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Title: Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.
Authors:
 [1]
  1. Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 221 Nassau St., 2nd floor, Princeton, NJ 08542 (United States)
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
22280429
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: AIP Conference Proceedings; Journal Volume: 1596; Journal Issue: 1; Conference: Short course on nuclear weapon issues in the 21st century, Washington, DC (United States), 2-3 Nov 2013; Other Information: (c) 2014 AIP Publishing LLC; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; FISSILE MATERIALS; FMCT; HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM; IAEA; INVENTORIES; MONITORING; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PLUTONIUM; SAFEGUARDS; UNITED NATIONS; VERIFICATION