15 Search Results

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

Due to the ever-changing risk environment that faces the Nation’s critical infrastructure, it is essential that a comprehensive, collaborative approach is taken to enhance the resilience of the infrastructure assets and systems that are relied upon by the American people. To address the gaps that exist in infrastructure resilience research and development, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) created the Resilience Optimization Center (IROC) to bring together multi-disciplinary subject matter experts internally across the laboratory, as well as from public and private entities, other national laboratories, and academia to address some of the Nation’s more challenging infrastructure problems. These experts are working to provide easier access to subject matter experts; providing feasible, optimized solutions that yield observable results; and creating collaborative teams that apply a cyber-physical-dependencies approach. Though a variety of research initiatives, IROC is striving to provide end-to-end solutions, bridging the gap between cyber and physical infrastructure through research, analysis, testing, and validation.

Smart grid technologies are based on the integration of the cyber network and the power grid into a cyber-physical power system (CPPS). The increasing cyber-physical interdependencies bring about tremendous opportunities for the modeling, monitoring, control, and protection of power grids, but also create new types of vulnerabilities and failure mechanisms threatening the reliability and resiliency of system operation. A major concern regarding the interdependent networks is the cascading failure (CF), where a small initial disturbance/failure in the network results in a seemingly unexpected large-scale failure. Although there has been a significant volume of recent work in the CF research of CPPS, a comprehensive review remains unavailable. This article aims to fill the gap by providing a systematic literature survey regarding the modeling, analysis, and mitigation of CF in CPPS. The open research questions for further research are also discussed. This article allows researchers to easily understand the state of the art of CF research in CPPS and fosters future work required towards full resolutions to the remaining questions and challenges.

The renewable energy proliferation calls upon the grid operators and planners to systematically evaluate the potential impacts of distributed energy resources (DERs). Considering the significant differences between various inverter-based resources (IBRs), especially the different capabilities between grid-forming inverters and grid-following inverters, it is crucial to develop an efficient and effective assessment procedure besides available co-simulation framework with high computation burdens. This paper presents a streamlined graph-based topology assessment for the integrated power system transmission and distribution networks. Graph analyses were performed based on the integrated graph of modified miniWECC grid model and IEEE 8500-node test feeder model, high performance computing platform with 40 nodes and total 2400 CPUs has been utilized to process this integrated graph, which has 100,000+ nodes and 10,000+ IBRs. The node ranking results not only verified the applicability of the proposed method, but also revealed the potential of distributed grid forming (GFM) and grid following (GFL) inverters interacting with the centralized power plants.

Distribution service restoration (DSR) under natural disasters is always a critical and challenging problem for utility companies. An effective solution must not ignore the power-communication interdependency as various systems are getting increasingly connected in the Smart Grid era. In this paper, we propose a two-layer distribution system model with both power and communication components. Based on this model, we formulate the restoration process as a routing problem that schedules the path and action sequence of utility crews that involves repairing damaged components, closing power switches, and enabling communication paths between the control center and remote field devices. Further, we develop a simulation-based method to quantitatively evaluate the restoration process with public reference models of large-scale power systems. The experimental results show that our method improves the total restored energy up to 57.6% and reduces the recovery time up to 63% by considering the power-communication interdependency.

A major outage in the electricity distribution system may affect the operation of water and natural gas supply systems, leading to an interruption of multiple services to critical customers. Therefore, enhancing resilience of critical infrastructures requires joint efforts of multiple sectors. In this paper, a distribution system service restoration method considering the electricity-water-gas interdependency is proposed. The objective is maximizing the supply of electricity, water, and gas to critical customers after an extreme event. The operational constraints of electricity, water, and natural gas networks are considered. Additionally, the characteristics of electricity-driven coupling components, including water pumps and gas compressors, are also modeled. Relaxation techniques are applied to non convex constraints posed by physical laws of those networks. Consequently, the restoration problem is formulated as a mixed-integer second-order cone program, which can readily be solved by the off-the-shelf solvers. The proposed method is validated by numerical simulations on an electricity-water-gas integrated system, developed based on benchmark models of the subsystems. The results indicate that considering the interdependency refines the allocation of limited generation resources and demonstrate the exactness of the proposed convex relaxation

The critical infrastructures protection landscape is a vast and varied pattern of independent, but interconnected infrastructure systems that are essential to the function of our modern society. The U.S. policy on critical infrastructure protection has been continually evolving since the “President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection” was published in 1997. In response to these policies, federal, state, and local governments, along with research institutions, have invested a substantial amount of time and effort into identifying and analyzing critical infrastructure, their functions, and dependencies/interdependencies to better understand their vulnerabilities. To date, the ability to assess vulnerabilities, resiliency, and priorities for protecting interdependent critical infrastructure systems from an all-hazards perspective remains a difficult problem. In this paper we introduce the All-Hazards Analysis (AHA) methodology, which provides an integrated functional basis across infrastructure systems, through the implementation of a common language and a scalable level of decomposition to effectively evaluate the resilience of interconnected infrastructure systems. AHA models infrastructure systems as directed multidimensional graphs, which enable the evaluation of cross-sector interdependencies prior to, during, and after disruptive events. Finally, and by design, AHA enables the cross linking of data taxonomies to enable more effective data sharing, such as the National Critical Functions (NCF) and Infrastructure Data Taxonomy (IDT).

Communication networks are integral to modern power grid operations and are becoming increasingly critical as grid dynamics speed up and as more controls become closed-loop in form. Focusing on the interdependence between the physical grid and the communication system, we identify several key characteristics and typical graph properties based on analysis of a real communication system for a power grid. Moreover, an automated process was provided for synthetic testbed in the NS-3 simulator for the power system test case, and its network characteristics have been further derived for power system monitoring and control applications

This study aims to investigate how future cold weather events might affect regions as their generation fleet continues to shift away from baseload coal and nuclear plants and toward natural gas units and renewables. In particular, this study explores the potential effects of simulated extreme winter weather events in the northeastern U.S. from 2018 through 2025, how that weather might affect the BES and natural gas infrastructure and market performance, and how might the electricity and natural gas markets respond to increased demand on the system.

This study follows upon the previously published NETL reports that examined the performance of electricity generation units during the winter storm and cold weather event known as the “Bomb Cyclone” that occurred in early 2018. This study briefly explains the dynamics of the natural gas market, reviews the performance of slated and at-risk for retirement coal plants during the Bomb Cyclone, calculates the costs of serving load above “normal” conditions, and observes trends in fuel secure generation. Subsequently, the report projects near-term economic and reliability costs associated with expansion of the natural gas generation network finding that natural gas deliverability constraints lead to high fuel and electricity price spikes that are exacerbated by the continued retirements of thermal units. Conservatively, an investment of $470 million to $1.1 billion over that already entrained in the long-haul natural gas transmission system is identified to avoid even worse outcomes.