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Title: Secondary Protection for 70 MPa Fueling - A White Paper from the Hydrogen Safety Panel

Abstract

In developing a 70 megapascal (MPa) fueling infrastructure, it is critical to ensure that a vehicle equipped with a lower service pressure fuel tank is never filled from a 70 MPa fueling source. Filling of a lower service pressure vehicle at a 70 MPa fueling source is likely to result in a catastrophic event with severe injuries or fatalities. The Hydrogen Safety Panel recommends that DOE undertake a two-step process to address this issue: 1. Perform an independent risk analysis of a 70MPa dispenser filling a lower pressure vehicle tank and develop different approaches for prevention and mitigation to meet an acceptable level of safety. Cost effectiveness, reliability, advantages and disadvantages are among the factors that should be evaluated for each approach considered. 2. Until such time as this analysis is complete and any recommended actions implemented, communicate the potential risk to responsible parties and strongly encourage those parties to add a secondary layer of protection to the existing system of mechanically non-interchangeable nozzles/receptacles. This will reduce the probability of a pressure mismatch during this developmental phase for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and infrastructure. This step can be reassessed after further analysis is completed and the need and effectiveness ofmore » secondary protection methods are evaluated. This paper provides background discussion of the problem, current safety systems and strategy and examples of potential future solutions to support the above recommendations.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [1]
  1. Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1012309
Report Number(s):
PNNL-18523
EB4204000; TRN: US201110%%214
DOE Contract Number:  
AC05-76RL01830
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
08 HYDROGEN; 30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION; HYDROGEN; HYDROGEN FUEL CELLS; INJURIES; MITIGATION; PROBABILITY; RECOMMENDATIONS; RELIABILITY; RISK ASSESSMENT; SAFETY; TANKS

Citation Formats

Weiner, Steven C., and Kallman, Richard A. Secondary Protection for 70 MPa Fueling - A White Paper from the Hydrogen Safety Panel. United States: N. p., 2009. Web. doi:10.2172/1012309.
Weiner, Steven C., & Kallman, Richard A. Secondary Protection for 70 MPa Fueling - A White Paper from the Hydrogen Safety Panel. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/1012309
Weiner, Steven C., and Kallman, Richard A. 2009. "Secondary Protection for 70 MPa Fueling - A White Paper from the Hydrogen Safety Panel". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/1012309. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1012309.
@article{osti_1012309,
title = {Secondary Protection for 70 MPa Fueling - A White Paper from the Hydrogen Safety Panel},
author = {Weiner, Steven C. and Kallman, Richard A.},
abstractNote = {In developing a 70 megapascal (MPa) fueling infrastructure, it is critical to ensure that a vehicle equipped with a lower service pressure fuel tank is never filled from a 70 MPa fueling source. Filling of a lower service pressure vehicle at a 70 MPa fueling source is likely to result in a catastrophic event with severe injuries or fatalities. The Hydrogen Safety Panel recommends that DOE undertake a two-step process to address this issue: 1. Perform an independent risk analysis of a 70MPa dispenser filling a lower pressure vehicle tank and develop different approaches for prevention and mitigation to meet an acceptable level of safety. Cost effectiveness, reliability, advantages and disadvantages are among the factors that should be evaluated for each approach considered. 2. Until such time as this analysis is complete and any recommended actions implemented, communicate the potential risk to responsible parties and strongly encourage those parties to add a secondary layer of protection to the existing system of mechanically non-interchangeable nozzles/receptacles. This will reduce the probability of a pressure mismatch during this developmental phase for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and infrastructure. This step can be reassessed after further analysis is completed and the need and effectiveness of secondary protection methods are evaluated. This paper provides background discussion of the problem, current safety systems and strategy and examples of potential future solutions to support the above recommendations.},
doi = {10.2172/1012309},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1012309}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2009},
month = {Wed Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2009}
}