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Title: Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components

Abstract

We consider infrastructures consisting of a network of systems, each composed of discrete components. The network provides the vital connectivity between the systems and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. The individual components of the systems can be attacked by cyber and physical means and can be appropriately reinforced to withstand these attacks. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure performance as a game between an attacker and a provider, who choose the numbers of the components of the systems and network to attack and reinforce, respectively. The costs and benefits of attacks and reinforcements are characterized using the sum-form, product-form and composite utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a component cost term. We present a two-level characterization of the correlations within the infrastructure: (i) the aggregate failure correlation function specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network, and (ii) the survival probabilities of the systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations using multiplier functions. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions that provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities and also the expected infrastructure capacity specified by the total number ofmore » operational components. We apply these results to derive and analyze defense strategies for distributed cloud computing infrastructures using cyber-physical models.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [2];  [3];  [4];  [5]; ORCiD logo [6]
  1. Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
  2. Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong (China)
  3. Univ. of Stavanger (Norway)
  4. Texas A & M Univ., College Station, TX (United States)
  5. Singapore Univ. of Technology and Design (Singapore)
  6. Univ. of Buffalo, NY (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Science (SC), Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) (SC-21); USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1474523
Grant/Contract Number:  
AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Sensors
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 18; Journal Issue: 5; Journal ID: ISSN 1424-8220
Publisher:
MDPI AG
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION

Citation Formats

Rao, Nageswara, Ma, Chris, Hausken, Kjell, He, Fei, Yau, David, and Zhuang, Jun. Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components. United States: N. p., 2018. Web. doi:10.3390/s18051421.
Rao, Nageswara, Ma, Chris, Hausken, Kjell, He, Fei, Yau, David, & Zhuang, Jun. Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components. United States. doi:10.3390/s18051421.
Rao, Nageswara, Ma, Chris, Hausken, Kjell, He, Fei, Yau, David, and Zhuang, Jun. Thu . "Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components". United States. doi:10.3390/s18051421. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1474523.
@article{osti_1474523,
title = {Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components},
author = {Rao, Nageswara and Ma, Chris and Hausken, Kjell and He, Fei and Yau, David and Zhuang, Jun},
abstractNote = {We consider infrastructures consisting of a network of systems, each composed of discrete components. The network provides the vital connectivity between the systems and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. The individual components of the systems can be attacked by cyber and physical means and can be appropriately reinforced to withstand these attacks. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure performance as a game between an attacker and a provider, who choose the numbers of the components of the systems and network to attack and reinforce, respectively. The costs and benefits of attacks and reinforcements are characterized using the sum-form, product-form and composite utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a component cost term. We present a two-level characterization of the correlations within the infrastructure: (i) the aggregate failure correlation function specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network, and (ii) the survival probabilities of the systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations using multiplier functions. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions that provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities and also the expected infrastructure capacity specified by the total number of operational components. We apply these results to derive and analyze defense strategies for distributed cloud computing infrastructures using cyber-physical models.},
doi = {10.3390/s18051421},
journal = {Sensors},
number = 5,
volume = 18,
place = {United States},
year = {2018},
month = {5}
}

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