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Title: Finite Energy and Bounded Attacks on Control System Sensor Signals

Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been in securing the networks using information security techniques and protection and reliability concerns at the control system level against random hardware and software failures. However, besides these failures the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis and detection methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop system under optimal signal attacks are provided. Illustrative numerical examples are provided together with an application to a power network with distributed LQ controllers.
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  1. ORNL
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Conference: American Controls Conference, Portland, OR, USA, 20140604, 20140606
Research Org:
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
Sponsoring Org:
ORNL LDRD Director's R&D
Country of Publication:
United States
Cyber-physical; resilient control; fault-tolerant systems; sensor attacks