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Title: Minimizing Glovebox Glove Breaches: PART II.

As a matter of good business practices, a team of glovebox experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been assembled to proactively investigate processes and procedures that minimize unplanned breaches in the glovebox, e.g., glove failures. A major part of this effort involves the review of glovebox glove failures that have occurred at the Plutonium Facility and at the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Facility. Information dating back to 1993 has been compiled from formal records. This data has been combined with information obtained from a baseline inventory of about 9,000 glovebox gloves. The key attributes tracked include those related to location, the glovebox glove, type and location of breaches, the worker, and the consequences resulting from breaches. This glovebox glove failure analysis yielded results in the areas of the ease of collecting this type of data, the causes of most glove failures that have occurred, the effectiveness of current controls, and recommendations to improve hazard control systems. As expected, a significant number of breaches involve high-risk operations such as grinding, hammering, using sharps (especially screwdrivers), and assembling equipment. Surprisingly, tasks such as the movement of equipment and material between gloveboxes and the opening of cans are also major contributionsmore » of breaches. Almost half the gloves fail within a year of their install date. The greatest consequence for over 90% of glovebox glove failures is alpha contamination of protective clothing. Personnel self-monitoring at the gloveboxes continues to be the most effective way of detecting glovebox glove failures. Glove failures from these tasks can be reduced through changes in procedures and the design of remote-handling apparatus. The Nuclear Materials Technology Division management uses this information to improve hazard control systems to reduce the number of unplanned breaches in the glovebox further. As a result, excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone and excess exposure to the radiological sources associated with unplanned breaches in the glovebox have been minimized. In conclusion, investigations of control failures, near misses, and accidents contribute to an organization's scientific and technological excellence by providing information that can be used to increase its operational safety.« less
Authors:
 [1] ;  [2] ;  [3] ;  [4] ;  [5] ;  [6]
  1. (Cournoyer, Michael E.)
  2. (Rose M.)
  3. (David J.)
  4. (Jay J.)
  5. (Robyn L.)
  6. (James J.)
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
977947
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-05-0651
TRN: US201012%%831
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Submitted to: WM’05 Conference, February 27 - March 3, 2005, Tucson, AZ
Research Org:
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Sponsoring Org:
DOE
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY; ACCIDENTS; AGE ESTIMATION; BUSINESS; CONTAMINATION; CONTROL SYSTEMS; DESIGN; GLOVEBOXES; GLOVES; GRINDING; LANL; MANAGEMENT; METALLURGY; OPENINGS; PERSONNEL; PLUTONIUM; PROTECTIVE CLOTHING; RECOMMENDATIONS; REMOTE HANDLING; RESPIRATION; SAFETY