Future Directions For Arms Control and Nonproliferation

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Introduction

This report provides a summary of the presentations and discussions at the Spring 1994 CNSN-Wilton Park Conference, on the subject of *Future Directions for Arms Control and Nonproliferation*. The Conference was one of a series on U.S-European security cooperation organized by The Center for National Security Negotiations (CNSN) of Science Applications International Corporation. These conferences bring together government and non-government experts, primarily from the United States and Europe, to discuss a range of regional and global security issues. The conferences provide an opportunity to explore, in a frank and off-the-record environment, common interests and concerns, as well as differences in approach that affect trans-Atlantic cooperation.

Conference presentations and discussions are conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Therefore, in summarizing the conference, this report does not identify the sources of any of the opinions presented. Furthermore, for reasons of readability, Conference discussions are reported as a single narrative, presenting different possible approaches to each question, and blending elements of various participants' views.

Implementation of Existing and Pending Agreements

The Transformation of East–West Relations

Arms control in Europe has been transformed by the end of the Cold War. The easing of distrust between the United States and Russia has brought an unprecedented level of cooperation and an end, at least for the moment, to the long and contentious negotiations of the traditional superpower arms control process. The United States and Russia now cooperate in efforts to manage shared security concerns in a way unthinkable before the late 1980s, working on the basis of much more informal and flexible agreements.

At the same time, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union has greatly complicated the arms control environment in Europe, creating a wide range of new obstacles to the implementation of existing agreements. The proliferation of independent states has shaken the foundations of bloc-based arms control agreements such as the CFE Treaty. Also, the creation of new nuclear states has changed the environment of nuclear arms control. The new nuclear states have proved, in some ways, a valuable focus of shared U.S.-Russian interest, but have also threatened to derail nuclear arms control. As a result, the age of major arms control negotiations seems to have been replaced by a focus on the problems of ensuring

the ratification and implementation of existing agreements, and on enhancing security by means of other measures, including consultation and cooperation, security assurances, and peacekeeping.

START, the NPT, and the Former Soviet Union

U.S.-Russian Cooperation

The future of the START I and II agreements, in many respects the crowning achievements of superpower arms control, has been brought into question by the changed environment. The end of superpower rivalry has made huge arsenals anomalous, and despite the fact that it has not entered into force, START I has already profoundly affected U.S. and Russian behavior. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union has left the United States, Russia, and some of the other former Soviet republics concerned about strategic stability in the former Soviet Union and the proliferation effects of the Soviet breakup. The resulting turmoil has threatened to derail START.

Shared U.S.-Russian concerns have led to a series of cooperative actions by the two countries, including the provisional application of major elements of both START treaties before their entry into force, the joint withdrawal in 1992 of most forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons, and the detargeting of strategic missiles. Other cooperative undertakings have included Russian agreement to abide by the MTCR, U.S. funding for physical security and materials-control efforts in the former Soviet republics, the purchase by the United States of excess weapons-grade uranium from the Soviet arsenal, and U.S. economic support for projects aimed at reorienting Russian nuclear scientists to work on civil energy research and other non-weapons programs.

The Domestic Context of Arms Control in Russia

Arms control in Russia is now taking place against an increasingly complex political background. The elections last fall made arms control more difficult to defend domestically, because of the election to the Duma of large numbers of nationalists, who see arms control and the reduction of Russian military capabilities as concessions to the United States. As a result, the Duma hearings on the CWC and START have been uphill battles for the Yeltsin government. Economic costs have become an additional argument in Russia against further arms control, since the costs of compliance and verification are high, and the Nunn-Lugar funding is limited.

The Yeltsin government, which still sees nuclear force reductions as in Russia's strategic interest, expects to continue to implement treaty provisions before ratification, including the liquidation of roughly four thousand warheads per year. Among the arms control constituency at

the highest political levels in Russia, there are many who see arms control and other forms of international cooperation, including the Partnership for Peace, as tools that Russia can use to transform and redefine itself. From the point of view of Russian moderates, it is important that the pace of such activities not become too great, however, since there is also increasing right-wing opposition.

The International Context of Arms Control in the F.S.U.

Implementation of nuclear arms control agreements has been most seriously impeded by the breakup of the Soviet Union into its component republics, leaving four states with an inheritance of strategic nuclear arms. The new states and the United States agreed, in the Lisbon Protocol of 1992, that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would become parties to the START I Treaty, and that all but Russia would eliminate their nuclear weapons within seven years, and would accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states as soon as possible. Belarus and Kazakhstan are acting to fulfill these obligations, and have negotiated agreements with Russia governing the removal to Russia of the strategic systems stationed on their territories.

The Ukrainian parliament (the Rada) has, however, repeatedly balked. It did finally ratify START I and the Lisbon Protocol in February 1994, but it has yet to approve accession to the NPT, and has thus continued to block START's entry into force. The United States has worked with Russia and Ukraine to resolve this ongoing problem. Significant progress was made in January 1994 with the signing of a tripartite agreement providing Ukraine with security assurances and reactor fuel in exchange for the withdrawal of the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia for dismantling. One hundred and twenty of these warheads have been delivered as of the end of April 1994. Whatever the progress under this accord, however, START I will not enter into force until Ukraine accedes to the NPT, and it is far from clear that the recently elected Rada will support that.

Potential Problems of Reliance on Interim Arrangements

The fact that the United States, Russia, and Ukraine are carrying out disarmament agreements before they legally enter into force raises two important questions. First, are the parties deceiving themselves by implementing interim agreements which, because of the lack of parliamentary approval, will not bind future Russian or Ukrainian governments? Second, does the present process of implementing U.S.-Russian agreements without formal verification measures threaten the future viability of those agreements?

There are some reasons to believe that these concerns, while important, need not stand in the way of the current process. In the first case, the high cost of replacing scrapped weapons should serve as a strong restraint on all of the governments involved. Ukraine, should it complete the process of turning over its warheads, would face the additional barrier of procuring

bomb-grade fissionable materials. In the second case, the United States and Russia are relying on intrusive informal inspections and on dismantlement procedures that are intended to be consistent with the eventual implementation of formal verification.

The ABM Treaty and Efforts to Counter the Threat of Ballistic Missiles

The U.S. Government believes that ballistic missiles, when coupled with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), present a grave threat to the security interests of the United States and its allies. An increasing number of states have acquired or are building ballistic missiles. Many of these states are hostile to Western interests, and many are known to have or to be developing weapons of mass destruction. Ballistic missiles with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads could be used to attack or intimidate U.S. friends and allies, to attempt to deter the United States from becoming involved in important regional conflicts. Thus, such weapons could severely damage U.S. and Western interests, simply by forestalling responses to serious international crises. They could also be used to attack U.S. forces in the field.

The experience of the Gulf War demonstrated the limits of counterforce in suppressing mobile ballistic missiles. The U.S. Government believes, however, that it is possible to build effective systems to defend against such missiles. Indeed, as part of its counterproliferation efforts, the Department of Defense is seeking to acquire effective defenses against ballistic missiles with ranges up to about 3000 km.

The proposed U.S. systems are intended, in the initial stage, for defense of forces in the field, and later, with the full-scale production of the THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Area Defense) system beginning in 2002, for the defense of larger areas. It is hoped that the systems will protect against the worst of the military and political effects of ballistic missiles with WMD or conventional warheads, and that this protection will reduce the incentives for countries to seek to acquire these weapons.

Questions on Russian Interest in BMD

It is not clear whether the United States and Russia share the same interests in the area of national or theater ballistic missile defenses. Some in Russia argue that that country has no interest, at present, in the problems of power projection against missile-armed adversaries. In this view, Russia is unlikely to be involved militarily in conflicts with such states—provided, that is, that Ukraine does not gain control of its nuclear-armed missiles—and thus has no need for missile defense.

Some in Russia do, however, continue to perceive a U.S. military threat, including a growing conventional threat to Russian strategic systems. As a result, there is at least a concern in Russia that the strategic offense-defense balance is shifting decisively in favor of the United States. One reason for this concern is that Russia lost much of its early-warning infrastructure in the collapse of the Soviet Union, and part of what remains will be lost in a few years, when certain key radar sites in the non-Russian republics revert to local control. Some in Russia fear that the United States will deploy a global ABM system, further changing the strategic balance between the two states.

Expressions of doubt about Russia's need for missile defenses, and of fear of U.S. strategic superiority, may not reflect the views of the Russian government, however. Throughout the 1980s, the Soviet government did not hesitate to make clear its opposition to radical U.S. initiatives in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The Yeltsin government, in contrast, has shown some willingness to consider U.S. proposals on the clarification of the ABM Treaty presented to the SCC, intended to allow development of theater ballistic missile defenses.

The Problem of Consistency with the ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty has been one of the foundations of the structure of superpower arms control. It was in itself a remarkable accomplishment, demonstrating that the United States and the Soviet Union could work together on common strategic interests. It also helped make possible other strategic arms control treaties, by helping to ensure the stability of the strategic nuclear relationship.

Proposed U.S. anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems would require operational testing against targets with velocities on the order of 5 km/s. Some in both the United States and Russia argue that, were this to occur, it would be impossible to preserve the ABM treaty in anything like its original form. ATBM systems capable of shooting down ballistic missiles traveling at 5 km/s, they argue, would have some capability against ICBMs, which re-enter the atmosphere at 7 km/s or more, and against slower strategic systems such as the Trident D-5, SSN-8, and SSN-18.

Others disagree with these arguments, and believe that the United States and Russia can, through negotiation, protect the purpose of the ABM Treaty, while developing and fielding ATBM systems. A limited ABM capability against single ICBMs is not the same as a meaningful capability against large-scale strategic strikes. The missile deployments, radars, and battle-management systems necessary for a true strategic defense are much more demanding, for example. Thus, if relations between the United States and Russia continue to be largely cooperative, it might be possible to overcome any stability concerns raised by an ATBM system with limited ABM capabilities. Furthermore, some argue that the proposed systems do not, in

fact, pose a significant threat to strategic missiles, and the that United States could therefore safely share some of the technology with Russia. Some Russians even call for cooperation extending to joint decision-making on deployments to overcome Russian defensive shortfalls and preserve common interests.

Likely Limitations and Cost-Benefit Concerns

Planned defensive systems will have limited capabilities against attacks involving many missiles, or attacks that make use of countermeasures designed to confuse or overwhelm the defense. Countermeasures such as unstable re-entry vehicles, decoys, or nuclear air bursts to blind sensors all could render defenses less effective or ineffective, depending on the sophistication of the defensive system. Some relatively simple and inexpensive countermeasures could be hard to overcome, a fact that causes some critics to question the long-term cost-effectiveness of missile defense programs. However, the need to counter defensive systems would also impose heavier burdens on proliferators, and leave larger doubts in any attacker's mind. Some countermeasures, such as flooding the defense with missiles or spending nuclear warheads on high-altitude bursts, would only be available to a more advanced proliferator.

The Future of CFE and CSBMs

CFE

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) is under pressure, and may face re-negotiation or non-compliance, in the worst-case view, within as little as a year. The CFE Treaty was negotiated before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and the complaints that some of its parties are presently making stem largely from its bloc-to-bloc structure. The most acute complaint, from Russia and Ukraine, is that the Treaty's regional deployment ceilings, constructed to constrain deployments in regions of the Soviet Union that would have threatened NATO's northern and southern flanks, unacceptably restrict those countries' deployments of forces in their threatened border regions. Ukraine, for example, is required to keep most of its forces in the western segment of the country, despite the fact that its security concerns are primarily on its eastern border. These deployments are a source of concern to Ukraine's western neighbors, especially Poland. Similarly, Russia is prohibited from deploying as much equipment as it would like on its borders with the Caucasus, where it is concerned about persistent instability. Instead, Russia finds its forces over-concentrated on its borders with Ukraine and Belarus.

Russia is still withdrawing forces from eastern Europe and would like to re-deploy them on its southern flank, both for strategic reasons and to make use of existing infrastructure, which

is in short supply elsewhere in the republic. This fact, coupled with Russia's strategic concerns in the south and with its conviction that the existing restrictions are simply an anachronism left by the Soviet collapse, have led it to request the renegotiation of the Treaty and, pending such a renegotiation, to express a real reluctance to comply with the flank limits.

The response from the other parties to the Treaty has, on the whole, been negative. One reason is that there is widespread agreement that the Treaty, whatever its flaws, imposes some stability and predictability on the security environment in central and eastern Europe. The Treaty's ceilings, and its requirements for transparency and inspections, provide needed guarantees to the newly independent states of the region, and help preserve their commitment to security cooperation. The Treaty's reduction and reporting requirements are largely being met and, if the political commitment exists, can continue to be met. Re-negotiation seems to many to risk the loss of a valuable agreement.

A second reason for opposing re-negotiation is that acceptance of Russia's desires concerning flank deployments might be taken as de facto acquiescence in Russia's military involvement in the "near abroad". At present, Russian southern-flank deployments are governed by the Treaty and by the Tashkent Agreement, in which Russia and the other newly independent states west of the Urals divided the CFE weapons allocations among themselves. Since Tashkent, Russia has begun to reassert its influence in parts of its former empire, a trend that makes many of its neighbors uncomfortable. Many of the parties to the Treaty are reluctant to give even apparent approval to Russian military involvement outside its borders.

Turkey and Norway also continue to oppose renegotiation of the flank limits, since from their point of view the strategic rationale for restricting Russian flank deployments still obtains. Opposition from these NATO states may prove to be the largest obstacle to compromise on the issue.

There is still some broad support for modifying the Treaty or for beginning, while continuing to implement the Treaty, negotiations on a follow-on agreement that would address Russia's and Ukraine's legitimate objections. Alternatively, it may be best to settle on an informal arrangement allowing limited, temporary relaxation of the Treaty's restrictions, pending negotiation of a permanent modification. Some have argued that a failure to make such an accommodation would prompt Russia simply to violate the flank limits, leaving the other parties to the Treaty at a loss for an appropriate response.

One permanent option might be to trade western acquiescence in modifying CFE for Russian acceptance of the extension of NATO, thus overcoming central and eastern European security objections. Such a settlement, however, would mean sacrificing much of the pretense of trying to constrain Russian involvement in the other new republics, and would not satisfy Norwegian and Turkish concerns. The extension of NATO would, in itself, raise large questions

about the CFE, and might require, for example, the adjustment of the equipment ceilings to equalize the forces of the new eastern and western alignments, in order to reassure Russia.

CFE, CSBMs, and Harmonization

There is a broad consensus that the confidence- and security-building process in Europe, which presently consists of efforts to strengthen the 1992 Vienna Document, is a useful part of the broad effort to improve security cooperation. On the other hand, there is some concern that the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) thus far agreed are helpful mainly in "fair weather", and that stronger CSBMs are needed if they are to have an important effect in containing tensions and defusing possible crises.

The structural arms reductions and intrusive verification called for in the CFE Treaty are widely viewed as necessary complements to the less stringent Vienna Document. Some CFE members propose combining or "harmonizing" the two agreements, in order to make the CFE provisions applicable to all CSCE members. Some CSCE states, however, do not wish to take on the limitations and verification requirements of the CFE agreement.

CSBMs impose a variety of reporting requirements that overlap considerably with those found in the CFE Treaty, and reducing this duplication would be one benefit of harmonization. Reporting and verification are already burdensome, leading to proposals for joint verification efforts, or even a common European verification organization, to reduce costs.

Non-Proliferation: Prospects for Trans-Atlantic Cooperation

BWC and CWC: Coping with Violators and Non-Members

All global arms control and proliferation regimes face the problem of coping with violators and non-members. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) face these problems in particularly severe forms, since the technology of entry-level chemical and biological weapons (CBW) is relatively cheap and well-known, and since verification, especially in the case of biological agent research, is extremely difficult. In addition, large numbers of states will probably remain outside the two agreements for the foreseeable future.

Several important questions arise from these considerations. First, should countries supporting the Conventions make a distinction in importance, and thus in pressing for adherence and compliance, between the CWC and BWC? There are several good reasons to treat the BWC as the more important of the two agreements. One is the long-standing distinction in international practice. Biological weapons have very rarely been used, and have lacked the legitimacy as weapons that chemical agents have sometimes had. Another is the very high

potential for severe, long-term damage biological agents are believed to hold. This results from the extremely high lethality of very small quantities of agent, and the ability of some agents to reproduce and spread, thereby threatening populations beyond those unfortunate enough to be directly targeted. Chemical agents are far less lethal, and do not spread.

Violations of the BWC are not only potentially far more dangerous than violations of the CWC, they are also likely to be much harder to detect. BW research and production facilities can be very small, and almost all parts of research and production are inherently dual-use. Even BW use may be very hard to prove to be other than a natural outbreak of a new disease strain. In order to deter potential proliferators or users of these weapons, therefore, the international community should respond vigorously to all violations of the BWC.

A second question policy-makers need to answer is whether states supporting the Conventions should respond differently to violators than to non-signatories. Parallel to that, in the case of non-signatories, should there be a distinction between states that openly declare possession or use the weapons and those that maintain ambiguity about their programs? Part of the most frequently expressed answer derives from the political fact that it is easier to justify enforcement action against those states that have broken their word than it is to apply pressure to non-signatories. However, at least in the case of biological weapons, there is general agreement that the international community should not condone deliberate ambiguity on the part of non-signatories.

Efforts to influence the behavior of non-signatories will not be simple, and may be only marginally effective. There are at least three distinct aspects of the problem: how to dissuade states from developing, producing, and deploying CBW; how to deal with states that sell these weapons; and how to respond to states that use these weapons. Experts believe that each will require different measures, starting with political pressure and economic sanctions; changing in the case of WMD sales to include the possibility of embargoes and blockades; and moving in the case of WMD use to include the possibility of a military response. As proliferators move along the spectrum of WMD activities, it will become both more important and more politically possible take international action against them. At the same time, the threat of retaliation is likely to become more serious, and may deter action.

A third fundamental policy question is whether friendly states and potentially threatening states should be treated differently. The CWC and BWC are efforts to disinvent weapons globally in a way the NPT never attempted. Some experts believe strongly that any violation of the CWC or BWC would seriously undermine the nascent international norm, and if left unanswered would undermine the global support necessary to sustain export controls and enforcement action. In this view, friendly states' programs are likely to prompt responses from neighboring states, and the expense and technical difficulty that have helped keep states from

building nuclear weapons are much less of an obstacle to CBW acquisition. In this view, the practice of distinguishing between friendly and unfriendly proliferators, as in the case of U.S. policy toward Israel's nuclear program—and for a long time, Pakistan's—cannot be followed with CBW.

A fourth fundamental question concerns the conceptual and political links between the North's nuclear weapons and the South's potential CBW. Many non-nuclear-weapon states will object strongly to the denial of CBW to the rest of the world while some states retain their nuclear weapons. This will complicate any efforts to promote adherence to the CBW Conventions, or to take any action against violators or non-signatories.

The NPT Extension Conference and the CTB

The lack of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has long been a sensitive issue between the member states of the NPT, with many of the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) arguing that the failure of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to negotiate such a treaty is a violation of their disarmament commitments under the NPT. Some of the NNWS are attempting to link the agreement of a CTBT to the extension of the NPT. The issue has been a center of contention at the NPT Review Conferences, and has twice prevented the conferences from issuing a joint final document.

Since the mid-1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have made unprecedented progress in arms control, and the negotiation and implementation of deep nuclear weapons cuts is expected to take some of the edge off of the NNWS criticisms. However, the 1995 NPT Conference is charged with deciding on the extension of the Treaty, and is thus able, for the first time, to hold the future of the Treaty hostage in order to press for a CTBT and other disarmament measures.

The general U.S. and European government view of the CTBT is that it would be marginally useful as a nonproliferation measure, constraining vertical proliferation more than horizontal. It would also be politically useful, for the sake of the NPT renewal, to at least be seen to be negotiating such a treaty. This does not mean that these states support linking NPT extension to success on a CTBT. Instead, they argue that the NPT should be extended on its own merits, since it is vital to controlling the proliferation of weapons that in fact primarily threaten non-nuclear states. Linkage could also leave the CTBT and the NPT hostage to each other, dooming both.

The current negotiations, taking place in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, have rejected any deadline for the completion of a CTB, thus rejecting linkage. There are problems with some parties, however. North Korea and Iran, for instance, support linkage,

apparently as an attack on NPT extension. Mexico also supports linkage, continuing its crusade to end the discriminatory character of the NPT. China is unenthusiastic about the CTBT, and has said that it will not join at all before 1996. China may also continue to test after signing a CTBT and before ratification. On the other hand, a number of NNWS have said that their extension decision will not be linked to the CTBT. This group includes a number of Arab states. It is not yet clear how the test ban issue will play out at the NPT Extension Conference next year.

Other Objections to NPT Extension

The discriminatory nature of the NPT is also a long-standing point of contention among the parties to the NPT. The CTBT issue can be seen as simply a lesser case of the discrimination issue, which may in its own right be an important focus of conflict at the 1995 conference. Unless the NWS put forward a plan to move to zero nuclear weapons, this issue will persist. One way of defusing it might be to combine deep force cuts with an argument for the necessity of keeping some nuclear weapons as a guarantee against proliferation. The NWS could argue that their responsible stewardship of these weapons, which has included refraining from using nuclear threats or weapons to gain advantage over NNWS, makes them the proper custodians of the weapons necessary to guarantee world security against proliferators.

The disappointment of the NNWS at the scale of technology transfer and assistance provided by the NWS in support of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is another source of tension between the parties. The technology transfer issue has become less of a problem, in some ways, as it has become clear that nuclear energy is not the boundless source of free energy some anticipated. Limits on technology transfer remain an issue, however, in part because of the broader sense that the NWS are not fulfilling their commitments under the NPT. The NWS need to make a clearer argument showing that the NPT does not interfere with legitimate nuclear activities, and should remind critics that the NPT is the essential underpinning that makes nuclear technology transfer possible.

Proliferation: Implications for Military Power Projection

In the judgment of the United States Government, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery pose an increasing threat to U.S. security interests around the world, and to the ability of the United States to project military power in defense of its allies and its interests. Proliferation in the post-Cold-War era has taken on a different character than it has had before. In contrast to Israel, India, and Pakistan, for example, which appear to have built nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes, newer proliferators such as Iraq seem much more likely to try to use WMD aggressively. Others, such as North Korea, might well sell nuclear weapons to other

states. The United States and its European allies share a perception that proliferation may soon create significant direct threats to European states. Trans-Atlantic cooperation to address proliferation problems continues, and non-proliferation regimes such as the MTCR have been extended to include adherence commitments from central and eastern European states.

Military Counterproliferation

The United States has, over the course of the past year, expanded its thinking and altered its programs in response to the military implications of proliferation. U.S. counterproliferation policy is intended to augment traditional nonproliferation policy, and aims to prepare military forces to operate in a WMD environment, and to provide military options to respond to WMD threats. In the U.S. view, an enhanced ability to respond to WMD threats is essential to preserving peace and security, and can also help retard proliferation by reducing the perceived military utility of WMD.

Counterproliferation is not intended to replace existing proliferation-control measures such as export controls, arms control, and diplomacy. The misperception that the United States might give up on preventing proliferation in favor of a military response may have been fed by U.S. efforts to reform its export control system, focusing it more tightly on a narrower range of technologies and target countries. Traditional measures are not being abandoned. Counterproliferation simply grows out of the realization that these measures sometimes fail, and that military options may sometimes be needed to defend interests and allies threatened by states armed with WMD.

Counterproliferation options include the use of force against proliferators, and the United States is exploring the development and deployment of weapons designed specifically to attack WMD capabilities. Counterproliferation is not, however, a program for the casual use of aggressive military measures to prevent or roll back proliferation. Military measures should be understood to comprise perhaps one tenth of an integrated diplomatic, economic, and military program for controlling proliferation threats. The underlying idea is that preemptive military action against a proliferator would only be taken in response to a violation of responsible stewardship of WMD. What "responsible" means is not yet clear, though threats to use WMD against another state might be one example of a breach of stewardship.

The practical implications of counterproliferation policy, however, remain unclear to U.S. friends and allies in Europe, and need to be further discussed. In particular, the circumstances under which military force would be used, and the goals that such a use of force would fulfill, need to be more fully explored. This is especially true because of the U.S. desire for political and military support from Europe in controlling, deterring, and if necessary countering proliferation threats around the world. Many in Europe are cynical about counterproliferation,

seeing it primarily as a way to defend defense budgets. In the view of European analysts, it is far from clear, despite the seriousness of the potential threat, that European publics would be willing to pay for missile defense or other military forces necessary for counterproliferation. It is also not clear to European observers—in light of the widespread reluctance of Western governments in recent cases to place troops at risk—that governments on either side of the Atlantic would have the will to respond militarily to proliferation, or even to aggression where weapons of mass destruction are involved.

Many kinds of action—certainly if European states are going to be involved—will only be politically possible with the blessing of the United Nations. This kind of legitimacy will be important if damage to the trans-Atlantic relationship is to be avoided. To be effective and politically possible, counterproliferation may have to be made part of a broad collective approach to international security, providing assurances to a wide range of countries in order to justify the use of sanctions and possibly military measures against proliferators. On the other hand, the quest for such legitimacy would probably not be an easy one.

Countering NBC Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East

The Arab-Israeli peace process has been accompanied by two and a half years of multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks between Israel and some of the Arab states. These talks have made substantial progress, and there is considerable hope that they will help provide a basis for a stable peace in the region. The talks in Cairo in February 1994 produced a draft joint declaration—with some text yet to be agreed—laying out common principles on future relations and on ultimate security objectives, including the idea of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The ACRS talks have also served important political purposes, building up relations between long-standing enemies, exposing all sides to a range of arms control ideas, and bringing negotiators, including military officers, together for the first time to discuss security issues.

The Arab states and Israel remain divided on a number of important issues, however. The most fundamental is whether arms control must come before peace, or peace before arms control. The Arab states, led by Egypt, tend to argue that arms control should come first, and in particular that the nuclear issue in the region should not be put off until after peace is negotiated. They argue that nuclear weapons are the most destructive and thus the most destabilizing weapons in the Middle East; that although in the present political environment and under the present Israeli government they are not an intolerable threat, the context could change; and that Israel's nuclear status undermines efforts to restrain the Iranian and Iraqi nuclear programs.

From the Israeli point of view, nuclear weapons provide the final security guarantee it needs in order to be able to negotiate peace with its Arab neighbors. All of the Middle East wars have been conventional, and Israel still faces neighbors with large and capable conventional forces. Syria's standing forces, for example, are comparable in size to Israel's full mobilization capacity. If Israel gives up control of the Golan Heights—a measure that is widely recognized in Israel as necessary for peace with Syria—Israel will be placed in a very vulnerable strategic position. To give up the Golan and its nuclear deterrent simultaneously would be neither politically possible nor strategically sensible. In Israel's view, political peace, supported by CSBMs, should be the first step. Israel will not be willing to give up its nuclear deterrent until peace is well established.

The two sides also have important differences over verification of possible arms control agreements. The Arab states envision reliance on the IAEA to verify nuclear disarmament under an eventual WMD-free-zone in the Middle East, but Israel regards the NPT and IAEA as ineffective barriers to proliferation, and prefers mutual verification by the parties in the region.

It has become clear that the multilateral arms control process cannot go much further without progress on the bilateral level between Israel and Syria. Last year's breakthrough in Israeli–Palestinian relations, culminating in the final Israeli-PLO agreement in May of 1994, has transformed the regional environment and may lead to a breakthrough in Israeli–Syrian relations, potentially producing an agreement by the fall of 1994. Syria's powerful influence in Lebanon has kept that country from pursuing an independent policy, and Lebanon and Israel would most likely reach a settlement soon after. Jordan has also been holding off until Syria shows more movement, and would be expected quickly to join in making peace with Israel. Nevertheless, strong differences on security arrangements and arms control will continue to bedevil the peace process.

Pacing Problems Relative to Global Regimes

The Middle East peace process and global nonproliferation efforts are also likely to come into increasing conflict, especially in the next year and a half, as the NPT extension conference approaches. Israel's ambiguous nuclear status has long offended NNWS members of the NPT. It has especially upset Israel's neighbors, who feel that Israel's nuclear weapons threaten their security, and believe that the NWS's tolerance for Israel's nuclear program has been unfair. These concerns have only become more acute in the last few years, as Israel has become less and less coy about its nuclear capabilities. The approach of the 1995 NPT extension conference makes Arab concerns important to the future of the global nonproliferation regime. Some Arab states are reluctant to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty without Israeli membership.

It might be possible to negotiate a fissile material production cut-off to partially overcome this conflict. A cut-off would bring Israel part-way into the nonproliferation regime, and might make it politically easier for Arab states to accommodate themselves to Israel's continued nuclear status for a few years. Arab states are concerned, however, that a cut-off would imply acceptance of Israel's nuclear status.

It is also not clear whether a cut-off could be verified satisfactorily without ending all ambiguity about Israel's past activities. Since Israeli ambiguity has helped make it politically possible for Arab states to choose not to build nuclear weapons, and since continued ambiguity may be important in a peace settlement, anything that rendered Israel's status impossible to ignore could be destructive. Clarity might accelerate proliferation in the Middle East and help legitimate Iraq's and Iran's nuclear programs.

Conventional Non-Proliferation and Arms Control

Conference discussion on controlling the proliferation of conventional capabilities treated the issues of conventional weapons proliferation as distinct from WMD proliferation problems. While WMD and their delivery systems pose direct threats to the national interests of the United States and European countries, and to their friends and allies around the world, conventional weapons have much less serious implications. Conventional weapons sales can have important destabilizing effects, and can adversely affect important interests of the supplier states, but they can also have stabilizing effects on regional balances.

In this view, conventional arms transfers should be treated on a case-by case basis, and analyzed in terms of their effects on regional stability and on the security of friendly states. Conventional arms transfers, it was argued, can in some cases fulfill the goals of arms control, making war less likely by maintaining regional balances of power. Arms transfers can be used to balance transfers by "rouge" suppliers such as North Korea, for example.

The post-Cold-War sales push is a potential problem, because it represents in some cases a suspension of strategic calculations. During the Cold War, there was a de facto control regime based on balancing by the United States and the Soviet Union, with each superpower working to keep its clients on par with the other's. Sales now are driven more by economic pressures, both in the former Soviet republics and satellite states, and in the United States. There has been a hope that foreign sales would provide economies of scale that would help keep arms industries healthy in an era of declining domestic procurement. However, it is becoming clear that foreign markets are not a panacea, and this realization may make restraint easier. It is important to try to re-impose the principles of stability and support for friends' security, and to cultivate some measure of mutual supplier restraint toward the more menacing customers.

The Uses and Limitations of Embargoes

Arms and economic embargoes will continue to be useful means of controlling conventional proliferation in some cases, but they impose high costs on other states and on the civilian population of the target country. There is a real need for better study of the lessons learned from past embargoes.

The effectiveness of an embargo depends on many variables. In contemplating the use of an embargo, it is important to consider what the political objective is, what measures are necessary to physically prevent the kinds of trade under discussion, and the level of international support, including the opinions of neighboring states, without which the embargo is likely to be ineffective. Also, international support may prove inadequate when it comes to imposing sanctions on violators of the embargo. Worse, the military impact of an embargo may well be inconsistent with the political goal the embargo is trying to achieve. Some critics believe that this is true of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, for example.

The Middle East

Conventional arms transfer policies toward the Middle East should be seen as part of a comprehensive political and military strategy to preserve the stability of the region. In the Gulf, the primary perceived threats are potential Iranian and Iraqi aggression. These can best be addressed politically, through the achievement of peace between Israel and its neighbors, allowing the United States and Europe to better isolate the two countries. If conventional arms transfers to Iran and Iraq disturb the military balance in the Gulf, the West should use compensating transfers to sustain a military balance in the region.

Constraining Transfers of Weapons Technologies

Efforts to control the transfer of weapons-usable technologies and equipment face increasingly difficult challenges from the continuing process of economic development. Ever-increasing numbers of countries are potential sources of supply for advanced, weapons-usable technology, and some of the states most likely to threaten Western interests—Iraq, for instance—have developed substantial indigenous weapons manufacturing capabilities in some areas. The greatest threats from technology transfer are in the area of weapons of mass destruction. However, the spread of broad technological mastery in the area of conventional weapons can also lead to significant regional instability, and impair any intervention that might become necessary. Furthermore, public opinion is not as easily aroused by the issue of technology transfer as it is by weapons sales, so technology is harder, politically speaking, to control.

There is broad recognition of the need to overhaul international export control systems. Such an overhaul, it is widely thought, should narrow the list of target states and critical technologies. Agreement among suppliers, coupled with improved intelligence sharing to break supplier networks, would help slow WMD and conventional proliferation.

A number of obstacles stand in the way. One is the problem of defining target states. This is complicated by the fact that the supplier states, with their different interests and histories, have differing threat assessments, and therefore different lists of friends and enemies. On top of this, even when it is possible to say that a state is a friend, there is frequently a chance that it will later become an enemy. Finally, an export regime based on a narrow list of target countries is likely to make it easier for proliferators to construct multi-national procurement networks to evade controls.

Another major problem is the political power of commercial interests. Competition for export income continues to interfere with agreement between supplier states on export regime harmonization, and arguments about foreign availability make unilateral regulation politically difficult. The increasing size of supplier groups such as the MTCR or the follow-on to COCOM make agreement much harder to achieve, exacerbating all of the familiar problems of such regimes.

Future Directions in Arms Control

Nuclear Arms Reductions After START II

The phrase "Nuclear arms reductions after START II" implies a couple of important assumptions: first, that the START Treaties will be implemented, and second, that another round of bilateral reductions should be considered. It is far from clear that nuclear arms control can continue as a bilateral activity much beyond the levels required in START II. The only major incentive for the United States and Russia to negotiate further cuts soon is the political benefit an additional agreement would bring to the NPT extension effort. On the other side of the balance, there are a number of reasons why further bilateral cuts may be impractical, unwise, or simply a low political priority.

Despite the transformation of U.S.–Russian relations, neither state is ready to give up the nuclear weapons that still serve as final guarantors of the peace between them. Each perceives a need to maintain a deterrent force, and reliability and survivability concerns make very deep force cuts unattractive. Russia retains an especially strong interest in retaining its nuclear

weapons, because the collapse of its conventional military capabilities have left it a superpower in nuclear weapons only.

At the same time, further arms control is no longer central to the political and security relationship between the United States and Russia. The implementation of existing agreements remains important, but further cuts would neither represent nor bring about much greater political accommodation. Furthermore, START implementation will take a long time, and cannot easily be speeded up much, due to the saturation of dismantlement capacity. Finally, there is no compelling reason for either side to push for further agreements until START II is well on its way to full implementation.

Problems of Negotiating Very Low Numbers of Nuclear Weapons

If an agreement is negotiated after START II, the United States and Russia might conceivably cut their arsenals to the 1000-warhead level, but beyond that level arms control will be greatly complicated by the need to involve other nuclear powers, including China, France, and the United Kingdom. At very low levels, it might also become necessary to involve undeclared nuclear powers.

Aside from the complexity of multilateral negotiations, and from the conceptual puzzles surrounding deterrent stability between multiple states, each of these possible participants will bring additional obstacles to further arms control. The United Kingdom and France are already making some cuts in their nuclear arsenals, and are likely to feel that they have reached the minimum deterrent level. The United States and Russia would probably want to retain some numerical advantage in warheads, but none of the three lesser nuclear powers would be excited about cutting its forces further in order to sustain a U.S.-Russian edge. Nevertheless, U.S.-Russian cuts may produce political pressure for further cuts in Europe, thus producing what negotiations might find impossible.

Whither Nuclear Weapons?

All of this discussion ignores the central question of the future of nuclear arms control: what should be the target level of nuclear arsenals, and why? What are nuclear weapons for? Should we eliminate them entirely? Nuclear weapons served clear purposes during the Cold War, but their role is far less settled now. Both for considering further nuclear arms reductions, and because greater clarity might help sustain the nonproliferation regime, it is important to try to find the answers to these questions.

In addition to the continued purpose of mutual deterrence, the existence of nuclear weapons provides a hedge against breakout. Existing nuclear arsenals might also be used to render nuclear weapons unusable by extending deterrence to non-nuclear-weapon states, guaranteeing retaliation against any aggressor using nuclear weapons. The underlying question

is what nuclear weapons can and should be used to deter. Actions by other nuclear states? Proliferators intent on acquiring the weapons? States that use nuclear weapons? Other weapons of mass destruction? Conventional threats? These basic questions will have to be answered before it will be possible to make wise policies on the future of nuclear arms control. A nuclear response to conventional attack is the only option that seems to be off the list, from the point of view of the United States, and that is only because the conventional threat to Europe has disappeared. The trend in U.S. thinking on this question seems to be towards de-emphasizing nuclear weapons for all purposes other than responding to nuclear attack. The changes have been limited so far, however. For example, the U.S. refused to rule out nuclear use in response to chemical attack in the Gulf War.

Verification and Information-Sharing

The future of arms control and CSBMs between the United States and Russia, and in Europe in general, will be made easier by the last few years' revolution in openness and information-sharing. The CFE, Open Skies, the Vienna 1992 CSBMs and later supplementary arrangements, and the less formal openness that has come to characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship all make confidence much easier to build and preserve in Europe. The multiple overlapping regimes do, however, have their costs. Many kinds of verification are now too expensive for the central European states to carry out, for instance, and the growing supply of information risks overloading governments' capabilities to digest and interpret what they receive. At the same time, stronger requirements for openness may be appealing, to make CSBMs reliable in times of greater international tension.

In international arms control and nonproliferation, openness has produced important changes. The case of Iraq, and now North Korea, helped convince the IAEA to drop its reluctance to accept intelligence input. At the same moment, the United States became far more willing to share intelligence with international organizations. The resulting partnership has been central to the successes the IAEA has had in exposing and halting the Iraqi nuclear program, and in exposing the existence of clandestine North Korean activities.

There are limitations and risks inherent in the new openness, however. One is the risk of compromising sources and methods. Disclosing technical means of data collection, even means as simple as isotopic sampling techniques, exposes them to spoofing, for example. There are also the risks of making the IAEA appear to be an instrument of Western intervention, or of producing a political backlash against action based on incorrect intelligence.

Future of European Security and Political/Economic Structures

Much of the future of Europe will depend on events in the former Soviet republics, especially Russia, and on the political and economic stability of central Europe. These will depend in part on, and will also influence, the pace and extent of the extension of western European political, economic, and security institutions.

The reasonable success of political and economic reforms in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and to a lesser extent the Slovak Republic seem to have put those countries on reasonably firm footing domestically. Even the return of the former communists to power in Poland has not ended the economic reforms. There are also good prospects for peaceful relations among these countries, prospects strengthened by Hungarian voters' recent rejection of revanchist nationalist politicians.

In the other states of central Europe, however, weak economies, weak political institutions, and widespread ethnic tensions pose a threat of ongoing instability and conflict. Farther east, the continuing economic decline of many of the former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine and Russia, threaten to aid radical nationalists and hard-line communists whose rise to power might revive an external military threat to central Europe.

The United States and Europe share the view that it is in their interests to promote stability in central Europe, based on continued political and economic reform. The success of democratic institutions and free-market economies should make it much easier to control nationalist tensions and other threats to domestic and international peace in the region. There is some agreement that European economic, political, and security institutions should be extended eastward in an effort to ensure stability in the region against internal and external threats.

Opening up to the east is also controversial, however. Some objections are political and economic: both the United States and the European Union, for instance, continue to restrict imports of important eastern European products, despite the goal of promoting free markets in the region, in order to protect powerful domestic interests.

The extension of western institutions, especially security institutions such as NATO and the WEU, also raises long-term strategic concerns. There is a consensus in western Europe and the United States that if these alliance systems are extended, they cannot include the former Soviet republics on the same basis as the central European states. Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is not yet bound by sufficient common values and interests. The extension of western structures to preserve security in central Europe is directed in part against the possible renewal of a threat from Russia.

There is a risk, however, that drawing a new line dividing Europe would undermine moderates in Russia, and bring into being what is presently only a potential Russian threat. This

concern, and the sense that it is not imperative to rush to extend a western security umbrella over central Europe, has led the United States and its European allies to take a go-slow approach, gradually extending economic, political, and security ties to the east. This strategy has allowed the west to promote stability in and integration with the central European states, without unnecessarily exacerbating the division of Europe. While the central European states have pressed for faster integration, they consider the progress that is being made significant.

The Future of U.S.-European Relations

It has become clear in the last couple of years, both to Europeans and Americans, that the United States should and will continue to play a role in Europe, and that U.S.-European cooperation in global security will continue to be vital to the interests of both. Without the single, unifying threat of the Soviet Union, however, European states and the United States will find themselves with a wider range of competing interests. In the long term, it will be a challenge to sustain the habits of consultation and cooperation that the trans-Atlantic alliance has built. It is also a vital task, since only through cooperative effort will Europe and the United States be able to protect their common security interests in Europe and around the world.

Appendix A: Conference Agenda and List of Participants

The 1994 CNSN-Wilton Park Conference
On
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION

Monday, 25 April

1900-1930 — Welcoming Remarks: Dr. Ralph Hallenbeck, SAIC
Prof. Richard Langhorne, Wilton Park
Mr. Frank Jenkins, CNSN

1930-2100 — **Opening Address: Objectives, Norms, and Achievements To Date**
Presenter:

Mr. John D. Holum
Director, United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency

Tuesday, 26 April

0900-1230 — **First Session: Implementing Existing Agreements I**
Moderators: Mr. Sidney Graybeal, SAIC
Dr. Patricia McFate, SAIC

I. *START, the NPT, and the Former Soviet Union*
Presenters:

Dr. Norman Wulf
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Mr. Georgiy Mamedov
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

II. *The ABM Treaty: Countering the Threat Posed by the Proliferation of Tactical Ballistic Missiles*
Presenter:

Dr. J. David Martin
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

Dr. Sergey Rogov
Russian Academy of Sciences

1330-1700 — **Second Session: Implementing Existing Agreements II**
Moderator: Dr. Richard Latter, Wilton Park

III. *Should CSBM and/or CFE Be Modified?*
Presenters:

Ms. Jane Sharp
Kings College, London

Amb. Jiri Divis
CSCE Delegation, The Czech Republic

IV. *Constraining Conventional Arms and Technology Transfers*
Presenter:

Mr. Michael Ferrier
Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale, France

V. *BWC and CWC: Coping With Violators and Non-Members*
Presenter:

Prof. Trevor Taylor
Staffordshire University, U.K.

1930-2100 **Keynote Address: Proliferation: Implications for Military Power Projection**
Presenter:

Dr. Mitch Wallerstein
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation Policy
U.S. Department of Defense

Wednesday, 27 April

0900-1330 **Third Session: Non-Proliferation: Prospects for Trans-Atlantic Cooperation**
Moderator: Prof. John Simpson, U.K.

VI. *The NPT Extention Conference and the CTB*
Presenters:

Mme. Therese Delpech
French Commissariat al'Energie Atomique

Ms. Judith Slater
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, U.K.

VII. *Military "Counter-Proliferation"*
Presenters:

Colonel Richard Wallace
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Peter Ammon
Policy Planning Staff, German Foreign Ministry

VIII. Countering NBC Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East
Presenters:

Dr. Shai Feldman
Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies

Amb. Mohamed Shaker
Arab Republic of Egypt

1900-2100 **Simulation: "The Day After"**
Moderator: Dr. Roger Molander
The RAND Corporation

Thursday, 28 April
0900-1230 **Fourth Session: Conventional Non-Proliferation**
Moderator: Dr. Ralph Hallenbeck, SAIC

IX. *Conventional Nonproliferation & Arms Control in the MidEast*
Presenters:

Dr. Richard Grimmett
U.S. Congressional Research Service

Mr. Ian Anthony
SIPRI

1330-1830 **Fifth Session: Future Directions**
Moderator: Dr. Gail Mattox, U.S. State Department

X. *Nuclear Arms Reductions After START II*
Presenters:

Mr. Bruno Tertrais
CREST, France

Mr. Frank Jenkins
Center for National Security Negotiation, SAIC

XI. *Verification and Information-Sharing*
Presenters:

Ms. Sally Mullen
U.S. Department of Energy

Mr. P.W.D. Hatt
U.K. Ministry of Defence

XII. *Security Assurances & Cooperative Threat Reductions in Europe and the* FSU
Presenters:

Ambassador Maynard Glitman
Consultant

Dr. Istvan Kormendy
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador James Goodby
U.S. Institute for Peace

Colonel Waldemar Czarnecki
Polish Ministry of Defense

1900 Reception

1930 Formal Supper

2000 **Supper Remarks:** Dr. Shai Feldman
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Israel

2030 Concluding Remarks: Dr. Ralph Hallenbeck, SAIC
Prof. Richard Langhorne, Wilton Park
Mr. Frank Jenkins, CNSN

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