A tri-level optimization model for interdependent infrastructure network resilience against compound hazard events
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Rochester Institute of Technology, NY (United States)
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Northeastern Univ., Boston, MA (United States)
- Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (United States)
- Northeastern Univ., Boston, MA (United States); Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Resilient operation of interdependent infrastructures against compound hazard events is essential for maintaining societal well-being. To address consequence assessment challenges in this problem space, we propose a novel policy-guided tri-level optimization model applied to a proof-of-concept case study with fuel distribution and transportation networks – encompassing one realistic network; one fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as networks drawn from three synthetic distributions. Mathematically, our approach takes the form of a defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model—a multi-agent tri-level optimization, comprised of a defender, attacker, and an operator acting in sequence. Here, in this study, our notional operator may choose proxy actions to operate an interdependent system comprised of fuel terminals and gas stations (functioning as supplies) and a transportation network with traffic flow (functioning as demand) to minimize unmet demand at gas stations. A notional attacker aims to hypothetically disrupt normal operations by reducing supply at the supply terminals, and the notional defender aims to identify best proxy defense policy options which include hardening supply terminals or allowing alternative distribution methods such as trucking reserve supplies. We solve our DAD formulation at a metropolitan scale and present practical defense policy insights against hypothetical compound hazards. We demonstrate the generalizability of our framework by presenting results for a realistic network; a fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as for three networks drawn from synthetic distributions. Additionally, we demonstrate the scalability of the framework by investigating runtime performance as a function of the network size. Steps for future research are also discussed.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- Grant/Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 2507167
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA--191126
- Journal Information:
- International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Journal Name: International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection Vol. 47; ISSN 1874-5482
- Publisher:
- ElsevierCopyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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