Decommissioning of the 247-F Fuel Manufacturing Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS)
- Washington Savannah River Company (WSRC), Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States)
Building 247-F at SRS was a roughly 110,000 ft{sup 2} two-story facility designed and constructed during the height of the cold war naval buildup to provide additional naval nuclear fuel manufacturing capacity in early 1980's. The manufacturing process employed a wide variety of acids, bases, and other hazardous materials. As the need for naval fuel declined, the facility was shut down and underwent initial deactivation, which was completed in 1990. All process systems were flushed with water and drained using the existing process drain valves. However, since these drains were not always installed at the lowest point in piping and equipment systems, a significant volume of liquid remained after initial deactivation. After initial deactivation, a non-destructive assay of the process area identified approximately 17 ({+-}100%) kg of uranium held up in equipment and piping. The facility was placed in Surveillance and Maintenance mode until 2003, when the decision was made to perform final deactivation, and then decommission the facility. The following lessons were learned as a result of the D and D of building 247-F. Successful D and D of a major radiochemical process building requires significant up-front planning by a team of knowledgeable personnel led by a strong project manager. The level of uncertainty and resultant risk to timely, cost effective project execution was found to be high. Examples of the types of problems encountered which had high potential to adversely impact cost and schedule performance are described below. Low level and sanitary waste acceptance criteria do not allow free liquids in waste containers. These liquids, which are often corrosive, must be safely removed from the equipment before it is loaded to waste containers. Drained liquids must be properly managed, often as hazardous or mixed waste. Tapping and draining of process lines is a dangerous operation, which must be performed carefully. The temptation to become complacent when breaking into lines is great. Incidents of personnel exposure to liquids during draining are likely. Records from the initial 1990 deactivation led early work planners to assume the facility was cold, dark and dry. This turned out to be a poor assumption. Work instructions had to be modified to require that engineers evaluate each of several hundred process lines to identify the low point, where a tap and drain system could be installed to allow positive verification that the line was empty before the line was cut for removal. During the period between facility shut down in 1990 and the start of final deactivation in 2003, roof leaks had developed, allowing rain water to enter building 247-F, which provided an environment for mold growth. Sampling confirmed the presence of Stachybotrys chartarum, a toxic indoor mold that grows on wet cellulosic material, such as drywall paper. D and D workers in areas where this hazard was identified were required to where proper personal protective equipment, which complicated work execution. Discovery of the potential presence of uniquely hazardous chemicals such as shock sensitive compounds and toxic uranium hexafluoride became issues which required investigation and special handling strategies. Team access to subject matter experts, who could quickly provide the required guidance for safe material handling, was critical to keeping the project on schedule. In old legacy facilities, it is possible that the D and D workers will be exposed to undocumented energy sources such as energized electrical conductors and pipes containing hazardous materials that originate outside the boundaries of the facility. Significant effort must be expended on adequate mechanical and electrical isolation. Subdividing the facility into well defined zones for which detailed zone-specific end points could be developed proved to be a highly effective project management strategy. Waste management must be carefully planned. The rate of waste generation as the facility is converted from a structure to waste can frequently exceed the D and D team's resources to characterize, package, store and transport the waste to a disposal facility in a timely manner. This can lead to schedule delays and/or increased project cost.
- Research Organization:
- American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 21144204
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: DD and R 2007: ANS Topical Meeting on Decommissioning, Decontamination, and Reutilization 2007, Chattanooga, TN (United States), 16-19 Sep 2007; Other Information: Country of input: France; Related Information: In: Proceedings of the 2007 ANS Topical Meeting on Decommissioning, Decontamination, and Reutilization - DD and R 2007, 336 pages.
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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