

2. The U.S. contamination of Spanish soil and the continuing radiological monitoring of the local inhabitants and the environment was the subject in 1980 of a lengthy feature article in Youge magazine by the European correspondent of the New York Times, who previously had authored "One of Our H-Bombs is Missing" shortly after the 1966 accident.
3. Numerous inquiries from ABC's "20-20" re this subject were received here about a year ago. No further inquiries have been made since then.
4. Since the accident, the Spanish Government has funded 80-90 percent of the total cost of the radiological monitoring and analysis effort. Periodically the U.S. is informally reminded by the Spanish government that the Pu contamination is a result of U.S., not Spanish, activities.
5. With the demise of Generalissimo Franco, Spanish Government and society are much more open, and controversial issues -- including U.S. plutonium contamination of their country -- periodically are raised in the legislature, medical societies, political parties, press, etc.
6. The issue of nuclear power is, if anything, more controversial in Spain than in the U.S., and is likely to become a major issue among political parties.
7. The Basque movement in Spain has embraced an anti-nuclear power position which is supported by terrorist activities.

In considering the above perspective, it should also be noted that, until recently, no one person/institution in the United States was familiar with all of the technical data accumulated by the Spanish nor responsible for determining to what extent the technical findings justified continued funding under this agreement. Furthermore, since the Spanish Government is very reticent to discuss these sensitive data and issues with persons not well-known to them personally, it has required considerable time (i.e., several years) for personal association to develop before they would confide in U.S. representatives and share data, particularly in view of their concerns pertaining to the openness of the U.S. Government.

DOE ARCHIVES

Therefore, U.S. technical assistance to Spain recently was consolidated under the Associate Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, whom the Spanish authorities have known and trusted since 1966. He was requested to work with the Spanish Government to assess the available data, determine what, if any, additional studies are needed, assist the Spanish Government in the preparation of reports, provide guidance to the U.S. Government re level of funding for Spain, and to advise the U.S. as to the need for a continued, additional, or reduced level of effort under the agreement. Since this ORNL effort was first funded at a very modest level in fiscal year 1982, it is expected that at least several years will be required before a valid assessment as to duration and level of continued U.S. support under the agreement can be made.

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- 4. Renewed interest by the U.S. press and television re perception of U.S. disinterest in concern about the health and welfare of foreign nationals exposed to U.S. weapons and plutonium. This possibly could be compared with other locations where the public was exposed to radiation from U.S. weapons (e.g., the Marshall Islands and Utah/ Nevada).
- 5. Inquiries by the Congress (or others) regarding U.S. international and/or moral obligations to foreign nationals exposed to plutonium from U.S. military activities.
- 6. Some combination of the above acting - in conjunction with the sharply increased interest, in Europe and in the U.S., regarding U.S. intentions with respect to the production, development, and use of nuclear weapons - to curtail options available to the U.S. Government in this respect.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1. In view of the above, and considering the history of the project, the sensitivities of the Spanish Government with respect to the project, the expressed opinion of the Scientific Attache, and the fact that \$200k for fiscal year 1982 is identified in the budget, it is imprudent and unnecessarily risky not to continue support of the Spanish Government in this matter for the foreseeable future.
- 2. ORNL has been requested to carry out over the next three years a technical appraisal of the program, including an appraisal of the need for and degree of continued U.S. support to the Spanish Government.
- 3. The potential political and technical risks (including the loss of scientific data) associated with abrupt termination of U.S. support appear to be high relative to the current investment.

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That support of the Spanish Government be continued for the immediate future.
- 2. That the mechanism for the transfer of such funds (\$200K in fiscal year 1982) be established via the attached internal memorandum.
- 3. That concurrent consultation be initiated with the Spanish Government on the future direction of the program if it is the U.S. intent to modify the program prior to the completion of the ORNL technical appraisal.

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