne and Brockman, John and Betty, Rita},
abstractNote = {The Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) program is a collaborative, interagency effort co-chaired by the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense aimed at improving the nation‘s ability to respond to and recover from a large-scale, wide-area, domestic attack involving the release of an environmentally persistent biological warfare agent. The program is focused on understanding interactions between the civilian and military sectors, and in building mutual support to carry out such remediations. This Interim Consequence Management Guidance document provides guidance for decisionmakers in executing activities required to respond to and recover from a biological incident affecting a wide urban area insofar as information is currently available. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis is discussed as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the key threat agents. Most other biological threat agents are much easier to remediate, and in many cases, inactivation would occur naturally within days as a result of environmental exposure; however, the framework and operational questions that need to be addressed are expected to remain the same. The guidance in this document is applicable to (1) enclosed facilities, such as commercial, residential, and continental U.S. military facilities; (2) semi-enclosed facilities, such as subways and public transit facilities; (3) outdoor areas (both localized and wide area), such as building exteriors, streets, parks, and other open spaces; (4) drinking water facilities; and (5) drinking water sources. This document follows an interagency framework [Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents (DHS and EPA 2009)]—which considered Raber et al. (2002) in its development—but takes the framework to a more operational level and provides guidance at key action and decision points.},
doi = {10.2172/1122193},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1122193}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue May 17 00:00:00 EDT 2011},
month = {Tue May 17 00:00:00 EDT 2011}
}