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Title: The avoidance of unwanted catch and cooperation: the case of the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery

Journal Article · · ICES Journal of Marine Science

Abstract This paper focuses on a particularly successful avoidance of unwanted catch of protected, endangered, and threatened (PET) species in the form of ecologically important sponge and coral, to be found off Canada's Pacific coast. The fishery causing the unwanted catch—the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery. A campaign to protect the sponge/coral led by environmental NGOs (ENGOs) resulted in the industry's access to the key California market being threatened. For reasons explained, the national resource manager's ability to take effective direct action had become severely compromised. The groundfish trawl fishing industry responded to the economic threat with a bottom up approach to the unwanted catch problem, by negotiating a habitat agreement with a consortium of ENGOs, with the blessing and full support of the national resource manager. The agreement, now in its tenth year of operation, has proved to be a remarkable success in avoidance of unwanted catch. The paper argues that the success rests fundamentally upon the fact that the fishers have been and are playing a stand alone stable cooperative game, which has led them in turn to play stable cooperative games with both the national resource manager and the ENGO consortium. The paper analyses the factors leading to the stand alone stable cooperative fisher game, doing so by necessity through the lens of game theory.

Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Supply Chain
OSTI ID:
1844280
Journal Information:
ICES Journal of Marine Science, Journal Name: ICES Journal of Marine Science Journal Issue: 3 Vol. 80; ISSN 1054-3139
Publisher:
Oxford University PressCopyright Statement
Country of Publication:
United Kingdom
Language:
English

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