



# OPPORTUNITIES FOR RISK COMMUNICATION USING BIORAM

---

SAND2011-3292C



**"how to get people to understand  
the risks you are talking about"**



# Once a year at ABSA – Why?

- To meet the friends
- Create network
- Find new tools and products






# What do we have in common?

- Communicate with the staff
- Dialogue with PI's
- Enlighten the IBC's
- Struggle with management





# How do we....

- Motivate ...
  - Convince ...
  - Inspire ...
  - Get money ...
  - Get support ...
- 
- When all we can say is that ... we *think* we did make a difference in last fiscal year





# What is the value of ...

- An incident ...
- A LAI ....
- A parent .....





# These are the questions...

---





# Where do we want to be?

- We want to live an easy life



- Everybody *immediately* will do what we ask them!
  - Bosses
  - PI's
  - IBC's
  - Employees



# What is the likelihood...

- ...that we will get that message conveyed smooth, easily and without resistance?







# What is the consequence...

- ...if we do not succeed as good Biosafety Communicators?






# How do we get there?

- ... Use the BioRAM tool as a mean to make it obvious to the rest of the world, that there is ***NO BETTER WAY*** than do *exactly* as we say!





## ➤ Vision

- A standardized approach to risk assessment
- Create understanding
  - A tool for prioritization
  - A tool for communication

## ➤ Mission

- Get consensus
  - What risks do we see in bio-labs
    - Get stakeholders from all over the world to help
- Create tool
  - Make it available



# Strategy

- **Brainstorming**
- **Workshops**
- **Software design**
- **Workshops**
- **Software modification**
- **Workshops**
- **Software adjustment**
- **$\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  testing**
- **Software finalizing**
- **Workshops – report generators**







# It takes more than just a strategy ...

➤ **A project lead ...**



➤ **Willingness ...**





# BioRAM

## Idea to Product: 3 years



2010



**International**  
BIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION



# Biosafety RAM



Risks based  
on routes of  
exposure

Inhalation  
Ingestion  
Contact  
Percutaneous

Agents

Procedures

**Risk Assessment Model Beta**

**Likelihood of Infection**

**Transmissibility**

**Humans**

**Inhalation**

Is this agent known to cause infection via inhalation in humans (to cause infection via droplets or droplet nuclei) that have entered the upper or lower respiratory tract in a laboratory setting?

2

4 = Preferred Route  
2 = A possible route  
1 = Unknown  
0 = Not a route

Is the infectious dose (ID50) of this agent for this route less than 1000 or unknown in humans?

3

4 = Yes  
2 = No  
0 = If this is not an infectious route

**Percutaneous**

Is this agent known to cause infection via percutaneous exposure (e.g., via a needle stick or skin contact) in a laboratory setting?

1

4 = Preferred Route  
2 = A possible route  
1 = Unknown  
0 = Not a route

Is the infectious dose (ID50) of this agent for this route less than 1000 or unknown in humans?

2

4 = Yes  
2 = No  
0 = If this is not an infectious route

**Direct Contact**

Is this agent known to cause infection via direct contact in humans (to cause infection through the mucosal membranes) in a laboratory setting?

3


4 = Preferred Route  
2 = A possible route  
1 = Unknown  
0 = Not a route

Is the infectious dose (ID50) of this agent for this route less than 1000 or unknown in humans?

Response:  Enter

☐ Flag response as an unknown answer

File	Default Charts	Result Summary	Question Impact	Question
1.215026 Likelihood Ingestion Individual				
1.215026 Likelihood Percutaneous Individual				
1.020752 Likelihood Contact Individual				
1.481329 Likelihood Contact Community				
0.501730 Likelihood Ingestion Community				
2.456538 Likelihood Ingestion Community				
1.275875 Likelihood Percutaneous Community				
1.431025 Likelihood Contact Community				
0.384453 Likelihood Ingestion Animal				
1.553551 Likelihood Ingestion Animal				
2.003436 Likelihood Percutaneous Animal				
0.536020 Likelihood Contact Animal				
0.345062 Consequence of Disease to Humans				
1.283775 Secondary Consequence of Disease to Humans				
0.85176 Consequence of Disease to Animals				
1.24215 Secondary Consequence of Disease to Animals				
0.36683 Consequence of Disease to the Community				
1.762753 Likelihood of Secondary Transmission				
1.686721 Likelihood of Secondary Transmission				



Risk  
drivers




# Likelihood – Consequence

Biosafety

Biosecurity

Both need to be addressed








# Biosafety RAM

Agents

Procedures

Flu virus






# Biosafety RAM

Agents

Procedures

Syphilis





# BioRAM visual impact

Example

Spiez  
Laboratory

Switzerland

Nipah Virus

Data from Spiez Laboratory Review of Biosafety RAM model (Daniel Kumin)




Figure 1: Risks posed by Nipah Virus prior to any implementation of Mitigati

After  
mitigation




Figure 2 Risks posed by Nipah virus post implementation of procedural, engineering, and ppe control measures

Before  
mitigation



# A TOOL FOR COMMUNICATION





**S**trengths

**W**eaknesses

**O**pportunities

**T**hreats

**MANY STRENGTHS  
FEW WEAKNESSES**



# BioRAM - SwOT

**Combines  
expertise from  
many sources**





# BioRAM - SwOT

**Intuitive**  
**Straight forward**

Short training

Visual





# BioRAM - Swot

## Time saving

Same agent -  
different  
procedures

Same  
procedure -  
different agent

Repeated  
analysis

Comparison of  
results







# BioRAM - Swot

## Fast

Takes out  
years of trial  
and error for  
making a good  
risk  
assessment





# BioRAM - SwOT

Precise





# BioRAM- SwOT

**Standardized**

**Encompasses  
what many  
have found  
relevant**

**Structured**

**Systematic**

**Prioritizes**





# BioRAM- SwOT

## Flexible

Allow for interpretation


Allow for own decision of :

- what to mitigate
- when
- how to shape your strategy





DSC00227.JPG




# BioRAM - SwOT


Cheap!!

➤ **Actually – it is free !!!**

➤ <http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/BioRAM/BiosafetyRAMSoftware.zip>

➤ <http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/BioRAM/BiosecurityRAM.zip>






# BioRAM - sW<sub>OT</sub>

Clinical labs

“Unknowns”







# BioRAM - sW<sub>OT</sub>

**Training  
needed for full  
success?**

Probably yes

... When is  
training not  
needed for  
mastering a  
new skill?

GARBAGE IN,  
GARBAGE OUT.



# BioRAM - swO<sub>T</sub>

2011

Chinese,  
Indonesian,  
Japanese,  
Spanish

2012

Arabic, Urdu,  
French, Dari







# BioRAM - swO<sub>T</sub>

Have an  
accepted  
communication  
tool

Up

Down

Across






# BioRAM - swO<sub>T</sub>

## Prioritizes

Which risk  
drivers ramp  
the risk up





# BioRAM - swoT

**People  
“forget” to use  
their brains**

Accepting at  
“face value” the  
results of the  
BioRAM






# BioRAM – Waste Example

## Waste procedures

- Before
- After



Is there a waste and decontamination program in place?

0 = There is no waste management and decontamination program at this laboratory

1 = This laboratory has limited procedures in place for waste management and decontamination


2 = This laboratory has some procedures in place for waste management and decontamination, but lacks oversight in implementation

4 = This laboratory has a comprehensive waste management and decontamination program, and well-defined procedures in place



# BioRAM during a building project

- To identify important key components in IA during a building phase
- To counterbalance VE and stop contractors in time





# BioRAM during a building project

Program

## ➤ **Programming phase.**

- Compare agents, and make sure that mitigation measures makes sense and is tailor suited to the actual risk

Design

## ➤ **Design Phase**

- Use as a tool to go for different mitigation measures if budget is narrow

Construction

## ➤ **Construction phase**

- SOP or engineered design?
- Use as an evaluation tool for deciding which engineering controls to take out

Acceptance

Operations




# BioRAM


## CWA 15793:2008

### ➤ PDCA cycle

- As a planning tool
- As a check tool
- Reporting



Dr. Becky Hammonds



# CWA 15793:2008





Figure 1 — Risk assessment strategy

## Risk Assessment

- Physical Description of Laboratory Environment:
- Describe Procedure:
- Identify Biological Hazards:
- BioRAM results:



File	Default Charts	Result Summary	Question Impact	Question
1.021926	Likelihood Ingestion Individual	0.0000	0.0000	Is the agent known to cause infection via ingestion in humans?
1.021927	Likelihood Ingestion Community	0.0000	0.0000	What is the potential for aerosols to be generated as a byproduct of the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021928	Likelihood Percutaneous Individual	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021929	Likelihood Percutaneous Community	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021930	Likelihood Contact Individual	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021931	Likelihood Contact Community	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021932	Likelihood Inhalation Individual	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021933	Likelihood Inhalation Community	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021934	Likelihood Secondary Transmission	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?
1.021935	Likelihood Secondary Transmission	0.0000	0.0000	Is the infectious dose (ID50) of the agent for this route less than 100%?

- Discuss the results
- Determine Acceptability of Risks:
- Action control plan (mitigation measures):
- Plans for review and validation:





**DOES IT MATTER IF IT IS NOT  
110% CORRECT?**



# 110%?



➤ **It depends!**

➤ How is it used?

- If used as a relative tool, before and after ... it takes out the bias

➤ Use the brain!

- **GI GO**

GARBAGE IN,  
GARBAGE OUT.



# 110%?



- **The context is important**
  - Comparing
  - Not in absolute numbers
- **We are already used to putting arbitrary numbers on biorisk**
- **And we can only count to 4 !**






# The new unskilled PI

---





# The old routined PI

- **Might be so happy with his own knowledge that he will "forget" to call in the other stakeholders**
  - Does he know all there is to ask?
  - Has he gotten lazy and skips some of the questions?





# The BSO's



## ➤ WHO?

➤ New BSO

➤ New tasks for the old BSO

■ New expertise areas

➤ A tool for communication with the PI's





# Communication with PI's


- ...”It is not me chasing you ...
  - ... it is the tool that tells us that this can be done safer!”
- **Outcome:**
  - Closes the discussion about “who is the expert here in my lab – Huh?”





# More than the BSO and the PI

- Too often universities are happy to outsource risk assessment to a single person
- The BioRAM process forces people to work together and **get better buy in**





# Communication with Management

- Show “the bang you get for your buck”
- Communicating several levels up the chain
  - Give them a message they can use without diluting the message
    - “**We are *here* this year compared to *there* last year**”
  - Easy way to quantify and communicate an average risk across an institution





# Communication tool to IBC's



- **Make a complex topic understandable for non-experts in less than 5 minutes for approval or rejection**



- If IBC feels timid and unsure, they want more information and postpones decisions

- **Graphics is understood in a split second**



**Biosafety RAM**

**Biosecurity RAM**

**2 TOOLS**



# Laboratory Bio*safety* Risk Assessment Project (Biosafety RAM)

$$\text{Risk} = f(\text{Likelihood, Consequence})$$

## Likelihood

- The likelihood of **infection by the agent** and the likelihood of **exposure** through an infectious route based on the **procedures and work practices**

## Consequences

- Of disease from **accidental exposure**

## Risks

- To laboratory workers
- Risk of accidental exposure to human and animal community
- Risks of secondary infection







# Laboratory Bio*security* Risk Assessment Project (BioRAM)

$$\text{Risk} = f(\text{Likelihood, Consequence})$$

## Likelihood

- The likelihood of **targeting a laboratory** based upon the agent's **potential for malicious use** and the likelihood of **successful acquisition** of the agent from the laboratory

## Consequences


- Of disease from **malicious release**

## Risks

- Risks to human and animal community




**It is free**  
**We want your input**  
**We need to improve**  
**We can only do this, if even more**  
**stakeholders take part in the last**  
**tuning of the tool**



**THIS WAS MADE WITH PUBLIC MONEY**  
**IT WAS DEVELOPED FOR PUBLIC USE**  
**IT NEEDS PUBLIC INPUT TO SUCCEED**



DSC00227.JPG



# Where do you get it?

Go to:

➤ <http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov>

.. and follow the links

