

SWPIF-0

31 October 1952

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Chief of Staff, Technical Services

FOR: Chief, Plans and Requirements Division

SUBJECT: Staff Study of Functions and Responsibilities of Weapons
Defense Division (in accordance with C/S Memo SWPCS of
6 Oct 52).

PROBLEM

1. To examine the functions and responsibilities of the Weapons Defense Division of this headquarters and determine its proper objectives for the next two to five years, particularly with a view toward determining whether any change is necessary or desirable at this time in the wording of the basic directive, "Mission and Responsibilities of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project" as promulgated by the Service Chiefs on 12 July 1951.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. Each of the Armed Services desires to attain and maintain within its own Service an adequate capability for atomic defense.

3. In fulfilling Assumption 2, each of the Services will desire to utilize its own agencies as much as possible. They will, however, be willing to participate in joint programs, or utilize the services of a joint agency, in those cases in which it may be established clearly that this is a more efficient or more effective means of accomplishing the common objective.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

4. The functions and responsibilities which currently are being discharged by the Weapons Defense Division* of this headquarters stem principally from the following two basic directives:

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* For brevity, the Weapons Defense Division will be referred to as the "Defense Division" throughout the remainder of this paper.

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS
WITHOUT ANALYSIS.

Date: 8/12/94

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a. The "Mission and Responsibilities of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project" as promulgated by the Service Chiefs on 12 July 1951. More specifically, they are based on the following portions of that directive:

SECTION II, sub-paragraphs 2a (9) and (11), which state that among the technical services which the AFSWP is to provide to the Armed Forces, the AFSWP will be responsible for the following functions:

"(9) Furthering the development of defensive measures against atomic weapons, through such means as:

"(a) Coordination and support of training for defensive measures where joint Service programs are desirable.

"(b) Evaluation of weapons effects data and dissemination of results of such evaluations to the Services, and also to other governmental agencies when appropriate.

"(c) Coordination of military research and development in the field of radiac instruments, individual and collective protective devices, radiological decontamination procedures, and medical aspects of atomic warfare, in accordance with the policies of the Research and Development Board."

"(11) Furnishing technical assistance and liaison to the Services and other governmental agencies, as requested or required."

b. From a directive issued to the Chief, AFSWP, by the three Service Chiefs under date of 29 January 1952, Subject: "Dissemination of Data obtained from Weapons Tests and Supporting Projects to the Federal Civil Defense Administration". This directive designates the AFSWP as "the Department of Defense agency to participate with the Atomic Energy Commission in determining what atomic weapons test information should be released to the Federal Civil Defense Administration to assist that organization in civil defense planning."

5. In assisting the AFSWP in its fulfillment of the responsibilities assigned by the directives quoted in the previous paragraph, the Defense Division has employed the following means:

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a. Joint training courses - Several types of these have had sponsorship, coordination, technical guidance, and some budgetary support from AFSWP. With the exception of certain postgraduate courses (or portions of same) which have been carried on at selected civilian universities, all of these courses have been set up at Service installations. Thus they have been housed and conducted by the individual Services, while through AFSWP coordination they have been attended by mixed student groups comprised of officers from all of the Services in accordance with their respective needs. (See Annex 1).

b. Technical publications - In the field of atomic defense, it has been the policy to limit the AFSWP publications to those of a broad basic nature which would be of about equal value to all of the Services. The aim has been to fill only the clearly indicated joint needs ^{for} such material for textbook and reference use in Service schools and for general Service guidance and indoctrination purposes. (See Annex 2). In addition to producing the AFSWP publications in this field, the Defense Division has been called upon continually to assist various persons engaged in producing more specialized publications or staff studies for use within a single Service, and to review a great many such publications in draft form. These reviews are primarily for technical accuracy and validity of approach although sometimes they also are requested for security classification, the latter being done in collaboration with AFSWP Security and Classification personnel.

c. Motion Pictures - In this field, AFSWP has followed a policy similar to that followed for its defense publications, viz., to produce a basic series of indoctrination films on the general subject of atomic defense which would steer clear of individual Service operational procedures and doctrines and thus be suitable for joint use by all of the Armed Services. (See Annex 3).

d. Direct Liaison - By making use of the advantageous position inherent in its possession of a joint staff and an accepted neutral position, the Defense Division, like other similar AFSWP headquarters organizational units, has achieved and maintained an extensive working level liaison with personnel of the appropriate operational, technical and training agencies handling problems related to atomic defense within all of the Armed Services. By this means, a considerable amount of technical information has been made readily available to those individuals having the greatest need for it. Much of this has been done through direct consultation rather than official correspondence, but care has been taken to handle or confirm it through official channels whenever policy, controversial matters, or commitments have been involved.

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e. Advisory Panels - Defense Division personnel have participated in the activities of three AFSWP advisory panels and one RDB panel as an aid in carrying out those portions of the AFSWP mission relating to ~~the~~ the coordination of military research and development and training in the field of atomic defense. These are:

- (1) The Panel on Radiological Instruments.
- (2) The Panel on Thermal Radiation.
- (3) The RDB Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare.
- (4) The Panel on Joint Radiological Defense Training.

(For further information as to the nature and purpose of this participation, see Annex 4).

f. FCDA liaison procedures - When the present U. S. Civil Defense program was first getting underway the Chief, Weapons Defense Division, was designated (by AFSWP Adm. Memo No. 9, dtd 26 May 1950) as the coordinator of civil defense matters for this headquarters. The principal outside agency then involved was the National Security Resources Board. Most of the civil defense functions of that agency were taken over by the Federal Civil Defense Administration when it was established (by Public Law 920) early in 1951. The current AFSWP headquarters directive on civil defense liaison is Administrative Memorandum No. 41 of 8 October 1951, in which the incumbent Chief of the Weapons Defense Division was designated (by name) as Alternate Coordinator for FCDA liaison, the Coordinator being the present Deputy Chief of Staff, Technical Services. Among others, this directive also designated two other members of the staff of the Defense Division (Lt. Col. Hartgering and Major Hord) for FCDA liaison functions within their respective fields. As a result of the designations mentioned above, the Defense Division has been involved in a considerable amount of staff work relating to this Civil Defense liaison function, especially in connection with the dissemination of Atomic Weapons Effects Data to the FCDA. Where communications with the AEC and FCDA are involved, this has always been required to be handled or confirmed by official correspondence, usually prepared in collaboration with the Technical Library Branch. Coordination and close liaison with the Assistant for Civil Defense in the Office of the Secretary of Defense also has been maintained in connection with these matters, but it has been possible to keep much of this on a less formal basis.

DISCUSSION

6. In order to provide a proper basis for conclusions and recommendations concerning the problem stated in paragraph 1, the responsibilities and functions quoted in paragraph 4 and the activities enumerated in paragraph 5 ~~first~~ will be considered from the following standpoints, where applicable:

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a. Which ones can be dispensed with at the present time without appreciable loss to the defense effort?

b. Of the remainder, which ones probably can be dispensed with during the next two to five years?

c. Of the remainder, which ones would it be reasonable to pass on to the individual Services or to some other competent existing Department of Defense agency within the next two to five years?

d. On the basis of any items still remaining after screening in the manner just outlined, what is the extent of the indicated continuing need for AFSWP assistance to the Armed Services in the atomic defense field?

In the four paragraphs immediately following, the items in question will be discussed under the categories just indicated.

7. Items which can be dispensed with now:

AFSWP production of Atomic Defense motion pictures. With the delivery by AFSWP earlier this month of two additional motion picture films of its general atomic defense series (items 6 and 7 of Annex 3), it is believed that the Services have received all of the technical support which they could reasonably expect from the AFSWP in this respect. The others of this series have now received wide distribution in all of the Services, and there is no indicated need for any more joint films in this field. In anticipation of this, arrangements were initiated by the Chief, Weapons Defense Division in June of this year to effect the transfer of the motion picture officer specialist (Major Gavey), formerly assigned to this Division, to the Technical Library Branch in order to make him more directly available for service to the Project as a whole. In this connection, it should be noted that the foregoing remarks concerning discontinuance of film production by AFSWP refer only to the special field of atomic defense. For example, there is still an urgent need for some short, up-to-date, purely technical films on atomic effects for general use at Service schools and elsewhere. Preliminary work on such films, involving joint efforts on the part of several AFSWP divisions, is currently under way.

8. Items which can probably be dispensed with during the next two ~~to five~~ years:

a. AFSWP Atomic Defense publications. There is no further indicated need for any additional AFSWP publications in the atomic defense

field, beyond those already produced for the joint use of the Services. A limited amount of effort will still be necessary during the next two years, however, in connection with the reprinting of several of these publications to fill indicated additional Service needs. (See Annex 5). The necessary funds have been provided for in the FY 1953 and 1954 AFSWP budgets. It is believed that no further reprinting by AFSWP of atomic defense publications should be necessary beyond FY 1954.

b. Advisory Panels - Only two of the panels listed in subparagraph 5e are under the primary cognizance of the Weapons Defense Division. It is believed reasonable to expect that both of these will have served their purpose to the point of diminishing returns within the next two years, and should be disbanded within that time. These are:

(1) Panel on Radiological Instruments - The staff study separately submitted by the PRI Secretary (Major Hord) recommends that it be abolished in 1954. The choice of 1954, rather than 1953, for this time estimate was based mainly on the lack of positive assurance that a satisfactory high range survey meter for permanent Service use, to replace the rather unwieldy interim instruments now in use, will have been achieved by any earlier date. Major Hord and I are in agreement that if the major objective just indicated is achieved sooner, it should then be possible to terminate this Panel during 1953. It should be noted, however, that its discontinuance will require the concurrence of the RDB since it also serves in an advisory capacity to the CAE of that agency. It should be further noted that the discontinuance of this panel would not eliminate a need in AFSWP headquarters for at least one radiac instrument specialist somewhere within its staff. This will be discussed in a later paragraph.

(2) Panel on Joint Radiological Defense Training* - As may be seen from its charter (Inclosure 1 of Annex 4), this Panel was established in January 1951 in order to provide the Chief, AFSWP, with a representative Armed Services Advisory Group on matters pertaining to joint atomic defense training within the Department of Defense. More detailed information as to the problems which provided the impetus for the formation of this Panel is included in Annex 4. Its services proved extremely valuable in generating necessary guidance for the reorientation of the AFSWP-sponsored atomic defense training program, both at the service school and graduate school levels. At the present time, it is indicated that after completion of some preliminary staff discussions now being carried on between the personnel concerned, one or two meetings of this panel probably will be required to assist in the evaluation of the Service school atomic defense training program, especially in the light of information now available as a result of the various Desert Rock maneuvers. Following this, it is believed that

* Inasmuch as the Chief, Weapons Defense Division also is the designated Chairman of this Panel, it is being included as an integral part of this paper in lieu of submission of a separate study by the Secretary.

(S) [REDACTED]
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 (S) [REDACTED]

further need for the services of this panel will not be sufficient to justify the administrative work (submission of reports to OSD, replacement of detached members, etc.) necessary to keep it in existence, and it should be disbanded in favor of employing conferences or informal ad hoc committees to deal with any special problems which could not be handled by ordinary correspondence. It is believed this point should be reached by about mid-1953.

9. Items which could reasonably be passed on to the individual Services, or to some other existing Department of Defense agency, within the next two to five years:

a. In one sense, the proposed withdrawals of AFSWP from the atomic defense motion picture field (Par. 7) and from the atomic defense publications field (Par. 8a) constitute a transferal of these activities to the individual Services. However, they are not so listed herein because the technical publications and motion pictures produced by the individual Services, unlike those which have been produced by AFSWP, usually are designed for use by a single Service rather than for joint use. The justification for AFSWP's discontinuance of these activities, therefore, lies in the opinions already stated that AFSWP has covered sufficiently the area of joint Service interest in these portions of the atomic defense field. Hence, the individual Services have been provided with a point of departure for their own more specialized publications and training films, avoiding the duplication of effort which would have resulted if AFSWP had not initially entered these fields.

b. Joint training for Radiac Instrument maintenance instructors. AFSWP originally sponsored this training because it was a new field in which there was an indicated need for an immediate Service instructional capability, and it was more economical to set this up on a joint basis. Within the next two years, the radiac instrument situation within the Services should have settled down to the point where no further AFSWP assistance on this item should be necessary.

c. Lecture-course training for Medical Officers. The one-week lecture courses which are being held at periodic intervals at both the Army and Navy medical centers ^{were} sponsored and supported by AFSWP as a means of initially disseminating the fundamentals of the medical aspects of atomic warfare to a large cross-section of Service medical personnel. By the end of the present fiscal year, these courses should have served their immediate purpose and their further continuance, if at all, should be left to the individual Services.

d. Coordination of Military research and development in items related to atomic defense. Certain items of this type are specifically listed for AFSWP coordination in one of the portions of the AFSWP mission paper already quoted in sub-paragraph 4a. These are, "radiac instruments ,

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individual and collective protective devices, radiological decontamination procedures, and medical aspects of atomic warfare". Within the next two years, it is believed that, for all except the medical items, the activities of the individual Service laboratories and other research agencies working in this field will have diminished or become clarified to the point where special intervention and guidance by AFSWP, such as is provided for by the wording just quoted, will no longer be necessary and the responsibility for whatever coordination is still needed can revert to the RIB*. In the case of radiac instruments, this would coincide with the discontinuance of the AFSWP Panel on Radiological Instruments. In the case of radiological decontamination, Dr. Scoville has indicated that a clash of Service plans involving a proposed unwarranted duplication of facilities and effort, which came to light at the CAE meeting which was held on 23 October 1952, apparently will require an early coordination conference to be held under AFSWP auspices to resolve the matter. Until these items have been squared away to the extent indicated, AFSWP could not reasonably request their elimination from the Mission paper, as this would be too much like leaving the scene of a fire which had not yet been brought under control. However, it should be possible for AFSWP to make an orderly withdrawal within the next two years in the case of all except the medical research. The latter is of a more long-term nature, and AFSWP's withdrawal of coordination and budgetary support must be carefully phased into the research program of the individual Services to insure no loss of continuity; otherwise the investment already made would be jeopardized. This probably will require more than two years, but it should be possible to complete the transfer well within the next five years.

10. Items for which there appears to be a continuing need, and which cannot reasonably be passed on to the individual Services:

a. Coordination and support of joint training related to atomic defense.

(1) At the postgraduate educational level, this applies to the two-year course in Nuclear Engineering (Effects), the 18 months curriculum in Structural Dynamics, and the 9 months special training in Medical Aspects of Nuclear Energy. All three of these courses have evolved from a well-demonstrated joint Service need and the graduates are in continual demand both by the individual Services and by AFSWP itself. All of the Armed Services are participating in them. All available evidence indicates that the present participation represents the approximate level which will have to be maintained permanently (to take care of rotation of duty, normal career development, attrition, etc.) for as long as the Armed Services require a capability in atomic weapons. The total number of students involved, when

* For all of the items listed except medical, the RIB committee on Atomic Energy has primary cognizance. The medical aspects come under the Joint Committee on Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare.

pooled and consolidated from all of the Services throughout AFSWP sponsorship, has been sufficient in number to justify and make it possible to arrange for the necessary special courses, briefings, field trips, etc., but this would not be the case if each Service attempted to handle these matters separately, not to mention the wasteful duplication of effort that also would result.

(2) At the Service school level, this applies to AFSWP assistance in the technical guidance and support of the six-week courses in Atomic Defense which are conducted by both the Army and the Navy for joint Service use, and the equivalent instruction which is carried on by the Air Force. The fact that these courses are the ones intended to train the officers who, directly or indirectly, carry on the bulk of the planning and training for atomic defense and protection within their respective Services makes them a particularly important point of contact for AFSWP in connection with its assigned responsibility for the furthering of defensive measures against atomic weapons. AFSWP experience with these schools through liaison visits, instructor conferences, etc., continues to indicate that, because of the difficulties inherent in the fact that this is a relatively new field in which the basic data and concepts are still changing, and because of the obvious urgency of getting this problem squared away, there would be an unacceptable time lag if these schools were required to receive all of their technical information through normal individual Service channels. They need and welcome direct AFSWP assistance in this respect, and this has been fully approved by their parent agencies, it being well understood that it is entirely of an informational and technical nature and does not invade individual Service policy and doctrine.

b. General liaison and advisory service - The extent to which the Defense Division has been continually called upon in an advisory capacity in the field of atomic defense and protection, by individual Service representatives, other joint DOD agencies, representatives of the AFSWP Field Command, and other Divisions of this headquarters can only be fully appreciated by one who has been in a position to directly observe this flow of questions and answers. It must be listed as a continuing item because all current evidence indicates that it is a technical coordinating and supporting service which will still be needed somewhere in AFSWP for a long time to come, and it has definite implications with respect to organization and personnel. To cite two examples:

(1) Very recently, drafts of four proposed major Service publications were undergoing simultaneous review (by request) within the Defense Division alone. Admittedly, this was an unusual situation, but one or two such publications are nearly always on the agenda. Of the four just mentioned, three were directly concerned with atomic defense or protection, and the fourth had some defensive aspects. If these reviews did not usually disclose any serious errors in technical data or proposed

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procedures there would be no need for AFSWP to concern itself with the maintenance of this capability. The fact is, however, that these reviews nearly always disclose a need for significant changes to be made before these publications are printed and promulgated to the Services involved. The main reason for this seems to be the time lag which it takes for atomic test data to permeate throughout the Services, plus the additional time required to appreciate its military significance. Added to this is the difficulty which many persons still seem to have in grasping the distinction between necessary peacetime radiological safety measures and realistic wartime military operational procedures, and the unfortunate tendency to carry the former over into the latter, where they seldom belong.

(2) Especially during the past year, Defense Division personnel have been involved in a considerable amount of work of the staff study type relating to the technical aspects of atomic test troop maneuvers. This is a complex business requiring close team work. For example, problems involving the protection of troops from the effects of atomic weapons usually require carefully coordinated study by a team consisting of an officer with ground forces operational background, a physicist or a technical specialist, and an atomic medical specialist. In an individual Service, it has been observed that to obtain an official expression of opinion reflecting these different military and technical or professional capabilities often requires a formidable series of endorsements back and forth between different offices, bureaus, or technical Services, involving a considerable amount of time and administrative effort. In AFSWP, however, it has been possible for problems of this kind to receive immediate joint attention because the necessary variety of special qualifications has been brought together in a unified group. The value of having a group of this type "in being" in a joint agency accessible to all of the Services has been repeatedly demonstrated.

c. Radiac instrument capability - The information and experience in regard to the latest developments in radiac instruments, their capabilities and limitations, sources of supply, etc., which has been built up in the Materiel Branch of the Defense Division originally was necessary for the functioning of the Panel on Radiation Instruments. However, this Branch also is used as a ready source of consolidated information and advice in this field by many Service agencies, by the AFSWP Field Command and by personnel of AFSWP headquarters, especially in connection with radiac instrument matters relating to atomic weapons tests and the evaluation of their effects. This appears to be an essential technical service for which a reasonable degree of continuity and capability should be provided on a permanent basis.

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d. Medical advisory capability - It has already been brought out in subparagraph 9d above that coordination and continued partial budgetary support by AFSWP of Armed Services research and development in medical aspects of atomic warfare will continue to be necessary for several more years. In addition to performing this function, a Medical Branch is permanently needed somewhere in AFSWP to provide the medical advice and staff work on matters such as those discussed in subparagraphs a and b above, as well as for general assistance in planning for medical support at atomic tests and in evaluating the results. Headquarters administrative functions in connection with providing medical services at AFSWP field installations could continue to be combined with this by having the AFSWP medical officers also wear additional hats as AFSWP "Surgeons," as at present.

e. Staff work in connection with DOD liaison with FCDA - As was indicated in subparagraph 5f, Weapons Defense Division personnel have inherited a major share of the staff work required in this headquarters to carry out the responsibility given to the AFSWP for dissemination of atomic weapons effects data to the FCDA. One of the simplest yardsticks to use in determining the extent to which this workload will continue is the estimated remaining number of technical reports and their approximate time of publication, both for the tests already held and for those definitely scheduled for the future. A check made with the Technical Library Branch on this basis has indicated that the present heavy work-load of this nature will continue for at least one more year. As now functioning, the main reason why the technical and administrative workload involved has assumed such proportions is because of the attempt which has been made to adhere very strictly to the "need to know" principle in transmitting military atomic effects data to the FCDA. Data which are of obvious value to the FCDA for civil defense planning purposes often have been found to exist in usable form only in official atomic effects test reports which also have contained, within the same covers, material which the FCDA did not need to know and which sometimes has been of a type quite sensitive from a military security standpoint. The mere mechanics of making the necessary deletions in the number of copies of reports required has at times been quite a burden for the Technical Library Branch. Furthermore, both the AEC and the FCDA have been quite sensitive about transmitting or receiving reports containing any appreciable number of deletions, and AFSWP itself has recognized that this procedure, even when unavoidable, is certainly undesirable from a political and military-civilian public relations standpoint. Consequently, each case of this kind has required special consideration and effort to find some solution which will reconcile the two opposing factors involved. During recent months, much thought has been given to the problems of simplifying the present procedures and reducing this element of the AFSWP workload. To date, no solution has

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been found. In any case, this function, even when simplified, is one which appears to be an unescapable permanent AFSWP responsibility, and a capability for handling it will have to be maintained somewhere within the technical divisions of this headquarters.

In summary, it is suggested that one final test should be applied to the items which have survived the previous screening and have been listed and discussed in subparagraphs a to e above. They should be subjected to the following question: "If the AFSWP does not continue to perform these functions or offer these services, is it reasonable to expect that they will be effectively provided and maintained elsewhere?" For reasons which have been brought out in the preceding discussion, it is believed that for the particular items listed, a realistic answer to this question is "No - at least not without an acceptable loss of effectiveness or an unjustifiable duplication of effort." Under these circumstances, these items should be retained and provided for by the AFSWP as a continuing part of its mission because even though it might be possible for AFSWP to relieve itself of some of these tasks, such action would not signify the completion or fulfillment of a mission. Instead, it would be tantamount to an evasion of a responsibility.

11. Organizational considerations: In considering any phased program for the transfer of some of AFSWP's current functions and responsibilities and the retention of the essential ones, it is desirable to include some consideration of the long-term implications of this program with respect to AFSWP's internal organization. In the case of the Defense Division, only the AFSWP headquarters organization is involved, since all of the work mentioned in the preceding paragraphs has been carried on by headquarters personnel, and the items listed for retention could not be effectively handled from any other location. This is due to the extensive personal contacts required both with other personnel of this headquarters and with numerous agencies in the Washington area. However, this present study does indicate that some organizational changes and retrenchments could well be made, and should be properly planned for. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the present Weapons Effects Division of this headquarters derived its parentage from the Defense Division, having been established by AFSWP General Orders No. 4 of 28 March 1950. This order, in effect, divided the former Radiological Defense Division into two parts, one of which was designated "Weapons Defense" and the other "Weapons Effects." The change was made because the situation at the

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time indicated that a rapidly expanding technical workload of urgent problems and unanswered questions would require two parallel and separate divisional organizations to provide proper coordination and supervision at the branch and division levels. The wisdom of this move has been well demonstrated by the experience of the past two and one-half years, during which both of these divisions have had their hands full. However, during the next two years, this present study indicates that there should be a noticeable reduction in the workload of the Defense Division, and it is understood that the current study and recommendations concerning the long-term role of the Effects Division indicate that some diminution of the scope of the activities of that Division also is in prospect. Under these circumstances, the logical organizational move would be to again combine these two divisions, retaining the name "Weapons Effects Division" for the new unit so formed since it is the broader title of the two. From a Defense Division workload standpoint, it appears that the optimum time for making this change would be late 1953 or early 1954.*

CONCLUSIONS

12. The eight atomic defense motion pictures and the seven atomic defense manuals produced or published by the AFSWP have sufficiently covered the joint needs of the Armed Services for films and publications of this type. Three of the manuals will, however, require reprinting to meet Service needs for additional copies.

13. There will be no need for the Panel on Radiological Instruments beyond 1954 (and possibly not beyond 1953), nor for the Panel on Joint Radiological Defense Training beyond 1953.

14. AFSWP coordination and support of the one-week lecture courses for Service medical officers will not be necessary beyond mid-1953, and of the joint Service training of Radiac Instrument maintenance instructors beyond 1954.

15. AFSWP coordination of military research and development in radiac instruments, individual and collective protective devices, and radiological decontamination will not be necessary beyond 1954; in medical aspects of atomic warfare it should cease to be necessary at some time within the next two to five years. RDB concurrence in this will be required because of various existing understandings and directives.

* More detailed recommendations are being made in a separate memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Technical Services, as to the means by which this merger could be accomplished without loss of continuity in certain essential functions.

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CONCLUSIONS (Cont'd)

16. AFSWP coordination and support of postgraduate training is necessary on a continuing basis for a limited number of Service officers, in the special courses which have been established to provide the advanced scientific and engineering capability needed by those occupying certain billets requiring a technical or professional educational background not otherwise available. These courses, in fact, are an important factor in the development and maintenance of individual Service capabilities in the atomic weapons field, since the graduates are enabling the Services to handle their own related training and research and development problems with a minimum of outside guidance and assistance.

17. AFSWP technical guidance and support of Service atomic defense training, at the one key contact point which has been established for this purpose in each Service, is needed on a continuing basis in order to reduce the time lag otherwise involved and to insure a reasonable degree of uniformity in this field. The latter is necessary to insure effective teamwork during joint military operations or in circumstances where close cooperation between military and civilian defense personnel might be required.

18. AFSWP must continue to serve as the designated agent of the DOD for dissemination of atomic weapons effects information to the FCDA, but a simplification of the procedures now in effect is urgently needed.

19. Within the next two years, the Weapons Defense Division should be merged into the Weapons Effects Division of this headquarters. In addition to continuing in its present mission, however, the modified Effects Division thus formed will need to maintain certain capabilities and provide certain services now being carried on within the Defense Division.

20. No changes should be made in those portions of the AFSWP "Mission Paper" quoted in subparagraph 4a herein, since these items are still needed to confirm AFSWP's coordinating role in functions which this study indicates should be continued. A change in the wording of subparagraph 2a(9)(c) of the Mission paper, to eliminate specific mention of research and development items except the medical aspects, probably will be in order about two years from now, and a similar change to eliminate the medical aspects could follow at a somewhat later date.

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ACTION RECOMMENDED

21. That AFSWP discontinue further production of atomic defense publications and motion pictures, except for one reprinting of each of the three basic publications listed in Annex 5.

22. That the Panels on Radiological Instruments and on Joint Radiological Defense Training be disbanded within the times indicated in Conclusion 13. RIB concurrence should be obtained at the time in the case of the PRI.

23. That AFSWP discontinue coordination and support of the lecture courses for Service medical officers and the training course for Service radiac instrument maintenance instructors, within the times indicated in Conclusion 14.

24. That AFSWP discontinue coordination and any remaining support of military research and development in the fields of radiac instruments, individual and collective protective devices, radiological decontamination, and medical aspects of atomic warfare, within the times indicated in Conclusion 15. RIB concurrence should be obtained at the time.

25. That AFSWP continue the coordination and support of joint postgraduate training for Service officers in the field represented by the present AFSWP-sponsored courses in Nuclear Engineering (Effects), Structural Dynamics, and Medical Aspects of Nuclear Energy.

26. That AFSWP continue to furnish technical guidance and support to the Armed Services in their atomic defense training, by direct liaison and transmittal of pertinent information at the key points of contact which have been established for this purpose.

27. That a thorough re-examination be made of the policies, responsibilities and procedures involved in AFSWP's present role as the DOD agent for dissemination of atomic weapons effects information to the FCDA, for the purpose of determining whether those now in effect could be simplified without compromise of any of the essential principles governing the security of classified information.

28. That the Weapons Defense Division be merged into the Weapons Effects Division of this headquarters in late 1953 or early 1954, but that this move be carefully phased and planned so as to insure continuity of certain functions and services which currently are being carried on by the Defense Division and which will be needed beyond the above-mentioned dates.

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ACTION RECOMMENDED (Cont'd)

29. That no changes be made at this time in the applicable portions of the "Mission and Responsibilities of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project" as promulgated by the Service Chiefs on 12 July 1951. During the latter part of 1954, consideration should be given to initiating the discussions with the RDB which will be necessary to clear the way for the changes described in Conclusion 20.



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ANNEX 1TRAINING COURSES SPONSORED BY AFSWP UNDER ITS ATOMIC DEFENSE PROGRAM

The following are the joint training courses for Armed Forces personnel, in the general field of Atomic Defense, which have been sponsored, coordinated, and given technical guidance and some financial support by the AFSWP, in accordance with its assigned responsibility for "coordination and support of training for defensive measures where joint Service programs are desirable." The AFSWP staff work in connection with all of these courses has been handled by the Weapons Defense Division.

1. Postgraduate Courses:

a. Radiological Defense Engineering - A three-year course, which has consisted of one year at the Naval Postgraduate School followed by two years at a civilian university (California or Ohio State). Effective in the summer of 1952, it was discontinued except for those students who had partially completed it, as it was supplanted by the new course listed as the next item below. Including those now under instruction, a total of 89 officers of the Armed Services will have received this training when the last class graduates in 1954.

b. Nuclear Engineering (Effects) - A two year course given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, with assistance from the University of California Extension service in the biological sciences portion of the curriculum. For detailed information concerning its mission and content see Inclosure 1, which is a copy of the letter from the Chief, AFSWP, to the Services which resulted in its establishment. The first class to be selected for it, which started in August 1952, consists of 7 Army officers, 8 Naval officers, and 1 Air Force officer. One Coast Guard officer also is taking the course with this class. For a typical example of a summer field indoctrination schedule for officers receiving this type of training, see Inclosure 2.

c. Structural Dynamics - An 18-months special curriculum which has been set up at the University of Illinois, intended especially for Army Engineers and Navy Civil Engineers, and Air Force officers having comparable technical assignments. For detailed information concerning its mission and content, see Inclosure 3, which is a copy of a letter from the Chief, AFSWP, to the Services which resulted in its establishment. The first class started in the summer of 1952 and consists of 4 Army Engineer Officers, 4 Navy Civil Engineer Corps Officers, and 2 Air Force Officers.

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Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS
ANNEX 1 ONLY - WITHOUT INCLOSURES.

Robert L. Hagan
Date: 2/11/12

ANNEX 1 (Cont'd)Security Information

d. Medical Aspects of Nuclear Energy - A 9-months training program for Service medical personnel which consists of a six-month special course in Radiobiology at Reed College, Portland, Oregon, followed by a one-week orientation course at Sandia Base and finishing with 3 months work in radioisotopes and other appropriate on-the-job training at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The current class consists of 5 Army, 4 Navy, and 4 Air Force officers.

2. Service School Courses:

a. Atomic Defense Officers - Six-week courses which are given at the Chemical Corps School, Ft. McClellan, Alabama, and the Naval Damage Control Schools, Treasure Island, San Francisco, California. These are open to officers of all of the Armed Services. Equivalent instruction for Air Force officers is included in the Passive Defense portion of the Munitions Officers' Course at Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado. For an outline of what is essentially the present content of these courses, see Inclosure 4. Although this inclosure refers to the course under its former name of "Radiological Defense", the name later was changed to "Atomic Defense" in accordance with a recommendation of the Joint Radiological Defense Training Panel.

b. Radiac Maintenance Instructors - A 4-week course given at the Naval Damage Control Training Center, Treasure Island, California, and open to both officers and enlisted men of all of the Services. The course includes a considerable amount of laboratory and bench work in trouble-shooting, adjusting and repairing all types of military radiac instruments.

3. Medical Lecture Courses:

One week lecture courses in Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, for Service Medical personnel, which are offered about once per quarter at the Army and Navy Medical centers in Washington, D. C., and Bethesda, Md.

4 Incls:

1. Cy Ch, AFSWP ltr to USAF dtd
25 Feb 52, Subj: Rec 2-Yr
PG Cse in Nuclear Eng (Effects)
(w/cy of Incl 2).
2. Cy Ch, AFSWP ltr to Supt USN PG
Sch, dtd 2 May 52, Subj: Proposed
Summer Itinerary.
3. Cy Ch, AFSWP ltr to Ch Engs, dtd
12 Mar 52, Subj: Rec PG Cse in
Struct Dynamics, etc (w/cy of Incl)
4. Cy Ch, AFSWP ltr to CNO, dtd 11 Apr 51,
Subj: Joint Tr Cse for Rad Def Off (w/cy of incl).

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