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Title: Targeted modification of hardware trojans

Abstract

The use of untrusted design tools, components, and designers, coupled with untrusted device fabrication, introduces the possibility of malicious modifications being made to integrated circuits (ICs) during their design and fabrication. These modifications are known as hardware trojans. The widespread use of commercially purchased 3rd party intellectual property (3PIP) and commercial design tools extends even into trusted design flows. Unfortunately, due to the theoretical result that there is no program that can decide whether any other program will eventually halt, we know that the properties of a program, or circuit, cannot be known in advance of running it. While we can design a circuit to meet some functional specification and generate a simulation or test suite to obtain at least probabilistic confidence that the circuit implements the intended functionality, we cannot test a circuit for unintended functionality due to the combinatorially large state space. To address these concerns, we have developed a design-time method for automatically and systematically modifying portions of a design that exhibit characteristics of hardware trojans. After each modification, the functionality of the design is verified against a comprehensive simulation suite to ensure that the intended circuit functionality has not been changed. This approach can be appliedmore » to any digital circuit and does not rely on secret keys or obfuscation.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [2];  [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
  2. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1502452
Alternate Identifier(s):
OSTI ID: 1502454
Report Number(s):
SAND-2018-12772J; SAND-2018-9731J
Journal ID: ISSN 2509-3428; 669721
Grant/Contract Number:  
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Name: Journal of Hardware and Systems Security; Journal ID: ISSN 2509-3428
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING; Hardware trojan prevention; Hardware trojan detection; Hardware security; Trusted hardware

Citation Formats

Hamlet, Jason R., Mayo, Jackson R., and Kammler, Vivian G. Targeted modification of hardware trojans. United States: N. p., 2019. Web. doi:10.1007/s41635-018-0058-x.
Hamlet, Jason R., Mayo, Jackson R., & Kammler, Vivian G. Targeted modification of hardware trojans. United States. doi:10.1007/s41635-018-0058-x.
Hamlet, Jason R., Mayo, Jackson R., and Kammler, Vivian G. Mon . "Targeted modification of hardware trojans". United States. doi:10.1007/s41635-018-0058-x.
@article{osti_1502452,
title = {Targeted modification of hardware trojans},
author = {Hamlet, Jason R. and Mayo, Jackson R. and Kammler, Vivian G.},
abstractNote = {The use of untrusted design tools, components, and designers, coupled with untrusted device fabrication, introduces the possibility of malicious modifications being made to integrated circuits (ICs) during their design and fabrication. These modifications are known as hardware trojans. The widespread use of commercially purchased 3rd party intellectual property (3PIP) and commercial design tools extends even into trusted design flows. Unfortunately, due to the theoretical result that there is no program that can decide whether any other program will eventually halt, we know that the properties of a program, or circuit, cannot be known in advance of running it. While we can design a circuit to meet some functional specification and generate a simulation or test suite to obtain at least probabilistic confidence that the circuit implements the intended functionality, we cannot test a circuit for unintended functionality due to the combinatorially large state space. To address these concerns, we have developed a design-time method for automatically and systematically modifying portions of a design that exhibit characteristics of hardware trojans. After each modification, the functionality of the design is verified against a comprehensive simulation suite to ensure that the intended circuit functionality has not been changed. This approach can be applied to any digital circuit and does not rely on secret keys or obfuscation.},
doi = {10.1007/s41635-018-0058-x},
journal = {Journal of Hardware and Systems Security},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2019},
month = {3}
}

Journal Article:
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This content will become publicly available on March 18, 2020
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