Nuclear criticality safety evaluation of the passage of decontaminated salt solution from the ITP filters into tank 50H for interim storage
This report assesses the nuclear criticality safety associated with the decontaminated salt solution after passing through the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) filters, through the stripper columns and into Tank 50H for interim storage until transfer to the Saltstone facility. The criticality safety basis for the ITP process is documented. Criticality safety in the ITP filtrate has been analyzed under normal and process upset conditions. This report evaluates the potential for criticality due to the precipitation or crystallization of fissionable material from solution and an ITP process filter failure in which insoluble material carryover from salt dissolution is present. It is concluded that no single inadvertent error will cause criticality and that the process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions.
- Research Organization:
- Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC09-89SR18035
- OSTI ID:
- 10168968
- Report Number(s):
- WSRC-TR-94-0269; ON: DE94015549; IN: NCSE WM 94-2; TRN: 94:007507
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: PBD: 27 May 1994
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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