Solving the hard problem of Bertrand's paradox
Bertrand's paradox is a famous problem of probability theory, pointing to a possible inconsistency in Laplace's principle of insufficient reason. In this article, we show that Bertrand's paradox contains two different problems: an “easy” problem and a “hard” problem. The easy problem can be solved by formulating Bertrand's question in sufficiently precise terms, so allowing for a nonambiguous modelization of the entity subjected to the randomization. We then show that once the easy problem is settled, also the hard problem becomes solvable, provided Laplace's principle of insufficient reason is applied not to the outcomes of the experiment, but to the different possible “ways of selecting” an interaction between the entity under investigation and that producing the randomization. This consists in evaluating a huge average over all possible “ways of selecting” an interaction, which we call a universal average. Following a strategy similar to that used in the definition of the Wiener measure, we calculate such universal average and therefore solve the hard problem of Bertrand's paradox. The link between Bertrand's problem of probability theory and the measurement problem of quantum mechanics is also briefly discussed.
 Authors:

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 Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies and Department of Mathematics, Brussels Free University, Brussels (Belgium)
 Laboratorio di Autoricerca di Base, Lugano (Switzerland)
 Publication Date:
 OSTI Identifier:
 22306096
 Resource Type:
 Journal Article
 Resource Relation:
 Journal Name: Journal of Mathematical Physics; Journal Volume: 55; Journal Issue: 8; Other Information: (c) 2014 AIP Publishing LLC; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
 Country of Publication:
 United States
 Language:
 English
 Subject:
 71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MEASURING METHODS; PROBABILITY; QUANTUM MECHANICS; RANDOMNESS