Designing and evaluating conventional arms control measures: The case of the Korean peninsula
As a method of designing and evaluating arms control measures, this study takes a combined approach of qualitative analysis and military simulation. Three qualitative criteria derived from the case studies on the Korean and European arms control are used to examine whether these measures are legally binding, verifiable, and negotiable. One quantifiable criterion is used to test against the base case scenario (a one-day surprise attach by North Korea) whether arms control measures will stabilize or destabilize the military status quo on the Peninsula in terms of North Korea's extent of penetration in the actual war situations. Four alternative measures are derived from the analysis: (1) Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs); (2) Establishment of Asymmetric Non-Deployment Zone (NDZ); (3) Reduction of the joint US-South Korean Team Spirit' exercises and North Korea's Forward Deployed Forces; and, (4) Reduction of South Korean and US forces and North Korean Forces. Findings indicate that establishment of the NDZ and a North Korean unilateral reduction are estimated to best achieve the goal of South Korean arms control.
- Research Organization:
- Rand Graduate Inst., Santa Monica, CA (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 5467498
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: Thesis (Ph.D.)
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Arms control in the Korean peninsula. Research report
Confidence building on the Korean Peninsula: A conceptual development for the cooperative monitoring of limited-force deployment zones
Related Subjects
29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATION
NORTH KOREA
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
EVALUATION
RECOMMENDATIONS
ASIA
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
350100* - Arms Control- Policy
Negotiations
& Legislation- (1987-)
290000 - Energy Planning & Policy