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CalWave has developed a submerged pressure differential type Wave Energy Converter (WEC) architecture called xWave. The single body device oscillates submerged, is positively buoyant, and taut moored to the sea floor and integrates novel features such as absorber submergence depth control. Since participation in the US Wave Energy Prize, CalWave has evolved the design and successfully concluded a scaled 10-month open ocean pilot. CalWave recently concluded the final design phase of a scaled up WEC version for PacWave and started component order/build of the WEC towards the grid-connected demonstration at PacWave. Documentation and data here includes: a system certification plan, a risk registry in the form of an FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis) table, an updated LCOE content model, a report on performance metrics, and a risk management plan.

The SeaRAY is a deployable power system for maritime sensors, monitoring equipment, communications, unmanned underwater vehicles, and other similar payloads. This project is to design, deliver, and test a prototype low-power WEC that lowers the total cost of ownership and provides robust, new capabilities for customers in the maritime environment. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is conducted to systematically identify all potential failure modes and their effects on the system, and to analyze the criticality of each risk based on the likelihood of the event and the severity of the impact. Actions may then be recommended to mitigate the criticality of a risk, either by reducing the likelihood of the risk or the severity of its impact. Risk assessment is executed iteratively as an integral part of the design process. By incorporating risk assessment early in the development cycle, mitigation of risk can be achieved cost effectively. The actions recommended to mitigate risk may be subsequently executed, and as the design progresses the risk assessment is reviewed and revised. Review of the risk assessment is integrated into structured design reviews, ensuring that critical risks are comprehended and that the Project will not progress to e.g. fabrication while intolerable risks remain. The risk assessment process results in the population and maintenance of Risk Registers (RRs). Each major system (and as needed, subsystem) will have a distinct RR. This allows each system or subsystem to be assessed individually, rendering the RRs to a manageable size for review.

Risk Registers for major subsystems completed according to the methodology described in the Risk Management Plan [DE-EE0008627 D1.2 Risk Management Plan PD v1.1 07-19-2019.pdf], also included here.

Updated Risk Registers for major subsystems of the StingRAY WEC completed according to the methodology described in compliance with the DOE Risk Management Framework developed by NREL.

Analysis method to systematically identify all potential failure modes and their effects on the Stingray WEC system. This analysis is incorporated early in the development cycle such that the mitigation of the identified failure modes can be achieved cost effectively and efficiently. The FMECA can begin once there is enough detail to functions and failure modes of a given system, and its interfaces with other systems. The FMECA occurs coincidently with the design process and is an iterative process which allows for design changes to overcome deficiencies in the analysis.Risk Registers for major subsystems completed according to the methodology described in "Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis Risk Reduction Program Plan.pdf" document below, in compliance with the DOE Risk Management Framework developed by NREL.

An applied research firm collaborated with staff at three community hospitals to apply Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to reduce risk from several high-risk healthcare processes. This included medication ordering and delivery, X-Ray labelling, blood transfusion, prevention of wrong site surgery, prevention of patient falls and antibiotic IV administration. The collaborating team developed its own successful FMECA approach and an eight-step procedure to gather data, conduct FMECA sessions, identify medical process weaknesses and risk reduction measures.

The staff at three Washington State hospitals and Battelle Pacific Northwest Division have been collaborating to apply Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to assess several hospital processes. The staff from Kadlec Medical Center (KMC), located in Richland, Washington; Kennewick General Hospital (KGH), located in Kennewick, Washington; and Lourdes Medical Center (LMC), located in Pasco, Washington, along with staff from Battelle, which is located in Richland, Washington have been working together successfully for two and a half years. Tri-Cities Shared Services, a local organization which implements shared hospital services, has provided the forum for joint activity. This effort was initiated in response to the new JCAHO patient safety standards implemented in July 2001, and the hospitals’ desire to be more proactive in improving patient safety. As a result of performing FMECAs the weaknesses of six medical processes have been characterized and corresponding system improvements implemented. Based on this collective experience, insights about the benefits of applying FMECAs to healthcare processes have been identified.

The revolutionary reactor design, PIUS-600 as described in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSID) was subject to analyses consisting of Failure Modes. Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) analysis, and conventional engineering review of the stress, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, and corrosion. These results were integrated in the PIUS Intermediate Table (PIT) from which accident initiators and mitigators were identified and categorized into seven estimated frequency intervals. Accident consequences were classified as: CC-1, minor radiological release, CC-2, clad release, CC-3, major release. The systems were analyzed using event sequence diagrams (ESDs) and event trees (ETs). The resulting accident sequences of the ET were categorized into event conditions (ECs) based on initiator frequency and combinations of failures. System interactions were considered in the FMECAs, ESDs, ETs and in an interaction table that also identified system safety classifications.

The revolutionary reactor design, PIUS-600 as described in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSID) was subject to analyses consisting of Failure Modes. Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) analysis, and conventional engineering review of the stress, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, and corrosion. These results were integrated in the PIUS Intermediate Table (PIT) from which accident initiators and mitigators were identified and categorized into seven estimated frequency intervals. Accident consequences were classified as: CC-1, minor radiological release, CC-2, clad release, CC-3, major release. The systems were analyzed using event sequence diagrams (ESDs) and event trees (ETs). The resulting accident sequences of the ET were categorized into event conditions (ECs) based on initiator frequency and combinations of failures. System interactions were considered in the FMECAs, ESDs, ETs and in an interaction table that also identified system safety classifications.

A simplified model of the PIUS 600 Reactor System is described, and results from two event simulations are discussed, and compared with ABB's predicted results. The model is based on a BWR Plant Analyzer developed by BNL, with PIUS-specific models added for the density locks. Initial results support the effectiveness of the passive reactor shutdown, although some significant power oscillations occur before the shutdown is completed.