Regulatory capture and the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission toward a new regulatory theory
Regulators operate in a constantly changing environment characterized by new technologies, increased competition in regulated fields, and heightened environmental awareness. In such an environment, they must maintain a balance between the customers` interest in low rates for safe and reliable utility service, and the need to maintain solvent utilities that have the ability to attract capital at a reasonable cost. Concentration on either end of that balance by a regulatory agency during any particular period brings almost inevitably, charges of unfairness by champions representing the other side of the balance. If, for example, a Public Utilities Commission (PUC) sees the need to concentrate on the financial health of the utilities under its jurisdiction, consumers will likely feel the sting of rate increases. In the author`s view, Capture Theory, a theory of regulatory behavior which held sway for decades, resulted from scholars viewing regulatory agencies during the part of a cycle of regulation, when the concentration was on that side of the issue. But even while the various forms of Capture Theory were ascendant in the mid-1970`s, events in the field of public utility regulation were serving to refute them all. {open_quotes}Instead of having the happy task of presiding over a process that seemed to bestow benefits upon everyone, regulators in the 1970`s were faced with the unpleasant duty of allocating misery among rival and intensely vocal groups.{close_quotes}
- OSTI ID:
- 381209
- Journal Information:
- NRRI Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 16, Issue 1; Other Information: PBD: Mar 1995
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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