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Title: Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures

Abstract

In certain critical infrastructures, correlations between cyber and physical components can be exploited to launch strategic attacks, so that disruptions to one component may affect others and possibly the entire infrastructure. Such correlations must be explicitly taken into account in ensuring the survival of the infrastructure. For large discrete infrastructures characterized by the number of cyber and physical components, we characterize the cyber–physical interactions at two levels: (i) the cyber–physical failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of the cyber sub-infrastructure given that of the physical sub-infrastructure (both specified by their marginal probabilities), and (ii) individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions expressed in terms of their multiplier functions. We formulate an abstract problem of ensuring the survival probability of a cyber–physical infrastructure with discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, whose utility functions are composed of infrastructure survival probability terms and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure survival probability on cost terms, correlation functions, multiplier functions, and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. We apply these analytical results to characterize themore » defense postures of simplified models of metro systems, cloud computing infrastructures, and smart power grids.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [2];  [3];  [4]; ORCiD logo [5]
  1. Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
  2. Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong (China)
  3. Texas A & M Univ., Kingsville, TX (United States). Dept. of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
  4. Singapore Univ. of Technology and Design (Singapore). Dept. of Computer Science
  5. Univ. at Buffalo, NY (United States). Dept. of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Science (SC), Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) (SC-21); USDOD
OSTI Identifier:
1468123
Grant/Contract Number:  
AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Games
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 9; Journal Issue: 3; Journal ID: ISSN 2073-4336
Publisher:
MDPI
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING; networked systems; cyber-physical infrastructures; aggregated correlations functions; sum-form, product-form, and composite utility functions

Citation Formats

Rao, Nageswara, Ma, Chris, He, Fei, Yau, David, and Zhuang, Jun. Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures. United States: N. p., 2018. Web. doi:10.3390/g9030052.
Rao, Nageswara, Ma, Chris, He, Fei, Yau, David, & Zhuang, Jun. Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures. United States. doi:10.3390/g9030052.
Rao, Nageswara, Ma, Chris, He, Fei, Yau, David, and Zhuang, Jun. Mon . "Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures". United States. doi:10.3390/g9030052. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1468123.
@article{osti_1468123,
title = {Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures},
author = {Rao, Nageswara and Ma, Chris and He, Fei and Yau, David and Zhuang, Jun},
abstractNote = {In certain critical infrastructures, correlations between cyber and physical components can be exploited to launch strategic attacks, so that disruptions to one component may affect others and possibly the entire infrastructure. Such correlations must be explicitly taken into account in ensuring the survival of the infrastructure. For large discrete infrastructures characterized by the number of cyber and physical components, we characterize the cyber–physical interactions at two levels: (i) the cyber–physical failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of the cyber sub-infrastructure given that of the physical sub-infrastructure (both specified by their marginal probabilities), and (ii) individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions expressed in terms of their multiplier functions. We formulate an abstract problem of ensuring the survival probability of a cyber–physical infrastructure with discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, whose utility functions are composed of infrastructure survival probability terms and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure survival probability on cost terms, correlation functions, multiplier functions, and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. We apply these analytical results to characterize the defense postures of simplified models of metro systems, cloud computing infrastructures, and smart power grids.},
doi = {10.3390/g9030052},
journal = {Games},
number = 3,
volume = 9,
place = {United States},
year = {2018},
month = {7}
}

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