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Title: Examining Fuel-Cycle Scenarios with the Safeguards Analysis Toolbox

SafeGuards Analysis (SGA) is a toolbox developed to allow engineers and scientists to create detailed simulations of safeguards material control and accountability simulations. SGA accepts material flow data from an external material flow model, and can be used with any existing fuel cycle or material control code. This work examines some new developments to the SGA code that allow the code to consider material losses over long timeframes. The first scenario described in this paper examined an enrichment facility consisting of two material balance areas (MBAs). Cumulative sum and basic control chart tests evaluate to a case involving a loss of material from both MBAs simultaneously and a case in which material is removed from the facility over a timescale of double the one that the tests were calibrated to detect. A second scenario represents an entire fuel-cycle consisting of four MBAs and two materials of interest (low-enriched uranium and plutonium). This scenario evaluated the calibrated safeguards system with three blind unidentified stream cases, with the goal of determining the calibrated system’s ability to detect where the material loss occurred in each case. SGA was able to produce the expected results for all of the examples examined in this paper,more » demonstrating that modules produced using the toolbox are capable of examining larger systems in realistic multi-MBA scenarios.« less
Authors:
 [1] ; ORCiD logo [1] ;  [2]
  1. Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO (United States). Nuclear Science and Engineering Program
  2. Univ. of Idaho, Moscow, ID (United States). Center for Advanced Energy Studies
Publication Date:
Grant/Contract Number:
NA0001730
Type:
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Nuclear Technology
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Name: Nuclear Technology; Journal ID: ISSN 0029-5450
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis - formerly American Nuclear Society (ANS)
Research Org:
Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO (United States)
Sponsoring Org:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (NA-22)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; Safeguards; modeling; uncertainty analysis
OSTI Identifier:
1461842

Shugart, Nicolas, King, Jeffrey, and Jacobson, Jake. Examining Fuel-Cycle Scenarios with the Safeguards Analysis Toolbox. United States: N. p., Web. doi:10.1080/00295450.2018.1469350.
Shugart, Nicolas, King, Jeffrey, & Jacobson, Jake. Examining Fuel-Cycle Scenarios with the Safeguards Analysis Toolbox. United States. doi:10.1080/00295450.2018.1469350.
Shugart, Nicolas, King, Jeffrey, and Jacobson, Jake. 2018. "Examining Fuel-Cycle Scenarios with the Safeguards Analysis Toolbox". United States. doi:10.1080/00295450.2018.1469350.
@article{osti_1461842,
title = {Examining Fuel-Cycle Scenarios with the Safeguards Analysis Toolbox},
author = {Shugart, Nicolas and King, Jeffrey and Jacobson, Jake},
abstractNote = {SafeGuards Analysis (SGA) is a toolbox developed to allow engineers and scientists to create detailed simulations of safeguards material control and accountability simulations. SGA accepts material flow data from an external material flow model, and can be used with any existing fuel cycle or material control code. This work examines some new developments to the SGA code that allow the code to consider material losses over long timeframes. The first scenario described in this paper examined an enrichment facility consisting of two material balance areas (MBAs). Cumulative sum and basic control chart tests evaluate to a case involving a loss of material from both MBAs simultaneously and a case in which material is removed from the facility over a timescale of double the one that the tests were calibrated to detect. A second scenario represents an entire fuel-cycle consisting of four MBAs and two materials of interest (low-enriched uranium and plutonium). This scenario evaluated the calibrated safeguards system with three blind unidentified stream cases, with the goal of determining the calibrated system’s ability to detect where the material loss occurred in each case. SGA was able to produce the expected results for all of the examples examined in this paper, demonstrating that modules produced using the toolbox are capable of examining larger systems in realistic multi-MBA scenarios.},
doi = {10.1080/00295450.2018.1469350},
journal = {Nuclear Technology},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2018},
month = {6}
}