

Participant Instructions

Missile Dismantlement Exercises

Introduction

Participants to the workshop will undertake two exercises that have very different philosophies and techniques to increase confidence and transparency surrounding the dismantlement of obsolete missiles by two adjacent countries. The exercises assume that there is no treaty between the two hypothetical countries that requires the dismantlement of the missiles but both sides agree that much can be gained by a cooperative effort. The first exercise aims to increase transparency of the dismantlement process by exchanging photographs of the missiles before their dismantlement. The second exercise introduces the concept of on-site visits from the two sides.

Exercise 1: Exchange of Pre-Dismantlement Photos

Background:

Two countries, Aland and Bcountry, have growing arsenals of missiles and each is planning to retire a class of obsolete missiles. Both feel that being transparent with this retirement process would be an effective method for reducing tensions in the region. As a first step toward such transparency, Aland and Bcountry have decided to first inform the other of the type of missile to be retired and exchange photographs of one of the missiles selected for dismantlement. It is possible that future mutual processes might involve additional measures. For now, however, both countries will decide for themselves what photographs will be exchanged and may obscure/shroud any components that they might consider sensitive. (Practical considerations at the Museum prevent those sensitive components from being removed for the exercise.) However, both countries agree that transparency is an important objective and will work to increase it.

Exercise:

The participants will be divided up into two teams with roughly equal participation from the two countries. One team will represent Aland (which in this exercise will be responsible for “dismantling” an SS-23 missile) and the other team will represent Bcountry (and be responsible for “dismantling” a SCUD-B). The teams will go to the museum’s outdoor exhibit and independently photograph the examples of their respective missiles. To explore a range of transparency measures, each team will take at least one photo with a defined measuring implement (essentially a meter stick but with only 10 cm markings) in the scene to be exchanged and at least one photo without such a device.

After returning to the meeting room(s), the teams will process and select the photos to be exchanged. The teams will select a minimum of one digital photo with and one photo without the measuring implement present and “email” those to the other team.¹ Each team will then analyze the photos given them by the other team. Using publicly available information gathered from the web and the photographs from the other team, each group will evaluate:

1. Their confidence that the photo represents the missile the other team has declared it would dismantle. In addition to evaluating their confidence, each team should ask themselves:
 - a. How much help was the presence of the measuring device to the photo they received?

¹ The exact form of the exchange will be decided based on the practicalities at the Museum.

- b. Did including the measuring device in the photo that the team emailed to the other side reveal any information that should not have been released?
2. What was the value of the publicly available information in identifying the missile? Was it sufficient to their needs to build confidence that the missile to be dismantled was what it was declared to be? Would the exchange of information about the missile have been any help?
3. What could either team have done in the exchange of photographs to increase transparency and confidence?
4. Would having a pre-dismantlement satellite image of the missile at the dismantlement site have increased your confidence? How would you have arranged that?

After the exercise, there will be a plenary discussion about these issues.

Exercise 2: Exchange of On-site Visits

Introduction:

The previous exercise represented one end of the range of transparency measures that might be undertaken during the dismantlement of obsolete missiles. This exercise allows the participants to examine the risks and benefits of strengthening the confidence building measures employed during independent dismantlement process by allowing on-site visits. Even here there are a wide range of possibilities; many less intrusive than the one simulated in this exercise. In fact, this exercise has been designed more to explore the methods and technologies involved in on-site visits.

We assume that it has been agreed during previous discussions that both sides will take several proactive steps to increase transparency of this process. These include:

- Exchange information on the type of missile to be dismantled (including physical dimensions that can be used during photo-interpretation of satellite images to increase its confidence that the missile displayed belongs to the class of missile that has been declared).
- Facilitate transparency by positioning the missile to be dismantled outdoors on an agreed upon date for satellite imagery.
- Allow on-site visits by observers from the other team both before and after dismantlement. (Only the pre-dismantlement visit of one team, Bcountry, will be simulated in this exercise.)

To summarize the agreed upon process:

1. Both sides exchange declarations on the type of missile to be destroyed.
2. Both sides will exchange "Baseline" visits on an agreed date (only Bcountry's visit will be simulated during the exercise). Aland will first host Bcountry on the Baseline visit where the modalities for the baseline visits will be discussed. Measures agreed to during this visit will allow the Visiting Team to increase its confidence that the missile on display is of the type declared for retirement. They will also arrange transparency measures that will increase confidence that the missile displayed is the one that will actually be destroyed. (The teams will have to decide on what measures to employ from those discussed in the Technology Modules.) Both sides have also agreed that the Host Team will be able to prevent the Visiting Team from observing sensitive information—using managed access techniques—both on the missile to be dismantled and at the site visited.
3. After both baseline visits have been performed, both sides will dismantle their missile in a process of their own choosing. However, both sides agree that it is desirable that the airframe will be recognizably destroyed and that the Visiting Team during the Post-Dismantlement Visit

will have a high degree of confidence that the pieces seen during the Post-Dismantlement Visit are from the same missile shown to them during the Baseline Visit. Precisely how this will be accomplished will be decided during the baseline modalities discussion.

Aland has chosen to dismantle the missile it has declared for dismantlement at Air Force Base Alpha.

Aland, as Host, must do the following in preparation for the visit of Bcountry:

1. Determine a plan for limiting Bcountry's access to those portions of the facility that are not agreement related as well as a plan for preventing them from seeing the sensitive parts of the facility that cannot be avoided during the visit. The plan must also assure the safety of the Visiting Team during their visit.
2. Determine what parts of the missile to be dismantled are sensitive and must be blocked from view from the Bcountry team and a plan for shielding that information. **(A separate sheet with the list of sensitive items that Aland must protect will be given to the Aland Team at the time of the exercise planning.)**

Bcountry, when preparing for its Baseline Visit, must do the following:

1. Plan how it is going to assure a high confidence that the missile it observes during the Baseline visit will be the same missile that is dismantled. It must take the tools and equipment needed for this during the visit and negotiate their implementation with the Host Country.
2. During the visit, the Team must implement whatever plan it has to assure an acceptable level of confidence that the missile dismantled is the missile seen during the Baseline Visit.