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Impacts of Vaccination and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Variants Alpha and Delta on Coronavirus Disease 2019 Transmission Dynamics in Four Metropolitan Areas of the United States

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1 **Title:** Impacts of vaccination and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 variants
2 Alpha and Delta on Coronavirus Disease 2019 transmission dynamics in four metropolitan areas
3 of the United States

4 **Running Title:** Impacts of COVID-19 vaccination and SARS-CoV-2 variants

5 **One-Sentence Summary:** Using a compartmental model parameterized to reproduce available
6 reports of new Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases, we quantified the impacts of
7 vaccination and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants
8 Alpha (lineage B.1.1.7) and Delta (lineage B.1.617.2) on regional epidemics in the metropolitan
9 statistical areas (MSAs) surrounding Dallas, Houston, New York City, and Phoenix.

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20

21 **ABSTRACT**

22 To characterize Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmission dynamics in each of
23 the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) surrounding Dallas, Houston, New York City, and
24 Phoenix in 2020 and 2021, we extended a previously reported compartmental model accounting
25 for effects of multiple distinct periods of non-pharmaceutical interventions by adding
26 consideration of vaccination and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-
27 CoV-2) variants Alpha (lineage B.1.1.7) and Delta (lineage B.1.617.2). For each MSA, we found
28 region-specific parameterizations of the model using daily reports of new COVID-19 cases
29 available from January 21, 2020 to October 31, 2021. In the process, we obtained estimates of
30 the relative infectiousness of Alpha and Delta as well as their takeoff times in each MSA (the
31 times at which sustained transmission began). The estimated infectiousness of Alpha ranged
32 from 1.1x to 1.4x that of viral strains circulating in 2020 and early 2021. The estimated relative
33 infectiousness of Delta was higher in all cases, ranging from 1.6x to 2.1x. The estimated Alpha
34 takeoff times ranged from February 1 to February 28, 2021. The estimated Delta takeoff times
35 ranged from June 2 to June 26, 2021. Estimated takeoff times are consistent with genomic
36 surveillance data.

37

38 **Keywords:** Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
39 Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), vaccination, SARS-CoV-2 variant Alpha (lineage B.1.1.7),
40 SARS-CoV-2 variant Delta (lineage B.1.617.2), mathematical model, Bayesian inference

41

42 INTRODUCTION

43 In 2020, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmission dynamics were
44 significantly influenced by non-pharmaceutical interventions [1–7]. In 2021, other factors arose
45 with significant impacts on disease transmission, namely, vaccination [8–9] and emergence of
46 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants [10–11].

47 Mass vaccination in the United States (US) began on December 14, 2020 [12], with
48 demonstrable reduction of disease burden within vaccinated populations [13]. As the vaccination
49 campaign progressed into March 2021, there was widespread reduction in disease incidence [14]
50 and relaxation of state-mandated non-pharmaceutical interventions [15].

51 In early 2021, SARS-CoV-2 variant Alpha (lineage B.1.1.7) spread across the US and
52 became the dominant circulating strain [16]. By the end of July 2021, the Delta variant (lineage
53 B.1.617.2) had supplanted Alpha [17], concomitant with increases in new COVID-19 case
54 detection [14]. Both Alpha and Delta have been estimated to be more transmissible than strains
55 circulating earlier [18–23], and it was determined that vaccinated persons infected with Alpha
56 and Delta were capable of transmitting disease [24, 25].

57 The Alpha variant was first detected in Kent, England in September 2020 [26], and was
58 declared a variant of concern (VOC) on December 18, 2020 [26]. The Delta variant was first
59 detected in Maharashtra, India in October 2020 [27] and was declared a VOC on May 6, 2021
60 [26]. In the literature, previous modeling works have investigated the relative transmissibility
61 and timing of SARS-CoV-2 variants Alpha, Delta, and Omicron in multiple regions/countries,
62 including England, Greece, Iran, China, and the US [28–36]. Modeling approaches applied in
63 these studies involved deterministic [32–34] and stochastic [28, 30] compartmental models of

64 COVID-19 transmission. Other approaches involved statistical models and various forms of
65 regression, e.g., multinomial logistic regression [29] and multivariable binary hyperbolic
66 regression [36]. Bayesian methods, including the sequential Bayesian method [32], a Bayesian
67 evidence synthesis framework [30], a Bayesian approach to estimate the effective reproduction
68 number R_t [31] and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling [28, 33], were
69 predominantly used. The data considered in these studies included case data [28, 30–35] viral
70 load data [28], seroprevalence data [30], information on deaths and hospital admissions [33],
71 age-specific vaccine coverage data [31], sequencing data [29], and biospecimen data [35].

72 In earlier work, we demonstrated that new COVID-19 case detection over various periods
73 in 2020 can be faithfully reproduced for 280 (out of the 384) metropolitan statistical areas
74 (MSAs) in the US and all 50 states by region-specific parameterizations of a compartmental
75 model that accounts for time-varying non-pharmaceutical interventions [5–7]. We found that the
76 multiple surges in disease incidence seen in 2020 [14] could be explained by changes in
77 protective disease-avoiding behaviors, which we will refer to collectively as social-distancing.
78 However, in 2021, the model lost its ability to capture disease transmission dynamics,
79 presumably because of the impacts of vaccination and the emergence of more transmissible
80 SARS-CoV-2 variants, namely, Alpha and Delta. Here, to quantify the impacts of vaccination
81 and SARS-CoV-2 variants Alpha and Delta on COVID-19 transmission dynamics, we extended
82 the model of Lin et al. [5] by adding consideration of vaccination and variants with increased
83 transmissibility. We then found region-specific parameterizations of the model using vaccination
84 and surveillance case data available for the MSAs surrounding Dallas, Houston, New York City,
85 and Phoenix.

86 **METHODS**

87 **Data**

88 Daily reports of new confirmed COVID-19 cases were obtained from the GitHub
89 repository maintained by *The New York Times* newspaper [37]. Daily reports of newly completed
90 vaccinations were obtained from the Covid Act Now database for the MSAs surrounding New
91 York City and Phoenix [38]. Because of reporting gaps in the Covid Act Now database, we used
92 a different source of vaccination data for the MSAs surrounding Dallas and Houston, the
93 *Democrat and Chronicle* newspaper [39]. County-level surveillance and vaccination data were
94 aggregated to obtain daily case and vaccination counts for the MSAs surrounding Dallas,
95 Houston, New York City, and Phoenix. In the case of a missing daily report, we imputed the
96 missing information as described in the Appendix.

97 **Compartmental Model for Disease Transmission Dynamics**

98 We used the compartmental model illustrated in Figure 1 (and Appendix Figure 1) to
99 analyze data available for each MSA of interest. The model consists of ordinary differential
100 equations (ODEs) describing the dynamics of 40 populations (state variables) (Appendix
101 Equations 1–38). The state variables are each defined in Appendix Table 1. Model parameters
102 are defined in Tables 1–3. Key features of the model are described below, and a full description
103 of the model is provided in the Appendix.

104 We extended the model of Lin et al. [5] by including 15 new populations and 28 new
105 transitions. Briefly, new parts of the model can be described as follows. Vaccination is modeled
106 by moving susceptible persons (in the S_M and S_P populations) into the V_1 population. Another
107 consequence of vaccination is the movement of recovered unvaccinated persons (in the R_U
108 population) into the R_V population. The rate of vaccination is changed as needed to match the

109 empirical daily rate of vaccination. Recovered and susceptible persons have the same *per capita*
110 probability of vaccination. Persons in S_M are mixing (i.e., not practicing social-distancing) and
111 persons in S_P are practicing social-distancing (and thereby protected from infection to a degree).
112 The series of transitions involving the populations V_1, \dots, V_6 was introduced to model the immune
113 response to vaccination (i.e., the amount of time required for vaccination to induce neutralizing
114 antibodies). With this approach, the time from vaccination to appearance of neutralizing
115 antibodies is a random variable characterized by an Erlang distribution. Persons in V_1, \dots, V_6 may
116 be infected. Persons in V_6 transition to one of the following four populations: $S_{V,1}, \dots, S_{V,4}$. These
117 populations represent persons with varying degrees of immune protection. Persons in $S_{V,1}$ are not
118 protected against productive infection (i.e., an infection that can be transmitted to others) by any
119 viral strain. Persons in $S_{V,2}$ are protected against productive infection by viral strains present
120 before the emergence of Alpha but not Alpha or Delta. Persons in $S_{V,3}$ are protected against
121 productive infection by viral strains present before the emergence of Alpha and also Alpha but
122 not Delta. Persons in $S_{V,4}$ are protected against productive infection by all of the viral strains
123 considered up to October 31, 2021. Vaccinated persons who become infected move into E_V . The
124 time spent in E_V corresponds to the length of the incubation period for vaccinated persons. The
125 mean duration of the incubation period is taken to be the same for vaccinated and unvaccinated
126 persons; however, as a simplification, for vaccinated persons, the time spent in the incubation
127 period is taken to consist of a single stage and consequently is exponentially distributed (vs.
128 Erlang distributed for unvaccinated persons). Non-quarantined exposed persons in populations
129 E_V and $E_{i,M}$ and $E_{i,P}$ for $i = 2, \dots, 5$ are taken to be infectious. Persons exiting E_V leave the
130 incubation period and enter the immune clearance phase of infection, during which they may be
131 asymptomatic (A_V) or symptomatic with mild disease (I_V). Non-quarantined asymptomatic

132 persons in populations A_V , A_M , and A_P are taken to be infectious. Persons in A_V are assumed to
133 eventually recover (i.e., to enter R_V). Persons with mild symptomatic disease may recover (i.e.,
134 enter R_V) or experience severe disease, at which point they move to H_V (in hospital or isolated at
135 home). Vaccinated persons have a diminished probability of severe disease in comparison to
136 unvaccinated persons. Persons in H_V either recover (move to R_V) or die from COVID-19
137 complications (move to D). For a person with severe disease, the probability of death is
138 independent of vaccination status. We assume that vaccinated persons do not participate in
139 social-distancing, quarantine, or self-isolation driven by symptom awareness.

140 The new compartments and transitions, which are highlighted in Figure 1, capture
141 vaccination among susceptible persons, recovered persons and infected non-quarantined persons
142 without symptoms at a time-varying *per capita* rate $\mu(t)$. The value of $\mu(t)$ changes daily for
143 consistency with MSA-specific daily reports of completed vaccinations (Appendix Equation 37)
144 from the COVID Act Now database and the *Democrat and Chronicle* COVID-19 vaccine
145 tracker. The model also captures immune responses to vaccination yielding varying degrees of
146 protection and consequences of breakthrough infection of vaccinated persons. Vaccine protection
147 against transmissible infection was taken to be variant-dependent.

148 We introduced a dimensionless step function, denoted $Y_\theta(t)$ (Appendix Equation 38),
149 which multiplies the disease-transmission rate constant β to account for m variants. In this study,
150 $m = 2$ (see Appendix Equations 1–4, 18–22, and 24). Thus, in the new model, the quantity
151 $Y_\theta(t)\beta$ (vs. β alone) characterizes disease transmissibility at time t . The step function $Y_\theta(t)$ was
152 initially assigned a value of $y_0 = 1$, and the value of $Y_\theta(t)$ was allowed to increase at times $t =$
153 θ_1 and $t = \theta_2$ (Appendix Equation 38). The disease transmission rate constant of the Alpha
154 variant was considered by introducing a step increase from $y_0\beta \equiv 1\beta$ to $y_1\beta$ (with $y_1 > 1$) at

155 time $t = \theta_1$ (the Alpha takeoff time). Similarly, the disease transmission rate constant of the
156 Delta variant was considered by introducing a step increase from $y_1\beta$ to $y_2\beta$ (with $y_2 > y_1$) at
157 time $t = \theta_2 > \theta_1$ (the Delta takeoff time). We will refer to y_1 and y_2 as the Alpha and Delta
158 transmissibility factors, respectively.

159 As in the original model of Lin et al. [5], the extended model accounts for a series of $n +$
160 1 distinct social-distancing periods (an initial period and n additional periods). Social-distancing
161 periods are characterized by two step functions: $P_\tau(t)$ and $\Lambda_\tau(t)$. The values of these functions
162 change coordinately at a set of switch times $\tau = (\sigma, \tau_1, \dots, \tau_n)$ (Appendix Equations 35 and 36),
163 where σ is the start time of the initial social-distancing period and τ_i is the start time of the i th
164 social-distancing period after the initial social-distancing period. The values of $P_\tau(t)$ and $\Lambda_\tau(t)$
165 are zero before time $t = \sigma$. The value of $P_\tau(t)$ defines the steady-state setpoint fraction of the
166 susceptible population practicing social-distancing at time t , and the value of $\Lambda_\tau(t)$ defines a
167 time scale for establishment of the steady state. The value of $\Lambda_\tau(t)$ is an eigenvalue equal to a
168 sum of social-distancing rate constants [5]. The non-zero values of $P_\tau(t)$ and $\Lambda_\tau(t)$ are denoted
169 p_0, \dots, p_n and $\lambda_0, \dots, \lambda_n$. We assume that vaccinated persons do not practice social-distancing.
170 Recall that we use the term “social-distancing” to refer to behaviors adopted to protect against
171 infection. These behaviors are assumed to reduce the risk of infection by a factor m_b .

172 **Parameters**

173 As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, we used MSA-specific case reporting data available up to
174 October 31, 2021 to infer MSA-specific values for parameters characterizing the start time of the
175 local epidemic (t_0), local disease transmissibility of ancestral viral strains (β), local social-
176 distancing dynamics ($\sigma, \lambda_0, p_0, \tau_i, \lambda_i$ and p_i , for $i = 1, \dots, n$), local emergence of variants ($\theta_1,$

177 y_1, θ_2, y_2), the local rate of new case detection (f_D), and noise in local case detection and
178 reporting (r). Values for other parameters were fixed (Table 3); inferences are conditioned on
179 these fixed parameter estimates. There are 18 fixed parameters taken to be applicable for all
180 MSAs. The total regional population S_0 , which is taken to be fixed, was set on the basis of
181 census data. The real-time *per capita* vaccination rate $\mu(t)$, a piecewise linear function, was set
182 for consistency with the current empirical *per capita* rate of vaccination [38]. We adopted the
183 fixed parameter estimates of Lin et al. [5]. New fixed parameter estimates made in this study for
184 m_h, f_0, f_1, f_2 , and k_V are explained in the Appendix. The m_h parameter characterizes vaccine
185 protection against severe disease, the f_0, f_1 , and f_2 parameters account for differential vaccine
186 effectiveness against the three viral strains considered in this study (ancestral, Alpha, and Delta),
187 and the k_V parameter characterizes the waiting time between vaccination and the acquisition of
188 vaccine-induced immunity. Our model does not account for gradual loss of immunity over time.
189 We let $\tilde{\mu}(t) = \mu_i$ for times t throughout the i th day after January 21, 2020 (Appendix Equation
190 37), where μ_i is the fraction of the local population reported to complete vaccination over the 1-d
191 surveillance period [38]. We then defined $\mu(t)$ as the piecewise linear interpolant to $\tilde{\mu}(t)$. In
192 summary, for a given inference, the number of adjustable parameters was $2m + 3n + 4$, where
193 m is the number of variants under consideration ($m = 2$ in this study) and n is the number of
194 distinct social-distancing periods being considered beyond an initial social-distancing period.
195 The setting for n was determined through a model-selection procedure described in the
196 Appendix.

197 **Auxiliary Measurement Model**

198 We assumed that state variables of the compartmental model (Figure 1, Appendix Table
199 1) are related to the expected number of new cases reported on a given calendar date through an

200 auxiliary measurement model (Appendix Equations 39 and 40). The measurement model has one
201 parameter: f_D , the region-specific fraction of new symptomatic infections detected. Thus, $f_D \in$
202 $[0, 1]$. As a simplification, we considered f_D to be time-invariant. This simplification means that
203 we assumed, for example, that case detection was neither limited nor strongly influenced by
204 testing capacity, which varied over time. This assumption is reasonable if, for example, case
205 detection is mainly determined by presentation for testing and, moreover, the motivations and
206 societal factors that influence presentation remained roughly constant over the period of interest.
207 One can also interpret f_D as the time-averaged case detection rate. The measurement-model
208 parameter f_D was inferred jointly with the adjustable model parameters and the likelihood
209 parameter r (see below).

210 **Statistical Model for Noise in Case Detection and Reporting**

211 We assumed that noise in new case detection and reporting on the i th day after January
212 21, 2020 is captured by a negative binomial distribution $\text{NB}(r, q_i)$ centered on $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$, the
213 expected number of new cases detected over the i th day after January 21, 2020 as given by the
214 compartmental model and the auxiliary measurement model (Appendix Equations 1–40). These
215 and other assumptions led to the likelihood function used in inference (Appendix Equations 41–
216 43). We determined the probability parameter q_i in $\text{NB}(r, q_i)$ using Appendix Equation 43; the
217 dispersion parameter r was taken to be a time-invariant adjustable parameter applicable for all
218 days of case reporting. The likelihood parameter r was inferred jointly with the adjustable model
219 parameters and the adjustable measurement-model parameter f_D .

220 **Computational Procedures**

221 We determined the intervals of the step functions $Y_\theta(t)$, $P_\tau(t)$, and $\Lambda_\tau(t)$ (i.e., θ and τ)
222 using a model-selection procedure described in the Appendix. Simulations and Bayesian
223 inferences were performed as previously described [5–7] and in the Appendix. Files needed to
224 reproduce inferences using the software package PyBioNetFit [40] are available online [41]. The
225 files include case data, vaccination data, and diagnostic plots related to Bayesian inference using
226 Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, including trace plots [41]. Summary diagnostics
227 characterizing the sampling for each MSA are given in Table 4. Briefly, we computed the stable
228 Gelman-Rubin statistic using the methodology of Vats and Knudson [42]. An advantage of this
229 statistic (over the original Gelman-Rubin statistic) is that only one Markov chain is required in
230 sampling. In addition, the stable Gelman-Rubin statistic and effective sample size (ESS) have a
231 one-to-one relationship.

232 RESULTS

233 Explanatory power of the model

234 As illustrated in Figures 2A, 3A, 4A, and 5A for the Dallas, Houston, New York City,
235 and Phoenix MSAs respectively, the new model is able to explain surveillance case data over the
236 period starting on January 21, 2020 and ending on October 31, 2021. The surveillance case
237 data—daily reports of newly detected COVID-19 cases—for each of the 4 MSAs of interest
238 largely lie within the 95% credible interval of the posterior predictive distribution for new case
239 detection, which indicates that each regional model has explanatory power for the period of
240 interest. Parameter estimates are summarized in Tables 1–3. Table 1 provides region-specific
241 maximum *a posteriori* (MAP) estimates obtained through Bayesian inference enabled by
242 Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling. Table 4 provides metrics that measure the

243 quality of MCMC sampling. The diagnostic results of Table 4 indicate that sampling was
244 acceptable, because all multivariate potential scale reduction factors (PSRFs) are very close to 1
245 and all multivariate effective sample sizes (ESSs) are at least 100. Diagnostic plots are provided
246 online [41].

247 **Quantification of the impacts of non-pharmaceutical interventions and emergence of** 248 **variants**

249 Each regional model (parameterized to reproduce MSA-specific case reports) provides
250 insight into the impacts of social-distancing behaviors and the emergence of the Alpha and Delta
251 variants; compare panel A and the corresponding panel B in Figures 2–5. For example, as can be
252 seen in Figure 4A, the New York City MSA experienced four notable surges in disease incidence
253 over the period of interest. Figure 4B suggests that the first surge ended because of adoption of
254 social-distancing behaviors, the second surge occurred because of relaxation of social-distancing
255 behaviors, the third surge was caused by Alpha, and the fourth surge was caused by Delta.
256 Interestingly, in other MSAs, Alpha had relatively little impact on disease incidence (compare
257 Figures 4A and 4B to Figures 2A and 2B, 3A and 3B, and 5A and 5B). These differences are
258 attributable to various factors, including the lower contagiousness of COVID-19 in Dallas,
259 Houston, and Phoenix relative to New York City (see entries for β in Table 1), the later arrival of
260 Alpha in Houston and Phoenix relative to New York City, and further progress of mass
261 vaccination in Phoenix relative to New York City. Alpha takeoff, as well as Delta takeoff, is
262 tracked locally in panel B (rightmost vertical axis) of Figures 2–5, and vaccination progress is
263 tracked locally in panel C of Figures 2–5.

264 **Impacts of vaccination**

265 On the basis of region-specific parameterizations, we estimated the immune and
266 susceptible fractions of each MSA population, as well as the fractions that achieved immunity
267 through infection and/or vaccination (see panel C in Figures 2–5). Each of these panels shows
268 the time evolution of five different populations in an MSA. In each MSA, only a minority of the
269 population remained susceptible to infection (with Delta) on October 31, 2021, with a sizable
270 fraction of the susceptible population being protected to a degree against severe disease by
271 having completed vaccination.

272 **Estimates of transmissibility factors and takeoff times of Alpha and Delta**

273 Our inferences provide quantitative insights into the transmissibility factors of Alpha and
274 Delta (y_1 and y_2) and their takeoff times (θ_1 and θ_2) in each of the 4 MSAs of interest. Figure 6
275 shows the marginal posteriors of y_1 , y_2 , θ_1 , and θ_2 , which were found on the basis of
276 surveillance data for each MSA (daily case counts) reported between January 21, 2020 and
277 October 31, 2021. Maximum *a posteriori* (MAP) estimates and 95% credible intervals for θ_1 and
278 θ_2 for each MSA are also shown in Figure 6. The MAP estimates for y_1 range from 1.1 (for the
279 Dallas MSA) to 1.4 (for the New York City MSA). The MAP estimates for y_2 range from 1.6
280 (for the Dallas MSA) to 2.1 (for the New York City MSA). The MAP estimates for θ_1 range
281 from February 1, 2021 (for the Dallas MSA) to February 28, 2021 (for the Phoenix MSA). The
282 MAP estimates for θ_2 range from June 2, 2021 (for the Dallas MSA) to June 26, 2021 (for the
283 Houston and Phoenix MSAs). The estimated takeoff times are consistent with regional genomic
284 surveillance data [43], which are summarized by the shaded regions of panel A in Figures 2–5.

285 **DISCUSSION**

286 We extended a model for COVID-19 transmission dynamics that already incorporated
287 time-varying changes in non-pharmaceutical interventions [5] to include the effects of
288 vaccination and new variants. This model together with its region-specific parameterizations
289 based on case data available through October 31, 2021 provide quantitative insights into the
290 relative infectiousness of SARS-CoV-2 variants Alpha (lineage B.1.1.7) and Delta (lineage
291 B.1.617.2). The increased transmissibility of Alpha and Delta in comparison to ancestral strains
292 is characterized by the marginal posteriors for the transmissibility factors y_1 and y_2 shown in
293 Figure 6 (panels A, C, E, and G). The maximum *a posteriori* (MAP) estimates of the
294 transmissibility factors were similar across the four metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of
295 interest (centered on Dallas, Houston, New York City, and Phoenix). The averages of our y_1 and
296 y_2 MAP estimates indicate that Alpha was 1.2x more infectious than ancestral strains, whereas
297 Delta was 1.9x more infectious (corresponding to Delta being approximately 50% more
298 infectious than Alpha). These estimates are consistent with estimates provided in other studies
299 [18–23]. Using a formula for the basic reproduction number R_0 derived earlier [7] and parameter
300 estimates of Tables 1 and 3, we obtain an R_0 estimate of 12 for Delta in the New York City
301 MSA, which places this SARS-CoV-2 variant among the more infectious viruses known.

302 We also obtained estimates of precisely when sustained transmission of Alpha and Delta
303 began in each of the four geographically distinct MSAs. In earlier work, takeoff times for Alpha
304 and Delta were estimated only for regions outside the US (e.g., Denmark [44] and Mexico [45]),
305 for regions in the US different from those considered here (e.g., New England [46] and two
306 MSAs in Northern California [47]), and for the entire US [48]. The takeoff times for the four
307 MSAs in the present study are characterized by the marginal posteriors for θ_1 and θ_2 shown in
308 Figure 6 (panels B, D, F, and H). The estimated takeoff times are consistent with the observed

309 prevalence of Alpha and Delta sequences detected in regional genomic surveillance [43], as can
310 be seen by comparing the two shaded regions in panel A of Figures 2–5 against the changes in
311 transmissibility $Y_\theta(t)$ depicted in the corresponding panel B of Figures 2–5. It should be noted
312 that the case data shown in Figures 2–5 are from the MSAs of interest (through aggregation of
313 county-level data), whereas the genomic surveillance data are from larger regions [43].

314 Our study has notable limitations, starting with the obvious uncertainties related to model
315 assumptions and fixed parameter estimates, which are discussed in some detail in the Appendix.
316 For example, our model assumes a constant rate of case detection and neglects gradual loss of
317 sterilizing immunity over time. This latter simplifying assumption is supported by a study
318 indicating that protection against re-infection from pre-Omicron variants is significant and
319 remains high even after 40 weeks [49]. Moreover, we caution that the inference jobs performed
320 in this study were challenging because of the relatively high-dimensional parameter spaces
321 involved (in comparison to typical inferences involving an ODE model-constrained likelihood
322 function). Diagnostics indicate good sampling (Table 4, [41]), but we cannot be entirely certain
323 that the samples obtained fully characterize the parameter posteriors of interest. It can be seen in
324 trace plots [41] that mixing across parameters was not uniform, and moreover, in some cases,
325 there are indications of trends (manifesting as a trace plot that lacks the appearance of a
326 horizontally extended, fuzzy caterpillar). The likely cause of these trace plots is poor local
327 performance of the proposal kernel, which was optimized in the adaptive sampling scheme for
328 global performance. The consequences of poor mixing may include biased parameter and
329 uncertainty estimates. Another concern is that the model incorporates redundant disease-
330 incidence surge mechanisms. In the model, an increase in viral infectiousness caused by the
331 emergence of a new variant can be mimicked, to some extent, by a relaxation of social-

332 distancing, and vice versa. For the MSAs considered here, inferred social-distancing levels were
333 low at the time of Alpha and Delta emergence, so the inferred transmissibility factors probably
334 reflect, at least mostly, changes in intrinsic viral infectiousness.

335 It is known that viral transmissibility does not depend only on viral features but also on
336 population features [7]. This study looked at multiple regions to ascertain whether population
337 features varied significantly. Our analysis indicates that population features influencing
338 transmission did not vary dramatically across these similar urban regions because we obtained
339 similar region-specific estimates for the Alpha and Delta transmissibility factors. The Alpha
340 transmissibility factors for the Dallas, Houston, New York City, and Phoenix MSAs were 1.1x,
341 1.2x, 1.4x, and 1.3x, respectively. the Delta transmissibility factors for these MSAs were 1.6x,
342 2.0x, 2.1x, and 1.8x, respectively.

343 We show that it is possible to gain insights into variant dynamics through a mechanistic
344 modeling approach. This study provides an example for modelers interesting in understanding
345 the impacts of a mass vaccination campaign and emergence of variants with altered
346 transmissibility during an epidemic of an aerosol-transmitted respiratory disease similar to
347 COVID-19.

348 In summary, this report provides estimates of Alpha and Delta transmissibility for
349 specific regions within the US as well as their takeoff times.

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529 **Table 1.** Model parameter values inferred for the Dallas, Houston, New York City, and Phoenix
 530 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) on October 31, 2021

Parameter	MAP estimate* for Dallas (Units)	MAP estimate* for Houston (Units)	MAP estimate* for New York City (Units)	MAP estimate* for Phoenix (Units)
t_0	14.8 (d)	11.2 (d)	9.6 (d)	14.0 (d)
β	0.30 (d ⁻¹)	0.29 (d ⁻¹)	0.37 (d ⁻¹)	0.29 (d ⁻¹)
σ	65 (d)	69 (d)	68 (d)	62 (d)
p_0	0.32	0.29	0.48	0.26
λ_0	9.7 (d ⁻¹)	7.5 (d ⁻¹)	9.7 (d ⁻¹)	6.6 (d ⁻¹)
τ_1	139 (d)	162 (d)	143 (d)	148 (d)
p_1	0.27	0.39	0.40	0.23
λ_1	2.8 (d ⁻¹)	0.1 (d ⁻¹)	2.7 (d ⁻¹)	2.5 (d ⁻¹)
τ_2	165 (d)	186 (d)	177 (d)	169 (d)
p_2	0.38	0.34	0.41	0.41
λ_2	0.63 (d ⁻¹)	0.53 (d ⁻¹)	0.39 (d ⁻¹)	0.47 (d ⁻¹)
τ_3	259 (d)	278 (d)	262 (d)	248 (d)
p_3	0.22	0.17	0.26	0.10
λ_3	5.1 (d ⁻¹)	3.2 (d ⁻¹)	8.1 (d ⁻¹)	5.2 (d ⁻¹)
τ_4	264 (d)	-	-	255 (d)
p_4	0.24	-	-	0.15
λ_4	1.7 (d ⁻¹)	-	-	3.2 (d ⁻¹)

θ_1	377 (d)	400 (d)	381 (d)	404 (d)
y_1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.3
θ_2	497 (d)	521 (d)	512 (d)	522 (d)
y_2	1.6	2.0	2.1	1.8
f_D	0.48	0.36	0.39	0.54
r	3.0	3.0	9.1	3.1

531 *Maximum *a posteriori* (MAP) estimates are region-specific and inference-time-dependent.

532 Here, inference was based on MSA-specific confirmed coronavirus disease case count data

533 available in the GitHub repository maintained by *The New York Times* newspaper [37] for

534 January 21, 2020 to October 31, 2021. Time $t = 0$ corresponds to midnight on January 21, 2020.

535 Inferences were conditioned on the compartmental model of Appendix Equations 1–38,

536 consideration of two viral variants (Alpha and Delta, $m = 2$), and $n + 1$ distinct social-

537 distancing periods in total ($n = 4$ for Dallas and Phoenix; $n = 3$ for New York City and

538 Houston), the fixed parameter estimates of Table 3, and the initial condition I_0 and S_0 at time $t =$

539 t_0 given in Table 3. The choice of two variants and the setting for n were chosen through a

540 model-selection procedure described in the Appendix. With $m = 2$ and $n = 3$, there are 18

541 adjustable model parameters: $t_0, \beta, \theta_1, y_1, \theta_2, y_2, \sigma, p_0, \lambda_0, \tau_1, p_1, \lambda_1, \tau_2, p_2, \lambda_2, \tau_3, p_3,$ and λ_3 .

542 With $m = 2$ and $n = 4$, there are 21 adjustable model parameters: $t_0, \beta, \theta_1, y_1, \theta_2, y_2, \sigma, p_0, \lambda_0,$

543 $\tau_1, p_1, \lambda_1, \tau_2, p_2, \lambda_2, \tau_3, p_3, \lambda_3, \tau_4, p_4,$ and λ_4 . These parameters were jointly inferred together

544 with f_D , the parameter of the measurement model (i.e., the fraction of new cases detected and

545 reported) (Appendix Equation 40), and r , the dispersion parameter of the statistical model for

546 noise in case detection and reporting (i.e., the adjustable parameter of the negative binomial

547 likelihood function) (Appendix Equations 41–43). We assumed a uniform proper prior, as
548 described in the Appendix.

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551 **Table 2.** Descriptions of MSA-specific adjustable model parameters.

Parameter	Description
t_0	Start of local disease transmission
β	Rate constant for disease transmission
σ	Start of first social-distancing period
p_0	Social-distancing setpoint for the period $t \in [\sigma, \tau_1)$
λ_0	Social-distancing eigenvalue paired with p_0
τ_1	Start of second social-distancing period
p_1	Social-distancing setpoint for the period $t \in [\tau_1, \tau_2)$
λ_1	Social-distancing eigenvalue paired with p_1
τ_2	Start of third social-distancing period
p_2	Social-distancing setpoint for the period $t \in [\tau_2, \tau_3)$
λ_2	Social-distancing eigenvalue paired with p_2
τ_3	Start of fourth social-distancing period
p_3	Social-distancing setpoint for the period $t \in [\tau_3, \tau_4)$
λ_3	Social-distancing eigenvalue paired with p_3
τ_4	Start of fifth social-distancing period
p_4	Social-distancing setpoint for the period $t \in [\tau_4, \infty)$
λ_4	Social-distancing eigenvalue paired with p_4
θ_1	Alpha takeoff time
γ_1	Increased infectiousness of Alpha (relative to ancestral strains)

θ_2	Delta takeoff time
y_2	Increased infectiousness of Delta (relative to ancestral strains)
f_D	Fraction of cases detected and reported
r	Dispersion parameter of NB(r, q_i)*

552 *The probability parameter of NB(r, q_i) is constrained, i.e., the value of q_i , which is reporting
553 time-dependent, is given by Appendix Equation 43.

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570 **Table 3.** Fixed parameter estimates for each region-specific compartmental model

Parameter	Estimate ¹ (Units)	Description	Source
I_0	1	Number of infectious persons at time $t = t_0$	[5]
S_0	19,216,182 ²	Total population	[5]
$\mu(t)$	Empirical time-series ³ (d ⁻¹)	Daily <i>per capita</i> rate of vaccination	[38, 39]
m_b	0.1	Reduction in risk of infection because of social-distancing	[5]
m_h	0.04	Reduction in risk of severe disease (once symptomatic) because of vaccination	This study ⁴
f_A	0.44	Fraction of all cases that are asymptomatic	[5]
f_H	0.054	Fraction of symptomatic cases that are severe (in the absence of vaccination)	[5]
f_R	0.79	Fraction of persons with severe disease who recover	[5]
$1 - f_0$	0.1	Fraction of vaccinated persons who fail to develop an immune response that protects against productive infection by ancestral strains or variants	This study ⁴
$f_0 - f_1$	0.09	Fraction of vaccinated persons who develop an immune response that protects against	This study ⁴

		productive infection by ancestral strains (but not the Alpha or Delta variant)	
$f_1 - f_2$	0.12	Fraction of vaccinated persons who develop an immune response that protects against productive infection by ancestral strains and the Alpha variant (but not the Delta variant)	This study ⁴
f_2	0.69	Fraction of vaccinated persons who develop an immune response that protects against productive infection by ancestral strains and the Alpha and Delta variants	This study ⁴
ρ_E	1.1	Relative infectiousness of persons without symptoms in the incubation period of infection	[5]
ρ_A	0.9	Relative infectiousness of persons without symptoms in the immune-clearance phase of infection	[5]
k_L	0.94 (d ⁻¹)	Rate constant for progression through each stage of the incubation period of infection ⁵	[5]
k_Q	0.0038 (d ⁻¹)	Rate constant for quarantine of infected, non-vaccinated persons	[5]
j_Q	0.4 (d ⁻¹)	Rate constant for self-isolation of symptomatic, non-vaccinated persons	[5]

c_A	0.26 (d ⁻¹)	Rate constant for completion of the immune clearance phase of infection for persons without symptoms	[5]
c_I	0.12 (d ⁻¹)	Rate constant for completion of the immune clearance phase of infection or progression to severe disease for non-vaccinated persons with symptoms	[5]
c_H	0.17 (d ⁻¹)	Rate constant for recovery or progression to death for non-vaccinated persons with severe disease	[5]
k_V	0.3 (d ⁻¹)	Rate constant for progression through each stage of immune response to vaccination ⁶	This study ⁴

571 ¹Fixed parameter estimates are based on information external to the surveillance data used to
572 infer the adjustable parameter values of Table 1. Estimates are applicable to all metropolitan
573 statistical areas (MSAs) of interest except for S_0 and the vaccination function $\mu(t)$, which are
574 region-specific. Recall that $\mu(t)$ is updated daily for consistency with vaccination data.

575 ²The total population S_0 is MSA-specific. Here, S_0 is given for the New York City MSA. The
576 initial susceptible population is taken to be the total population. We used $S_0 = 7,573,136$,
577 7,066,141, and 4,873,019 for the Dallas, Houston, and Phoenix MSAs, respectively.

578 ³The function $\mu(t)$ is determined by region-specific vaccination data [38, 39].

579 ⁴See the Appendix for more information
580 study.

581 ⁵As in the study of Lin et al. [5], the incubation period is divided into 5 stages (Figure 1), each of
582 equal duration on average.

583 ⁶The immune response to vaccination is divided into 6 stages (Figure 1), each of equal duration
584 on average. The choice of 6 stages is justified in the Appendix and Appendix Figure 2.

585

586 **Table 4.** Multivariate potential scale reduction factors (PSRFs) and multivariate effective sample
587 sizes (ESSs) corresponding to the stable Gelman-Rubin statistic for Markov chains generated
588 using PyBioNetFit for the Dallas, Houston, New York City, and Phoenix Metropolitan Statistical
589 Areas (MSAs)

MSA	Multivariate PSRF ¹	Multivariate ESS ¹
Dallas	1.0024	211.6
Houston	1.0026	193.2
New York City	1.0023	212.5
Phoenix	1.0033	152.9


590 ¹Computed using the methodology of Vats and Knudson [42].

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596 **Figure 1.** Illustration of compartmental model. The independent variable of the model is time t .

597 The 40 dependent state variables of the model are populations, which are represented as boxes

598 with rounded corners. A description of each state variable is given in Appendix Table 1. The 15

599 highlighted boxes (on the blue background) represent state variables introduced to capture the

600 effects of vaccination and the Alpha and Delta variants. The other 25 boxes represent state

601 variables considered in the model of Lin et al. [5]. Arrows connecting boxes represent

602 transitions. Each transition represents the movement of persons from one population to another.

603 The arrows highlighted in orange represent transitions introduced to capture the effects of

604 vaccination and the Alpha and Delta variants. Other arrows represent transitions considered in


605 the model of Lin et al. [5]. Each arrow is associated with one or more parameters that

606 characterize a rate of movement; these parameters are not shown here but are shown in Appendix

607 Figure 1. A full description of the model is given in the Appendix.


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
611 **Figure 2.** Inference results obtained for the MSA surrounding Dallas using regional surveillance
612 data—daily reports of new COVID-19 cases—available for January 21, 2020 to October 31,
613 2021. A) Credible intervals of the time-dependent posterior predictive distribution for detected
614 and reported new cases are shown. The monochrome bands from innermost to outermost indicate
615 the 20%, 50%, and 95% credible intervals. This colored region all together indicates the 95%
616 credible interval and can be expected to cover approximately 95% of the data. Empirical case
617 reports are indicated by black symbols. Alpha prevalence is indicated with a shaded light-yellow
618 background. Delta prevalence is indicated with a shaded light-green background. B) The social-
619 distancing stationary setpoint is given by $P_\tau(t)$ and the variant transmissibility factor is given by
620 $Y_\theta(t)$. Note that the values of $P_\tau(t)$ and $Y_\theta(t)$ are dimensionless. Credible intervals
621 corresponding to 1000 samples from the time-dependent posterior predictive distributions are
622 shown for $P_\tau(t)$ and $Y_\theta(t)$. The curve corresponding to $Y_\theta(t)$ is monotonically increasing with an
623 initial value of 1. The curve corresponding to $P_\tau(t)$ is decreasing from left to right after the start
624 of social-distancing. C) Inferred changes in the distribution of persons amongst five selected
625 subpopulations over the course of the local COVID-19 epidemic. The five populations sum to a
626 constant, S_0 , the total population. Results shown here are based on the parameter values given in
627 Tables 1 and 3. The five populations are defined as follows: the population of susceptible
628 unvaccinated persons (blue area) is given by $S_M + S_P$, the population of susceptible vaccinated
629 persons (green area) is given by $\sum_{i=1}^6 V_i + S_{V,1} + U_{\theta_1}(t)S_{V,2} + U_{\theta_2}(t)S_{V,3}$, the population of
630 actively infected persons (orange area) is given by $H_U + H_V + E_V + \sum_{i=1}^5 (E_{i,M} + E_{i,P} + E_{i,Q}) +$
631 $\sum_{x \in \{M,P,Q,V\}} (A_x + I_x)$, the population of removed unvaccinated persons (gray area) is given by
632 $R_U + D$, and the population of removed vaccinated persons (yellow area) is given by $R_V +$
633 $(1 - U_{\theta_1}(t))S_{V,2} + (1 - U_{\theta_2}(t))S_{V,3} + S_{V,4}$. Except for $U_{\theta_1}(t)$ and $U_{\theta_2}(t)$, the terms in the

634 above definitions refer to state variables of the compartmental model of Figure 1 and Appendix
635 Figure 1, which are defined in Appendix Table 1. $U_{\theta_1}(t)$ and $U_{\theta_2}(t)$ are unit step functions
636 (Appendix Equation 33 and 34), which change value from 0 to 1 at time $t = \theta_1$ and $t = \theta_2$,
637 respectively. Recall that θ_1 and θ_2 are the Alpha and Delta takeoff times. The sum $\sum_i(\mu_i \times 1 \text{ d})$
638 (purple dots), which is the empirical cumulative number of completed vaccinations, is shown as
639 a function of time t .
640



642 **Figure 3.** Inference results obtained for the MSA surrounding Houston using regional
643 surveillance data—daily reports of new COVID-19 cases—available for January 21, 2020 to
644 October 31, 2021. It should be noted that four anomalous (negative) empirical case counts are
645 not shown in the plot. A case count of 14,300 cases on September 21, 2020 is not shown in the
646 plot. See the caption of Figure 2 for additional information.

647



649 **Figure 4.** Inference results obtained for the MSA surrounding New York City using regional
650 surveillance data—daily reports of new COVID-19 cases—available for January 21, 2020 to
651 October 31, 2021. It should be noted that a single anomalous (negative) empirical case count is
652 not shown in the plot. See the caption of Figure 2 for additional information.

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
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663 **Figure 5.** Inference results obtained for the MSA surrounding Phoenix using regional
664 surveillance data—daily reports of new COVID-19 cases—available for January 21, 2020 to
665 October 31, 2021. It should be noted that two anomalous (negative) empirical case counts are not
666 shown in the plot. See the caption of Figure 2 for additional information.

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
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679 **Figure 6.** Marginal posterior distributions of transmissibility factors for Alpha in dark-green and
680 Delta in light-green (left panels) and takeoff times for Alpha and Delta (right panels) in four
681 MSAs centered on (A,B) Dallas, (C,D) Houston, (E,F) New York City, and (G,H) Phoenix.
682 Inferences are based on daily reports of new cases from January 21, 2020 to October 31, 2021.
683 For each of the right panels, the 95% credible intervals for Alpha and Delta takeoff times are
684 indicated in parentheses, and the MAP estimate for a given region is indicated to the left of the
685 credible interval.

686

687 APPENDIX

688 Imputation of Missing Daily Case Counts

689 By October 31, 2021, many regions in the US were not reporting new detected COVID-
690 19 cases on a strictly daily basis. When one or more daily case counts were not available, we
691 imputed daily case counts on the basis of a linear fit to the two nearest available cumulative case

692 counts. This approach has the effect of evenly distributing case counts across the days for which
 693 daily reports are unavailable.

694 **Equations of the Compartmental Model**

695 The compartmental model, which is illustrated in Figure 1 and Appendix Figure 1,
 696 consists of the following 40 ordinary differential equations (ODEs):

$$\frac{dS_M}{dt} = -\beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{S_M}{S_0}\right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) \quad (1)$$

$$- U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) S_M - (1 - P_\tau(t)) S_P] - \mu(t) S_0 \left(\frac{S_M}{\phi_V(t)}\right)$$

$$\frac{dS_P}{dt} = -m_b \beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{S_P}{S_0}\right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) \quad (2)$$

$$+ U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) S_M - (1 - P_\tau(t)) S_P] - \mu(t) S_0 \left(\frac{S_P}{\phi_V(t)}\right)$$

$$\frac{dE_{1,M}}{dt} = \beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{S_M}{S_0}\right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) - k_L E_{1,M} \quad (3)$$

$$- U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) E_{1,M} - (1 - P_\tau(t)) E_{1,P}]$$

$$\frac{dE_{1,P}}{dt} = m_b \beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{S_P}{S_0}\right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) - k_L E_{1,P} \quad (4)$$

$$+ U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) E_{1,M} - (1 - P_\tau(t)) E_{1,P}]$$

$$\frac{dE_{i,M}}{dt} = k_L E_{i-1,M} - k_L E_{i,M} - k_Q E_{i,M} - U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) E_{i,M} - (1 - P_\tau(t)) E_{i,P}], \quad (5)$$

for $i = 2, 3, 4, 5$

$$\frac{dE_{i,P}}{dt} = k_L E_{i-1,P} - k_L E_{i,P} - k_Q E_{i,P} + U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) E_{i,M} - (1 - P_\tau(t)) E_{i,P}], \quad (6)$$

for $i = 2, 3, 4, 5$

$$\frac{dE_{2,Q}}{dt} = k_Q (E_{2,M} + E_{2,P}) - k_L E_{2,Q} \quad (7)$$

$$\frac{dE_{i,Q}}{dt} = k_Q (E_{i,M} + E_{i,P}) + k_L E_{i-1,Q} - k_L E_{i,Q}, \text{ for } i = 3, 4, 5 \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{dA_M}{dt} = f_A k_L E_{5,M} - k_Q A_M - U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) A_M - (1 - P_\tau(t)) A_P] - c_A A_M \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{dA_P}{dt} = f_A k_L E_{5,P} - k_Q A_P + U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) A_M - (1 - P_\tau(t)) A_P] - c_A A_P \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{dA_Q}{dt} = f_A k_L E_{5,Q} + k_Q (A_M + A_P) - c_A A_Q \quad (11)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dI_M}{dt} &= (1 - f_A) k_L E_{5,M} - (k_Q + j_Q) I_M - U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) I_M - (1 - P_\tau(t)) I_P] \\ &\quad - c_I I_M \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

$$\frac{dI_P}{dt} = (1 - f_A) k_L E_{5,P} - (k_Q + j_Q) I_P + U_\sigma(t) \Lambda_\tau(t) [P_\tau(t) I_M - (1 - P_\tau(t)) I_P] - c_I I_P \quad (13)$$

$$\frac{dI_Q}{dt} = (1 - f_A) k_L E_{5,Q} + (k_Q + j_Q) (I_M + I_P) - c_I I_Q \quad (14)$$

$$\frac{dH_U}{dt} = f_H c_I (I_M + I_P + I_Q) - c_H H_U \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{dD}{dt} = (1 - f_R) c_H H_U + (1 - f_R) c_H H_V \quad (16)$$

$$\frac{dR_U}{dt} = c_A(A_M + A_P + A_Q) + (1 - f_H)c_I(I_M + I_P + I_Q) + f_R c_H H_U - \mu(t)S_0 \left(\frac{R_U}{\phi_V(t)} \right) \quad (17)$$

$$\frac{dV_1}{dt} = \mu(t)S_0 \left(\frac{S_M + S_P}{\phi_V(t)} \right) - k_V V_1 - \beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{V_1}{S_0} \right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) \quad (18)$$

$$\frac{dV_i}{dt} = k_V V_{i-1} - k_V V_i - \beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{V_i}{S_0} \right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)), \quad (19)$$

for $i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6$

$$\frac{dS_{V,1}}{dt} = (1 - f_0)k_V V_6 - \beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{S_{V,1}}{S_0} \right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{dS_{V,2}}{dt} = (f_0 - f_1)k_V V_6 - U_{\theta_1}(t)\beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{S_{V,2}}{S_0} \right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{dS_{V,3}}{dt} = (f_1 - f_2)k_V V_6 - U_{\theta_2}(t)\beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{S_{V,3}}{S_0} \right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) \quad (22)$$

$$\frac{dS_{V,4}}{dt} = f_2 k_V V_6 \quad (23)$$

$$\frac{dE_V}{dt} = \beta Y_\theta(t) \left(\frac{1}{S_0} \right) (\phi_M(t, \rho) + m_b \phi_P(t, \rho)) \quad (24)$$

$$\cdot \sum_{i=1}^6 (V_i + S_{V,1} + U_{\theta_1}(t)S_{V,2} + U_{\theta_2}(t)S_{V,3}) - \left(\frac{k_L}{5} \right) E_V$$

$$\frac{dA_V}{dt} = f_A \left(\frac{k_L}{5} \right) E_V - c_A A_V \quad (25)$$

$$\frac{dI_V}{dt} = (1 - f_A) \left(\frac{k_L}{5} \right) E_V - c_I I_V \quad (26)$$

$$\frac{dH_V}{dt} = m_h f_H c_I I_V - c_H H_V \quad (27)$$

$$\frac{dR_V}{dt} = \mu(t) S_0 \left(\frac{R_U}{\phi_V(t)} \right) + c_A A_V + (1 - m_h f_H) c_I I_V + f_R c_H H_V \quad (28)$$

697 In these equations, the independent variable is time t , and the state variables ($S_M, S_P,$
698 $E_{1,M}, \dots, E_{5,M}, E_{1,P}, \dots, E_{5,P}, E_{2,Q}, \dots, E_{5,Q}, A_M, A_P, A_Q, I_M, I_P, I_Q, H_U, D, R_U, V_1, \dots, V_6,$
699 $S_{V,1}, \dots, S_{V,4}, E_V, A_V, I_V, H_V,$ and R_V) represent 40 (sub)populations (Appendix Table 1), which
700 change over time. Thus, each ODE in Equations (1)–(28) defines the time-rate of change of a
701 population, i.e., the time-rate of change of a state variable. Note that Equations (5), (6), (8) and
702 (19) define 4, 4, 3, and 5 ODEs of the model, respectively. The model is formulated such that S_0 ,
703 the total population, is a constant. Thus, the model does not account for birth, death for reasons
704 other than COVID-19, immigration, or emigration.

705 The initial condition associated with Equations (1)–(28) is taken to be $S_M(t_0) = S_0$,
706 $I_M(t_0) = I_0 = 1$, and all other populations ($S_P, E_{1,M}, \dots, E_{5,M}, E_{1,P}, \dots, E_{5,P}, E_{2,Q}, \dots, E_{5,Q}, A_M,$
707 $A_P, A_Q, I_P, I_Q, H_U, D, R_U, V_1, \dots, V_6, S_{V,1}, \dots, S_{V,4}, E_V, A_V, I_V, H_V,$ and R_V) are equal to 0. Recall
708 that the parameter S_0 denotes the total region-specific population size. Thus, we assume that the
709 entire population is susceptible at the start of the local epidemic at time $t = t_0 > 0$, where time
710 $t = 0$ corresponds to 00:00 hours (midnight) on January 21, 2020. The parameter I_0 denotes the
711 number of infectious symptomatic persons at the start of the regional epidemic.

712 In the model, the parameters $\beta, k_L, k_Q, j_Q, c_A, c_I, c_H,$ and k_V are positive-valued rate
713 constants (all with units of d^{-1}), and the parameters $m_b, m_h, f_A, f_H, f_R, f_0 \geq f_1, f_1 \geq f_2,$ and f_2
714 are (dimensionless) fractions. Brief definitions of parameters are given in Tables 1 and 2.

715 In the model, the quantities $\phi_M(t, \rho)$, $\phi_P(t, \rho)$, and $\phi_V(t)$ are functions of (time-
716 dependent) state variables (as defined below), which represent the population of infectious
717 persons who are mixing freely (i.e., not practicing social-distancing), the population of infectious
718 persons who are practicing social-distancing (i.e., adopting disease-avoiding behaviors), and the
719 population of persons eligible for vaccination, respectively. The quantities $\phi_M(t, \rho)$ and $\phi_P(t, \rho)$
720 are also functions of $\rho \equiv (\rho_E, \rho_A)$, where ρ_E (ρ_A) is a dimensionless ratio representing the
721 infectiousness of persons in the incubation phase of infection (the infectiousness of
722 asymptomatic persons in the immune clearance phase of infection) relative to the infectiousness
723 of symptomatic persons with the same social-distancing behavior. The quantity $\phi_V(t)$ represents
724 the population of persons eligible for vaccination.

$$\phi_M(t, \rho) = I_M + I_V + \rho_E(E_{2,M} + E_{3,M} + E_{4,M} + E_{5,M} + E_V) + \rho_A(A_M + A_V) \quad (29)$$

$$\phi_P(t, \rho) = I_P + \rho_E(E_{2,P} + E_{3,P} + E_{4,P} + E_{5,P}) + \rho_A A_P \quad (30)$$

$$\phi_V(t) = S_M + S_P + \sum_{i=1}^5 (E_{i,M} + E_{i,P}) + A_M + A_P + R_U \quad (31)$$

725 The state variables that appear in these equations represent time-varying populations. Recall that
726 state variables are defined in Appendix Table 1.

727 In the model, the quantities $U_\sigma(t)$, $U_{\theta_1}(t)$, and $U_{\theta_2}(t)$ are unit step functions. The values
728 of these functions change from 0 to 1 at the times indicated by the subscripts: σ , the onset time of
729 the initial social-distancing period; θ_1 , the takeoff time of SARS-CoV-2 variant Alpha; and θ_2 ,
730 the takeoff time of SARS-CoV-2 variant Delta.

$$U_{\sigma}(t) = \begin{cases} 0 & t < \sigma \\ 1 & t \geq \sigma \end{cases} \quad (32)$$

$$U_{\theta_1}(t) = \begin{cases} 0 & t < \theta_1 \\ 1 & t \geq \theta_1 \end{cases} \quad (33)$$

$$U_{\theta_2}(t) = \begin{cases} 0 & t < \theta_2 \\ 1 & t \geq \theta_2 \end{cases} \quad (34)$$

731 As indicated in Appendix Figure 1, transitions from S_M to S_P , for example, become possible at
732 time $t = \sigma$, transitions from $S_{V,2}$ to E_V become possible at time $t = \theta_1$, and transitions from $S_{V,3}$
733 to E_V become possible at time $t = \theta_2$.

734 In the model, the quantities $P_{\tau}(t)$, and $\Lambda_{\tau}(t)$ are step functions that characterize changes
735 in social-distancing. The value of $P_{\tau}(t)$ determines a setpoint steady-state fraction of susceptible
736 persons who are practicing social-distancing. The value of $\Lambda_{\tau}(t)$ determines a time scale for
737 approach to the setpoint steady state. Changes in the values of $P_{\tau}(t)$ and $\Lambda_{\tau}(t)$ occur
738 coordinately. These changes occur at times $t = \sigma, \tau_1, \dots, \tau_n$, where n is the number of distinct
739 social-distancing periods beyond an initial social-distancing period. Initially, we took $n = 7$ (i.e.,
740 8 total social-distancing stages). The value of n is decremented by 1 (at an inferred time) if $n \leftarrow$
741 $n - 1$ is determined to be admissible by a model-selection procedure, which is described below.
742 It should be noted that p_0, p_1, \dots, p_n are parameters of $P_{\tau}(t)$ and that $\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n$ are parameters
743 of $\Lambda_{\tau}(t)$. These parameters determine the non-zero values of the step functions over different
744 periods. For example, p_1 is the value of $P_{\tau}(t)$ and λ_1 is the value of $\Lambda_{\tau}(t)$ for the period $t \in$
745 $[\tau_1, \tau_2)$.

$$P_{\tau}(t) = \begin{cases} p_0 & \sigma \leq t < \tau_1 \\ p_1 & \tau_1 \leq t < \tau_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ p_n & \tau_n \leq t < \infty \end{cases} \quad (35)$$

$$\Lambda_{\tau}(t) = \begin{cases} \lambda_0 & \sigma \leq t < \tau_1 \\ \lambda_1 & \tau_1 \leq t < \tau_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ \lambda_n & \tau_n \leq t < \infty \end{cases} \quad (36)$$

746 The values of $P_{\tau}(t)$ and $\Lambda_{\tau}(t)$ are 0 for $t < \sigma$.

747 In the model, the quantity $\mu(t)$ is a piecewise linear interpolant to a function $\tilde{\mu}(t)$ that
748 characterizes the current rate of vaccination. The value of $\tilde{\mu}(t)$ is determined by the empirical
749 daily rate of vaccination, and thus, can vary from day to day. Daily vaccination data were
750 extracted from the Covid Act Now database and the *Democrat and Chronicle* newspaper [2]
751 using the Covid Act Now Data API [1] and web scraping. We will use μ_i to refer to the value of
752 $\tilde{\mu}(t)$ for $t \in [t_i, t_{i+1})$, where time t_i corresponds to midnight on the i th day after January 21,
753 2020.

$$\tilde{\mu}(t) = \mu_i \text{ for } t \in [t_i, t_{i+1}) \quad (37)$$

754 Settings for μ_i were made such that $\mu_i S_0 \times 1 \text{ d}$ is the number of vaccinations completed in the
755 nearest past 1-d period according to Covid Act Now data and the *Democrat and Chronicle*
756 newspaper.

757 In the model, the quantity $Y_{\theta}(t)$ is a step function that quantifies how disease
758 transmissibility increases upon emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants Alpha and Delta. Initially,
759 $Y_{\theta}(t) = 1$. The value of $Y_{\theta}(t)$ is increased (by an inferred factor greater than 1 at an inferred
760 time, θ_1 or θ_2) if the change is determined to be admissible by a model-selection procedure,

761 which is described below. It should be noted that y_1 and y_2 are parameters of $Y_\theta(t)$. These
762 parameters determine the values of the step function $Y_\theta(t)$ over different periods: y_1 is the value
763 of $Y_\theta(t)$ for the period $t \in [\theta_1, \theta_2)$ and y_2 is the value of $Y_\theta(t)$ for the remaining period of
764 concern (with Delta as the dominant circulating viral strain).

$$Y_\theta(t) = \begin{cases} y_0 & \theta_0 \leq t < \theta_1 \\ y_1 & \theta_1 \leq t < \theta_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ y_m & \theta_m \leq t < \infty \end{cases} \quad (38)$$

765 where m is the number of viral variants that have emerged up to the current time, $\theta_0 \equiv t_0$, and
766 $y_0 \equiv 1$. Here, we consider $m = 2$.

767 Equations of the Auxiliary Measurement Model

768 As in the study of Lin et al. [3], we assumed that only symptomatic persons are detected
769 in testing. The accumulation of symptomatic persons is governed by

$$\frac{dC_S}{dt} = (1 - f_A) \left[k_L (E_{5,M} + E_{5,P} + E_{5,Q}) + \left(\frac{k_L}{5}\right) E_V \right] \quad (39)$$

770 where $C_S(t)$ is the cumulative number of symptomatic persons (cases) at time t . Here, unlike in
771 the study of Lin et al. [3], the expression for $C_S(t)$ accounts for exposed persons in quarantine.
772 Initially, $C_S = 0$. We numerically integrated Appendix Equation (39) together with the ODEs of
773 the compartmental model. From the trajectory for C_S , we derive a prediction for the expected
774 number of new COVID-19 cases reported on calendar date \mathcal{D}_i , $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$, using the following
775 equation:

$$I(t_i, t_{i+1}) = f_D [C_S(t_{i+1}) - C_S(t_i)] \quad (40)$$

776 where f_D is an adjustable region-specific parameter characterizing the time-averaged fraction of
777 symptomatic cases detected and reported, t_i corresponds to midnight on the i th day after January
778 21, 2020, and $t_{i+1} - t_i$ is the reporting interval (1 d). We compare $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ to δC_i , the number
779 of new cases reported on calendar date \mathcal{D}_i .

780 **Definition of the Likelihood Function**

781 Bayesian inference relies on the definition of a likelihood, which here serves the purpose
782 of assessing the compatibility of available surveillance data with adjustable (free) parameter
783 values. Let us use $\{\delta C_i\}_{i=0}^d$ to denote the daily case reporting data available between 0 and d
784 days after midnight on January 21, 2020 (the date of the first case report in the US) and let
785 $D = \{\delta C_i\}_{i=0}^d$. Let us use $\theta_F(n, m)$ to denote the set of adjustable (free) parameter values. The
786 number of adjustable parameters, $|\theta_F|$, depends on n , the number of social-distancing periods
787 considered beyond an initial social-distancing period, and m , the number of SARS-CoV-2
788 variants under consideration. As in the study of Lin et al. [3], we assume that δC_i , the number of
789 new COVID-19 cases detected over a 1-d period and reported on calendar date \mathcal{D}_i for a given
790 region, is a random variable and its expected value follows a model-derived deterministic
791 trajectory given by $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ (Equation 40). We assume that day-to-day fluctuations in the
792 random variable are independent and characterized by a negative binomial distribution $\text{NB}(r, q_i)$,
793 which has two parameters, $r > 0$ and $q_i \in (0, 1)$. Note that $\mathbb{E}[\text{NB}(r, q_i)] = r(1 - q_i)/q_i$. We
794 assume that this distribution has the same dispersion parameter r across all case reports. With
795 these assumptions, we arrive at the following likelihood function:

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta_F(n, m); \{\delta C_i\}_{i=0}^d) = \prod_{i=0}^d \mathcal{L}_i(\theta_F(n, m); \delta C_i) \quad (41)$$

796 where

$$\mathcal{L}_i(\theta_F(n, m); \delta C_i) = \text{nbinom}(\delta C_i; r, q_i) = \binom{\delta C_i + r - 1}{\delta C_i - 1} q_i^r (1 - q_i)^{\delta C_i} \quad (42)$$

797 and

$$q_i = \frac{r}{r + I(t_i, t_{i+1})}. \quad (43)$$

798 In these equations, i is an integer indicating the date \mathcal{D}_i and period (t_i, t_{i+1}) ; $\text{nbinom}(\delta C_i; r, q_i)$
799 is the probability mass function of the negative binomial distribution $\text{NB}(r, q_i)$, and $\theta_F(n, m) =$
800 $\{t_0, \beta, \sigma, \tau_1, \dots, \tau_n, p_0, p_1, \dots, p_n, \lambda_0, \lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_m, y_1, \dots, y_m, f_D, r\}$ for $n \geq 1$ and $m \geq 1$;
801 $\theta_F(0,0) = \{t_0, \beta, p_0, \lambda_0, f_D, r\}$.

802 Parameters

803 Each model parameter is briefly described in Tables 1–3. These parameters have either
804 fixed values or adjustable values (i.e., values inferred from surveillance data). The fixed values
805 may be universal (i.e., applicable to all MSAs of interest) or MSA-specific. All inferred
806 parameter values are MSA-specific. In addition, the measurement model (Appendix Equations
807 39 and 40) has one adjustable MSA-specific parameter, f_D , and the likelihood function
808 (Appendix Equations 41–43) has one adjustable MSA-specific parameter, r . Values of the other
809 likelihood parameters, q_0, \dots, q_d , are constrained and are determined using Appendix Equation
810 43.

811 **Original model of Lin et al.**

812 The model shares $19 + 3n$ parameters with the model of Lin et al. [3], including
813 parameters that define the initial condition (t_0 , I_0 , and S_0). (Recall that n is the number of social-
814 distancing periods being considered beyond the initial social-distancing period.) The shared
815 parameters are t_0 , I_0 , S_0 , β , σ , τ_1, \dots, τ_n , p_0, \dots, p_n , $\lambda_0, \dots, \lambda_n$, ρ_A , ρ_E , m_b , f_A , f_H , f_R , k_L , k_Q , j_Q ,
816 c_A , c_H , and c_I . As in the study of Lin et al. [3], we inferred MSA-specific values for the
817 following parameters: t_0 , β , σ , p_0, \dots, p_n , and $\lambda_0, \dots, \lambda_n$. We also inferred MSA-specific values
818 for τ_1, \dots, τ_n provided that $n \geq 1$. As in the study of Lin et al. [3], the remaining 14 parameters
819 shared between the old and new models (I_0 , S_0 , ρ_A , ρ_E , m_b , f_A , f_H , f_R , k_L , k_Q , j_Q , c_A , c_H , and c_I)
820 were taken to have fixed values, and we adopted the settings of Lin et al. [3] for these parameters
821 (Table 3). These settings are universal except for the setting for S_0 , the total population, which is
822 MSA-specific.

823 **Extension of the model of Lin et al.**

824 Our extension of the model of Lin et al. [3] introduces $5 + 2(m + 1) + (d + 1)$
825 parameters, where m ($= 0, 1$ or 2) is the number of SARS-CoV-2 variants being considered and
826 d is the number of days since January 21, 2020: $\theta_0, \dots, \theta_m$, y_0, \dots, y_m , m_h , f_0 , f_1 , f_2 , k_V , and
827 μ_0, \dots, μ_d . The θ and y parameters are variant takeover times and transmissibility factors,
828 respectively, except that the value of θ_0 is defined as t_0 and the value of y_0 is defined as 1. The
829 Alpha transmissibility factor y_1 , the Alpha takeoff time θ_1 , the Delta transmissibility factor y_2 ,
830 and the Delta takeoff time θ_2 were inferred for each MSA with $m = 2$ (cf. Table 1). The
831 transmissibility factors were each constrained to be greater than or equal to 1. The settings for
832 μ_0, \dots, μ_d are empirical and MSA-specific. Each μ_i is set such that $\mu_i S_0 \times 1$ d is the number of

833 vaccinations completed over the past 1-d period nearest to the i th day after January 21, 2020. As
834 noted earlier, the number of completed vaccinations was obtained for each MSA from Covid Act
835 Now and the *Democrat and Chronicle* newspaper [2] using the Covid Act Now Data API [1] and
836 web scraping. In the spreadsheet accessed daily from Covid Act Now, the
837 ‘metrics.vaccinationsCompletedRatio’ column gives the percentage of the total population that
838 has received the recommended number of doses: one dose for Ad26.CoV2.S (Janssen, Johnson
839 & Johnson) or two doses for mRNA-1273 (Moderna) and BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech). As a
840 simplification, we considered all completed vaccinations to be equivalent. The parameters m_h ,
841 f_0 , f_1 , f_2 , and k_V were assigned fixed universal estimates (Table 3). Each of these estimates is
842 explained below.

843 **Estimation of k_V**

844 The rate constant k_V characterizes the rate of transition out of compartment V_i for $i =$
845 $1, \dots, n_V$. Recall that, in the model, susceptible persons enter V_1 upon vaccination (Figure 1,
846 Appendix Figure 1). The values of $n_V (= 6)$ and $k_V (= 0.3 \text{ d}^{-1})$ were selected so that the time a
847 person spends in V_1, \dots, V_{n_V} , which we will denote as t_V , is distributed approximately the same as
848 \tilde{t}_V , the waiting time between vaccination of a previously uninfected person and detection of
849 vaccine-induced SARS-CoV-2-specific IgG antibodies [4] (Appendix Figure 2). According to
850 the model, the time that a person spends in V_1, \dots, V_{n_V} is distributed according to the probability
851 density function $f(t_V; n_V, k_V) = k_V^{n_V} t_V^{n_V-1} e^{-k_V t_V} / (n_V - 1)!$, i.e., t_V is Erlang distributed with
852 shape parameter $n_V = 6$ and rate parameter $k_V = 0.3 \text{ d}^{-1}$. As can be seen in Appendix Figure 2,
853 the cumulative distribution function of this Erlang distribution reasonably captures the empirical
854 cumulative distribution of waiting times observed in the longitudinal study of Korodi et al. [4].

855 Thus, in the model, passage through V_1, \dots, V_6 with rate constant $k_V = 0.3 \text{ d}^{-1}$ accounts for the
856 variable and significantly non-zero amount of time required for development of a protective
857 antibody response after vaccination.

858 **Estimation of f_0, f_1 , and f_2**

859 The parameters $f_0 > f_1, f_1 > f_2$, and f_2 are fractions that characterize the average effectiveness
860 of vaccines used in the US and that determine the sizes of (mutually exclusive) subpopulations of
861 vaccinated persons having different susceptibilities to productive infection (i.e., an infection that
862 can be transmitted to others): $S_{V,1}, S_{V,2}, S_{V,3}$, and $S_{V,4}$ (Figure 1, Appendix Figure 1). We assume
863 that persons in the $S_{V,1}$ subpopulation are susceptible to productive infection by any of the viral
864 strains considered, and in contrast, we assume that persons in the $S_{V,4}$ subpopulation are
865 susceptible to productive infection by none of the viral strains considered. Persons in the $S_{V,2}$
866 subpopulation are taken to be susceptible to productive infection by the Alpha and Delta variants
867 but not viral strains in circulation before the emergence of Alpha. Persons in the $S_{V,3}$
868 subpopulation are taken to be susceptible to productive infection by the Delta variant but not the
869 Alpha variant or viral strains in circulation before the emergence of Alpha. The quantity $1 - f_0$
870 defines the fraction of vaccinated persons who enter the $S_{V,1}$ subpopulation after exiting V_6 , the
871 quantity $f_0 - f_1$ defines the fraction of vaccinated persons who enter the $S_{V,2}$ subpopulation after
872 exiting V_6 , the quantity $f_1 - f_2$ defines the fraction of vaccinated persons who enter the $S_{V,3}$
873 subpopulation after exiting V_6 , and f_2 defines the fraction of vaccinated persons who enter the
874 $S_{V,4}$ subpopulation after exiting V_6 . We take f_0 to characterize vaccine effectiveness before the
875 emergence of Alpha. According to Thompson et al. [5], vaccine effectiveness was initially 90%.
876 Thus, we set $f_0 = 0.9$. We take f_1 to characterize vaccine effectiveness after the emergence of

877 Alpha but before the emergence of Delta. According to Puranik et al. [6], in May 2021, vaccine
878 effectiveness was 81%. Thus, we set $f_1 = 0.81$. We take f_2 to characterize vaccine effectiveness
879 after the emergence of Delta. According to Tang et al. [7], the effectiveness of two doses of the
880 Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine (BNT162b2) against Delta is 53.5% and the effectiveness of two doses
881 of the Moderna vaccine (mRNA-1273) against Delta is 84.8%. Taking the average of these
882 figures, we set $f_2 = 0.69$.

883 **Estimation of m_h**

884 The parameter m_h characterizes the reduced risk of severe disease for a vaccinated
885 person in the case of a breakthrough infection. We set $m_h = 0.04$, i.e., we assumed that there is a
886 25-fold reduction in the risk of severe disease for infected persons who have been vaccinated,
887 which is consistent with the observations of Lopez Bernal et al. [8].

888 **Notable New Modeling Assumptions**

889 It should be noted that we treat the incubation period for newly infected (exposed)
890 vaccinated persons differently than for newly infected (exposed) unvaccinated persons (Figure 1,
891 Appendix Figure 1). For unvaccinated persons, as in the study of Lin et al. [3], we divide
892 exposed persons in the incubation period of infection into five subpopulations: $E_{1,M}, \dots, E_{5,M}$ for
893 exposed persons who are mixing (i.e., persons who are not practicing social-distancing),
894 $E_{1,P}, \dots, E_{5,P}$ for exposed persons who are practicing social-distancing, and $E_{1,Q}, \dots, E_{5,Q}$ for
895 exposed quarantined persons. Persons move through the five stages of the incubation period
896 sequentially. In contrast, as a simplification, for vaccinated persons, we consider only a single
897 exposed population: E_V . We take persons to exit E_V with rate constant $k_L/5$ (Appendix Figure
898 1). With this choice, the duration of the incubation period of infection is the same, on average,

899 for both vaccinated and unvaccinated persons. The average duration is $5/k_L$ (about 5 d) in both
900 cases. The difference is that the duration of the incubation period is Erlang distributed for
901 unvaccinated persons, as discussed by Lin et al. [3], but exponentially distributed for vaccinated
902 persons.

903 As indicated in Equation (29), we take vaccinated persons with productive infections to
904 be equally as infectious as unvaccinated persons.

905 As noted earlier, we take all vaccinated persons to be mixing (i.e., to not be practicing
906 social-distancing). Thus, populations of infected vaccinated persons (E_V , I_V , and A_V) contribute
907 to $\phi_M(t)$ (Appendix Equation 29) but not $\phi_P(t)$ (Appendix Equation 30).

908 As indicated in Appendix Equation 31, we consider pre-symptomatic exposed and
909 asymptomatic unvaccinated persons to be eligible for vaccination and, thus, these persons
910 contribute to the consumption of vaccine doses (i.e., these persons account for a portion of the
911 number of completed vaccinations on a given day i , $\mu_i S_0 \times 1$ d). However, we do not move
912 these persons to vaccinated compartments. The reason is that exposed and asymptomatic persons
913 are expected to develop immunity faster through recovery from infection (i.e., movement to R_U)
914 than from vaccination.

915 As indicated in Appendix Equation 31, we do not consider symptomatic, quarantined,
916 severely ill and hospitalized/isolated-at-home, and deceased persons to be eligible for
917 vaccination.

918 **Inference Approach**

919 Recall that θ_F denotes the set of all adjustable parameters. As in the study of Lin et al.
920 [3], for each MSA, we inferred MSA-specific adjustable parameter values θ_F using all MSA-
921 specific surveillance data available up to a specified day of inference \mathcal{D}_d (i.e., the d th day after
922 January 21, 2020). We took a Bayesian inference approach, meaning that, for a given dataset, we
923 generated parameter posterior samples (a collection of θ_F 's) through Markov chain Monte Carlo
924 (MCMC) sampling. The parameter posterior samples provide a probabilistic characterization of
925 the adjustable parameter values consistent with the dataset used in inference. By drawing
926 samples from the parametric posterior distribution, we generated a posterior predictive
927 distribution for $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ for each i of interest. We considered all days from January 21, 2020 to
928 October 31, 2021. In other words, for each i of interest, a prediction for $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ was generated
929 for each of many θ_F 's drawn randomly (with uniform probability) from the parametric posterior
930 distribution. The resulting distribution of $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ values is the posterior predictive distribution
931 for $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$. Recall that $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ is given by Appendix Equation 40 and corresponds to
932 $\mathbb{E}[\delta C_i]$, the expected number of new COVID-19 cases detected over a 1-d surveillance interval
933 and reported for the i th day after January 21, 2020. Observation noise was injected into the
934 posterior predictive distributions by replacing each sampled value for $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ with
935 $X_i \sim \text{NB}(r, q_i)$, where r is a member of the sampled set of parameter values θ_F used to generate
936 the prediction of $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ and q_i is given by Equation 43.

937 According to Bayes' theorem, given surveillance data $D = \{\delta C_i\}_{i=0}^d$, the parametric
938 posterior is given as

$$\mathbb{P}\{\theta_F|D\} = \frac{\mathbb{P}\{D|\theta_F\} \mathbb{P}\{\theta_F\}}{Z} \quad (44)$$

939 where $\mathbb{P}\{\theta_F\}$ is the prior (which is formulated to capture knowledge of θ_F external to D or to
940 express lack of such knowledge), $\mathbb{P}\{D|\theta_F\}$ is the likelihood defined by Appendix Equations 41–
941 43, and Z is a normalizing constant. We assumed a proper uniform prior, i.e., for each adjustable
942 parameter, we assumed that all values between specified lower and upper bounds are equally
943 likely before consideration of D . We used the same bounds as in the study of Lin et al. [3]. Then,
944 we used an adaptive MCMC (aMCMC) algorithm [9] to generate samples from $\mathbb{P}\{D|\theta_F\} \mathbb{P}\{\theta_F\}$,
945 which is proportional to $\mathbb{P}\{\theta_F|D\}$. Thus, the relative probabilities of parameter sets θ_F according
946 to $\mathbb{P}\{\theta_F|D\}$ are correctly represented by the samples.

947 Specifically, the adaptive MCMC algorithm [9] generates samples from the multivariate
948 parametric posterior for adjustable model parameters (t_0 , β , and parameters for variant
949 emergence and social-distancing), the measurement model parameter f_D , and the likelihood
950 parameter r (Tables 1 and 2). This algorithm is available within the PyBioNetFit software
951 package [10]. Use of the algorithm was performed as described by Lin et al. [3]. The report of
952 Neumann et al. [10] includes helpful general usage advice, which was followed in this study.
953 Inference jobs were executed on a computer cluster. For each inference job, a total of 25 chains
954 were generated, and the chain with the best mixing and convergence properties was selected for
955 subsequent analyses.

956 Each inference was conditioned on the compartmental model of Figure 1 (Appendix
957 Equations 1–38), settings for the structural parameters m (the number of SARS-CoV-2 variants
958 under consideration) and n (the number of social-distancing periods under consideration beyond
959 an initial social-distancing period), the measurement model (Appendix Equations 39 and 40), and
960 fixed parameter estimates (Tables 1 and 2), including empirical daily *per capita* vaccination rates
961 (i.e., the settings for μ_i in Appendix Equation 37). We assumed a proper uniform prior for each

962 adjustable parameter [3] and a negative binomial likelihood function (Appendix Equations 41–
963 43). Use of proper uniform priors means that MAP estimates are maximum likelihood estimates
964 (MLEs). In each inference, the data entering the likelihood function, $D = \{\delta C_i\}_{i=0}^d$ (Appendix
965 Equation 41), were MSA-specific daily reports of newly detected COVID-19 cases available up
966 to the date of inference \mathcal{D}_d (i.e., the d -th day after January 21, 2020). Thus, all inferences are
967 region-specific and time-dependent.

968 Use of Model Selection to Determine Intervals of Step Functions

969 Variant takeover times, $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2)$, and start times of social-distancing periods, $\tau =$
970 $(\sigma, \tau_1, \dots, \tau_n)$, were inferred from data; however, changes of the associated time-dependent step
971 functions, $Y_\theta(t)$, $P_\tau(t)$, and $\Lambda_\tau(t)$, were introduced only when an increase in model complexity
972 was deemed to be justified. Each decision to introduce variant takeover or start of a new social-
973 distancing period (beyond the initial period) was made using a model-selection procedure, which
974 is described below. It should be noted that y_1 and y_2 are parameters of $Y_\theta(t)$, p_0, p_1, \dots, p_n are
975 parameters of $P_\tau(t)$, and $\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n$ are parameters of $\Lambda_\tau(t)$. These parameters determine the
976 values of the step functions over different periods. For example, for $n \geq 1$, p_1 is the value of
977 $P_\tau(t)$ and λ_1 is the value of $\Lambda_\tau(t)$ for the period $t \in [\tau_1, \tau_2)$. Similarly, y_1 is the value of $Y_\theta(t)$
978 for the period $t \in [\theta_1, \theta_2)$, and y_2 is the value of $Y_\theta(t)$ for the period $t \in [\theta_2, t_{\text{final}})$, where t_{final}
979 corresponds to the date of inference (October 31, 2021).

980 We started with a setting of $n = 7$ for each MSA of interest (i.e., 8 total social-distancing
981 stages). To determine if n could be reduced, we conducted parsimony checks. In a parsimony
982 check, 100 MLE curves, each constituting a fit to the data, were generated via optimization jobs.
983 In these jobs, the total number of social-distancing stages in the model ($n + 1$) was set at 1 less

984 than for the current proposed best fit. Each of the 100 fits was visually inspected to determine
985 whether or not the following criteria held: 1) the quality of fit is acceptable (i.e., comparable to
986 what is obtained with the current proposed best fit); 2) Alpha and Delta surges (identified by
987 sequencing data) are explained at least partly by increased transmissibility; 3) social-distancing
988 setpoint parameter values are feasible (i.e., each setpoint parameter takes on a value between 0.2
989 and 0.8); and 4) social-distancing changes proximal to an Alpha or Delta surge (if any) occur
990 only after an increase in transmissibility. If one or more of these conditions was not satisfied, we
991 accepted the proposed best fit as the most parsimonious fit to the data. If all conditions held, we
992 updated the proposed best fit, and the parsimony check was repeated for a model with one less
993 social-distancing stage. In the Appendix, we show examples of violations of parsimony-check
994 criteria for the MSA surrounding Houston (Appendix Figure 3).

995 **Simulations**

996 After specification of parameter values (Tables 1–3), we used the SciPy
997 (<https://www.scipy.org>) interface to LSODA [12] to numerically integrate the system of coupled
998 ODEs consisting of the 40 ODEs of the compartmental model and the 1 ODE of the
999 measurement model (Appendix Equations 1–39). The initial condition was defined by settings
1000 for t_0 , I_0 , and S_0 (Tables 1–3). Integration combined with use of Appendix Equation 40 yielded a
1001 prediction of the expected number of new cases detected for each 1-d surveillance period of
1002 interest in the past or future: $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$, where t_i corresponds to midnight on the i th day after
1003 January 21, 2020. To account for randomness in case detection and reporting, we replaced
1004 $I(t_i, t_{i+1})$ with $X_i \sim \text{NB}(r, q_i)$, where q_i is given by Appendix Equation 43.

1005 **Appendix References**


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Appendix Table 1. State variables of the compartmental model

State variable (population)	Description
S_M	Population of susceptible unvaccinated persons who are mixing (i.e., not practicing social-distancing)
S_P	Population of susceptible unvaccinated persons who are practicing social-distancing
$S_{V,1}$	Population of vaccinated unexposed persons who developed an immune response to vaccination that does not protect against productive infection by ancestral strains or the Alpha and Delta variants
$S_{V,2}$	Population of vaccinated unexposed persons who developed an immune response to vaccination that protects against productive infection by ancestral strains but not the Alpha or Delta variants
$S_{V,3}$	Population of vaccinated unexposed persons who developed an immune response to vaccination that protects against productive infection by ancestral strains and the Alpha variant but not the Delta variant
$S_{V,4}$	Population of vaccinated unexposed persons who developed an immune response to vaccination that protects against productive infection by ancestral strains and the Alpha and Delta variants
$V_i (i = 1, \dots, 6)$	Population of vaccinated persons in the i th stage of immune response to vaccination
$E_{i,M} (i = 1, \dots, 5)$	Population of exposed unvaccinated persons in the i th stage of the incubation period of infection and who are mixing
$E_{i,P} (i = 1, \dots, 5)$	Population of exposed unvaccinated persons in the i th stage of the incubation period of infection and who are practicing social-distancing
$E_{i,Q} (i = 2, \dots, 5)$	Population of exposed unvaccinated persons in the i th stage of the incubation period of infection and who are quarantined
E_V	Population of vaccinated persons in the incubation period of a productive infection (i.e., an infection that can be transmitted to others)

A_M	Population of asymptomatic unvaccinated persons who are in the immune clearance phase of infection and who are mixing
A_P	Population of asymptomatic unvaccinated persons who are in the immune clearance phase of infection and who are practicing social-distancing
A_Q	Population of asymptomatic unvaccinated persons who are in the immune clearance phase of infection and who are quarantined
A_V	Population of asymptomatic vaccinated persons who are in the immune clearance phase of a productive infection (i.e., an infection that can be transmitted to others)
I_M	Population of infectious, symptomatic, and unvaccinated persons with mild disease who are mixing
I_P	Population of infectious, symptomatic, non-vaccinated, and infectious persons with mild disease who are practicing social-distancing
I_Q	Population of infectious, symptomatic, and unvaccinated persons with mild disease who are quarantined
I_V	Population of infectious, symptomatic, and vaccinated persons with mild disease
R_U	Population of recovered unvaccinated persons
R_V	Population of recovered vaccinated persons
H_U	Population of unvaccinated persons with severe disease who are hospitalized or isolated at home
H_V	Population of vaccinated persons with severe disease who are hospitalized or isolated at home
D	Population of deceased persons




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1053 **Appendix Figure 1.** Expanded illustration of the new compartmental model. In the extended
 1054 model, vaccination was considered by allowing susceptible and recovered persons to transition
 1055 into a vaccinated compartment, either V_1 and R_V . Susceptible (recovered) persons who have
 1056 completed vaccination move into the V_1 (R_V) compartment. The susceptible persons who move
 1057 into V_1 are drawn from S_M (populated by susceptible persons who are mixing and unprotected by
 1058 social-distancing) and from S_P (populated by susceptible persons who are protected by social-
 1059 distancing). After susceptible persons enter V_1 , they can move through a series of additional
 1060 compartments (V_2 through V_6), which are included to capture the time needed for immunity to
 1061 develop after completion of vaccination. We estimate that the time needed to acquire immunity
 1062 after vaccination is approximately three weeks based on longitudinal studies of anti-spike protein
 1063 IgG levels [4]. Persons who exit the V_6 compartment without becoming infected enter one of the
 1064 following compartments: $S_{V,1}$, $S_{V,2}$, $S_{V,3}$, or $S_{V,4}$. Persons in $S_{V,1}$ are taken to remain susceptible

1065 to productive infection by all SARS-CoV-2 strains of interest (Alpha, Delta, and ancestral
1066 strains). Persons in $S_{V,2}$ are taken to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 Alpha and Delta variants.
1067 Persons in $S_{V,3}$ are taken to be susceptible to Delta. Persons in $S_{V,4}$ are taken to be protected
1068 against all strains of interest. Infection of persons in $S_{V,3}$ is only allowed if Delta is present, i.e.,
1069 at times $t > \theta_2$. Infection of persons in $S_{V,2}$ is only allowed if Alpha or Delta is present, i.e., at
1070 times $t > \theta_1$. Vaccinated persons in compartments V_1 through V_6 and compartment $S_{V,1}$ are
1071 allowed to become infected at any time, at which point they transition to compartment E_V ,
1072 consisting of vaccinated persons who were exposed before development of vaccine-induced
1073 immunity. Persons in compartment $S_{V,2}$ are allowed to become infected if $t \geq \theta_1$. Similarly,
1074 persons in compartment $S_{V,3}$ are allowed to become infected if $t \geq \theta_2$. Possible outcomes for
1075 persons in E_V are taken to be the same as those for unvaccinated exposed persons; however, the
1076 incubation period is taken to be distinct. Persons in E_V can experience asymptomatic disease
1077 (upon entering A_V) or they can become symptomatic (upon entering I_V). Persons in A_V
1078 eventually recover, entering compartment R_V . Persons in I_V can progress to severe disease (upon
1079 entering H_V) or recover (upon entering R_V). Persons in H_V either recover (moving into R_V) or die
1080 (moving into D). Persons who have recovered from infection, in the R_U compartment, move
1081 directly into the R_V compartment upon vaccination. Persons in the R_U and R_V compartments are
1082 taken to have full immunity. The vaccination rate at which susceptible and recovered persons
1083 move into vaccinated compartments is updated daily for consistency with the empirical overall
1084 rate of vaccination, which we extract daily from the COVID Act Now Data API [1] and the
1085 *Democrat and Chronicle* newspaper [2]. The relative values of the vaccination rate are set such
1086 that each person eligible for vaccination has the same probability of being vaccinated. All
1087 unvaccinated persons are taken to be eligible for vaccination except symptomatic persons (in

1088 compartments I_M and I_P), persons who are hospitalized or severely ill at home (in compartment
1089 H), quarantined persons (in the various compartments labeled with a Q subscript), and deceased
1090 persons (in compartment D). It should be noted that asymptomatic, non-quarantined persons (in
1091 compartments A_M and A_P) and presymptomatic, non-quarantined persons (in the E
1092 compartments) are taken to be eligible (and to influence the vaccination rate constants) but, as a
1093 simplification, these persons are not explicitly tracked as vaccinated or unvaccinated because
1094 each of these persons will eventually enter either the D compartment or the R_U compartment, at
1095 which point they will have immunity. In the model, the effects of SARS-CoV-2 variants are
1096 captured by a time-dependent dimensionless multiplier $Y_\theta(t)$ of the rate constant β . This rate
1097 constant, which appears in Appendix Equations 1–4, 18–22, and 24, determines the rate of
1098 disease transmission within the subpopulation unprotected by social-distancing behaviors when
1099 $Y_\theta(t) = 1$. We take $Y_\theta(t) = 1$ for times $t < \theta_1$, i.e., for the initial period of the COVID-19
1100 pandemic in the US that we take to have started on January 21, 2020. We take $Y_\theta(t)$ to have the
1101 form of a step function with distinct values greater than 1 for periods starting at $t = \theta_1$ and
1102 $\theta_{k+1} > \theta_k$ for $k = 1, \dots, m$. Thus, the model allows for m distinct periods of variant strain
1103 dominance delimited by a set of start times $\theta = \{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_m\}$. We considered $m = 2$. We assume
1104 that variants differ only in transmissibility.



1105

1106 **Appendix Figure 2.** Comparison of an Erlang cumulative distribution function with shape
1107 parameter $n_V = 6$ and rate parameter $k_V = 0.3 \text{ d}^{-1}$ and the empirical cumulative distribution of
1108 waiting times (\tilde{t}_V values) observed in the longitudinal study of Korodi et al. [4]. The waiting
1109 time \tilde{t}_V is the time between vaccination of a previously uninfected person and detection of
1110 vaccine-induced SARS-CoV-2-specific IgG antibodies.

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
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1119 **Appendix Figure 3.** Example of a parsimony check with criteria that are violated for the
1120 MSA surrounding Houston. (A) Alpha and Delta surges (identified by sequencing data) are not
1121 explained, at least in part, by increased transmissibility, while all other criteria are satisfied. Each
1122 broken vertical black line from left to right indicates the date of onset of a social-distancing stage
1123 (i.e., with $n = 3$ for this illustration). Each broken vertical red line from left to right indicates the
1124 takeoff date of a variant (namely, Alpha or Delta). (B) Not all social-distancing setpoint
1125 parameter values are feasible, while all other criteria are satisfied. (C) Social-distancing changes
1126 proximal to an Alpha or Delta surge (if any) precede an increase in transmissibility, while all
1127 other criteria are satisfied. In Panel A, we see that the orange segment between the two broken
1128 vertical red lines, which denotes the relative transmissibility of Alpha, is no larger than the
1129 orange segment to its left, which denotes the relative transmissibility of ancestral strains of
1130 SARS-CoV-2. In Panel B, the rightmost blue segment, which denotes the social-distancing
1131 setpoint parameter value for the final social-distancing stage, has a value of roughly 0.16, which
1132 is deemed infeasible by our criterion. Finally, in Panel C, the rightmost broken vertical black line

1133 is proximal to the leftmost broken vertical red line, which corresponds to the takeoff time of the
1134 Alpha surge, and the social-distancing setpoint parameter value changes prior to the Alpha surge.
1135 Note that all three panels show MLE curves, each of which constitutes an acceptable fit to the
1136 data.