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Sandia Safeguards Overview

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International Safeguards and Technical Systems

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Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

Department Goals

- Research, develop, and deploy tools, processes and procedures to ensure information integrity and confidence
- We address information assurance concerns across data lifecycle and with a system's view
 - Sensor
 - Delivery infrastructure
 - Processing
 - Knowledge generation
 - Human interface
 - Operations/Practices/Procedures
- We apply diverse capabilities to programmatic missions
 - International Safeguards
 - Transparency Agreement
 - Security

International Safeguards

- Activities, actions and agreements that provide assurance to the global community that countries are using nuclear technologies for *peaceful purposes*
- 6832 contains all SNL programmatic responsibility and technical direction



IAEA headquarters,

Early developments directly addressed IAEA needs




- Integrated Monitoring System (IMS-I) (1980)
 - Designed to detect movement of shipping casks containing LWR fuel
 - Main intelligence of system contained in Data Collection Module (DCM)
 - Collected rad detector and crane location detector information
 - Information displayed through Inspector Display Module (IDM)
- IMS-II (1985)
 - System capable of monitoring unattended areas
 - Contained DCM, IDM, UPS, and passive IR and Mini-Surveillance Television and Recording (MINISTAR) system

Additional Development work

- Film scanner developed (1981) to ease film review process
- Modular Integrated Video System (MIVS) (1991)
 - Replacement for Agency's twin Minolta film camera system
 - POTAS funded
 - Aquila Technologies Group selected by POTAS after SNL development as commercial supplier
- MIVS Image Processing System (MIPS)
 - Eased burden of review

Development beyond video systems

- Seal Pattern Reader (SPAR) (late 1970s)
 - Capable of reading several types of ultrasonic seals
 - Fuel Assembly Identification Device (FAID) (Sandia)
 - Random Coil Seal (ARC) (Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd)
 - Multielement Bottle Seal (MEB) (Sellafield, UK)
 - VAK-III (JRC)
- Cobra Seal (1980s)
 - Passive fiber optic loop seal
 - After SNL development Aquila Technologies Group selected as commercial supplier



Picture courtesy SNL

Sample Vial Secure Container


- Sample Vial Secure Container (SVSC) (1990s)
 - Vial for transporting of liquid samples
 - Provide confidence in sample integrity after loss of custody
 - Constructed from polysulfone (rad hard)
 - Single use
 - Visual inspection
 - Unique features
 - Metal plate with an engraved serial number
 - Swirl pattern in casing
 - Small size (3" x 1")



Picture courtesy SNL

Reflective Particle Tags (RPT)

- Hematite particles embedded in adhesive matrix
- Speckle pattern in unique and extremely difficult to duplicate
- Application is relatively simple and field verifiable




Picture courtesy SNL

Digital Systems

- Authenticated Item Monitoring System (AIMS) (1989)
 - RF seal and receiver system in tamper enclosure
 - Integrated data authentication into system
- Data authentication expertise
 - evolved from development and testing of unattended seismic stations late 1970's and early 1980's
- Associated R&D formed basis for cryptographic data authentication approaches still used today

Electronic Seals


- T-1 Radio Frequency Seal
 - Active fiber optic loop seal
 - Two-way RF communication
 - Tamper indicating enclosure and loop integrity
 - IAEA accepted for specific facility (KAMS)
- T-1A
 - Enhanced T1 capabilities
 - Smaller battery, plastic case, internal antenna, plastic fiber optic
- Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA)
 - SSP architectural framework
 - Security, power, communications
 - Enhanced RF range
 - NIST approved cryptography



Pictures courtesy SNL

Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS)

- System designed and built for ABACC
 - Addresses one issue of unannounced inspections
 - Two hours could elapse between the notification of inspection arrival of inspectors at facility
 - System performs video surveillance to record facility activities in area of interest during this time
 - SVSS employs commercial, off the shelf components



Additional Support to IAEA

- Developed INVO information management tools for analysis and inspection (1994-2003)
 - INVO intra-net
 - Analysis visualization tool
 - Creating knowledge regarding roles and responsibilities of Iraqi organizations based on diverse information sources
 - Tools to process heterogeneous inspection data




INVO team members

Picture courtesy SNL

Leveraging capabilities


- Augmented Computer Exercise for Inspection Training (ACE-IT) (1995)
 - Trains Inspectors/Hosts for SNRI inspections
 - Developed for CWC challenge inspections
 - Scenario based virtual reality exercise
 - Modified for Additional Protocol, Complimentary Access (2002)
 - Continues to evolve and apply to various communities
 - Training
 - Confidence building measures



Screenshot courtesy SNL

Tamper Indicating Shrink Wrap


- Developed in support of Chemical Weapons Convention
- Intended for securing whole-volume elements



SAND99-2455

Partnering to support IAEA

- SNL performed first demonstration of secure Internet communications (VPN-based) between STUK, Helsinki, Finland and the IAEA in 1999
 - Use of public infrastructure drastically reduced communication costs and is now commonly used by IAEA
 - Previous remote monitoring communication cost tens of thousands of dollars



- POTAS funded activity

SNL International Safeguards Areas




- Equipment and Information Security
 - Authentication, encryption, tamper indication and system design
- Remote and Unattended Monitoring
 - Secure communications Internet, satellite, or telephone
 - Basis technologies for Remote Inspections
- Vulnerability Assessments
 - Ensure continued operations equipment evaluated in rigorous testing
- Containment and Surveillance (C&S) technologies
 - Technologies ensure “Continuity of Knowledge”
- Onsite Inspection and Managed Access
 - Readiness procedures and host/inspector training
- Geological Repository Safeguards
 - Objectives still being established
 - C&S methods are viewed as essential

Diverse Program for Safeguards

- Research:
 - Intrinsic Tamper Indicating Seal
 - Intrinsic markings
 - Open Source Geographic Information for Safeguards Analysis
 - Advanced cryptography
- Development:
 - DOE/NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)
 - Support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards requests
 - The U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to Agency Safeguards (POTAS)
- Technical Engagement:
 - Bilateral Cooperation Agreements between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and various international partners Office of Global Security Engagement and Cooperation
 - Regional Safeguards authorities: Euratom, ABACC
 - States: Japan, Korea, France, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, and many others


Research Projects

- Intrinsically Tamper Indicating Ceramic Seal (ITICS)
 - Ceramic based seal to replace globally deployed metallic seal



Picture courtesy SNL

- Intrinsic, unique identification markings and patterns



Picture courtesy SNL


Research Projects-Information

- Open Source Geographic Information for Safeguards Analysis
 - Researching means to improve analyst ability to harvest geo-referenced information from open sources for safeguards analysis



Research Projects-Information

- Knowledge Generation (2000)
 - Software to compare operator declarations with plant operations
 - Useful for large, heterogeneous data sets
 - Recently applied to data generated from reprocessing plant model
 - Limited scope but results were encouraging



Transparency Agreements

- Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Implementation Program
 - Transparency element of the US/RF Agreement to dispose of 500 MT of Russia HEU (Megatons-to-Megawatts)
 - SNL activities include
 - Monitoring visits
 - Special Monitoring Visits
 - » 4 sites, typically 1 week duration
 - Transparency Monitoring Office
 - » 2 sites, typically 3 month duration
 - Radioactive Source Management
 - Negotiate and manage purchase, installation, certification and disposal of radioactive sources for Blend Down Monitoring Systems at 3 sites
 - Seal Program
 - Implement all aspects of seal deployment

A sampling of Sandia POTAS tasks



- Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA)
- Vulnerability Assessment of the Ultrasonic Sealing Bolt (USSB)
- Vulnerability Assessment of the “Sign and Forward System”
- Weld Reflective Particle Tag
- Consulting on Equipment Security
- Consulting on Information Collection and Analysis Systems
- Mobile Monitoring System for Container Transport (MMCT) at Chernobyl
- Universal Nondestructive Assay Platform (UNAP) Workshop

Other activities

- Test and Evaluation capabilities
 - Perform various installation, operation, and evaluation activities
 - Discrete device testing
 - Performance
 - Environmental
 - Radiation Portal testing
 - Outdoor Test Facility (OTF)
 - Evaluate ground sensor systems
 - Perimeter Security systems
 - T&E of detection sensor systems
- Training
 - Physical security training-training SMEs
 - International Training course
 - International country training courses
 - DOE and NRC physical security training course



Summary

- Sandia has a long history in the area of International Safeguards
- We continue to build upon this experience base to assist the community
- We view Information assurance as a broad application space
 - From discrete sensors to operations and procedures
 - Information protection requires systems approach
- We access the resources across Sandia to help us accomplish our work