Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

Conference · Fri Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2010

OSTI ID:990243

Laughter, Mark D ^[1]; Whitaker, J Michael ^[1]; Howell, John ^[2]

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1. ORNL
2. University of Glasgow

Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load cell data; (8) hardware and software implementation for process load cell data collection; (9) costs associated with unattended monitoring of load cells (for both operator and inspector) weighed against the potential benefits of having access to such data; (10) results from field tests of load cell data collection systems in operating facilities; and (11) use of unattended load cell data to increase efficiency of on-site inspection schedules and activities.

• Research Organization: Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• DOE Contract Number: DE-AC05-00OR22725
• OSTI ID: 990243
• Resource Relation: Conference: 2010 IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna, Austria, 20101101, 20101105
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS
29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
ALGORITHMS
DATA PROCESSING
DETECTION
EFFICIENCY
FIELD TESTS
GAS CENTRIFUGES
GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
IAEA
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
IMPLEMENTATION
ISOTOPE SEPARATION
METRICS
MONITORING
NUCLEAR POWER
ON-SITE INSPECTION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
SAFEGUARDS
SHUTDOWN
STORAGE
VERIFICATION