Shareholder interests and utility competition
Abstract
The process of determining how to implement utility competition is often cast as a struggle between two opposing camps: shareholders and ratepayers. There are, of course, two other major players, management and regulators. The bipolar view tacitly assumes that shareholder and management interests coincide and that regulators have customer interests at heart. Neither assumption is valid. Shareholder interests deviate from management interests in important ways, just as the interests of the entrenched regulatory bureaucracy diverge from the public interest. Therefore, shareholder and management interests must be considered separately. In the past, managements have often pursued their own interests, with devastating financial impact on shareholders. Competition offers shareholders an opportunity to increase their leverage over managements, thereby increasing their returns as well.
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- OSTI Identifier:
- 146074
- Resource Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal Name:
- Fortnightly
- Additional Journal Information:
- Journal Volume: 133; Journal Issue: 6; Other Information: PBD: 15 Mar 1995
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 29 ENERGY PLANNING AND POLICY; ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY; COMPETITION; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; FINANCIAL DATA
Citation Formats
Studness, C M. Shareholder interests and utility competition. United States: N. p., 1995.
Web.
Studness, C M. Shareholder interests and utility competition. United States.
Studness, C M. 1995.
"Shareholder interests and utility competition". United States.
@article{osti_146074,
title = {Shareholder interests and utility competition},
author = {Studness, C M},
abstractNote = {The process of determining how to implement utility competition is often cast as a struggle between two opposing camps: shareholders and ratepayers. There are, of course, two other major players, management and regulators. The bipolar view tacitly assumes that shareholder and management interests coincide and that regulators have customer interests at heart. Neither assumption is valid. Shareholder interests deviate from management interests in important ways, just as the interests of the entrenched regulatory bureaucracy diverge from the public interest. Therefore, shareholder and management interests must be considered separately. In the past, managements have often pursued their own interests, with devastating financial impact on shareholders. Competition offers shareholders an opportunity to increase their leverage over managements, thereby increasing their returns as well.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/146074},
journal = {Fortnightly},
number = 6,
volume = 133,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 15 00:00:00 EST 1995},
month = {Wed Mar 15 00:00:00 EST 1995}
}