



Association for Information and Image Management



1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100
Silver Spring, Maryland 20910
301/587-8202




Centimeter



Inches



MANUFACTURED TO AIM STANDARDS
BY APPLIED IMAGE, INC.



1 of 1

THE CFE TREATY AND CHANGED CONDITIONS IN EUROPE*

Jack Allentuck
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, NY, USA

ABSTRACT

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in November 1990 by sixteen nations, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and six nations, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). It was designed to prevent a major surprise attack in Europe by the conventional forces of one Treaty Organization against those of the other and was the first major arms control treaty to address conventional weapons.

This paper focuses on how CFE adapted to changes in the military-political situation in Europe which occurred after 1990 and failed to adapt to others. Suggestions are offered on how it might be changed to make it more relevant under these changed conditions.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in November 1990 by twenty-two nations, sixteen members of NATO and six members of the WTO. Its principal objectives were as follows:

- to establish a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at levels lower than heretofore,

- to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and
- to eliminate as a matter of high priority the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe.

While the treaty imposed responsibilities on states, it was functionally organized on the basis of the two Treaty Organizations. In fact, it provided that no signatory of the CFE could inspect another signatory, which was a member of the same treaty organization. Even in November 1990 the existence of the WTO was in doubt and at least one member state, Hungary, had indicated its desire to conduct verification inspections of another member state, the USSR, which existed at that time.

The final demise of the WTO in July 1991 followed by the break-up of the Soviet Union in December of that year gave rise to two problems, which stated in general terms are as follows:

- How to implement the CFE as it was formulated, given the momentous changes of 1991, and
- how to redefine the principal objectives of the CFE so as to continue its relevance following the elimination, as a credible

*This work is performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy, Contract No. DE-AC02-76CH00016.

MASTER *ds*

threat, of the possibility of a surprise attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe across the German plain using conventional weapons.

BACKGROUND

Negotiations on the terms of the CFE Treaty began in March 1989 and agreement was announced in October 1990. Signing followed in November. The rapid resolution of remaining differences between the United States and the Soviet Union prior to agreement was facilitated by pressure on negotiators applied by the heads of both governments. It was apparent that both the United States and the Soviet Union each saw the CFE as serving their interests. Some differences relating to limitations on troop strength and aerial inspections still remained. These were tabled for resolution in future Phase I-A and Phase 2 negotiations. An agreement on troop strength was reached in July 1992. It called for each party to declare a ceiling on its troops strength within the area of application.

The objectives of the CFE were to be achieved in part by limiting the numbers and locations of weapons of various types otherwise referred to as Treaty Limited Items (TLIs)¹, to be held by NATO and the WTO in the area of application, which comprised the entire European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU). ATTU was further divided into a number of concentric zones centered on the German-Polish border. Limits on the number of TLIs located in any zone were inverse functions of proximity to the center.

The number of weapons to be held by each signatory would be determined by an allocation process conducted by the Treaty Organization of which the signatory was a member. Verification inspections were to be organized by the Treaty Organizations, but conducted by the signatories. Thus, CFE was in a sense multilateral and in

another sense bilateral. With the demise of the WTO an important player left the stage and the role it was to play in implementing the treaty had to be otherwise filled. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, it became necessary that a successor state be identified and that the matter of adherence to the CFE Treaty of the states which emerged from it be resolved. In addition, the TLIs allocated to the Soviet Union had to be reallocated among Russia, the successor state, and the other newly independent states.

With the emergence of the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union as independent states, long-suppressed animosities between some of them flared into open warfare. Similarly hostilities broke-out between ethnic groups within the borders of some of these states, while in others, latent hatreds threaten to emerge in open civil war.

The demise of the WTO was accompanied by demands of former member states that Soviet military forces be withdrawn from their territories. At the same time, open hostilities flared in the Balkans as Yugoslavia, a federal state, broke-up. Fighting continues in that region and threatens to spread to Albania.

The demise of WTO and the eastward withdrawal of Russian forces, accompanied by what appears to be a general demoralization of these forces, suggest that a surprise attack on Western Europe by Russia is no longer a credible threat. On the other hand, different threats to European security have or seem to be emerging.

These changed conditions in Eastern and Central Europe raise questions as to how the objectives of the CFE Treaty may be redefined and certain of its terms respecified so that it may continue to be relevant.

IMPLEMENTING THE CFE TREATY UNDER CHANGED CONDITIONS

Russia declared itself the successor state to the former Soviet Union and was recognized as such by the other signatories to the Treaty. In

¹TLIs are artillery, main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters.

a meeting in Budapest in March 1990, the members of WTO allocated WTO TLIs among themselves. This allocation was not changed following the demise of WTO. The TLIs, allowed the Soviet Union by the CFE Treaty, were allocated at a summit meeting in Tashkent in May 1992, among Russia and the newly independent states which by then had adhered to the CFE Treaty². NATO coordinated inspection activities of its members. Former WTO members have succeeded in arranging CFE inspections without a coordinating body.

EMERGING THREATS

While the threat which the CFE Treaty was designed to prevent, i.e., a surprise attack on Western Europe across the German plain, is no longer credible, other threats have emerged. They result from the following:

- Rampant nationalism in the republics of the former Soviet Union has lead to civil wars in certain republics, for example, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Other states which face civil wars of varying degrees of ferocity are Moldova, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation itself. Conflicts have also broken out between states.
- An economy in a chaotic state has lead to a declining standard of living in the Russian Federation. This is combined with nostalgia for the perceived better life under the former regime and a well-armed military which feels humiliated and is in a state of questionable subordination to civil authority. That this situation may lead to the assumption of power by a regime which will pose a direct threat to the newly independent republics and to former members of the WTO is not incredible.

²In addition to the original twenty-two signatories, former Soviet Republics (in addition to Russia) have adhered to the CFE Treaty. Czechoslovakia, an original signatory, separated into two republics, Czech and Slovakia.

- The break-up of Yugoslavia has already lead to a bloody war in the Balkans which threatens to spread.

ADAPTING TO CHANGE

One approach to assuring the security of Central and Eastern Europe is the NATO partnership concept. This concept was proposed by the United States partially in response to endeavors of former WTO members to join NATO motivated by the perception that their security would be enhanced by NATO membership. This "partnership" concept was defined in "Partnership in the Name of Peace" submitted to a meeting of NATO defense ministers in October 1993. A feature of the Partnership for Peace would be to provide a framework for detailed operational military cooperation within the NATO framework leading eventually to participation with NATO on a range of military activities including joint military planning, training, and exercises. On the other hand, the "partners" would be excluded from the NATO security guarantee embodied in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty which requires each member to regard an attack on one as an attack on all. This notwithstanding, a Russian Intelligence Service analysis cautions that for Russia bringing a powerful military alliance closer to its borders would require among other things "a fundamental rethinking of all defense concepts; restructuring of armed forces; a revision of the operation division of a map of the theater of military operations; setting up additional infrastructure; redeployment of large military contingents; and a change in operation plans and the nature of combat training." Despite this caution, NATO has signed partnership agreements with fourteen East European States including seven Soviet Republics, six former members of the WTO and Albania. Of these, some have announced plans to seek full membership.

Another approach is based on adapting the CFE to changed conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. Such an adaptation would have two objectives. One would be to minimize the

possibility of an attack using conventional forces on former members of WTO by a Russian regime which had come to power with an agenda of reasserting domination over its erstwhile allies. The other objective would be to reduce the possibility of additional fighting among the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

CHANGING THE CFE TREATY

Recall that the approach taken in the CFE Treaty to prevent an attack across the German plain using conventional forces was to thin out armaments held by Treaty signatories in concentric zones about a center on the Polish-German border in inverse proportion to the distance from the center. Under present conditions, that center is less relevant. Indeed it has shifted eastward to a borderline which separates Russia from the Baltic Republics and Finland, the Ukraine and Belarus from the former members of WTO. The principle of limiting the number of conventional weapons as an inverse function of distance from the center should be implemented around this new center. The details of specifying the number of TLIs in newly established zones is likely to be difficult. Such an approach would mitigate the perception by the Russians of the eastward extension of the borders of NATO as a new threat. In addition, the WTO states now entering a kind of second-class NATO membership might be content not to press for Article 5 protection which NATO does not appear ready to grant. They would, however, enjoy the security offered by the thinning-out of Russian forces facing their borders.

The approach suggested above, based on an eastward movement of the CFE center, is not of itself likely to have any beneficial consequence for threats, from the use of conventional weapons, that the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union pose to one another.

Consider once again the TLIs for these states as shown in Table 1. The principle underlying this allocation is not apparent. It is seen that the number of TLIs, allocated to Moldova, Georgia,

Azerbaijan, and Armenia (the group of four) are identical. Kazakhstan has no allocation of weapons since it is located outside of ATTU. Ukraine's allocation is on a par with France, while Belarus' allocation is intermediate between the Ukraine and the group of four.

This paper focuses on the latter group. Moldova was seized after World War II by the former Soviet Union from Romania, with which it shares a border. It also has a border with the Ukraine. The majority ethnic Russian population which attempts to establish a separate state between the Dniester River and the Ukraine. This effort has had the assistance of Russian military units stationed there. The ethnic Romanians have displayed a strong inclination toward annexation by Romania.

Armenia shares borders with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Turkey and Armenia harbor an ages old enmity. Armenia has an ongoing war with Azerbaijan in which the Russian Army has intervened from time to time. Georgia has an ongoing civil war in which Russian military intervention has played a part.

The TLIs allocated to each country in this group seems to put them on an equal footing with regard to conflicts among themselves. These numbers are inadequate for warfare against neighboring states outside of the group. However, they are adequate for suppressing ethnic conflicts aimed at creating separate states as long as such insurrectionists do not receive external support. External support can take two forms: direct intervention by an organized military unit or "leakage" of weapons across an international border. Note that as a consequence of the CFE Treaty, signatories find themselves with a surplus of substantial quantities of modern weapons. While there are legitimate means for the disposal of such surplus, the simple existence of a surplus makes illegitimate disposal likely.

The CFE Treaty requires a set of verification activities to 1) determine base-line data on TLIs in each signatory's inventory upon the Treaty's entry-into-force, and 2) to

determine subsequently that each signatory is in compliance with the terms of the Treaty. An examination of the CFE verification process as designed for its initial objective, i.e., preventing a surprise attack by large military forces, indicates that its verification goal was not to make each and every non-compliance crystal clear. Rather it was to uncover violations involving militarily significant quantities (MSQs) of TLIs. In Reference 1 it was shown that an MSQ in the context of that threat and the principal objective of the Treaty was the weaponry associated approximately with two Russian motorized rifle divisions.

The TLIs allowed each of the group of four is approximately that associated with two Russian motorized rifle divisions. Thus an MSQ in the context of conflict prevention among these countries is likely to be very much smaller than the MSQ in the context of the CFE Treaty's original objective. The argument made in Reference 1 that high technology verification aids were not needed for the CFE Treaty because of the magnitude of an MSQ is no longer valid. In Table 2, verification requirements and available verification techniques originally considered for the CFE Treaty are shown. Those rejected should now be reconsidered in the light of smaller MSQs which have emerged with the break-up of the former Soviet Union.

SUMMARY

Because of the demise of the WTO and the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the principal occurrence which the CFE Treaty was designed to prevent, a surprise attack across Germany by a major force employing conventional weapons, has ceased to be credible. Other threats have emerged. The threat of a Russian attack following a change in regime on one or more of its former allies is credible. Thus, there has been an earlier shift of the line across which a surprise attack may occur. To mitigate this threat, a revised definition of zones of reduced military forces should be considered.

The emergence of independent republics from the former Soviet Union has already sparked conflicts involving small forces (by major power standards). These republics have adhered to the CFE Treaty. Because MSQs are proportionately small, the detection of violations are likely to involve the use of sophisticated technological techniques, which were rejected when the CFE Treaty was originally signed.

REFERENCE

1. J. Allentuck, "Verifying The CFE Treaty: Any Role For Technology?", INMM 32nd Annual Meeting Proceedings, July 28-31, 1991, Vol. XX, pp. 796-799.

DISCLAIMER

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

Table 1
Allocation of Former Soviet CFE-limited Weapons Among The Successor States*

	TANKS			ACVs			ARTILLARY			A/C	HELOS
	Total	Active	Stored	Total	Active	Stored	Total	Active	Stored	Total	Total
Russia	6,400	4,975	1,425	11,480	10,525	955	6,415	5,105	1,310	3,450	890
Ukraine	4,080	3,130	950	5,050	4,350	700	4,040	3,240	800	1,090	330
Belarus	1,800	1,525	275	2,600	2,175	425	1,615	1,375	240	260	80
Armenia	220	220	0	220	220	0	285	285	0	100	50
Azerbaijan	220	220	0	220	220	0	285	285	0	100	50
Georgia	220	220	0	220	220	0	285	285	0	100	50
Moldova	210	210	0	210	210	0	250	250	0	50	50
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	13,150	10,500	2,650	20,000	17,920	2,080	13,175	10,825	2,350	5,150	1,500

* Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 21 May 1992

Table 2
Verification Requirements and Techniques

TECHNIQUES	VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS		
	BASELINE DATA	REDUCTION, DESTRUCTION, CONVERSION	INTRODUCTION, PRODUCTION, STORAGE
<u>Platforms and Sensors</u>			
Satellites (NTM, all sensors)	*		*
Non-penetrating aircraft	→	→	
Penetrating Aircraft	→	→	
Optical	→	→	
Electro-optical	→	→	
Radar	→	→	
Infra-red	→	→	
Ground-based Sensors			→
Seismic Detection			→
Electro-magnetic signature			→
Acoustic Detector			→
Containment/surveillance			→
On-site Inspection Facilitator			
Helicopters*	*	*	*
Ground Vehicles*	*	*	*
Cameras, Video, and still	*	*	*
Lap-top Computers	*	*	*
Tagging	→	→	→

→ Suggested but rejected

* Allowed

* Furnished by inspected party

**DATE
FILMED**

9/30/94

END

