Idealization, uncertainty and heterogeneity : game frameworks defined with formal concept analysis.
The present study begins with Formal Concept Analysis, and undertakes to demonstrate how a succession of game frameworks may, by design, address increasingly complex and interesting social phenomena. We develop a series of multi-agent exchange games, each of which incorporates an additional dimension of complexity. All games are based on coalition patterns in exchanges where diverse cultural markers provide a basis for trust and reciprocity. The first game is characterized by an idealized concept of trust. A second game framework introduces uncertainty regarding the reciprocity of prospective transactions. A third game framework retains idealized trust and uncertainty, and adds additional agent heterogeneity. Cultural markers are not equally salient in conferring or withholding trust, and the result is a richer transactional process.
- Research Organization:
- Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC02-06CH11357
- OSTI ID:
- 971936
- Report Number(s):
- ANL/DIS/CP-119258; TRN: US201005%%1
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Agent 2006 Conference on Social Agents: Results and Prospects; Sep. 18, 2006 - Sep. 23, 2006; Chicago, IL
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- ENGLISH
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