Threshold magnitudes for a multichannel correlation detector in background seismicity
Colocated explosive sources often produce correlated seismic waveforms. Multichannel correlation detectors identify these signals by scanning template waveforms recorded from known reference events against "target" data to find similar waveforms. This screening problem is challenged at thresholds required to monitor smaller explosions, often because non-target signals falsely trigger such detectors. Therefore, it is generally unclear what thresholds will reliably identify a target explosion while screening non-target background seismicity. Here, we estimate threshold magnitudes for hypothetical explosions located at the North Korean nuclear test site over six months of 2010, by processing International Monitoring System (IMS) array data with a multichannel waveform correlation detector. Our method (1) accounts for low amplitude background seismicity that falsely triggers correlation detectors but is unidentifiable with conventional power beams, (2) adapts to diurnally variable noise levels and (3) uses source-receiver reciprocity concepts to estimate thresholds for explosions spatially separated from the template source. Furthermore, we find that underground explosions with body wave magnitudes m b = 1.66 are detectable at the IMS array USRK with probability 0.99, when using template waveforms consisting only of P -waves, without false alarms. We conservatively find that these thresholds also increase by up to a magnitude unit for sourcesmore »
- Publication Date:
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-15-24681
Journal ID: ISSN 0037-1106
- Grant/Contract Number:
- AC52-06NA25396
- Type:
- Accepted Manuscript
- Journal Name:
- Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America
- Additional Journal Information:
- Journal Volume: 106; Journal Issue: 2; Journal ID: ISSN 0037-1106
- Publisher:
- Seismological Society of America
- Research Org:
- Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Org:
- USDOE
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES; 58 GEOSCIENCES; 97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; continuous threshold monitoring; seismology; cross correlation; statistical signal processing; International Monitoring System; test ban treaty verification; North Korea
- OSTI Identifier:
- 1255954
Carmichael, Joshua D., and Hartse, Hans. Threshold magnitudes for a multichannel correlation detector in background seismicity. United States: N. p.,
Web. doi:10.1785/0120150191.
Carmichael, Joshua D., & Hartse, Hans. Threshold magnitudes for a multichannel correlation detector in background seismicity. United States. doi:10.1785/0120150191.
Carmichael, Joshua D., and Hartse, Hans. 2016.
"Threshold magnitudes for a multichannel correlation detector in background seismicity". United States.
doi:10.1785/0120150191. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1255954.
@article{osti_1255954,
title = {Threshold magnitudes for a multichannel correlation detector in background seismicity},
author = {Carmichael, Joshua D. and Hartse, Hans},
abstractNote = {Colocated explosive sources often produce correlated seismic waveforms. Multichannel correlation detectors identify these signals by scanning template waveforms recorded from known reference events against "target" data to find similar waveforms. This screening problem is challenged at thresholds required to monitor smaller explosions, often because non-target signals falsely trigger such detectors. Therefore, it is generally unclear what thresholds will reliably identify a target explosion while screening non-target background seismicity. Here, we estimate threshold magnitudes for hypothetical explosions located at the North Korean nuclear test site over six months of 2010, by processing International Monitoring System (IMS) array data with a multichannel waveform correlation detector. Our method (1) accounts for low amplitude background seismicity that falsely triggers correlation detectors but is unidentifiable with conventional power beams, (2) adapts to diurnally variable noise levels and (3) uses source-receiver reciprocity concepts to estimate thresholds for explosions spatially separated from the template source. Furthermore, we find that underground explosions with body wave magnitudes mb = 1.66 are detectable at the IMS array USRK with probability 0.99, when using template waveforms consisting only of P -waves, without false alarms. We conservatively find that these thresholds also increase by up to a magnitude unit for sources located 4 km or more from the Feb.12, 2013 announced nuclear test.},
doi = {10.1785/0120150191},
journal = {Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America},
number = 2,
volume = 106,
place = {United States},
year = {2016},
month = {4}
}
- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript (DOE)
- Publisher's Version of Record
- https://doi.org/10.1785/0120150191