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Title: Beyond a series of security nets: Applying STAMP & STPA to port security

Abstract

Port security is an increasing concern considering the significant role of ports in global commerce and today’s increasingly complex threat environment. Current approaches to port security mirror traditional models of accident causality -- ‘a series of security nets’ based on component reliability and probabilistic assumptions. Traditional port security frameworks result in isolated and inconsistent improvement strategies. Recent work in engineered safety combines the ideas of hierarchy, emergence, control and communication into a new paradigm for understanding port security as an emergent complex system property. The ‘System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP)’ is a new model of causality based on systems and control theory. The associated analysis process -- System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) -- identifies specific technical or procedural security requirements designed to work in coordination with (and be traceable to) overall port objectives. This process yields port security design specifications that can mitigate (if not eliminate) port security vulnerabilities related to an emphasis on component reliability, lack of coordination between port security stakeholders or economic pressures endemic in the maritime industry. As a result, this article aims to demonstrate how STAMP’s broader view of causality and complexity can better address the dynamic and interactive behaviors of social, organizational andmore » technical components of port security.« less

Authors:
ORCiD logo [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1238582
Report Number(s):
SAND-2015-7409J
Journal ID: ISSN 1938-7741; PII: 161
Grant/Contract Number:  
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Journal of Transportation Security
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 8; Journal Issue: 3-4; Journal ID: ISSN 1938-7741
Publisher:
Springer
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING; security; ports; port security; STAMP; STPA; systems theory; complex system

Citation Formats

Williams, Adam D. Beyond a series of security nets: Applying STAMP & STPA to port security. United States: N. p., 2015. Web. doi:10.1007/s12198-015-0161-y.
Williams, Adam D. Beyond a series of security nets: Applying STAMP & STPA to port security. United States. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-015-0161-y
Williams, Adam D. Tue . "Beyond a series of security nets: Applying STAMP & STPA to port security". United States. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-015-0161-y. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1238582.
@article{osti_1238582,
title = {Beyond a series of security nets: Applying STAMP & STPA to port security},
author = {Williams, Adam D.},
abstractNote = {Port security is an increasing concern considering the significant role of ports in global commerce and today’s increasingly complex threat environment. Current approaches to port security mirror traditional models of accident causality -- ‘a series of security nets’ based on component reliability and probabilistic assumptions. Traditional port security frameworks result in isolated and inconsistent improvement strategies. Recent work in engineered safety combines the ideas of hierarchy, emergence, control and communication into a new paradigm for understanding port security as an emergent complex system property. The ‘System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP)’ is a new model of causality based on systems and control theory. The associated analysis process -- System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) -- identifies specific technical or procedural security requirements designed to work in coordination with (and be traceable to) overall port objectives. This process yields port security design specifications that can mitigate (if not eliminate) port security vulnerabilities related to an emphasis on component reliability, lack of coordination between port security stakeholders or economic pressures endemic in the maritime industry. As a result, this article aims to demonstrate how STAMP’s broader view of causality and complexity can better address the dynamic and interactive behaviors of social, organizational and technical components of port security.},
doi = {10.1007/s12198-015-0161-y},
journal = {Journal of Transportation Security},
number = 3-4,
volume = 8,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Nov 17 00:00:00 EST 2015},
month = {Tue Nov 17 00:00:00 EST 2015}
}