Remote inspection of adversary-controlled environments
- Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum (Germany); University of Michigan, NERS
- Princeton University, NJ (United States)
- Harvard University, Boston, MA (United States)
- PHYSEC GmbH, Bochum (Germany); Ruhr University Bochum (Germany)
- Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum (Germany)
- TU Berlin (Germany); University of Connecticut, Storrs, Mansfield, CT (United States)
Remotely monitoring the location and enduring presence of valuable items in adversary-controlled environments presents significant challenges. In this article, we demonstrate a monitoring approach that leverages the gigahertz radio-wave scattering and absorption of a room and its contents, including a set of mirrors with random orientations placed inside, to remotely verify the absence of any disturbance over time. Our technique extends to large physical systems the application of physical unclonable functions for integrity protection. Its main applications are scenarios where parties are mutually distrustful and have privacy and security constraints. Examples range from the verification of nuclear arms-control treaties to the securing of currency, artwork, or data centers.
- Research Organization:
- University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); National Science Foundation (NSF); DARPA
- Grant/Contract Number:
- NA0003920; NA0002534; SC0022199
- OSTI ID:
- 2283165
- Journal Information:
- Nature Communications, Journal Name: Nature Communications Journal Issue: 1 Vol. 14; ISSN 2041-1723
- Publisher:
- Nature Publishing GroupCopyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
The development and application of the Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA).
Universal Authenticated Item Monitoring System (AIMS) second generation equipment