2011 Annual Criticality Safety Program Performance Summary
The 2011 review of the INL Criticality Safety Program has determined that the program is robust and effective. The review was prepared for, and fulfills Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) item H.20, 'Annual Criticality Safety Program performance summary that includes the status of assessments, issues, corrective actions, infractions, requirements management, training, and programmatic support.' This performance summary addresses the status of these important elements of the INL Criticality Safety Program. Assessments - Assessments in 2011 were planned and scheduled. The scheduled assessments included a Criticality Safety Program Effectiveness Review, Criticality Control Area Inspections, a Protection of Controlled Unclassified Information Inspection, an Assessment of Criticality Safety SQA, and this management assessment of the Criticality Safety Program. All of the assessments were completed with the exception of the 'Effectiveness Review' for SSPSF, which was delayed due to emerging work. Although minor issues were identified in the assessments, no issues or combination of issues indicated that the INL Criticality Safety Program was ineffective. The identification of issues demonstrates the importance of an assessment program to the overall health and effectiveness of the INL Criticality Safety Program. Issues and Corrective Actions - There are relatively few criticality safety related issues in the Laboratory ICAMS system. Most were identified by Criticality Safety Program assessments. No issues indicate ineffectiveness in the INL Criticality Safety Program. All of the issues are being worked and there are no imminent criticality concerns. Infractions - There was one criticality safety related violation in 2011. On January 18, 2011, it was discovered that a fuel plate bundle in the Nuclear Materials Inspection and Storage (NMIS) facility exceeded the fissionable mass limit, resulting in a technical safety requirement (TSR) violation. The TSR limits fuel plate bundles to 1085 grams U-235, which is the maximum loading of an ATR fuel element. The overloaded fuel plate bundle contained 1097 grams U-235 and was assembled under an 1100 gram U-235 limit in 1982. In 2003, the limit was reduced to 1085 grams citing a new criticality safety evaluation for ATR fuel elements. The fuel plate bundle inventories were not checked for compliance prior to implementing the reduced limit. A subsequent review of the NMIS inventory did not identify further violations. Requirements Management - The INL Criticality Safety program is organized and well documented. The source requirements for the INL Criticality Safety Program are from 10 CFR 830.204, DOE Order 420.1B, Chapter III, 'Nuclear Criticality Safety,' ANSI/ANS 8-series Industry Standards, and DOE Standards. These source requirements are documented in LRD-18001, 'INL Criticality Safety Program Requirements Manual.' The majority of the criticality safety source requirements are contained in DOE Order 420.1B because it invokes all of the ANSI/ANS 8-Series Standards. DOE Order 420.1B also invokes several DOE Standards, including DOE-STD-3007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities.' DOE Order 420.1B contains requirements for DOE 'Heads of Field Elements' to approve the criticality safety program and specific elements of the program, namely, the qualification of criticality staff and the method for preparing criticality safety evaluations. This was accomplished by the approval of SAR-400, 'INL Standardized Nuclear Safety Basis Manual,' Chapter 6, 'Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality.' Chapter 6 of SAR-400 contains sufficient detail and/or reference to the specific DOE and contractor documents that adequately describe the INL Criticality Safety Program per the elements specified in DOE Order 420.1B. The Safety Evaluation Report for SAR-400 specifically recognizes that the approval of SAR-400 approves the INL Criticality Safety Program. No new source requirements were released in 2011. A revision to LRD-18001 is planned for 2012 to clarify design requirements for criticality alarms. Training - Criticality Safety Engineering has developed training and provides training for many employee positions, including fissionable material handlers, facility managers, criticality safety officers, firefighters, and criticality safety engineers. Criticality safety training at the INL is a program strength. A revision to the training module developed in 2010 to supplement MFC certified fissionable material handlers (operators) training was prepared and presented in August of 2011. This training, 'Applied Science of Criticality Safety,' builds upon existing training and gives operators a better understanding of how their criticality controls are derived. Improvements to 00INL189, 'INL Criticality Safety Principles' are planned for 2012 to strengthen fissionable material handler training.
- Research Organization:
- Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE - NE
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC07-05ID14517
- OSTI ID:
- 1035901
- Report Number(s):
- INL/EXT-11-23919; TRN: US1201255
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS//MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE
COMPLIANCE
CONTRACTORS
CRITICALITY
DESIGN
ENGINEERS
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
FUEL ELEMENTS
FUEL PLATES
INVENTORIES
MANAGEMENT
PERFORMANCE
PERSONNEL
RADIATION PROTECTION
SAFETY
SAFETY ENGINEERING
STORAGE
TRAINING
Assessment
Criticality Safety