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Title: Report on Concepts & Approaches for SSBD for eCHEM

The verification of special nuclear material (SNM) in spent fuel pyroprocessing is an important safeguards challenge. The detection of spontaneous fission (SF) neutrons from curium is an accepted, non-destructive technique that has been applied to verify special nuclear material (SNM) content in used fuel and other materials in the fuel cycle. The nuclear material accounting (NMA) technique at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute‚Äôs Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) is based on the Cm balance technique. Several publications have demonstrated the safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities as a complementary measure to NMA. More recently, this concept was expanded and preliminarily demonstrated for pyroprocessing. The concept of Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) is part of this expansion, and is built around the interpretation of input from various sensors in a declared facility coupled with complementary NMA methods to increase confidence and lower standard error inventory differences (SEID). The SBS methodology was conceptually developed and relies on near real time analysis of process monitoring data to detect material diversion complemented by robust containment and surveillance (C/S) measures. This work demonstrates one example of how the SBS framework can be used in the electrorefiner. In this SBS application, amore » combination of cyclic voltammetry (CV) and neutron counting is applied to track and monitor Pu mass balance. The main purpose of this experiment is to determine if meaningful information can be gained from CV measurements with regard to the Mg/Gd ratio. This data will be coupled with ICP-MS to verify Gd concentrations and analyzed for statistical significance. It is expected the CV data will register a significant change under the off-normal operating conditions. Knowing how to identify and interpret those changes may help inform how to target more traditional neutron counting methods, which could support a more efficient safeguards system. The experimental results will be compared with theoretical calculations and the ERAD simulations.« less
Authors:
 [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
1329633
Report Number(s):
LA-UR--16-27463
TRN: US1700387
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Research Org:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; REPROCESSING; SPENT FUELS; FISSILE MATERIALS; FISSION NEUTRONS; PLUTONIUM; MASS BALANCE; MONITORING; ICP MASS SPECTROSCOPY; CURIUM; SAFEGUARDS; SPONTANEOUS FISSION; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; CONCENTRATION RATIO; FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS; ACCOUNTING; DETECTION; SIMULATION; VERIFICATION; VOLTAMETRY; NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION