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Title: An Approach for Assessing Consequences of Potential Supply Chain and Insider Contributed Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

This paper provides an approach for developing potential attacks on I and C systems of NPPs and assessing their consequences. An important concept is that the NPPs were not designed to cope with Stuxnet-type of attacks (and any other cyber attacks). That is, the plants were only designed for design basis accidents. The safety margins and redundancies built in the design are all based on design basis accidents. They may be helpful in mitigating cyberattacks, but may not be adequate.
Authors:
 [1] ;  [1] ;  [1] ;  [1]
  1. Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
1329799
Report Number(s):
BNL--112742-2016
R&D Project: 21407; TRN: US1700407
DOE Contract Number:
SC00112704
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Related Information: 2016 ANS Winter Conference; Las Vegas, NV; 20161106 through 20161110
Research Org:
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)
Sponsoring Org:
USDOE
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS; NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS; SAFETY MARGINS; SABOTAGE; VULNERABILITY; REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS; REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION Nuclear Power Plant; Stuxnet attack; Natanz