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  1. Nuclear and radiological hazards and threats.

    No abstract prepared.
  2. Sandia National Laboratories Strategic Context Workshop Series 2017: National Security Futures for Strategic Thinking.

    In August 2017, Sandia convened five workshops to explore the future of advanced technologies and global peace and security through the lenses of deterrence, information, innovation, nonproliferation, and population and Earth systems.
  3. Nuclear and radiological hazards and transportation.

    No abstract prepared.
  4. Nuclear and radiological hazards and threats.

    No abstract prepared.
  5. Verifying Missile Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia

    Missiles are attractive weapon systems because of their flexibility, survivability, and relatively low cost. Consequently, many nations are seeking to build missile forces resulting in regional arms races. Missile forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). Efforts to control missile proliferation must account for these effects. A number of strategies to control the destabilizing effects of missiles were developed during the Cold War. Some of these strategies are applicable to regional missile control but new approaches, tailored to regional geographic and security conditions, are needed. Regional missile nonproliferation canmore » be pursued in a variety of ways: Reducing the demand for missiles by decreasing the perception of national threats; Restricting the export of missiles and associated equipment by supplier countries; Restricting information describing missile technology; Limiting missile development activities such as flight or engine tests; Restricting the operational deployment of existing missile forces; and Reducing existing missile forces by number and/or type. Even when development is complete, limits on deployment within range of potential targets or limits on operational readiness can help stabilize potential missile confrontations. Implementing these strategies often involves the collection and exchange of information about activities related to missile development or deployment. Monitoring is the process of collecting information used to for subsequent verification of commitments. A systematic approach to implementing verification is presented that identifies areas where monitoring could support missile nonproliferation agreements. The paper presents both non-technical and technical techniques for monitoring. Examples of non-technical techniques are declarations about planned test launches or on-site inspections. Examples of technical monitoring include remote monitoring (i.e., a sensor that is physically present at a facility) and remote sensing (i.e., a sensor that records activity without being physically present at a facility).« less
  6. Verifying missile non-proliferation in Northeast Asia.

    No abstract prepared.
  7. Ballistic Missile Silo Door Monitoring Analysis

    This paper compares the cost and effectiveness of several potential options that may be used to monitor silo-based ballistic missiles. Silo door monitoring can be used to verify that warheads removed to deactivate or download silo-based ballistic missiles have not been replaced. A precedent for monitoring warhead replacement using reentry vehicle on site inspections (RV-OSIs) and using satellites has been established by START-I and START-II. However, other monitoring options have the potential to be less expensive and more effective. Three options are the most promising if high verification confidence is desired: random monitoring using door sensors; random monitoring using mannedmore » or unmanned aircraft; and continuous remote monitoring using unattended door sensors.« less
  8. CTBT integrated verification system evaluation model supplement

    Sandia National Laboratories has developed a computer based model called IVSEM (Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model) to estimate the performance of a nuclear detonation monitoring system. The IVSEM project was initiated in June 1994, by Sandia's Monitoring Systems and Technology Center and has been funded by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (DOE/NN). IVSEM is a simple, ''top-level,'' modeling tool which estimates the performance of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring system and can help explore the impact of various sensor system concepts and technology advancements on CTBT monitoring. One of IVSEM's uniquemore » features is that it integrates results from the various CTBT sensor technologies (seismic, in sound, radionuclide, and hydroacoustic) and allows the user to investigate synergy among the technologies. Specifically, IVSEM estimates the detection effectiveness (probability of detection), location accuracy, and identification capability of the integrated system and of each technology subsystem individually. The model attempts to accurately estimate the monitoring system's performance at medium interfaces (air-land, air-water) and for some evasive testing methods such as seismic decoupling. The original IVSEM report, CTBT Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model, SAND97-25 18, described version 1.2 of IVSEM. This report describes the changes made to IVSEM version 1.2 and the addition of identification capability estimates that have been incorporated into IVSEM version 2.0.« less
  9. Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/9: De-Alerting Strategic Ballistic Missiles

    This paper presents a framework for evaluating the technical merits of strategic ballistic missile de-alerting measures, and it uses the framework to evaluate a variety of possible measures for silo-based, land-mobile, and submarine-based missiles. De-alerting measures are defined for the purpose of this paper as reversible actions taken to increase the time or effort required to launch a strategic ballistic missile. The paper does not assess the desirability of pursuing a de-alerting program. Such an assessment is highly context dependent. The paper postulates that if de-alerting is desirable and is used as an arms control mechanism, de-alerting measures should satisfymore » specific cirteria relating to force security, practicality, effectiveness, significant delay, and verifiability. Silo-launched missiles lend themselves most readily to de-alerting verification, because communications necessary for monitoring do not increase the vulnerabilty of the weapons by a significant amount. Land-mobile missile de-alerting measures would be more challenging to verify, because monitoring measures that disclose the launcher's location would potentially increase their vulnerability. Submarine-launched missile de-alerting measures would be extremely challlenging if not impossible to monitor without increasing the submarine's vulnerability.« less

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