


INDIA - CHINA:

ASSESSING THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN
BILATERAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES



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CONVERGENCE VS DIVERGENCE

- Sino-Indian relations exhibit both convergence of interests and deep-rooted strategic divergences
- April 11, 2005; Strategic Partnership signed between New Delhi and Beijing
- Agreement on establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity
- Emphasized a shift from competition to cooperation
- It remains unfulfilled and has proven difficult to attain

COORDINATED APPROACH IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Cooperation in various international forums include:
- Doha round of talks in the WTO;
- Climate change negotiations at Copenhagen;
- Counter-terrorism cooperation; and
- Mutual energy security, although the extent of cooperation here is rather limited

ECONOMIC SYNERGY?

- China's trade with India tipped to cross \$100 billion by 2015
- Trade is not balanced and heavily fashioned in China's favour
- India runs large deficits with China
- The dumping of Chinese goods is adversely affecting India's local manufacturing industry
- Rising trade deficit, non-tariff trade barriers, and difficulties faced by Indian exporters in China are emerging issues

GRAND STRATEGY

- China's power has dramatically grown and looms large in international and Chinese perceptions
- Chinese nationalists assert their claims and “core” interests
- Reflected in China’s assertive diplomatic posture and military activities throughout the past two years
- China is moving rapidly to close economic and military gaps with the US
- Thus consolidating its ‘comprehensive national power’
- The political leadership in China interprets any movement in and around its areas of "core interest" as an attempt to contain (ezhi), what it interprets as, China's "peaceful rise".

THE KEY QUESTION...

- Would economic convergence of interests between India and China override the prevailing strategic differences and security dilemma?

KEY POINTS OF FRICTION

India, on its part, identifies key points of friction as:

- Territorial and boundary dispute
- Chinese large territorial claims on vastly-populated regions of India
- Sino-Pak WMD and military collaboration and sustained support to Pakistan
- China's rapid quest for regional diplomacy that persistently seeks to counter-balance India
- Chinese presence in PoK
- Increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region by actively pursuing an "encirclement strategy" towards India in order to gain long-term strategic advantage in the region
- Absence of any agreement between China and the large Tibetan community in exile in India since 1959
- Negative perception of Indian ties with the US and Japan

KEY POINTS OF FRICTION

- Refusal to discuss nuclear confidence building and risk reduction measures with India
- China does not recognise India's status as a nuclear weapons power and insists that India must abide by UNSC Resolution 1172, give up its nuclear weapons and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state

KEY POINTS OF FRICTION

- The NSG waiver and IAEA safeguards agreements have provided India an entry into the NWS club
- September 2008-China exhibited offensive posture when it attempted to foil the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal at the NSG meet
- Earlier, the Chinese leadership had assured that Beijing would not block the emergence of a consensus at the NSG
- A March 2009, *China Daily* opinion piece stated, “The US-India Nuclear Deal would destroy non-proliferation efforts”
- Reacting to the NSG waiver, *Renmin Ribao* accused Washington of being soft on India
- It warned that if the US made a ‘nuclear exception’ for India, other powers (i.e., China) would do the same for their ‘friends’ (an obvious reference to Pakistan)

KEY POINTS OF FRICTION

- NPT regime damaged beyond repair when the China-Pakistan combine carried out proliferation... No other country was placed in the situation India faced of a proliferating China on the one side and a proliferating Pakistan on the other, **both in an alliance with each other**

STRATEGISING OFFENSIVE RHETORIC

- In July 2009, Zhan Lue, wrote an article for the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (CISS)
- It puts forth a shockingly offensive proposition that ‘**China should break India into 20-30 independent states**’ with the help of “friendly countries” such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan

STATEMENT BY INDIAN PM

“China is attempting to **keep India unsettled** and in ‘a low level of equilibrium’”

- Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh


The Times of India

September 2010


CLAIMS OVER ARUNACHAL

- China continues to claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, > 90,000 sq kms
- Claims that is “Southern Tibet”
- Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi pointedly **reiterated this claim** on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006
- Continuing claims on Arunachal Pradesh will complicate India’s acceptance of Tibet as part of China, as it has unilaterally done since 1954

MAP DISPLAYING ARUNACHAL AS “CHINESE TERRITORY”



International Land Border



INCESSANT CHINESE INTRUSIONS

- Since 1962, the LAC has not yet been physically demarcated/delineated on ground and in military maps
- **Patrol face-offs are fairly common** and armed clashes can take place anytime
- Large number of transgressions from the Chinese side, **demonstrate aggressive tactical posturing**

CBM...

- There cannot be a better CBM than **demarcating the LAC** with a sense of sincerity and urgency
- China appears at unease that **a border settlement, without major territorial concessions from the Indian side, could potentially augment India's power position**
- Shape territorial and foreign policy while it holds asymmetric power advantages

CONCEPT OF TIBET'S INTEGRATION

- Enhancing security on the western frontier
- Correlation to the larger concept of Chinese national integration
- January 2010 Politburo meeting
- *zhongguo tese, xizang tedian*
 - Development with Chinese characteristics and a Tibetan flavor...

LOGISTICS BUILD-UP IN TIBET

- Infrastructure and logistics build-up shall double up as base support for the PLA
- Enabling transfer of telecommunications and other command and control facilities

— New railway
— Existing railway



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RED FOOTPRINTS IN POK

- The area of J&K under the control of Pakistan sizes up to approximately 85,793 sq km
- Was further divided in 1970 into two separate administrative divisions, namely,
- Mirpur-Muzaffarabad (Referred to as Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir)
- Federally Administered Gilgit-Baltistan
- Being the northernmost part of PoK, Gilgit-Baltistan was referred to as the “Northern Areas”
- Pakistan illegally ceded a huge portion of territory of the Shaksgam Valley of PoK, worth 5,180 sq km to China in a border agreement of 1963

JAMMU & KASHMIR



RED FOOTPRINTS IN POK

- China, largely through the PLA, is carrying out various “developmental projects” in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir
- Military activities include road and infrastructure building and military transportation
- Sino-Pak agreement to allow market access for bilateral trade in 11 service sectors through the Karakoram Highway
- China’s Western Highway, also known as the Lhasa-Kashgar/Xinjiang Highway connects Xinjiang to Tibet
- From Quilanaldi, the road branches off to the Khunjerab Pass and, subsequently, becomes the Karakoram Highway right up to Gilgit
- June 2006 MoU decision - Karakoram Highway to be widened from 10 meters to 30 meters
- Operational capacity likely to go up to three times
- Aimed at improving the rapid deployment and capability of the integrated forces – particularly the ability to swiftly maneuver heavy equipment

CHINESE-FUNDED PROJECTS IN POK

- Construction of a dry port at Sost on the Sino-Pak border
- Connected by the Karakoram Highway to Karimabad, Gilgit and Chilas in the south and the Chinese cities of Tashkurgan, Upal and Kashgar in the north
- Serve as a channel of trading activity primarily for the Central Asian countries
- Construction of a hydro-power station at Bunji, in the Astore district of Gilgit-Baltistan
- Bunji project is among the eight hydel projects to be constructed
- Construction of the \$12.6 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam to be completed by 2016
- Capacity to generate 4,500 MW of electricity per day
- China has agreed to grant Pakistan \$121 million supplier credit to establish a link line between the Karakoram Highway and the Bhasha Dam site

SINO-PAK COLLABORATION

- Nuclear weapon and missile-related collaboration is well documented
- China has opposed UN efforts to sanction the Pakistan-based extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba and chief operator Hafiz Saeed
- China maintains an uncanny silence on mentioning Pakistan, even indirectly, in context of international terrorist attacks
- July 2011 - first counterterrorism dialogue between India and China
- China objected in the UN to proscribing Maulana Masood Azhar of the terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed and two Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives, Azam Cheema and Abdul Rehman Makki, under the al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions list
- Defence Minister, AK Antony stated, November 2009, “The increasing nexus between China and Pakistan in the military sphere remains an area of serious concern.”

TRAJECTORY OF CBMS IN THE INDO-CHINESE CONTEXT

- The political dialogue has failed to yield any forward movement on the border dispute
- China's ongoing campaign for military modernisation and its consequent impact on regional players including India, both, at the diplomatic and military level
- There is an urgent need to promote bilateral CBMs in the military arena and the nuclear realm
- Sino-Indian Panchsheel Agreement of 1954
- 1993 - Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas
- 1996 – CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC in the China-India Border Areas
- 2005 - Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question

COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

- China and India have both been advocates of continued strengthening of multilateral counterterrorism cooperation within the UN framework
- At an operational level, cooperation in counterterrorism and counter-narcotics trafficking sums up to be of mutual benefit.

COUNTER-TERROR EXERCISE

- Post-26/11 - First ever Sino-Indian military combat exercise on Indian soil to jointly counter terrorism and insurgency
- Exercise was resultant of an MoU signed in May 2006, stipulating the two countries would hold joint military exercises and unite forces in counter-terrorism operations
- Conducted in Belgaum, Karnataka in December 2008
- A Chinese Infantry Battalion of the **Chengdu Military Area Command** and Indian Army troops from the **8 Maratha Light Infantry Battalion** undertook:
- Joint tactical maneuvers and drills; and
- Interoperability training and joint command post procedures, finally culminating in a simulated joint counter-terrorism operational exercise

COUNTER-TERROR MECHANISMS AS A CBM

Proposals for this could include the following:

- Exchange of information and assessments on the international and regional terrorist situation
- Strengthening of bilateral intelligence and investigative cooperation
- Enhance military-to-military cooperation on counterterrorism
- Working together on multilateral initiatives on terrorism, including on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373
- Initiation of dialogue and cooperation in homeland/internal security, terrorist financing, forensic science and transportation security
- Undertaking concrete steps to detect and counter the activities of individual terrorists and terrorist organisations of concern to the two countries

INDO-CHINA BILATERAL CBMS: THE WAY FORWARD

- India has proposed to set up a new Border Personnel Meeting venue along the Uttarakhand-Himachal Pradesh stretch of the Sino-Indian border as a CBM between the two countries
- Proposed during the 4th round of the Annual Defence Dialogue between Beijing and New Delhi in December 2011
- Both sides agreed to increase the defense exchanges
- Thus far, meetings at regular intervals are held at three facilities in:
- Kibithu in Arunachal Pradesh
- Nathu La in Sikkim
- Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir
- Indian side argued that there was no such venue in the central sector of the 3,488 kms long International Land Border

NEED FOR NUCLEAR DIALOGUE AND CBMS

- The present scenario of “non-negotiation of nuclear CBMs between India and China” only tends to add to the security dilemma between Beijing and New Delhi
- Presence of nuclear weapons further complicates the debates over a conventional conflict
- Differentiating conventionally armed missiles from that of being nuclear-armed can be hard to achieve, however, the issue of their respective deployments could be mutually taken up for discussion

PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING A NUCLEAR CBM DIALOGUE BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

- Jointly advocate the cause of universal nuclear disarmament
- Channelize efforts for an international convention on unconditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons and on the non-use and non-threat-of-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and in nuclear-free zones
- Declaration of not using WMD against each other
- Support efforts to establish nuclear-free zones
- Pledge not to use nuclear weapons against one another and more importantly, a de-targeting agreement with each other
- Discuss the possibility of land-based nuclear arsenals remaining “de-mated” and “de-alerted” in peacetime
- Agreement on technical parameters, pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles
- Make existing hotlines and communication channels available 24x7
- Mutual agreement on reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and notifying each other of any such incident/accident

IN CONCLUSION ...

- *Peaking tensions can many a times become a fertile ground for confidence building measures to be adopted mutually*

QUESTIONS???

