Electromagnetic Signature Technique as a Promising Tool to Verify Nuclear Weapons Storage and Dismantlement under a Nuclear Arms Control Regime
The 2010 ratification of the New START Treaty has been widely regarded as a noteworthy national security achievement for both the Obama administration and the Medvedev-Putin regime, but deeper cuts are envisioned under future arms control regimes. Future verification needs will include monitoring the storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondaries, and other materials. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under future arms control regimes will pose new challenges. Since acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes, non-nuclear non-sensitive signatures may provide a significant verification tool without the use of additional information barriers. The use of electromagnetic signatures to monitor nuclear material storage containers is a promising technology with the potential to fulfill these challenging requirements. Research performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to confirm the presence of specific components on a “yes/no” basis without revealing classified information. Arms control inspectors might use this technique to verify the presence or absence of monitored items, including both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Although additional research is needed to study signature aspects such as uniqueness and investigate container-specific scenarios, the technique potentially offers a rapid and cost-effective tool to verify reduction and dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 1111234
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-88443
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM 53), July 15-19, 2012, Orlando, Florida, 4:2405-2411
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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