Estimation of the time for steam generator trip due to cyber intrusions

Journal Article · 01 April 2022 · Annals of Nuclear Energy

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anucene.2022.109108 · OSTI ID:1875475

Patel, Japan K. ^[1]; Varuttamaseni, Athi ^[2]; Youngblood, Robert W. ^[3]; Lee, John C. ^[1]; Wacker, Steven ^[1]; Pires Barbosa, Rafael ^[1]; Guo, Junjie ^[1]

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1. Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
2. Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)
3. Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

The time required to trip a pressurized water reactor (PWR) by inserting malicious signals into its steam generator (SG) control system has been studied using the Generic PWR (GPWR) Simulator. A semi-analytical model is developed to approximately reproduce the simulator response and understand the dynamics of the control unit. A series of two proportional-integral controllers determines control action according to preset constants, the readings from the feedwater level sensor, and those from feedwater and steam flowrate transmitters. It is observed that the most important factor that determines whether a trip will occur is how much additional water is added to or withheld from the SG over time compared to normal operating conditions. In order to determine the effects of control action on the SG, changes in mass inventory are considered. This approach models the SG water level as a function of mass inventory and has a backward temporal memory. A Python interface is developed for the GPWR framework to automatically simulate different spoofing scenarios and post-process the related data. We observe that the trip times predominantly depend on flow mismatch and/or level errors. Controller parameters, including the integral time and gain constants, either speed up or slow down the rate of progression to a trip setpoint but do not cause a trip by themselves. The reactor can trip on a high-level signal when the reading crosses above 78%, increased from its reference level of 57%, or a low-level reading when it is below 25%. The present results show roughly how long the operators would have to respond to an attack, given a specific set of spoofing signals within the issue space analyzed. Furthermore, we have generated a simple surface by fitting a combination of exponential functions to the data obtained from the GPWR Simulator. In general, trips on a low level have been observed to occur faster than those on a high level.

• Research Organization: Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE Office of Science (SC), Nuclear Physics (NP)
• Grant/Contract Number: SC0012704; NE0008783
• OSTI ID: 1875475
• Alternate ID(s): OSTI ID: 1860998; OSTI ID: 1895442
• Report Number(s): BNL-223107-2022-JAAM
• Journal Information: Annals of Nuclear Energy, Journal Name: Annals of Nuclear Energy Vol. 173; ISSN 0306-4549
• Publisher: ElsevierCopyright Statement
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English