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Title: Optimal Attack Strategies Subject to Detection Constraints Against Cyber-Physical Systems

This paper studies an attacker against a cyberphysical system (CPS) whose goal is to move the state of a CPS to a target state while ensuring that his or her probability of being detected does not exceed a given bound. The attacker’s probability of being detected is related to the nonnegative bias induced by his or her attack on the CPS’s detection statistic. We formulate a linear quadratic cost function that captures the attacker’s control goal and establish constraints on the induced bias that reflect the attacker’s detection-avoidance objectives. When the attacker is constrained to be detected at the false-alarm rate of the detector, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker’s state estimate. In the case that the attacker’s bias is upper bounded by a positive constant, we provide two algorithms – an optimal algorithm and a sub-optimal, less computationally intensive algorithm – to find suitable attack sequences. Lastly, we illustrate our attack strategies in numerical examples based on a remotely-controlled helicopter under attack.
Authors:
ORCiD logo [1] ; ORCiD logo [1] ;  [1]
  1. Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA (United States)
Publication Date:
Grant/Contract Number:
OE0000779
Type:
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: PP; Journal Issue: 99; Journal ID: ISSN 2325-5870
Publisher:
IEEE
Research Org:
Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA (United States)
Sponsoring Org:
USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATION
OSTI Identifier:
1406998
Alternate Identifier(s):
OSTI ID: 1433649

Chen, Yuan, Kar, Soummya, and Moura, Jose M. F.. Optimal Attack Strategies Subject to Detection Constraints Against Cyber-Physical Systems. United States: N. p., Web. doi:10.1109/TCNS.2017.2690399.
Chen, Yuan, Kar, Soummya, & Moura, Jose M. F.. Optimal Attack Strategies Subject to Detection Constraints Against Cyber-Physical Systems. United States. doi:10.1109/TCNS.2017.2690399.
Chen, Yuan, Kar, Soummya, and Moura, Jose M. F.. 2017. "Optimal Attack Strategies Subject to Detection Constraints Against Cyber-Physical Systems". United States. doi:10.1109/TCNS.2017.2690399. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1406998.
@article{osti_1406998,
title = {Optimal Attack Strategies Subject to Detection Constraints Against Cyber-Physical Systems},
author = {Chen, Yuan and Kar, Soummya and Moura, Jose M. F.},
abstractNote = {This paper studies an attacker against a cyberphysical system (CPS) whose goal is to move the state of a CPS to a target state while ensuring that his or her probability of being detected does not exceed a given bound. The attacker’s probability of being detected is related to the nonnegative bias induced by his or her attack on the CPS’s detection statistic. We formulate a linear quadratic cost function that captures the attacker’s control goal and establish constraints on the induced bias that reflect the attacker’s detection-avoidance objectives. When the attacker is constrained to be detected at the false-alarm rate of the detector, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker’s state estimate. In the case that the attacker’s bias is upper bounded by a positive constant, we provide two algorithms – an optimal algorithm and a sub-optimal, less computationally intensive algorithm – to find suitable attack sequences. Lastly, we illustrate our attack strategies in numerical examples based on a remotely-controlled helicopter under attack.},
doi = {10.1109/TCNS.2017.2690399},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems},
number = 99,
volume = PP,
place = {United States},
year = {2017},
month = {3}
}