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The NGSS, an Overview and Discussion

Sandia National Laboratories



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What is the NGSS?

- **At the most basic level, the NGSS is a camera-based surveillance system**
- **The NGSS was originally designed for use by IAEA inspectors to support verification of compliance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**

Why camera-based surveillance?



- In your group, take 10 minutes and identify at least 5 reasons for using camera-based surveillance in safeguards verification?

– Put each idea on its own post-it note.

Detect
something
unusual

Confirm
Procedures

Why camera-based surveillance?



- What are some of the benefits of camera-based surveillance for safeguards?

What are the potential issues with camera-based surveillance?

- Time to THINK LIKE A BAD-GUY



- In your group, figure out ways a bad-guy might be able to defeat a camera-based surveillance system
 - E.g. [Spoofing the image](#)
 - *Put each idea on its own post-it note.*

What are the potential issues with camera-based surveillance?



- **What are some of the potential security issues with camera-based surveillance?**

What are the potential issues with camera-based surveillance?



- In your group, think about technical issues that could cause a camera-based surveillance system to fail
 - Put each idea on its own post-it note.

What are the potential issues with camera-based surveillance?



- **What are some of the technical issues that could cause a camera-based surveillance system to fail?**

Camera-Based Surveillance

- **We have identified reasons why we want to use camera-base surveillance for safeguard verification**
- **We, unfortunately, also identified security and technical issues associated with camera-based surveillance systems**
- **Now let's look at some technical solutions to protect against these security and technical issues**

Someone Tampering with the System



- Tampering includes altering the data at the electronic level or altering the physical camera (replacing it, breaking it, etc.)
- **SOLUTIONS**
 - **Electronic tamper indicating devices**
 - *Like your own signature, each device has a unique signature which it includes with its data.*
 - This ensures the data came from the correct camera
 - *Unlike your own signature, this unique signature is also tied to the specific data*
 - This ensures the data has not been altered
 - **Physical tamper indicating devices can include:**
 - *Physical seals (EOSS)*
 - *Tamper indicating paint on enclosures*

Unauthorized Viewing/Tampering with the Data

- Someone gaining unauthorized access to the data could be through physical access to the system, pulling data off the network, hacking into the system to get the data
- **SOLUTIONS**
 - Cryptographic authentication at the source
 - Data encryption at the source
 - Tamper housing which destroys data (or ability to see the data)



Cryptographic Authentication

- Prevent unauthorized deletion, insertion, or duplication of data.
- The data is combined mathematically to form a smaller set of data which is used to augment the original message





Private (Symmetric Key) Authentication

- Uses a single key to ensure the authentic of the sender to the receiver (both have the same key)




Public (Asymmetric Key) Authentication

- Uses a single key to ensure the authenticity of the sender to the receiver (each has their own key)




Data Encryption – a bit more detail

- Data encryption is a cryptographic process that is used to alter data into an unreadable, but a reversible format
- This prevents unauthorized viewing of the information




Private (Symmetric Key) Encryption

- The same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the data




Public/Private (Asymmetric Key) Encryption

- A separate key is used for encrypting and decrypting the data




Public/Private (Asymmetric Key) Encryption

- A separate key is used for encrypting and decrypting the data



Public/Private (Asymmetric Key) Encryption

- A separate key is used for encrypting and decrypting the data



Asymmetric vs. symmetric systems

- **Asymmetric systems**

- Slower
- More computationally intensive
- Easier key management
- Need Certificate Authority (CA)

- **Symmetric systems**

- Faster
- Easier to implement
- Less computational power required
- Key management and security of keys critical to security of system

NGSS

- Now, let's look specifically at the NGSS to see how it has been designed with measures in place to protect against security and technical issues

Goals of NGSS

- **High reliability**
- **“Standards-based” design**
- **Improved security**
- **Improved capabilities**
- **Modular components for flexibility**
- **Ease of maintenance and setup**
- **Sustainable**
- **Weight**

NGSS Technical Features

- **Technical specifications**

- Up to 8 Cameras per rack (DCMC5)
 - *Up to 4 virtual channels per camera*
- Network based storage
- IP Based communication
- Onsite / remote configuration

- **Redundancy**

- Redundant storage
 - *On camera*
 - *On data consolidator*
- Redundant power

- **Security**

- Tamper indicative housing
- Components authenticated
- Images encrypted



NGSS Components

- **DCMC5 Camera**

- **Technical Specifications**

- 5M-pixel CMOS sensor
 - Virtual 4 channel model
 - Electronic Pan/Tilt/Zoom
 - Up to 1 image/second
 - IP based communication
 - Status of Health messages transmitted to chassis

- **Redundancy**

- Images stored on internal SD card
 - Images pulled from DCMC5 and stored on multiple devices within the chassis
 - Battery back up on chassis
 - Local battery back up

- **Security**

- Images encrypted within DCMC5
 - Images authenticated within DCMC5
 - Communication to and from DCMC5 authenticated
 - Tamper indicative / sealable housing to destroy cryptographic keys



NGSS Components

- **Digital Camera Interface (DCI)**
 - **Technical Specifications**
 - *DCI has a one to one relationship with DCMC5*
 - *Pulls data from DCMC5*
 - Status of health
 - Images
 - **Redundancy**
 - *Stores data locally on an SD card*
 - *Shares data with the NAS*
 - *Back up power from its own UPS*
 - **Security**
 - *Housed in tamper indicative 19" rack*
 - **Backwards compatible with DCM-14**
 - **RS-485 connection to EOSS to trigger image capture**
 - *Seals may be daisy chained*



NGSS Components

- **Data Consolidator (DC) Chassis**

- Holds NGSS up to four NGSS sub-systems per chassis

- *Central Processing Unit (CPU)*
 - *Network Attached Storage (NAS)*
 - *Digital Camera Interface (DCI)*
 - *16 port Ethernet switch*

- **Redundancy**

- *Back up power for each sub-system*

- **Security**

- *Housed in tamper indicative 19" rack*



NGSS Components

- **Central Processing Unit (CPU)**
 - **Technical Specifications**
 - *Monitors all networking traffic*
 - *Handles system component discovery and configuration*
 - *Provides remote data oversight*
 - *Up to 32 cameras*
 - **Redundancy**
 - *Back up power from its own UPS*
 - **Security**
 - *Housed in tamper indicative 19" rack*



NGSS Components

- **Network Attached Storage (NAS)**

- **Technical Specifications**

- *Pulls data from DCI and stores locally*
 - *One to four relationship between NAS and DCMC5s*
(One to one relationship if DCMC5 in 4 channel mode)

- **Redundancy**

- *Mirrored 128 G-byte solid state drives*
 - *Field replaceable*
 - *Back up power from its own UPS*

- **Security**

- *Housed in tamper indicative 19" rack*




DCM-C5 Security

- **Master key encrypts all private keys stored on camera**
- **Camera images are authenticated then encrypted for storage on SD card**
 - DSA2K authentication
 - AES 128-bit CBC-mode encryption
- **Communications**
 - Transport Layer Security (TLS) used for encrypted and authenticated communications
 - Several cipher suites supported
- **Certificates**
 - Inspectorate acts as certificate authority (CA)
 - The camera must store up to seven certificates, depending on selected cipher suite
 - *DSA signing: certificate for authentication of images and possibly communication, which must be signed by CA. Camera is owner of private key.*
 - *RSA signing: optionally used for communications, the camera can generate a certificate request to be signed by the CA. Camera is owner of private key.*
 - *Trusted Certificate Authority: optionally used for TLS communication with clients.*
 - *Encryption Channel 1-4: Up to four RSA certificates for encryption of each channel*
- **Access levels**
 - Root: Client can command and query camera, requires a certificate and password
 - User: Client receives all camera data, query information, and requires a certificate
 - Device: A client receives encrypted information only

NGSS Web Interface System Configuration




- The NGSS system includes an optional touch-panel display attached to the CPU subsystem for touch-screen access to the NGSS Web Interface for system configuration.



Cryptotoken (with valid certificates) + password required for system access

NGSS Review Software

- Software is a modified version of GARS
- Decryption
- Authentication
- State of Health
- Image Processing



The NGSS

- **The NGSS is a camera-based surveillance system with specific measures implemented to ensure technical reliability and security**

Crypto Details

Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cipher Suites

- **DHEDSS-AES128CBC-SHA256 (0x0040),
DHEDSS-AES128CBC-SHA1 (0x0032),
DHERSA-AES128CBC-SHA256 (0x0067),
DHERSA-AES128CBC-SHA1 (0x0033),
RSA-AES128CBC-SHA256 (0x003C),
RSA-AES128CBC-SHA1 (0x002F).**
- **Key exchange**
 - Diffie-Hellman using DSS certificate
 - Diffie-Hellman using RSA certificate
 - RSA
- **Encryption**
 - AES 128-bit CBC
- **Authentication**
 - SHA1
 - SHA256