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
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DTIC ACCESSION NUMBER

LEVEL JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

INVENTORY

OPERATION PLAN No. 3-53

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

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OPERATION PLAN NO. 3-59

Statement A

1. *Handwritten signature: Mark B. Clark*
2. *Handwritten signature: [unclear]*

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City ISING 2. MA-1201
Lithuania 15 Aug 87

P.W. CLARKSON

MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER

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to JTAG

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C 0092

JTF SEVEN LOG NO. 5-541
COPY NO. 126

O 0417

10
17-7
Op Order
3-53
Change 1

CHANGES
(NO. 1)

Operation Order
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

From: HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
10 February 1954
of the
ARMED FORCES
SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
2-654

1. The following corrections and inclosed pages constitute Change No. 1 to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 3-53. The inclosed pages should be inserted in their proper places and the rescinded pages removed and destroyed in accordance with applicable security regulations. New pages C-1 and C-2 replace original page C-1 only and require renumbering of subsequent pages.

2. Make the following pen and ink corrections:

- a. Annex A, page A-3, paragraph 5 - After last sentence add "In the event unidentified aircraft enter the test area, CTG 7.3 will alert CTG 7.4 regarding the situation. CTG 7.4 will direct test aircraft to depart the area on appropriate headings and control of the area will revert to CTG 7.3 for the duration of the defensive effort."
- b. Annex A, page A-4, paragraph 8 - Change last sentence to read: "The weather island airlift will be controlled by CTG 7.4 utilizing EBW aircraft made available by the CO, Naval Station, Kwajalein."
- c. Annex A, Appendix I and II - Change classification from RESTRICTED to UNCLASSIFIED.
- d. Annex C, page C-2 (before renumbering) - Delete first seven lines at top of page.
- e. Annex C, page C-4, paragraph 9, line 1 - Add the word "submarine" between "for" and "contact."
- f. Annex C, page C-5, paragraph 12, line 8 - Delete words "SECURITY INFORMATION" and substitute words "RESTRICTED DATA."
- g. Annex C, page C-5, paragraph 12, line 9 - Delete words "RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION" and substitute the word "CONFIDENTIAL."
- h. Annex E, page E-2 - Add Project 3-4, "Neutralization of Mine Fields."
- i. Annex H, page H-1, paragraph f - Delete and reletter subsequent paragraphs.
- j. Annex H, page H-3, paragraph 2 (before relettering) - Add second sentence as follows: "Assume control of shot area as necessary for air defense, alerting CTG 7.4 accordingly to permit removal of test aircraft from the area affected."

COPY NO. 126
JTF LOG NO. S-541

k. Annex L, page L-2, paragraph 3d(2) - Change to read:
"Emergency or routine administrative messages not concerned with
Operation CASTLE which may be transmitted over normal Navy circuits."

✓ l. Annex L, page L-2, paragraph 3d(7) - Delete and re-
number paragraph 3d(8) to read 3d(7).

✓ m. Annex L, page L-6, paragraph 6a(8) and page L-7,
paragraph 6c(6) - Substitute "ENVU" for "Firing Party."

✓ n. Annex L, page L-7, paragraph 6c(11) - Change the word
"plan" to read "plant."

✓ o. Annex M, Appendix III, pages M-III-1 and M-III-2 - Change
classification to CONFIDENTIAL.

✓ p. Annex N, page N-4, paragraph 6l, 7i and 7j - Change
reference "7l" to read "7k."

✓ q. Annex N, Appendix I, page N-I-4, paragraph 17c(3) - Change
reference "4a" to read "5a."

3. Attention is invited to CJTF SEVEN dispatch 170747Z Jan.
Effective 17 January 1954, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53 became
an operation order.

4 Incl

1. Pages C-1 and C-2 (Rev.)
2. Annex D
3. Annex I (Rev.)
4. Annex S

P. W. CLAPKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

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OpOrder No. 3-53

OFFICIAL:

W. S. Cowart, Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.
Colonel, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

**HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN**

OPERATION PLAN NO. 3-53

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CHANGES TO OPERATION PLAN NO. 3-53

Enter Number and Date of Corrections as Indicated

Change No.	Dated	Effective	Date Made	Signature
1	10 Feb 54		23 Mar 54	W. L. [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Operation Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

- Chart References:
- a. U. S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 5203, North Pacific Ocean, Marshall Islands.
 - b. U. S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 6032, North Pacific Ocean, Marshall Islands - Northern Part - Bikini Atoll
 - c. U. S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 6033, North Pacific Ocean, Marshall Islands, Eniwetok Atoll.

Task Organization

- a. Task Group 7.1 (Scientific) Dr. William E. Ogle, LASL
- b. Task Group 7.2 (Army) Colonel Edward H. Lahti, USA
- c. Task Group 7.3 (Navy) Rear Admiral Henry C. Bruton, USN
- d. Task Group 7.4 (Air Force) Brig General Howell M. Estes, USAF
- e. Task Group 7.5 (AEC Base Facilities) Mr. James E. Reeves, AEC

1 General

a. Scope of Instructions

(1) This operation plan covers the period of operations from the time major elements of the joint task force are deployed in the forward area until the completion of on site operations. It is published at this time for planning purposes only and is subject to periodic revision and refinement as more detailed information becomes available. When so directed by the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN (CJTF SEVEN), this plan will become effective as an operation order covering overall on-site operations and will supersede Operation Order No. 1-53.

(2) "Forward Area", as the term is used in this plan, is defined as that area encompassing the MARSHALL ISLANDS.

(3) "ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area", as the term is used in this plan, is that area encompassing ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS and bounded by the meridians 160°35' - 166°16' east longitude, and by the parallels 10°15' - 12°45' north latitude (an area of 150 by 250 miles).

(4) "Closed Area", as the term is used in this plan, is defined as including the land areas of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS, the water areas of the respective lagoons and the water areas within three (3) miles to the seaward side of the respective land areas.

(5) "Atoll Commander, ENIWETOK (ATCOM ENIWETOK)", as the term is used in this plan, is the commander of the area defined in subparagraph (3) above, JTF SEVEN elements on KWAJALEIN and on task force weather islands

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Operation Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

b. General Situation

(1) In accordance with directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CJTF SEVEN will conduct tests of experimental weapons and devices on ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS early in 1954 and will make experimental measurements proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Department of Defense (DOD), as approved by their respective agencies. All weapons and devices will be statically detonated.

(2) By authority of the JCS, CJTF SEVEN exercises full operational control and certain administrative control of the task groups during on-site operations. This administrative control is defined as that exercised for the purpose of establishing communications channels and coordinating reports, movement and fiscal matters, exclusive of those pertaining to the administration of the AEC proving ground and AEC contractors, subcontractors and other participating agencies. (CJTF SEVEN No. 2-53, Administrative Order, refers).

(3) By authority of the Chairman, AEC, the commander of the joint task force is designated as the senior representative of the AEC in the forward area during on-site operations.

(4) By decision of the JCS on 2 April 1953, CJTF SEVEN reports to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) for movement control, logistic support and for the purpose of general security with respect to the task force and ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.

(5) Intelligence, Security and Public Information. Annex C applies.

(6) Friendly Forces. JTF SEVEN consists of units from the military Services and personnel of the AEC, its contractors, subcontractors and other participating agencies.

2. Mission

a. JTF SEVEN will:

(1) Conduct tests of experimental weapons and devices on ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS as soon as preparations are complete.

(2) Conduct experimental tests and measurements for the AEC and DOD as approved by their respective agencies.

b. CJTF SEVEN, as ATCOM ENIWETOK, will:

(1) Upon commencement of the operational phase of CASTLE, assume responsibility within the forward area for security of JTF SEVEN and ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.

(2) To the maximum capability with the forces assigned:

(a) Enforce the status of ENIWETOK, which was closed effective 1 December 1947 pursuant to the provisions of the Strategic Trusteeship for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and BIKINI ATOLLS, which was closed effective 2 April 1953.

(b) Limit entry into the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area to authorized vessels and aircraft.

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Operation Plan
CJTF SEVEN No 3-53

3. Tasks for Subordinate Units

a. Scientific Task Group (TG 7.1) will:

- (1) Conduct tests of the experimental weapons and devices.
- (2) Conduct the technical and measurement programs (Annex E)
- (3) Conduct technical report film operations (Annex T).

Refer to Annex F for summary of tasks.

b. Army Task Group (TG 7.2) will:

- (1) Provide a mobile defense force for the ground security of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.
- (2) Operate port, base and military communications facilities at ENIWETOK and certain military installations at BIKINI in accordance with existing AEC-DCD agreements.
- (3) Provide and operate the overall military communications system for handling all forward area joint task force inter-atoll and long-haul traffic (exclusive of air operations, air weather, internal naval communications and the TG 7.1 inter-atoll radio circuit).
- (4) With certain personnel augmentation from TG 7.4, provide logistic support for those elements of the joint task force based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

Refer to Annex G for summary of tasks.

c. Navy Task Group (TG 7.3) will:

- (1) Provide for the security of the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area by:
 - (a) Maintaining the status of the "Closed Area".
 - (b) Detecting, warning and escorting unauthorized vessels and aircraft out of the Danger Area.
- (2) Provide suitable water transportation, air and surface escort and shipboard assembly facilities for the weapons and devices to meet the requirements of the Commander, TG 7.1.
- (3) Provide shipboard command and control facilities for CJTF SEVEN, with command and administrative space for CTG 7.1, CTG 7.4 and CTG 7.5 afloat.
- (4) Assume operational control of inter-island helicopter airlift system at BIKINI and provide ship to shore and inter-island surface and helicopter transportation, primarily at BIKINI, to include flights for damage survey and recovery of scientific data.
- (5) Provide shipboard facilities to house designated elements of the joint task force while afloat, including pre-shot evacuations as directed by CJTF SEVEN.
- (6) Support TG 7.1 directly with ships, aircraft and small craft

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Operation Plan
CJTF SEVEN No 3-53

required in experiments and projects and as otherwise directed by CJTF SEVEN.

Refer to Annex H for summary of tasks.

d. Air Force Task Group (TG 7.4) will:

(1) Assume operational control of the inter-atoll airlift system and the inter-island airlift system at ENIWETOK (Annex Q).

(2) Execute assigned CASTLE missions to include cloud sampling, effects tests aircraft operations, communications services, search and rescue, technical report photography aircraft operations, weather service, Military Air Transport Service (MATS) terminal operations and official observer flights.

(3) Provide air controller and other supervisory personnel for the air operations center aboard the command ship (USS ESTES).

Refer to Annex I for summary of tasks.

e. AEC Base Facilities Task Group (TG 7.5) will:

(1) Continue to execute missions assigned by the Manager, Santa Fe Operations Office (SFCO) in accordance with current AEC policies.

(2) Operate and maintain certain installations and facilities at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS in accordance with existing agreements with CTG 7.1 and between the AEC and DOD.

(3) Provide necessary base facilities and logistic support for military personnel at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS in accordance with existing agreements.

(4) Provide necessary test facilities to meet the scientific requirements and inform CJTF SEVEN of significant developments affecting his overall mission.

Refer to Annex J for summary of tasks.

x. Task Group Commanders will:

(1) Prepare plans for the accomplishment of all tasks assigned herein and forward copies of such plans to arrive in this headquarters not later than 1 January 1954.

(2) Provide personnel, as required, for participation in the defense of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS. All military personnel based on ENIWETOK ISLAND will, to the extent practicable, be trained in and available for ground defense (Annex K).

(3) Submit reports for historical and other purposes to CJTF SEVEN in accordance with current JTF SEVEN directives.

(4) When so notified by CJTF SEVEN that units of equipment are released, return the equipment to parent organizations.

(5) Exercise maximum economy in the conduct of all operations. Attention is directed to letter, subject: "Conservation of Funds,

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Operation Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

"Time and Resources", published by CJTF SEVEN on 8 May 1953.

4. Administrative and Logistical Matters. CJTF SEVEN No. 2-53, Administrative Order, applies.

5. Command and Signal Matters

a. Command Relationships

(1) Annex B applies. Also, see CJTF SEVEN letter, subject: "Exercise of Command", dated 2 October 1953.

(2) The senior task force officer based at KWAJALEIN will coordinate matters involving task force activities (except movement control) at that location.

(3) The Commander, TG 7.4 exercises control for all JTF SEVEN activities on the weather islands, to include administration and supply.

b. Command Posts

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DUTY</u>	<u>BIKINI OPERATIONS</u>	<u>DURING ENIWETOK OPERATIONS</u>
CJTF SEVEN	USS ESTES (AGC-12)		PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.1	USS ESTES (AGC-12)		PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.2	ENIWETOK ISLAND		ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.3	USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)		PARRY ISLAND or CVE
CTG 7.4	USS ESTES (AGC-12)		ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.5	USS ESTES (AGC-12)		PARRY ISLAND

c. Communications. Annex L applies.

d. Time zone "M" applies for forward area activities.

P. W. Clarkson

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Annexes:

A - Concept of Operations

Appendix:

- I - Map of Eniwetok Atoll
- II - Map of Bikini Atoll
- III - Forward Area Native Population

B - Organization and Command Relationships

Appendix:

Operation Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

- I - Organization for Operation CASTLE
- II - Command Channels, JTF SEVEN Afloat

- C - Intelligence, Security and Public Information
- D - Troop and Equipment List
- E - Scientific Test Programs (RESTRICTED DATA - Limited Distribution)
- F - Scientific Task Group Summary of Tasks (TG 7.1)
- G - Army Task Group Summary of Tasks (TG 7.2)
- H - Naval Task Group Summary of Tasks (TG 7.3)
- I - Air Force Task Group Summary of Tasks (TG 7.4)
- J - AEC Base Facilities Task Group Summary of Tasks (TG 7.5)
- K - Hostile Action Alert Plan
 - Appendix:
 - I - Control of Electronic Radiation and Surface Lighting
- L - Communications
 - Appendix:
 - I - Principal Task Force HF Radio Circuits
 - II - VHF Voice Radio Circuits, Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls
 - III - JTF SEVEN Teletype Network
- M - Weather Plan
 - Appendix:
 - I - Location Chart of Weather Units
 - II - Weather Organization
 - III - Patrol Planes Weather Reporting Code
- N - Radiological Safety
 - Appendix:
 - I - Radiological Safety Regulations
 - II - Radiological Safety Office and Center
 - III - Hazards Resulting from Atomic Bomb Explosions
- O - Search and Rescue
- P - Boat Plan
- Q - Airlift Plan
- R - Shot Phase Evacuation and Reentry Plan
- S - Official Observer Plan
- T - Photography Plan
- U - Radioactive Samples Return Plan (RESTRICTED DATA - Limited Distribution)

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Operation Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

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DMA, AEC, 1901 Constitution Avenue, Washington 25, D. C. 1
Manager, SPCO, Box 5400, Albuquerque, New Mexico 1
Manager, San Francisco Operations Office, AEC, 200 Bush Street,
San Francisco 4, Calif. 1
Manager of Operations, USAEC, P.O. Box 30, Ansonia Station,
New York 23, N.Y. (ATTN: Mr. Merrill Eisenbud) 1

JTF SEVEN AGENCIES

CTG 7.1, Box 1663, Los Alamos, New Mexico 10
CTG 7.2, APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif. 5
CTG 7.3, Washington 25, D. C. 45
CTG 7.4, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 10
CTG 7.5, Box 5400, Albuquerque, New Mexico 8
JTF SEVEN LNO, Travis AFB, Calif. 1
JTF SEVEN LNO, NSC, Oakland, Calif. 1
JTF SEVEN LNO, Hickam AFB, Box 440, APO 953, c/o PM,
San Francisco, Calif. 1
JTF SEVEN LNO, Kwajalein, Navy #824, c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif. 1
JTF SEVEN Scientific Director, Box 1663, Los Alamos, New Mexico 1

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1952

Annex A to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 2-53

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. General. Operation CASTLE will be a series of atomic tests conducted early in 1954 at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS, MARSHALL ISLANDS. The operation will consist of seven (7) shots. This concept of operations covers the period beginning with the deployment of major elements of JTF SEVEN in the forward area and terminating with the completion of tests, collection of scientific data and disposition of radioactive samples.
2. Mission
 - a. To conduct tests of experimental weapons and devices as outlined below.
 - b. To conduct the technical and measurement programs.
 - c. To provide for security of the joint task force and ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.
3. Tasks for Subordinate Units. The conduct of missions 2a and 2b, above, is the responsibility of the Scientific Task Group. Other task groups will furnish the support necessary to fulfill these missions. To insure successful accomplishment of the missions, this support will be coordinated by CJTF SEVEN.
4. Shot Schedule (For prediction of yield and fallout, see Annex B, Scientific Test Programs).

<u>SHOT & CODE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SITE</u>
#1 BRAVO	B Day 1 Mar	BIKINI - (on reef 2950 feet, bearing 250° from SW tip of NAMU.
#2 UNION	U Day 11 Mar	BIKINI (Range) - Intersection of arcs with radii of 6900 feet from BURCKH and three (3) statute miles from AC CEN.
#3 YANKEE	Y Day 22 Mar	BIKINI (Range) - UNION crater.
#4 ECHO	E Day 29 Mar	ENIWETOK - BREKINR ISLAND.
#5 HECTOR	H Day 5 Apr	BIKINI (Range) - UNION crater.
#6 ROMEO	R Day 15 Apr	BIKINI (Range) - UNION crater.
#7 KOOK	K Day 22 Apr	BIKINI - ENWIRAN ISLAND.

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Concept of Operations
CJTF SEVEN No. 53

5. Factors Significant to On-Site Operations

- a. ENIWETOK ATOLL will be the base of operations irrespective of the scope of activities at BIKINI ATOLL.
- b. The principal port of entry for aircraft and the majority of shipping will remain at ENIWETOK ATOLL. Radio links with OAHU, T.H. and LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO, will remain on ENIWETOK ISLAND.
- c. Pre shot evacuation of joint task force elements will be conducted during certain operations at BIKINI. See paragraph 10, below.
- d. One of the most critical operational factors during CASTLE will be population congestion at principal locations. In view of the anticipated conditions, task group commanders will assure that:
 - (1) Personnel are not permitted to remain in the forward area to perform routine tasks capable of accomplishment at home stations, or for the sole purpose of witnessing the shots.
 - (2) Personnel are redeployed from the forward area as soon as practicable after completion of their tasks.
 - (3) Personnel will not be based at BIKINI longer than their operational mission requires.
- e. Joint task force and task group headquarters will be located at ENIWETOK ATOLL, with commanders and key operations staff personnel moving to BIKINI so as to be on site two (2) days before and one (1) day after each shot. CTG 7.3 headquarters will be located on PARRY ISLAND until about one week prior to shot #1; thereafter, it will be located afloat on board the CVE unless otherwise directed by CJTF SEVEN. Administrative and logistic staffs will remain at ENIWETOK ATOLL. CJTF SEVEN, task group commanders and key operations staff personnel will be located as follows:

	<u>DURING BIKINI SHOTS (D-2 to D/1)</u>	<u>AT OTHER TIMES</u>
CJTF SEVEN	AGC	PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.1	AGC	PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.2	ENIWETOK ISLAND	ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.3	CVE	PARRY ISLAND or CVE
CTG 7.4	AGC	ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.5	AGC	PARRY ISLAND

- f. Six (6) of the seven (7) weapons and devices will be assembled on ENIWETOK ATOLL.
- g. Machine shop, laboratory, photographic, warehouse and stockroom facilities will remain on PARRY and ENIWETOK ISLANDS, except limited facilities at BIKINI.
- h. Preliminary assembly and testing of experimental equipment and rehearsals will be done at ENIWETOK ATOLL, to the extent practicable.
- i. The USS CURTISS will be used as the principal shipboard facility for TG 7.1 scientific personnel and laboratory, shop and office space.

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Concept of Operations
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

In the event unidentified aircraft enter the test area, CTG 7.3 will alert CTG 7.4 regarding the situation. CTG 7.4 will direct test air craft to depart the area on appropriate headings and control of the area will revert to CTG 7.3 for the duration of the defensive effort.

- j. All major cryogenic work will be done at ENIWETOK ATOLL.
- k. The Army Task Group will be required to provide base facilities for approximately 2000 other task force personnel.
- l. The command ship will be positioned within VHF communications range of ENYU ISLAND during the BIKINI operations.
- m. Inflight refueling operations will not be conducted. During all shots at BIKINI, except KOON, the airstrip on ENINMAN ISLAND group may be used for emergency landing. The airstrip on ROI ISLAND, KWAJALEIN ATOLL, will be available for emergency landing.
- n. During shots and rehearsals, command of joint task force air operations will be exercised through the CIC of the command ship. The CIC will be supervised by joint task force controllers provided by TG 7.4. These air controllers will control movement of TG 7.4 aircraft and, in the interest of safety and positioning requirements, the activities of such other aircraft as may be appropriate.
- o. CJTF SEVEN will coordinate arrangements for sample return flights.
- p. All shots at BIKINI will be detonated by the Firing Party on ENYU ISLAND. The ENIWETOK shot will be detonated by the Firing Party on PARRY ISLAND.
- q. All shots will be detonated before sunrise. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory shots will be one (1) to one half (1/2) hour before and UCRL shots one-half (1/2) hour before.

Population Firing Operational Phase The following figures depict population distribution at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS during various phases of the operation. (These population figures will be subject to change in the near future due to revisions in shot locations).

	<u>DURING BIKINI OPERATIONS</u>	<u>DURING ENIWETOK OPERATIONS</u>
Hq, JTF SEVEN	50 - AGC (25 Cabin Class) 40 - PARRY ISLAND	3 - AGC (2 Cabin Class) 87 - PARRY ISLAND
WX Central	20 - AGC (10 Cabin Class)	20 - ENIWETOK ISLAND
TG 7.1	80 - AGC (35 Cabin Class) 50 - CVE (33 Cabin Class) 111 - AV (98 Cabin Class) 184 - AP (Cabin Class) 310 - ENINMAN ISLAND 128 - Other islands of BIKINI 95 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 605 - PARRY ISLAND 138 - Other islands of ENIWETOK	95 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 840 - PARRY ISLAND 150 - ROJOA ISLAND
TG 7.2	8 - AGC (2 Cabin Class) 117 - AP 124 - BIKINI ATOLL 983 - ENIWETOK ISLAND	997 - ENIWETOK ISLAND

Concept of Operations
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

	<u>DURING BIKINI OPERATIONS</u>	<u>DURING ENIWETOK OPERATIONS</u>
TG 7.2 (Cont'd)	95 - PARRY ISLAND 30 - Other islands of ENIWETOK	95 - PARRY ISLAND 30 - Other islands of ENIWETOK
TG 7.3	4230 - Afloat 30 - PARRY ISLAND 165 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 303 - KWAJALEIN	4200 - Afloat 60 - PARRY ISLAND 165 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 303 - KWAJALEIN
TG 7.4	8 - AGC (5 Cabin Class) 28 - CVE (7 Cabin Class) 1579 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 84 - Weather Islands 36 - BIKINI ATOLL 64 - KWAJALEIN	8 - AGC (5 Cabin Class) 1619 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 84 - Weather Islands 64 - KWAJALEIN
TG 7.5	30 - AGC (15 Cabin Class) AV (Cabin Class) 270 - AP (Cabin Class) 491 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 438 - Other islands of BIKINI 954 - PARRY ISLAND 40 - ENIWETOK ISLAND 143 - Other islands of ENIWETOK	1150 - PARRY ISLAND 40 - ENIWETOK ISLAND - Other islands of ENIWETOK

7. Coordinated Inter-Island Airlift Operations. The limited availability of aircraft to support inter-island airlift operations will necessitate maximum utilization of all inter-island equipment in the forward area. To assure maximum utilization and provide efficient service in support of the overall task force mission, aircraft will be centrally controlled and dispatched by the commander responsible (CTG 7.3 at BIKINI and CTG 7.4 at ENIWETOK) for providing the service. Using agencies will be required to plan their movement activities well in advance to permit proper scheduling.
8. Coordinated Inter-Atoll Airlift Operations. CTG 7.4 will provide an inter-atoll airlift system between ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS with flights to other atolls in the forward area as required to support joint task force elements. Using agencies will be required to submit requirements well in advance to permit proper scheduling. Subsequent to the last shot at BIKINI, the ENIWETOK-BIKINI service will be provided by PBM aircraft, taking off from ENIWETOK ISLAND airstrip and landing in the BIKINI lagoon. Except for MAJURO, which will be supplied by C-47, the weather island airlift will be controlled by CTG 7.4 ~~as coordinated with CTG 7.3~~ *utilizing PBM 4 aircraft made available by the CO, Naval Station, Rongerik.*
9. Coordinated Boat Pool Operations. Since both CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.5 will provide large scale boat pool service at BIKINI ATOLL for multiple using agencies, overall control of this activity by either task group commander will not be feasible. A joint task force scheduling panel consisting of representatives of TG 7.3 and TG 7.5 will conduct boat pool operations at BIKINI ATOLL under the direct supervision of CJTF SEVEN. Prior to the last shot at BIKINI, the TG 7.5 boat pool will be evacuated to ENIWETOK at which time CTG 7.3 will assume responsibility for all boat pool operations at BIKINI. CTG 7.2 and CTG 7.5 will continue to operate their respective boat

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Concept of Operations
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

pools in accordance with existing procedures during the ENIWETOK phase of the operation. CTG 7 3 will continue to operate those units of his boat pool at ENIWETOK during the BIKINI operational phase.

10. Evacuation. Annex R applies.

a. All BIKINI based personnel and equipment not directly involved in or essential to late preparations and shot operations will be phased to ENIWETOK ATOLL or permanently redeployed prior to B minus 2 days.

b. The following evacuation procedures apply:

(1) Shot #1 (BRAVO), Shot #2 (UNION), Shot #3 (YANKEE), Shot #5 (NECTAR), Shot #6 (CMCBO)

(a) With the exception of the Firing Party on ENYU (and possibly a small maintenance party on ENINMAN) BIKINI ATOLL will be evacuated of all personnel. The number of personnel on ENYU (and ENINMAN) will be within the capability of helicopter lift.

(b) In the event of excessive contamination of the ENINMAN ISLAND camp, a limited capability will exist for indefinite operations from afloat.

(c) Boat pool craft, not accompanying the evacuation to sea, will be either anchored in deep water in the southern part of BIKINI lagoon or beached on the ENINMAN ISLAND group or ENYU ISLAND.

(2) Shot #7 (KOCN) Total pre-shot evacuation of all personnel (less Firing Party on ENYU) will be necessary. Equipment not previously redeployed to ENIWETOK ATOLL will be redeployed on ENYU (and/or BIKINI) ISLAND prior to shot time.

(3) Shot #4 (ECHO) There will be no pre-shot evacuation of personnel or materiel from ENIWETOK ATOLL. Only the relocation of personnel, equipment and small craft from the northern islands to ENIWETOK and PARRY ISLANDS will be necessary.

(4) All ships of TG 7 3 will put to sea for each shot if not occupied in other operations at the non-involved atoll. Small craft at the affected lagoon which cannot be evacuated will be moored in deep water or placed ashore in areas affording greatest protection from blast, heat, wave action and radiological effects.

c. Emergency Post-Shot Evacuation Capability

(1) During the ENIWETOK operations the joint task force will maintain a capability for emergency post-shot evacuation. An emergency post-shot evacuation will be executed on order of CJTF SEVEN in the event radiological contamination conditions so dictate. Such evacuation will be for personnel safety only and will not involve materiel or personal belongings other than toilet articles. Any such evacuation will be capable of accomplishment on four (4) hours notice.

(2) During shot phases at BIKINI (H Hour to H/24 hours) personnel at ENIWETOK ATOLL will be in an alert status. Although remote,

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Concept of Operations
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

there is a possibility that ENIWETOK will be subjected to radioactive fall-out during BIKINI operations. In the event radioactive fall-out is detected at ENIWETOK, a predesignated signal will be given at which time all personnel will proceed to covered areas (buildings, tents, etc.) and remain under cover until the all clear signal is sounded. Should excessive contamination become apparent, CJTF SEVEN will order that an evacuation be conducted, using available aircraft, and specified task force vessels will proceed on order of CJTF SEVEN from BIKINI to ENIWETOK to assist in the emergency evacuation of all endangered personnel. The provision of paragraph c(1) above will then apply.

(3) If reentry to either or both atolls is delayed beyond the period that the joint task force can reasonably sustain itself afloat, provisions will be made for an alternate destination landing.

d. Progressive Redeployment. Personnel, equipment and materiel will be redeployed consistent with completion of tasks or as soon as they become surplus to the needs for accomplishing the missions of JTF SEVEN. The troop transport (AP) will be utilized to redeploy some 600 personnel immediately after Shot #7 (ROON).

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U S. Army
Commander

Appendix

- I - Map of Eniwetok Atoll
- II - Map of BIKINI ATOLL
- III - Forward Area Native Population

OFFICIAL:


W. S. Cowart Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART JR
Colonel, U S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

~~SECRET~~
Unclassified

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
20 October 1953, 1600 R

Appendix I to Annex A
Commander's Concept of Operations, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

MAP OF ENIWETOK ATOLL




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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
 Washington 25, D. C.
 20 October 1953, 1600 R

Appendix III to Annex A
 Concept of Operations, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

FORWARD AREA NATIVE POPULATION



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex B to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. The organization and command relationships of the joint task force are depicted on the charts attached as appendices hereto.
2. To enable CJTF SEVEN to exercise operational control while afloat, the organization as outlined in Appendix II is established.
3. CJTF SEVEN exercises full operational control of the Army Task Group at all times and assumes full operational control of the Navy, Air Force and Scientific Task Groups upon arrival of their respective headquarters in the forward area. He will assume operational control of T-7-6 upon commencement of the operational phase.
4. The on-site operational phase commences on a date agreed upon by the AEC and DOD. During the on-site phase the AEC designates CJTF SEVEN as its overall representative in the forward area, thereby giving him complete operational control of the military and scientific aspects of the operation.
5. CJTF SEVEN coordinates the activities of the Scientific Task Group and the AEC Base Facilities Task Group in accordance with existing AEC-CJTF policy agreements.
6. While the task force headquarters is located at ENIWETOK, the task force commander assumes the additional responsibility of ATCCM ENIWETOK, under CINCPAC, per decision of the JCS on 13 April 1951 and letter G-4 22 JTF SEVEN TS (14 Apr 53), DETAIL, 23 April 1953, subject: "Directive for Conduct of Operation CASTLE". In the absence of the task force commander, the senior task force officer present will discharge the responsibilities of CJTF SEVEN as ATCCM ENIWETOK.
7. The senior task force officer at HAWAIIAN will coordinate matters involving JTF SEVEN activities (except movement control) at that station.

Appendix

P. W. CLARSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander


- I - Organization for
Operation CASTLE
- II - Command Channels, JTF SEVEN (Afloat)

OFFICIAL:

W. S. Cowart Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMAND CHANNELS JTF SEVEN (AF)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RD CHANNELS JTF SEVEN (AFLOAT)



APPENDIX II TO ANNEX B
Command Organization of JTF SEVEN (afloat)
C/JTF SEVEN Op Plan 3-53

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HOW) c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
10 February 1954

Annex C to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. Intelligence - General Situation. The atmosphere of tension existing between the United States and its allies and the USSR and its satellites stands little chance of diminishing during the next six months. It may increase as the result of possible further Soviet inspired actions against nations on the geographical fringe of the Soviet Bloc.
2. General Soviet Capabilities. The armed forces of the USSR are maintained in an advanced state of military readiness. As a result, the Soviets can undertake military aggression with little or no advanced warning.

Soviet Capabilities as Applied to JTF 7

a. Naval Capabilities. The Soviets have nineteen ocean patrol and thirty-seven medium range type submarines in the Pacific Ocean area. Because of endurance limitations of the medium range type, it is believed that the ocean patrol type would be better for operations in the Eniwetok area. It is estimated that at least four to six ocean patrol submarines could be maintained on station in the Eniwetok area indefinitely, and for short periods this number could be increased.

b. Air Capabilities

(1) Aerial photo and radiological reconnaissance of the Eniwetok area from Far East bases (Sakhalin or the Kuriles) is within Soviet capabilities. It is estimated that the TU-4 has a combat range/radius of 3,100/1,700 nautical miles with a 10,000-pound bomb load. The TU-4, with the rated bomb load replaced by fuel, could remain in the target area for only a brief period. By utilizing range extension techniques (including removal of defensive armament with attendant increase of fuel capacity, replacement of rated bomb load by fuel, and one aerial refueling), the time over the target for a TU-4 aircraft could be extended to over four hours. Although there is no evidence that the USSR has actually employed range extension techniques, it is within Soviet technical capabilities to employ such techniques. The Third Long Range Air Army is presently estimated to have a TO&E strength of approximately 190 TU-4's. No TU-4 aircraft are known to be modified for long range reconnaissance.

(2) In 1951 a single four-engine bomber considerably larger than the TU-4 was observed in flight. This aircraft has been designated as the Type 31 heavy bomber. It probably has a range/radius of 3,700/1,850 nautical miles with conventional reciprocating engines. The Soviets are known to have developed and tested a turboprop engine but the production status is unknown. A successful engine of this type would give the Type-31 a combat range/radius of 4,800/2,500 nautical miles and considerably in excess of this if the combat load were replaced with fuel.

(3) Although there is no intelligence to indicate that the Type-31 is in series production or in operational units, information suggests that the Soviets have a few aircraft, larger than the TU-4, which are estimated to be capable of overflying the operational area.

(4) It is possible that the Soviets might equip one or more of these aircraft for photo and radiological reconnaissance if a sufficiently high priority exists for this requirement.

Intelligence, Security and Public Information
JTF SEVEN No. 3-53

It is considered that the USSR could interfere with the mission of Joint Task Force Seven, or the compromise of its activities could be affected by:

a. Espionage. Espionage could be accomplished by the penetration of personnel into the Task Force or the defection of personnel within the Task Force. In addition to radiological reconnaissance, espionage could be accomplished photographically by ship, aircraft, or submarine, with the latter two being the most plausible. Submarine approach within 1,500 yards or less of important islands of the atoll or overflight by enemy aircraft are possible. By such means periodic photography and observation could record the progress, process of preparation, and type of construction within the operational area, and important operations probably could be interpreted by an analysis of these records.

b. Sabotage. Sabotage could be accomplished by subversive personnel within the Task Force or, more remotely, by a raiding party landed from the sea. Subversive action by these means could include the destruction of communications and technical installation facilities within the operational area.

c. Overt Action by Vessel or Aircraft. Overt action by vessel or aircraft could take the form of attack by aerial bombardment, naval gunfire or amphibious assault.

d. Raids. Raids could be conducted by aggressive or surreptitious methods under the cover of darkness from combatant ships or submarines. The landing and recovery of raiders by submarine could be accomplished under the conditions of darkness and the confusion resulting from their activities.

e. Unauthorized Instrumentation. Interference with the mission could be accomplished by electronic counter-measures by a vessel or aircraft operating some distance from the area. Compromise could be effected by surreptitiously planting and recovering instruments by a landing party.

f. Failure of JTF 7 Personnel to Observe Security Precautions. Failure of JTF 7 personnel to observe security precautions could easily compromise the mission by their talking or writing indiscriminately about classified information during the planning and operational stages.

Effect of Capabilities on JTF 7. The capabilities listed above make it possible for the Soviets to take the following action against the operational area:

- a. Submarine reconnaissance.
- b. Air reconnaissance.
- c. Ground reconnaissance or sabotage by landing parties from submarine.
- d. Raids from submarines or surface ships.
- e. Raids by aircraft.

Conclusions. Capability a is considered the most likely to occur under conditions existing today. Capability b is a possibility but is less likely and capabilities c, d, and e most likely would be exercised in the event of open hostilities between the United States and the USSR. It is believed that information as to the operations of JTF 7 and the results thereof would be of more practical value to the Soviets than hindering or impeding the operation.

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Intelligence, Security and Public Information
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

recording the results of security examinations.

5. Personnel Clearances Each task group commander is responsible that all personnel participating in Operation CASTLE are cleared in accordance with CJTF SEVEN security memoranda
6. Classification Criteria. A "Classification Guide for Operation CASTLE" concerning all pertinent classification criteria will be issued to the task group commanders for their guidance

7. Travel Security Control

- a. CINCPAC Serial 020, dated 1 April 1952, outlines the requirements for entrance to the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational or closed area, as defined on page 1 of this operation plan
- b. All persons who are authorized to enter the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area will be initially cleared for entry under the provisions of CINCPAC Serial 020. Task group commanders may authorize reentry without recourse to CINCPAC.
- c. CTG 7.2 is responsible that individuals arriving at the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area who have not been cleared for entry under CINCPAC Serial 020, or reentry as provided in paragraph 7b, above, are restricted to ENIWETOK ISLAND and unclassified information pending proper clearance
- d. Movements of surface vessels and aircraft within the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area will be monitored by CTG 7.3. CTG 7.3 will be responsible for the security control of personnel and cargo on vessels and aircraft originally arriving at ENIWETOK-BIKINI ATOLLS and any further arrivals that may be occasioned by inter-atoll travel
- e. Travel of personnel within the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area will be controlled by a badge system for access to the higher classified areas.

8. Security Areas

a. The "ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area", as defined on page 1 of this operation plan, consists of three (3) classified area categories, as defined by AEC GM Security Bulletin No. 18 for purposes of security enforcement. These areas are:

(1) Exclusion Area A security area containing a security interest which is of such nature that access to this area constitutes, for all practical purposes, access to the security interest contained therein - i.e., a shot site or assembly area.

(2) Limited Area A security area containing a security interest in which area uncontrolled movement would permit access to the security interest contained therein; but such access may be prevented by escort and other internal restrictions and controls - i.e., PARRY ISLAND

(3) Controlled Area. A security area adjacent to or encompassing limited or exclusion areas and within which area uncontrolled movement does not permit access to a security interest, and which is

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

[REDACTED]

Intelligence, Security and Public Information
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

designed for the principal purpose of providing administrative control, safety, or a buffer area of security restrictions for limited or exclusion areas - i.e., ENIWETOK Closed Area.

b. Exclusion and limited areas are established by CJTF SEVEN. Internal security requirements and access to these areas are determined by CTG 7.5. CTG 7.2 will guard these areas, admitting only those persons authorized by CJTF SEVEN.

c. The closed (controlled) area has been established by CINCPAC. Admittance to this area is authorized by CINCPAC upon recommendation of CJTF SEVEN or commander of any task group, as his representative. The internal security of this area is the responsibility of ATCOM ENIWETOK.

d. Clearance requirements for access to the security areas are designated as follows.

<u>SECURITY AREAS</u>	<u>JTF CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS</u>	<u>AEC CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS</u>
Exclusion Area	"Q" Clearance and Access List.	"Q" Clearance and Access List.
Limited Area	"Q" Clearance, Top Secret Military Clearance, Secret Military Clearance under escort.	"Q" Clearance, "P" approval under escort (without access to Restricted Data), Top Secret Clearance (provided no access to Restricted Data from AEC contractor personnel), Secret Military Clearance under escort.
Controlled Area	INITIAL ENTRY Good Security Risk (CINCPAC Ser. 020) CONTINUED ACCESS Secret Military Clearance.	"P" approval & good security risk (CINCPAC Serial 020)

9. Contact Reports The procedure for contact reporting is defined in CINCPACFLT Serial 003360 2B, dated 14 April 1953. CTG 7.2 will comply with its provisions when carrying out security patrols in the ENIWETOK BIKINI area, keeping CJTF SEVEN fully informed.
10. Badge System A badge system will control travel to the exclusion and limited areas. CTG 7.2 will be responsible for controlling and enforcing this system on orders promulgated by CJTF SEVEN. CTG 7.6 is responsible for procurement and issue of badges as set forth in CJTF SEVEN security memoranda. The badge system will become effective on or about 1 January 1954.
11. Contraband
- a. Unless authorized by specific orders to individuals, possession of items of material listed below in the ENIWETOK-BIKINI area is prohibited and the items considered contraband.

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence, Security and Public Information
CJTF SEVEN No 3-53

(1) All photographic equipment.

(2) All equipment adaptable for use in either visual or electrical communication

(3) All optical equipment.

(4) All materials with explosive capabilities.

(5) All weapons.

(6) All drugs

b. Travel orders for all personnel destined for the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area will include the following statement:

"Unless specifically authorized, personnel will not have in their possession any items of material to include all photographic equipment, all equipment adaptable for use in either visual or electrical communications, all optical equipment, all material with explosive capabilities, weapons and all drugs and intoxicating beverages".

c. Items of contraband will be confiscated and report of the circumstances made to CJTF SEVEN.

d. Film found in possession of unauthorized persons will be confiscated, forwarded to CTG 7.5 for processing and classification and a report will be made to CJTF SEVEN.

12. Photography Only official photography is authorized in the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area. All official photography will be reviewed by the Joint Task Force SEVEN Classification Officer for proper classification and determination of RESTRICTED DATA. Prior to review and final classification by the classification officer, all photography will be given a preliminary classification. The preliminary classification will in no case be lower than ~~SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~ for scientific and technical report photography and ~~RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION~~ for administrative photography.

Restricted Data

Confidential

13. Communications Security. The security and monitoring of communications will be accomplished under the direction of CJTF SEVEN.

14. Counter-Intelligence CJTF SEVEN will have operational control of all CIC units. CTG 7.4 will have operational control of all OSI agents whose activities will, in general, be confined to Air Force matters.

15. Security Patrols. CTG 7.2 is responsible for conducting the necessary security patrols within ENIWETOK-BIKINI ATOLLS. Air and sea security patrols outside the ENIWETOK-BIKINI ATOLLS will be the responsibility of CTG 7.3.

16. Inspections Inspections will be conducted upon arrival of personnel and periodically thereafter to detect security violations and contraband and to insure the use of proper identification credentials and proper safeguarding of classified matter. Individuals are responsible for reporting security violations which come to their attention.

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Intelligence, Security and Public Information
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

17. Security Violations. Task group commanders are responsible for investigating and reporting immediately all violations of security regulations which occur within their jurisdiction.
18. Security Control of AEC Accountable Material - Transportation
 - a. AEC is responsible for the security control in the transporting of AEC accountable and other classified materials from the point of origin to the carrier at the designated port of embarkation.
 - b. CTG 7.3 is responsible for the security control of AEC accountable and other classified materials while being transported on a Navy vessel to the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area.
 - c. CJTF SEVEN is responsible for the security control of AEC accountable and other classified materials while being transported aboard aircraft and all vessels not under the command of CTG 7.3 to the ENIWETOK BIKINI operational area.
 - d. CTG 7.5 is responsible for the security control of AEC accountable and other classified materials upon transfer from the carrier to his custody. A representative from CTG 7.5 will accompany the materials, when necessary, from the point of origin until they are taken into the custody of CTG 7.5 at its ultimate destination.
 - e. After delivery of AEC accountable and other classified materials to the custody of CTG 7.5 at the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area, CTG 7.5 will be responsible for the security control of these materials, including inter-atoll movements, and is authorized to call upon CTG 7.2 and CTG 7.3 whenever guards are required for inter-atoll transport.
19. Public Information
 - a. JTF SEVEN does not release any public information.
 - b. Releases to the press in regard to JTF SEVEN operations and activities are made only by the AEC or DOD.
 - c. Personnel of JTF SEVEN are prohibited from releasing any information for publication, in regard to the joint task force or its activities. They must neither confirm nor deny any articles appearing in the press. Queries from the press or elsewhere will be referred to AEC-DOD releases.
 - d. AEC-DOD releases, when made, will be disseminated to units of JTF SEVEN through normal communication channels at the earliest possible time.

OFFICIAL:

S. P. Walker, Jr.
S. P. WALKER, JR.
Colonel, U.S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
 APO 187 (HON), c/o Postmaster
 San Francisco, California
 10 February 1954

Annex D to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 3-53

TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST

1. This annex specifies the personnel and the significant major items of equipment of the AEC, Army, Navy and Air Force during the operational phase of CASTLE. It does not indicate the temporary location of personnel during the shot phases.
2. It is published for the information and overall planning guidance of all concerned.

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN

SERVICE ELEMENT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			OPERATIONAL LOCATION	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	OFF.	EM	CIV.		
COMMAND	9	9		PARRY ISLAND	16 Jan 54
J-1	5	15		PARRY ISLAND	16 Jan 54
J-2	4	3		PARRY ISLAND	20 Jan 54
J-3	11	7		PARRY ISLAND	16 Jan 54
J-4	8	5		PARRY ISLAND	20 Jan 54
J-5	5	4		PARRY ISLAND	16 Jan 54
Compt	1	3		PARRY ISLAND	16 Jan 54
Advisors to CJTF	4	1	2	PARRY ISLAND	
TOTAL	47	47	2		

TASK GROUP 7.1 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			OPERATIONAL LOCATION	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	MILITARY OFF.	CIVILIAN EM	OFF. GR.		
HC TG 7.1	19	48	55	#PARRY ISLAND	1 Feb 54
TASK UNIT					
7.1.1 (LASL Programs)	26	18	40		
7.1.2 (Production)			56	PARRY ISLAND	15 Feb 54
7.1.3 (Special Mats Facilities)			52	PARRY ISLAND	15 Feb 54
7.1.4 (LASL Assembly)			56	PARRY ISLAND	20 Jan 54

Troop and Equipment List
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

TASK GROUP 7.1 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			OPERATIONAL LOCATION	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	MILITARY OFF.	EM	CIVILIAN OFF. GR.		
7.1.6 (Firing Party)	(Personnel drawn from other units)			#PARRY ISLAND	
7.1.7 (RadSafe)	9	40	5	#PARRY ISLAND	20 Feb 54
7.1.8 (Tech Photo)		4	6	#PARRY ISLAND	1 Feb 54
7.1.9 (Doc Photo Air Force)	7	19	19	#PARRY ISLAND	1 Feb 54
7.1.12	1		125	BIKINI & NORTH ISLAND	18 Mar 54
7.1.13 (DOD Programs)	54	151	175	#PARRY ISLAND	21 Mar 54
	1	5		RONGERIK ATOLL	17 Jan 54
			47	ENIWETOK ATOLL	7 Feb 54
			1	GUAM	7 Feb 54
			1	JOHNSTON	7 Feb 54
			1	WAKE	7 Feb 54
7.1.14 (UCRL Assembly)	1		48	BIKINI & NORTH ISLAND	18 Mar 54
7.1.15 (EC&G Timing & Firing)	2	3	64	#PARRY ISLAND	1 Mar 54
TOTAL	120	288	751		

Administrative headquarters will remain on Parry Island during entire operation. Primary operational location during periods 15 Feb through 25 Mar and 1 Apr through 25 Apr will be Bikini.

TASK GROUP 7.2 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			OPERATIONAL LOCATION	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	MILITARY OFF.	EM	CIVILIAN OFF. GR.		
HQ & HQ DET	29	149		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
	0	10		PARRY ISLAND	
SVC DET	20	218		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place

Troop and Equipment List
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

TASK GROUP 7.2 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			OPERATIONAL LOCATION	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	OFF.	EM.	CIV.		
SIG DET	7	110		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
	1	18		PARRY ISLAND	In Place
	0	10		ENINMAN ISLAND	In Place
	1	17		ENYU ISLAND	In Place
MP DET	2	43		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
	1	72		PARRY ISLAND	In Place
	0	28		EBERIRU ISLAND	In Place
	1	58		ENINMAN ISLAND	In Place
	1	20		NAMU ISLAND	In Place
	1	14		ENYU ISLAND	In Place
	1	15		ROMURIKKU ISLAND	In Place
PORT DET	5	132		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
TRUCK DET	4	124		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
18TH MP CID	3	0		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
	2	0		ENINMAN ISLAND	In Place
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY DET 8600 AAU	3	21		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
	1	9		ENINMAN ISLAND	In Place
NAVY DET	1	28		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
PROVISIONAL CIC DET	1	0		PARRY ISLAND	In Place
	1	0		ENINMAN ISLAND	In Place
	1	0		ENYU ISLAND	In Place
	1	0		EBERIRU ISLAND	In Place
	4	0		ENIWETOK ISLAND	In Place
#ARMY HELICOPTER SECTION (4)		(5)		ENINMAN ISLAND	In Place
TOTAL	92	10%			

Included in SVC DET 7126 AU

BOAT POOL: 2 LCM and 1 LCPL

VEHICLES: 83 special purpose, 297 general purpose

AIRCRAFT: 3 H-13 Helicopters

Troop and Equipment List
 CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

TASK GROUP 7.3 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			EQUIPMENT	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	OFF.	EL.	CIV.		
STAFF OF CTG 7.3	17	44	1		In Place
<u>TU 7.3.0</u>				<u>SPECIAL DEVICES UNIT</u>	
TE 7.3.0.0	39	616		Special Serv's Element (USS CURTISS AV-4)	24 Jan 54
TE 7.3.0.1				Escort Element	
<u>TU 7.3.1</u>				<u>SURFACE SECURITY UNIT</u>	
	3	4		(ComDesDiv TWELVE)	
	16	289		USS EPPERSON (DDE-710)	24 Jan 54
	18	266		USS PHILIP (DDE-498)	24 Jan 54
	20	265		USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449)	24 Jan 54
	15	265		USS HENSHAW (DDE-499)	24 Jan 54
	4	55		USS HC 1546	4 Feb 54
<u>TU 7.3.2</u>				<u>CARRIER UNIT</u>	
	70	849		Carrier Element	
	20	40		USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	22 Jan 54
				10 HRF & AF Helicopters as assigned	
TE 7.3.2.1	4	15		<u>BIKINI VF ELEMENT</u>	
				3 F4U-5N	
TE 7.3.2.2	4	15		<u>ENIWETOK VF ELEMENT</u>	
				3 F4U-5N	
<u>TU 7.3.3</u>				<u>PATROL PLANE UNIT</u>	
	50	357		(VP-29)	In Place
				12 P2V-6	
				1 P2V-5	
				1 P4Y-2	
	6	41		2 PBH-5A	
<u>TU 7.3.4</u>	47	624		<u>JTF FLAGSHIP</u>	3 Feb 54
				(USS ESTES AGC-12)	
<u>TU 7.3.5</u>				<u>UTILITY UNIT</u>	
	6	75		USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114)	16 Jan 54
	5	80		USS SIOUX (ATF-75)	24 Jan 54
	5	81		USS APACHE (ATF-76)	29 Jan 54
	6	82		USS MOLALA (ATF-106)	6 Feb 54
	7	73		USS COCOFA (ATF-101)	8 Feb 54
	6	62		USS GYPSY (AKSD-1)	8 Feb 54
<u>TU 7.3.6</u>				<u>AT SHIP COUNTERMEASURES</u>	
				<u>TEST UNIT</u>	
TE 7.3.6.0				<u>Drone Ship Element</u>	
	4	47		(YAG-39)	
	4	49		(YAG-40)	
TE 7.3.6.1				<u>TOXING AND DECONTAMINATION ELEMENT</u>	
				ATF's as assigned	

Troop and Equipment at
 CJTF SeW&N No. 3-53

TASK GROUP 7.3 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			EQUIPMENT	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	OFF.	EM	CIV.		
<u>TU 7.3.7</u>				<u>BIKINI HARBOR UNIT</u>	
TE 7.3.7.0	20	253		USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2)	20 Jan 54
	4	231		Boat Pool Element	
				5 LCU	
				18 LCM	
				2 LCPR	
				1 LCPL	
				1 MMB (26')	
				1 AVR	
				1 YO	
				1 YCV	
				1 YFN	
				1 YC	
<u>TU 7.3.8</u>				<u>ENIWETOK HARBOR UNIT</u>	
TE 7.3.8.0	0	40		(YOG, YOGN, 1 AVR)	
	1	46		Underwater Detection Element (1 LCM)	
<u>TU 7.3.9</u>				<u>TRANSPORT UNIT</u>	
TE 7.3.9.0				Special Devices Transport Element (USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2))	20 Jan 54
TE 7.3.9.1	6	116		Special Devices Transport Element (USS LST 762)	15 Jan 54
TE 7.3.9.2				Escort Element	
TE 7.3.9.3				Escort Element	
TE 7.3.9.4	6	102		Materials Transport Element (USS LST 825)	11 Feb 54
TE 7.3.9.5				Materials Transport Element	
TE 7.3.9.6	7	18	171	Personnel Transport Element (USNS FRED C. ADNSWORTH)	26 Feb 54
TOTAL	420	5365	172		

Total Individuals Task Group: 5957

TASK GROUP 7.4 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			EQUIPMENT	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	OFF.	EM.	CIV.		
HC TG 7.4	48	49	3	<u>ENIWETOK</u>	29 Jan 54
<u>TEST SUPPORT UNIT</u>					
4930TH TEST SPT GROUP	8	38	1	1 C-54 (CJTF) (Opnl Con Only)	In Place

Troop and Equipment List
 CJTF SEVEN No. 5-53

TASK GROUP 7.6 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			EQUIPMENT	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	OFF.	EM.	CIV.		
				4 C-47 12 L-13 3 H-19A 4 H-19B 5 4-13 (Army) (Opnl Con Only)	
4931ST TEST EPT SQ	36	249			In Place
4932ND TEST SPT SQ	11	202			In Place
1110TH AIR SPT DET	2	8			10 Feb 54
<u>TEST ACFT UNIT</u>					
4926TH TEST SC (S)	41	109	1	15 F-84G	30 Jan 54
CLOUD SAMPLING AND EFFECTS ELEMENT	36	114	15	1 RB-36 2 B-36H (PW) 1 B-36D 1 B-47	30 Jan 54
ACFT CONTROL	4	4			10 Jan 54
IRDA ELEMENT	12	30		3 B-50	D - 2
<u>TEST SERVICES UNIT</u>					
HQ TSU	7	10			20 Jan 54
WEA CENTRAL ELM	10	6			21 Jan 54
WEA RECON ELM	53	243		9 KB-29	1 Feb 54
WEA REPT ELM	2	9			20 Jan 54
COMM ELM AACS	4	124			20 Jan 54
SAR ELEMENT	10	16		2 SA-16	23 Jan 54
<u>MATS TERMINAL Det</u>					
1502-1 MATS DET	3	11			10 Jan 54
1960-1 AACS DET	1	38			10 Jan 54
DET 2, 57TH STRAT RECON SQ	2	25			10 Jan 54
PHOTO ELM	10	13		3 C-54	1 Feb 54
ENTWETOK TOTAL	300	1298	20		

Troop and Equipment List
 CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

TASK GROUP 7.4 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST (cont'd)

NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH			EQUIPMENT	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	CAF.	LM.	CIV.		
<u>KFAJALFIN</u>					
COMB DET MARS	0	34			
<u>BIKINI</u>					
4931ST TEST SPT SQ	6	39			
COMM ELM	0	9			
<u>WEATHER ISLANDS</u>					
WEATHER REPT ELM	1	86			
TOTAL	307	1466	20		

TASK GROUP 7.5 TROOP AND EQUIPMENT LIST


NAME OF UNIT	OPERATIONAL STRENGTH		OPERATIONAL LOCATION	CLOSED IN FORWARD AREA
	OFF CLASS	EM CLASS		
HQ TG 7.5	9		PARRY ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	4		ENINMAN ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	1		USC CURTISS	
<u>HOLMES & NARVER</u>				
	72	899	PARRY ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	6	53	ENIWETOK ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	12	151	ROJOA ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	42	523	ENINMAN ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	24	229	NAMU ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	11	187	ROMURIKKU ISLAND	20 Jan 54
	5	64	ENYU ISLAND	20 Jan 54
TOTAL	188	2106		

BOAT POOL: 24 LCM, 9 LCU, 2 YTL, 3 Water Taxi, 18 DUKW.

P. W. CLARKSON
 Major General, USA
 Commander

OFFICIAL:

William S. Cowart, Jr.
 WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.
 Colonel, U. S. Air Force
 Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3



HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex F to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

SCIENTIFIC TASK GROUP SUMMARY OF TASKS (TG 7.1)

The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the Scientific Task Group during the CASTLE on-site operational phase. CTG 7.1 will:

- a. Position, arm and detonate the weapons and devices.
- b. Conduct technical and measurement programs (Annex E applies).
- c. Complete the installation and calibration of the devices and all instruments and test apparatus.
- d. Recommend to CJTF SEVEN safe slant range distances from ground level for aircraft during shot periods.
- e. Conduct the radiological safety program (Annex N applies).
- f. Provide technical and technical report film coverage in conformity with Annex T.
- g. Schedule the inter-atoll movement of weapons and devices and provide required technical assistance to other task groups in connection with their responsibilities for such movements.
- h. Be responsible for the removal of all TG 7.1 personnel and necessary equipment from the shot site danger area.
- i. When directed by CJTF SEVEN, evacuate TG 7.1 personnel from BIKINI ATOLL.
- j. Be prepared, upon directive from CJTF SEVEN, to conduct emergency post shot evacuation of TG 7.1 personnel from ENINETCK ATOLL.
- k. Keep CJTF SEVEN informed on test and technical developments affecting the operational plan and military support requirements therefor.
- l. Prepare appropriate technical reports at the conclusion of each shot and the overall operation (Annex E applies).
- m. Provide CJTF SEVEN with a statement of preliminary test results at H plus 1, H plus 12 and H plus 72 hours.

OFFICIAL:

William S. Stewart Jr.
WILLIAM S. STEWART JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex G to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 3-51

ARMY TASK GROUP SUMMARY OF TASKS (TG 7.2)

The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the Army Task Group during the CASTLE on-site operational phase. CTG 7.2 will:

- a. Provide for the ground security of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS in accordance with Annex K, Hostile Action Alert Plan.
- b. Take measures to prevent unauthorized entry into exclusion areas, coordinating this activity with CTG 7.5.
- c. With certain transportation support furnished by TG 7.3 and TG 7.4, provide for the general surveillance of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS to insure against removal by unauthorized agents of significant samples from shot islands and to prevent unauthorized photography and trespassing.
- d. Deny entry of personnel into ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS to those individuals not appropriately cleared.
- e. Conduct liaison with CTG 7.5 to the end that his support requirements are met, particularly as they relate to security and stevedoring facilities.
- f. Provide and operate the overall military communications system for handling of all forward area task force inter-atoll and long-haul traffic (exclusive of air operations, air weather, internal naval communications and the TG 7.1 inter-atoll radio circuit).
- g. Continue to operate all base facilities at ENIWETOK ISLAND, except those specifically allocated to CTG 7.4 and CTG 7.5, in accordance with existing agreements.
- h. Conduct port and stevedoring operations at ENIWETOK ATOLL with stevedoring assistance made available by CTG 7.5 in accordance with existing agreements.
- i. Operate and maintain a TG 7.2 boat pool at ENIWETOK, taking cognizance of Annex P, Boat Plan.
- j. Provide support services for Headquarters, JTF SEVEN, as required. Contemplated requirements will include medical and mess personnel and equipment, transportation services, routine supply and administrative and housekeeping assistance.
- k. Provide monitoring and decontamination services indicated in Annex N, Radiological Safety.
- l. Be prepared, on order of CJTF SEVEN, to conduct emergency post-shot evacuation from ENIWETOK ATOLL of all personnel based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.
- m. With certain personnel augmentation from TG 7.4, provide logistic support for those elements of the joint task force based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.



Army Task Group Summary of Tasks
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

n Ship all equipment and material as it becomes surplus in accordance with instructions from CJTF SEVEN.

o Support TG 7.1 as directed by CJTF SEVEN.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

OFFICIAL:


WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex H to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3 53

NAVAL TASK GROUP SUMMARY OF TASKS (TG 7.3)

The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the Naval Task Group during the CASTLE on-site operational phase. CTG 7.3 will:

- a. Provide for the security of the ENIWETOK-BIKINI danger area by:
 - (1) Denying entry of unauthorized vessels and aircraft into the closed area in accordance with instructions to be issued at a later date.
 - (2) Maintaining a plot of ships and aircraft transiting the danger area.
 - (3) Providing a capability for rapid surface movement of ground defense forces between ENIWETOK and BIKINI in the event of emergency.
 - (4) When directed before each shot, patrol the significant sector out to 600 miles to detect, report and warn surface shipping.
- b. At BIKINI, operate a boat pool in accordance with Annex P, Boat Plan. Be prepared to operate the boat pool from other task force ships when the LSD is engaged in transportation of experimental weapons and devices.
- c. Provide an inter-atoll surface transportation system to support joint task force elements in the forward area. Annex P, Boat Plan, applies.
- d. Control harbor operations at ENIWETOK and BIKINI.
- e. Detail two (2) PBMs and required personnel to CTG 7.4 for operational control, to augment the ENIWETOK-BIKINI airlift system and to provide amphibious airlift services between ENIWETOK and BIKINI when required.
- ~~f. Provide transportation for limited air supply of weather stations, coordinating with CTG 7.4 as necessary.~~
- F. Provide shipboard assembly facilities for the experimental weapons and devices and limited laboratory, shop and office space for TG 7.1.
- G. As directed, transport the experimental weapons and devices and the necessary barges and associated personnel between and within ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS. Provide suitable escort in transit and conduct rehearsals of this activity as required.
- H. Operate a ship-to-shore and inter-island helicopter lift system at BIKINI to support pre-shot operations and post-shot flights for damage survey and recovery of scientific data. Be prepared to assist CTG 7.4 in the conduct of this activity at ENIWETOK upon conclusion of BIKINI operations. Annex Q applies.

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Naval Task Group Summary of Tasks
CTF SEVEN No. 3-53

- I** Provide space on the CVE for a mobile radiochemical laboratory, a photodensitometry trailer and the associated operations of the radiological safety unit of TG 7.1
- J** Assume responsibility for all aircraft decontamination at BIKINI ATOLL. Aircraft decontamination operations aboard the CVE will be accomplished without outside assistance, however, operations ashore at BIKINI will be conducted with assistance from CTG 7.1.
- K** Provide decontamination crews for TG 7.3 aircraft at ENIWETOK ATOLL. Limited assistance will be furnished by CTG 7.4 when required.
- L** Provide shipboard command, control and communications facilities for CTF SEVEN and staff, communications and electronics facilities for TG 7.3 aircraft control and command and administrative space for Headquarters, TG 7.1 and TG 7.5.
- M** Provide shipboard facilities to house elements of the joint task force when affiliated at BIKINI. Annex R applies.
- N** Provide capability for emergency post shot evacuation of personnel for less than 28 hours when pre-shot evacuation has not been conducted.
- O** Provide for radiological safety of embarked task force personnel during periods of alert.
- P** When facilities available, be prepared to provide alternate emergency communications channels for the joint task force.
- Q** Provide facilities and aerological personnel aboard the AGC for the task force weather central and facilities required by communications security monitoring personnel.
- R** Assist CTG 7.5 as required in positioning and mooring weapons barges and by providing standby support for moored barges in event of bad weather.
- S** Position, service and recover special buoyage systems and instrumentation for TG 7.1 projects.
- T** Assist in carrying out crater surveys as required by designated projects.
- U** Direct the movement of drone vessels during shot periods, in coordination with CTG 7.1, and be prepared to assist in large scale decontamination of these vessels and effects aircraft loaded thereon.
- V** Assist CTG 7.4 in search and rescue operations as required. Annex C applies.
- W** Provide one (1) BDE on station between ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS during the BIKINI shot phases to assist in the control of aircraft.
- X** Coordinate with CTG 7.4 in the integration of TG 7.3 aircraft into shot time aircraft positioning plans.

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Naval Task Group Summary of Tasks
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

- ✓ X Effect positive positioning control of TG 7.3 aircraft in shot areas in accordance with shot time positioning plans and in compliance with order issued from the joint task force air operations center, USS ESTES. *Assume control of shot area as necessary for air defense, alerting CTG 7.4 accordingly to permit removal of test aircraft from the area as needed.*
- aa. Provide CTG 7.2 with personnel augmentation as necessary to support TG 7.3 elements on ENIWETCK ISLAND.
- bb. Place and recover free-floating buoys used for pressure and fall-out measurements
- cc. Provide additional support for TG 7.1 as directed by CJTF SEVEN.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U S. Army
Commander

OFFICIAL

W. S. Cowart, Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART, Jr.
Colonel, U S Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO LC7 (HQS), 7/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
10 February 1954

Annex I to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 3-52

AIR FORCE TASK GROUP SUMMARY OF TASKS (TG 7.4)

The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the Air Force Task Group during the CASTLE on-site operational phase. CTG 7.4 will:

a. Provide, maintain and operate aircraft in support of the following scientific missions:

- (1) Cloud sampling and cloud tracking.
- (2) Measurements of blast, gust and thermal effect on aircraft.
- (3) Technical and technical report photography.
- (4) Airborne direction of sampling aircraft.

b. Conduct weather reconnaissance flights to provide joint task force weather central with required data. Annex M applies.

c. Operate joint task force weather stations at ENIWETOK, POKAPE, RONGERIK, MAJURO and KUSALE. Support, in accordance with approved agreement, certain TG 7.1 requirements at weather stations. Annex M applies.

d. Administer and logistically support the Joint Task Force Weather Central. Annex M applies.

e. Conduct resupply of weather islands utilizing FBM aircraft made available by CO, MAVSTAKMAJ.

f. Operate an inter-atoll air transportation system between ENIWETOK and BIKINI to include C-47 flights to Kwajalein and other atolls as required. Annex Q applies.

g. Operate an inter-island airlift system at ENIWETOK ATOLL, utilizing liaison aircraft and helicopters. Annex Q applies.

h. As required, detail helicopters and associated personnel to CTG 7.3 to augment the TG 7.3 inter-island airlift system at BIKINI.

i. Conduct administrative flights in connection with the joint task force mission and the maintenance of flying proficiency of rated joint task force personnel.

j. Provide search and rescue coverage in the forward area, assisted by CTG 7.3 and within cognizance of SAR area commander. Annex O applies.

k. Control and position flights for official observers as required by CJTF SEVEN.

l. Operate and maintain continuously an air operations control center on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

Air Force Task Group Summary of Tasks
CJTF SEVEN NO. 3-53

- m. Provide supervisory personnel for the joint task force air operations center aboard the AOC during shot phases.
- n. Provide senior naval aviator of TG 7.3 - Air Defense Element at ENIWETOK - with data and communications facilities to maintain air security of the ENIWETOK portion of the ENIWETOK-BIKINI area.
- o. Operate airdrome facilities on ENIWETOK ISLAND and BIKINI, except for FOL storage facilities at both locations.
- p. Provide and operate complete MATS terminal facilities at ENIWETOK, coordinating traffic management aspects of this activity with CTG 7.2.
- q. Provide Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) as required in support of joint task force operations.
- r. Prepare shot time aircraft positioning plans, coordinating with CTG 7.3 in the integration of TG 7.3 aircraft into the plans.
- s. During shot periods, assume overall positioning control of task force aircraft, other than security forces operating in shot areas. (Instructions to TG 7.3 test aircraft will be given through CTG 7.3 in the CVE.) In the event interception of unidentified aircraft becomes necessary in shot area, direct test aircraft to depart the area, passing control of the area to CTG 7.3 for the duration of the defensive effort.
- t. Provide CTG 7.2 with personnel augmentation necessary to support TG 7.4 at ENIWETOK ISLAND.
- u. Provide decontamination crews and facilities for TG 7.4 aircraft at ENIWETOK ATOLL and assist CTG 7.3 in aircraft decontamination as required.
- v. Assist TG 7.2 in emergency evacuation of personnel based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.
- w. Support TG 7.1 as directed by CJTF SEVEN.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

OFFICIAL:

W. S. Cowart, Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

1
2
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[REDACTED]

AEC Base Facilities Task Group Summary of Tasks
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

such personnel as necessary to support TC 7.1 and TC 7.5 elements afloat.

m. Provide support services for Headquarters, JTF SEVEN as required.

n. Continue to redeploy contractor personnel expeditiously, commensurate with progress of the construction program.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

OFFICIAL: •

W. S. Conant, Jr.
WILLIAM S. CONANT, JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

J-2

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex K to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

HOSTILE ACTION ALERT PLAN

Definitions: The following alert conditions are for use by the task force and should not be confused with CINCPAC alert conditions. Reports by ATCOM ENIWETOK to CINCPAC will conform with alert conditions as defined in Annex X and Z to CINCPAC General Emergency Operation Plan No. 11-53, dated 20 June 1953.

WHITE Alert, as employed in this plan, indicates that hostile action or attack on forward area installations is imminent and will occur within a period of time specified by ATCOM ENIWETOK.

RED Alert indicates that any one or all of the forward area positions are being subjected to hostile reconnaissance or attack.

Since this plan is designed to comply with CINCPAC General Emergency Operation Plan No. 11-53, CJTF SEVEN will be referred to as ATCOM ENIWETOK. In the absence of CJTF SEVEN, while the task force headquarters is in the forward area, the senior task force officer present will discharge the responsibilities of ATCOM ENIWETOK.

1. General Concept

In the event of an outbreak of general war during the on-site operational phase, the task force will continue toward the execution of its mission within the capability of the forces remaining available unless instructions to the contrary are received from the AEC and DOD. The purpose of this hostile action alert plan is to insure that Operation CASTLE will be conducted with a minimum threat from direct hostile interference or threat of capture by enemy of its critical supplies, material and key scientific personnel. This plan establishes those measures best suited to the defense of the BIKINI-ENIWETOK area and will become effective upon commencement of the operational phase. The premise upon which this plan is based is that any actual attack by an enemy would, in all probability, occur when the entire task force has been established in the forward area. The objective would then more appropriately warrant and reward the risk involved. Short of such an actual attack, hostile action would in all likelihood be limited to missions of reconnaissance nature. ATCOM ENIWETOK will command and, through his staff, coordinate the defense when major elements of the task force are involved.

The task force will be placed on WHITE and RED alerts in accordance with orders initiated by ATCOM ENIWETOK based on information secured from higher and adjacent commands or from local sources. When on a WHITE alert status, all task group commanders will prepare for RED alert conditions to the maximum extent possible in view of their primary tasks and missions. ATCOM ENIWETOK will suspend or modify existing security regulations regarding entry to islands north of ENIWETOK as required under the RED alert.

The ground defense of the atolls is at all times a function of CTG 7.2. The existence of his trained, organized and equipped combat security force gives him a small but highly mobile striking force capable of rapid movement by vessel and/or aircraft to any threatened island in either of the atoll areas. CTG 7.3 will

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provide the vessels necessary to transport the combat security force to threatened areas and will assume control of all boats and landing craft operated by CTG 7.5 during such an emergency and will provide ship gunfire support as practicable to assist in preventing enemy landings. CTG 7.4 will, through the employment of his liaison aircraft section, provide additional transportation, reconnaissance, maintenance of emergency communications and resupply, as appropriate. Naval aircraft, by reconnaissance over the ocean areas of the danger area, will provide timely detection and warning of hostile forces, deny entry to the danger area of all hostile aircraft and vessels, and, during the combat phase, provide close air support to the ground combat security force. The TG 7.2 combat security force will be augmented and reinforced by available military personnel from TG 7.1, TG 7.3 and TG 7.4.

Transient vessels and aircraft at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS will be utilized by ATCOM ENIWETOK in the best interest of the defense missions.

Consideration is given to the plan of evacuation of certain key scientific personnel and designated critical material in the event of timely and accurate warning under the provisions of a WHITE alert and the actual evacuation on order of ATCOM ENIWETOK under the provisions of a RED alert. This evacuation will be conducted by boat and/or aircraft as the situation requires. Total or partial evacuation of the task force from either or both atolls will be on order of ATCOM ENIWETOK only, and the methods of evacuation will be commensurate with the situation at the contemplated time of evacuation. Preparation for the destruction of scientific and military equipment to include critical material to preclude capture will be made on the initial warning of hostile action. Actual destruction will be carried out by order of ATCOM ENIWETOK only.

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Enemy forces in the event of general hostilities will be those of the Soviet Union and its eastern European and Asiatic satellites.

(2) Indigenous communist groups in anti-Soviet and neutral countries will support the Soviet bloc.

(3) The USSR and its satellites have given no indication of relaxing their drive toward world domination and are maintaining an advanced state of preparedness for war. The Soviet Union will probably not initiate overt warfare so long as other means are successful or unless it seems evident that the U.S. and its allies are becoming so strong as to prevent the further spread of Communism. For additional details see Annex C.

b. Friendly Forces. CINCPAC will:

(1) Defend the U.S. against attack through the Pacific Ocean.

(2) Maintain the security of the U.S. island positions and bases within the Pacific Command.

(3) Establish and maintain control of essential sea areas and protect sea and air communications.

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(4) Establish a convoy system and control and routing of shipping to include providing convoy air and surface escorts and air defense of convoys.

(5) Coordinate and conduct search and rescue operations, military control of air traffic, ocean weather operations and reconnaissance within the Pacific Command.

(6) Evacuate or assist in the evacuation of such U.S. nationals from areas within or adjacent to the Pacific Command as necessary or as directed.

Component commands of CINCPAC will provide forces to ATOM ENIWETOK to assist in defense and to maintain security as required.

2. Missions. In the event of hostile intervention or warning of war during the period the plan is in effect, ATOM ENIWETOK will:

(1) Maintain the status of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLL and their territorial waters as "closed areas".

(2) Prevent entry into the ENIWETOK-BIKINI danger zone of unauthorized vessels and aircraft within the capability of available forces.

(3) Deny entry of personnel into ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLL to those individuals not cleared for entry in accordance with ATOM instructions.

(4) Provide for general surveillance of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS to prevent unauthorized photography, trespassing and removal by unauthorized personnel of significant samples from such areas.

(5) Provide for internal security and passive air defense of activities and prevent or minimize subversion or sabotage within areas of responsibility.

(6) Control electronic emissions and surface lighting, permitting such operations as are essential and do not conflict with minimum active and passive defense measures.

(7) Keep CINCPAC informed of current situation.

(8) Take measures to minimize the effects of attack by all weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological and radiological).

(9) Postpone or discontinue all activities not essential to the defense of the area, protection of critical materials and devices and protection of key scientific personnel.

(10) Be prepared to evacuate or destroy all classified documents and materials as specified in Security Memorandum No. 6, CJTF SEVEN, dated 13 September 1953.

(11) Be prepared to evacuate key scientific personnel.

3. Tasks For Subordinate Units

a. The Commander, TG 7.1, in the event of a WHITE alert, will:

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(1) Designate those key personnel to be evacuated as appropriate in the best interests of the scientific efforts of the United States.

(2) Maintain key personnel, weapon and device components and critical test equipment in a state of readiness for immediate evacuation to the extent permitted by the situation at the time.

(3) Within means available, assist CTG 7.2 in the preparation for the defense of threatened areas.

(4) Maintain a list of TG 7.1 military personnel to be made available for the TG 7.2 combat security force.

b. The Commander, TG 7.1, in the event of a RTI alert, will:

(1) On order of ATCOM ENHETOK, assist in the immediate evacuation of those designated personnel whose evacuation is in the best interest of the scientific efforts of the United States.

(2) Assist CTG 7.2 in the emergency loading of weapons and defense of threatened areas.

(3) As directed by ATCOM ENHETOK, remove or destroy atomic weapons components and critical test equipment, assisted by CTG 7.2, CTG 7.3, CTG 7.4 and CTG 7.5.

(4) Release designated TG 7.1 military personnel to the TG 7.2 combat security force.

c. The Commander, TG 7.2, in the event of a MIST alert, will:

(1) Make necessary adjustment of atoll security forces to provide maximum physical defense of the ENHETOK-BIKINI ATOLL against overt acts and landing parties commensurate with the means and latest information available.

(2) Be prepared to move ground defense units either by water or air transportation to the scene of any enemy threat within the danger area.

(3) Prepare and approve appropriate field fortifications in the area or island considered to be most susceptible to attack.

(4) Conduct final coordination with ATCOM ENHETOK and other task group commanders as required for implementation of these defense measures.

(5) Prepare for the evacuation or destruction of classified documents as specified in Security Memorandum No. 6, HQ, JCP SEVEN, dated 13 September 1953.

(6) Be prepared to assist CTG 7.1 in the immediate removal or destruction of atomic weapons components and critical test equipment.

d. The Commander, TG 7.2, in the event of a REF alert, will:

(1) Initiate the appropriate tactical disposition of his defense forces, disperse threatened critical classes of supply and physically occupy previously constructed fortifications for the defense of

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Hostile Action Alert Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

any critical threatened island.

(2) Defend ENIWETOK ATOLL, particularly ENIWETOK, PARRY and shot islands, from hostile attack with combat security force and, on order of ATCOM ENIWETOK, move to BIKINI ATOLL by vessel and/or aircraft in event that atoll is threatened.

(3) Assist CTG 7.1 in the immediate removal or destruction of atomic weapon components and critical test equipment in threatened area.

(4) Resist and counter-attack enemy forces until the threat is resolved or until orders are issued by ATCOM ENIWETOK to the contrary.

e. The Commander, TG 7.3, in the event of a WHITE alert, will:

(1) Be prepared to implement the conditions of a RED alert.

(2) Maintain strict surveillance of the danger area to detect and report the location and movement of hostile forces and their probable direction of attack

(3) Deny entry to the danger area to all unauthorized vessels

(4) Prepare to assist CTG 7.2 in the defense of the ENIWETOK - BIKINI ATOLLS through the use of naval aircraft in close support and intercept missions where feasible.

(5) Provide necessary surface vessels to transport the TG 7.2 combat security force to threatened areas.

(6) Through coordination with CTG 7.4, prepare to augment the airlift capability of TG 7.4 in accomplishment of his missions as outlined below

(7) Be prepared to assist CTG 7.1 in the disposition of critical materials and equipment where required.

(8) Prepare to evacuate key personnel designated by ATCOM ENIWETOK by ship and to disperse ships with escorts

f. The Commander, TG 7.3, in the event of a RED alert, will:

(1) Defend ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS from attack by enemy vessels and protect sea lines of communication in the danger area.

(2) Assist in the evacuation of key personnel when such evacuation is ordered by ATCOM ENIWETOK. Coordinate evacuation with other task groups.

(3) Deny entry to danger area of all unauthorized vessels.

(4) Assist CTG 7.2 in the defense of atolls through the destruction of enemy aircraft and vessels.

(5) Transport the TG 7.2 combat security force to threatened areas as required.

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Hostile Action Alert Plan
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(6) Augment the TG 7.4 airlift capability as required.

(7) Coordinate with and assist ground units by naval gunfire, air support and disruption of enemy ship to shore activities in the event of hostile amphibious action.

(8) Disperse ships when directed by ATCOM ENIWETOK.

(9) Assist CTG 7.1 in the disposition of critical materials and equipment where required.

g. The Commander, TG 7.4, in the event of a WHITE alert, will:

(1) Prepare to furnish sufficient airlift in the forward area to evacuate key personnel, atomic weapons components and critical test equipment as designated by CTG 7.1.

(2) Assist CTG 7.2 wherever possible in defensive measures by providing personnel for defense, loading of vessels and construction of shelters and field fortifications.

(3) Provide an airlift capability for movement of the TG 7.2 combat security force from ENIWETOK ATOLL to BIKINI ATOLL in the event of a threat at BIKINI.

(4) Assist CTG 7.3 in the detection, location and movement of any hostile force in the danger area.

h. The Commander, TG 7.4, in the event of a RED alert, will:

(1) Provide airlift for evacuation of previously designated personnel, critical weapons components and critical test equipment as designated by CTG 7.1.

(2) Assist in the defense of the atoll through the utilization of liaison aircraft and helicopters for evacuation, resupply of ammunition to ground defense units and conduct of aerial reconnaissance.

(3) Provide CTG 7.2 with ENIWETOK based personnel for ground defense, loading of vessels, construction of hasty fortifications and shelters and on order of ATCOM ENIWETOK the destruction of military installations.

(4) On order of ATCOM ENIWETOK, move the TG 7.2 combat security force from ENIWETOK ATOLL to BIKINI ATOLL.

i. The Commander, TG 7.5, in the event of a WHITE alert, will:

(1) Assist CTG 7.1 in maintaining weapons and device components and critical equipment in a state of readiness for immediate evacuation to the extent permitted by the existing situation.

(2) Consistent with means available, assist CTG 7.2 in the preparation for defense of threatened areas.

(3) Prepare to assist other task groups in the emergency loading of vessels.

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Hostile Action Alert Plan
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J. The Commander, TG 7.5, in the event of a RED alert, will:

- (1) Assist CTG 7.1 in the evacuation or disposal of weapon and device components and critical test equipment.
- (2) Assist CTG 7.2 in the defense of threatened areas consistent with means available.
- (3) Assist other task groups in the emergency loading of vessels.

x. All task groups will:

- (1) Prepare a detailed hostile action alert plan, complying with instructions contained herein, and forward copy to this headquarters not later than 7 January 1954.
- (2) Comply with the provisions of Appendix I as conditions are announced by ATCOM ENIWETOK.
- (3) Comply with the provisions of Security Memorandum No 6, Hqs, JTF SEVEN, dated 13 September 1953, in the evacuation or destruction of classified documents.

4. Administration and Logistics See CJTF SEVEN Administrative Order for Operation CASTLE (CJTF SEVEN No 2-53).

5. Communications Annex L applies

a. In the event of hostile action the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 Division, Hqs, JTF SEVEN, will immediately assume operational control of all task force communication facilities. With task group coordination, all existing atomic test communication facilities will be converted to tactical communication requirements. Minimum tactical communication requirements will be included in task group hostile action alert plans. See Annex L for additional details.

b. See Appendix I for control of electronic radiation and surface lighting.

c. Command Posts

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>BIKINI PHASE</u>	<u>ENIWETOK PHASE</u>
CJTF SEVEN (ATCOM)	USS ESTES (AGC-12)	PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.1	USS ESTES (AGC-12)	PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.2	ENIWETOK ISLAND	ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.3	USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	PARRY ISLAND or CVE
CTG 7.4	USS ESTES (AGC-12)	ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.5	USS ESTES (AGC-12)	PARRY ISLAND


P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander


Hostile Attack Alert Plan
CCIP SEVEN No. 7-53

Appendix

I - Control of Electronic Radiation and Surface Lighting

OFFICIAL


WILLIAM S. COWART, Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Appendix K to Annex K
Hostile Action Alert Plan, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No 3-53

CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC RADIATION AND SURFACE LIGHTING

1. This appendix provides procedures for the curtailment of non-essential radio, electronic and lighting services on ENIWETOK ATOLL.
2. Assumptions
 - a. Enemy forces will rely primarily on celestial and/or radar means for navigation but electronic emissions and surface lighting could be used to increase the accuracy of attack.
 - b. The extent of control of electronics emissions will be such as to satisfy the following conditions:
 - (1) Degree of protection to be gained must be greater than the cost of controls.
 - (2) Controls will be imposed on all types of non-essential emissions.
 - c. The importance of blackout, dimout and camouflage has been reduced by the developments in electronics devices and bombing techniques so that total blackout is no longer justified.
 - d. The geographical and meteorological characteristics of the island positions tend to nullify the effects of electronic and surface lighting deception.
3. Concept of Control
 - a. Upon announcement of the following conditions by ATCCM ENIWETOK, all task group commanders will:
 - (1) WHITE ALERT
 - (a) Lighting: After outbreak of general hostilities, place into effect dimout conditions based upon the following criteria:
 1. Lighting needed for maximum productive and operational efficiency should be retained.
 2. Lights exposed to the sky or seaward and capable of creating skyglow or of silhouetting vessels should be dimmed seventy five (75) percent.
 3. Street and other exterior lighting should be extinguished, reduced or shielded to the minimum needed for safety
 4. Blackout curtain will not be required other than to meet the requirements outlined in the foregoing.
 - (b) Electronic Services: Normal wartime controls.
 - (c) Maritime Navigational Aids (other than electronic): As determined by CINCPACFLT and CCGDFOURTEEN.

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Control of Electronic Radiation and Surface Lighting
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

(2) RED ALERT

(a) Lighting. Reduce lighting to the minimum consistent with safety in the dispatching of personnel and equipment involved in active or passive defense measures

(b) Electronic Services: Shut down all non-essential electronic services except key electronic air and maritime navigational aids

(c) Maritime Navigational Aids (other than electronic). Extinguish all except designated key aids

(3) More stringent conditions may be imposed by CINCPAC as the situation becomes more critical. Such conditions could result in

(a) All non-essential electronic services being shut down. Key electronics air navigational aids would then be operated as required by the Air Defense Control Center (CTG 7.3). Key electronic maritime navigational aids would be operated only as required by CINCPACFLT.

(b) All maritime navigational aids (other than electronic) being extinguished except those required by CINCPACFLT.

4. Reports by ATCON ENWETOK will be made in conformity with Annex X to CINCPAC General Emergency Operation Plan No. 11-53, dated 20 June 1953
5. Each task group commander will submit his determination of key aids and essential services to this headquarters. This will accompany the task group alert plan

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U S Army
Commander

OFFICIAL:

W. S. Cowart Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex L to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

COMMUNICATIONS

1. General Remarks

a. The objectives of the basic plan are to:

(1) Conduct tests, commencing in January 1954, of weapons and experimental devices in the ENIWEKOK-BIKINI area to include technical and measurement programs proposed by the AEC and DOD.

(2) To provide for the security of the joint task force plus ENIWEKOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.

b. This annex establishes the policies and general plans for the installation, maintenance and operation of communication-electronic facilities of Joint Task Force SEVEN. Further information concerning communication-electronic facilities of task groups will be found in the operation orders of the task groups.

2. Statement of the Situation. On 21 May 1952, the JCS designated the Chief of Staff, U S. Army as Executive Agent for an overseas atomic test operation (Operation CASTLE) and assigned the mission of the execution of CASTLE to the Commander, Joint Task Force 132. On 1 February 1953, JTF 132 was administratively redesignated as Joint Task Force SEVEN (JTF SEVEN) with no change in the previously assigned mission of conducting Operation CASTLE.

a. Enemy Situation. The Soviet Union has the following capabilities which may affect the accomplishment of our communication - electronic mission.

(1) Monitoring or Intercept. All low, medium and high frequency radio circuits are subject to constant intercept from fixed land positions or possibly from ships, aircraft or submarines. In the same manner and under favorable atmospheric conditions, VHF transmissions also are susceptible to active Soviet monitoring.

(2) Jamming. Although it is not expected that the Soviets will take aggressive action to interfere with task force communication-electronic operations, they have demonstrated their capabilities in HF jamming. There also are indications that they are prepared to jam in the VHF/UHF bands.

(3) Other Interference. In addition, it is considered that interference with the communication-electronic mission or compromise of its activities could be affected by espionage, sabotage, overt action by vessel or aircraft, raids, observations, unauthorized instrumentation and declaration of war.

b. Friendly Situation. The following activities, outside the task force, will furnish communication-electronic support as indicated.

(1) National Security Agency (NSA) - will provide experimental AFSAY 804 (x) ciphony equipment for the USS EJTES firing party circuit.

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(2) Navy Security Agency (NSA) will provide a communications security unit for monitoring task force traffic in the ENIWETOK - BIKINI area.

(3) USAF Security Service will provide special SCMs (SAMSON) synchronous mixer/maintenante personnel and equipment required for principal task force radioteletype circuits.

(4) Primary Relay Station (JRF) OAHU, T.H. will be the principal relay facility for task force traffic to and from air task groups to and from the ENIWETOK BIKINI area.

(5) Major Relay Station (JRF) KWAJALEIN, M.I. will be the principal relay facility for air task group traffic to and from the ENIWETOK BIKINI area, will also provide an alternate relay facility for other task force traffic.

(6) Communication Center (JNF) LAS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO will provide an alternate relay facility for task force traffic destined for ZI addressees.

3. Guiding Principles

a. No radio circuit or telephone circuit having a radio link is approved for transmission of classified information in the clear.

b. All TOP SECRET and RESTRICTED DATA traffic will be enciphered off-line prior to transmission.

c. Code names will not be assigned to individuals. The use of personal names on voice radio circuits is authorized.

d. All messages for transmission to addressees outside the ENIWETOK-BIKINI operational area will be routed through the Joint Relay Center, ENIWETOK, except ~~messages to be transmitted over normal Navy circuits.~~

(1) Unauthorized entry, contact and amplifying reports which may be transmitted over normal Navy circuits.

Emergency or
(2) Routine administrative messages not concerned with Operation CASTLE which may be transmitted over normal Navy circuits.

(3) Traffic between CTG 7.3 and VP 29 Detachment, KWAJALEIN.

(4) Traffic between CTG 7.4 and the weather island detachments.

(5) Unclassified traffic (i.e., weather, aircraft movement) between AACS, KWAJALEIN and AACS Detachment, ENIWETOK.

(6) Intra-task group operational traffic.

(7) ~~Emergency traffic which cannot be delivered to the Joint Relay Center because of circuit failure.~~

(8) Other traffic as directed by CJTF SEVEN.

Commanders are responsible that communication security is observed at all times.

Communications
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

- e. Personal message service as outlined in COI 29-2, will be available to all personnel in the ENIWETOK BIKINI area
- f. Radioteletype facilities will be used in lieu of voice radio whenever practicable for communication security reasons.
- g. Since the new phonetic alphabet (alpha, bravo, caca, etc.) is not being used by all Services, the old phonetic alphabet (able, baker, charlie, etc.) will be used during CASTLE
- h. COIs issued by this headquarters will supplement instructions contained herein
- i. No cover or deception plan is to be employed except for deception offered by the reconnaissance and for such traffic security as is provided by the use of SIGTOT SAMP-N equipment on RATT circuits
- j. No requirements for radio silence are imposed on Joint Task Force SEVEN radio circuits. Commanders of task groups may impose radio silence as required for accomplishment of their mission.

4. Operational Concept, Capabilities and Limitations of the Basic and Communication Plans

- a. Task Force Operations Operation CASTLE will be conducted on both ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS which are approximately 180 miles apart. ENIWETOK ATOLL will be the base of operations irrespective of the scope of activities at BIKINI ATOLL. Joint task force and task group headquarters, except TG 7.3, will be located at ENIWETOK ATOLL with commanders and key operations staff personnel moving to BIKINI so as to be on site two (2) days before and one (1) day after each shot. Headquarters TG 7.3, will be located on PARRY ISLAND until about one week prior to the first shot. Thereafter, it will be located afloat in and the CVE unless otherwise directed. Administrative and Logistics staffs will remain on ENIWETOK ATOLL. The Air Force Task Group will be based on ENIWETOK ISLAND. The P2V patrol squadron of TG 7.3 will be based at ENAJALEIN for maintenance and will stage patrol missions through ENIWETOK ISLAND. During shots and rehearsals command of joint task force air operations will be exercised through the CIC of the command ship. The joint task force air controllers will also control movement of TG 7.4 aircraft and the movements of other aircraft as may be appropriate
- b. Affect on Communications Operations over such widely dispersed areas, as well as control of operations from both ashore and afloat, make reliable and efficient communications a mandatory requirement.
- c. Types of Communication Facilities A limited number of submarine cable telephone circuits will be maintained and operated by Task Group 7.5 to inter-connect islands of the ENIWETOK ATOLL and to inter-connect islands of BIKINI ATOLL. Maximum use should be made of these facilities to meet communication needs within each atoll because of the communication security afforded by wire facilities. However, the limited number of cable facilities, wide dispersion of operations and work parties and the number of aircraft and ships involved will require extensive use of medium (MF), high (HF) and very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF)

radio equipment between ENEWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS. The use of VHF radio equipment will be kept to a minimum for security reasons and will be closely controlled. Whenever possible, radio teletype circuits will be used for long distance radio communications beyond the range of VHF equipment. Automatic on-line encryption normally will be used in conjunction with such facilities except where off-line encryption is necessary to meet security requirements. Considerable numbers of VHF radio equipment will be used. IT IS MANDATORY THAT CLASSIFIED MATTERS NOT BE DISCUSSED OVER ANY RADIO CIRCUIT OPERATING BETWEEN ENEWETOK AND BIKINI ATOLLS.

d. Security and Accuracy. Particular attention will be given to security of communications and to speed and accuracy in handling message traffic.

e. Joint Relay Center. All organizations within the Pacific Province should utilize services of a permanent relay-cryptic center at ENEWETOK, installed, operated and maintained by TG 7.3. Tributary stations serviced by this relay center will include Hqs, JTF SEVEN, TG 7.2, TG 7.1 (off-shore) TG 7.4 and others as required. Headquarters, JTF SEVEN communications center (PAPY ISLAND) will protect for TG 7.1, TG 7.2 and COM 7.3 (off-shore). In addition, routine naval administrative communications will be handled through established naval communication facilities.

f. Secure Circuit. Cryptic Center, ENEWETOK, will be cryptic guard for all above mentioned tributary stations except TG 7.2 (off-shore) and also TG 7.1 (off-shore) traffic. Radio teletype circuits between the following points will be available: communications between major forward and rear echelon task force elements and will be operated with ON LINE encryption, using SIGTOT and PAMSON (synchronous mixer) for teletype traffic up to and including SECRET.

<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
ENEWETOK - CANE (VHF)	Full Dux (1)
ENEWETOK - BIKINI	Full Dux (1)
PAPY ISLAND - BIKINI (off-shore circuit)	Full Dux (1)
ENEWETOK - WAKALEIN	Full Dux (1)
ENEWETOK - US ISLANDS	Full Dux (1)
ENEWETOK - AGC (USS BATES)	Full Dux (1)

ALL TOP SECRET and RESTRICTED DATA traffic will be enciphered off-line prior to transmission. This is necessary to meet AEC requirements and because terminal communication personnel are not in all instances TOP SECRET or "C" cleared.

g. A full duplex off-line SIGTOT circuit will be operated between the USS BATES and Joint Relay Center, ENEWETOK.

h. Telecon Facilities. Telecon facilities will be available at Headquarters, JTF SEVEN (PAPY ISLAND). Requests for this service will be submitted in accordance with COM 7.3-1.

i. Local Telephone Facilities. Wire telephone facilities cleared for conversation up to and including SECRET will be available at:

- (1) ENEWETOK ISLAND (400 line dial exchange with connecting service to other islands of ENEWETOK ATOLL)

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(2) BIKINI ATOLL (connecting service between necessary islands of BIKINI ATOLL).

(3) PARRY ISLAND (270 line manual with connecting service to other islands of ENIWETOK ATOLL).

(4) Six pair telephone cables are installed to the following buoys:

<u>ENIWAN ISLAND</u>	<u>PARRY ISLAND</u>	<u>ENIWETOK ISLAND</u>
LSD Mooring	B-1	M-3
CVE Mooring		L-2
AOC Mooring		L-4
Crash Boat Mooring		Crash Boat Mooring Buoy

j) VHF Radio Backup VHF radio relay equipment will be provided at key points as a backup for wire and cable telephone facilities but communications will be limited to unclassified conversations and message traffic when such facilities are in use. TELEPHONE OPERATORS WILL INFORM TELEPHONE USERS IN ALL CASES WHEN CALLS ARE ROUTED OVER VHF RADIO RELAY FACILITIES AND USERS WILL BE INFORMED THAT CONVERSATIONS MUST BE CONFINED TO UNCLASSIFIED MATTERS

k) HF Voice Radio Circuits Long distance and inter-atoll radio facilities using HF equipment will be limited to those authorized by CJTF SEVEN. All voice radio circuits will be limited to UNCLASSIFIED matter and the users will be held responsible for security violations. Task group commanders will be responsible that such facilities are used properly and in accordance with security requirements. Voice radio circuits will be closely monitored. Radio teletype or CW facilities will be used in lieu of voice radio whenever practicable. The following long distance voice radio circuits will be available on a closely controlled basis between the following points:

(1) ENIWETOK/PARRY - BIKINI ATOLL (controlled by CJTF SEVEN).

(2) TG 7.1 PARRY - BIKINI ATOLL (controlled by CTG 7.1).

(3) ENIWETOK - BIKINI ATOLL - FWAJALEIN (controlled by TG 7.4 for the control of air movement traffic only).

(4) AOC ENIWETOK - CIC USS ESTES (controlled by TG 7.4 for air operations)

l. ESTES-Firing Party Ciphony Voice Circuit. A two way VHF voice radio circuit with voice security equipment cleared for conversations up to and including TOP SECRET will be available between the USS ESTES and the firing party on shore.

5. Communications-Electronics Mission Communication elements of JTF SEVEN and supporting agencies will provide all essential communications to insure the successful accomplishment of the mission of JTF SEVEN and subordinate elements. Such communications will provide maximum security, reliability, accuracy, speed of service and flexibility consistent with existing technical and logistic capabilities.

6. Assignment of Communication Responsibilities

a. Mission, J-5 Division, Headquarters, JTF SEVEN

- (1) Coordinate overall task force communications and electronics activities
- (2) Assign and control all radio frequencies, call signs, address groups and routing indicators.
- (3) Maintain operational control of the communications security monitoring unit. Prepare for CJTF SEVEN reports of security violations
- (4) Operate communications center and crypto facilities at Hqs, JTF SEVEN, Washington 25, D C
- (5) Control utilization of teleconferencing facilities in the ENIWETOK BIKINI area
- (6) Prepare Headquarters, JTF SEVEN telephone directory.
- (7) Prepare and distribute COIs (Communication Operation Instructions).
- (8) Provide for operation and maintenance of terminal VHF ciphony facilities (USS ESTES ^{ENY 14} ~~Firing Party~~)
- (9) Control distribution of available SIGTOT-SAMSON equipment and tapes to meet operational requirements of the task force.
- (10) Maintain a transmission security training program for all users of voice radio facilities and a message drafter improvement program to insure most efficient use of limited operational communication facilities.
- (11) Prepare and distribute to all task groups the Operation CASTLE Joint Authentication System (AFSAL 5369).

b. Scientific Task Group (TG 7.1)

- (1) Operate and maintain special electronic and communications equipment required by the Scientific Task Group; this to include E G. & G. terminal equipment at PARRY and ENYU for the TG 7.1 HF duplex voice and RATT circuits.
- (2) Initiate voice-time broadcast for all elements of the task force.

c. Army Task Group (TG 7.2)

- (1) Operate and maintain relay center, ENIWETOK.
- (2) Operate and maintain communications centers for Hqs, JTF SEVEN (PARRY ISLAND), Hqs, TG 7.2 (ENIWETOK ISLAND) and in support of AEC operations at BIKINI ATOLL
- (3) Provide crypto guard facilities for Hqs, JTF SEVEN, TG 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5 and for other than intra TG 7.3 (ashore) traffic.

Communications

CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

The Commander, TG 7.3 will provide crypto facilities for Navy traffic transmitted and received over CTG 7.3 CW Common Net

(4) Operate and maintain all land based communications facilities required at ENIWETOK ATOLL except:

- (a) Task Group 7.4 internal communications.
- (b) Task Group 7.3 internal communications.
- (c) Telephone plant on islands other than ENIWETOK.
- (d) Inter-island and buoy cable systems.
- (e) Special facilities required by TG 7.1 and TG 7.5.
- (f) Inter-atoll radio facilities of TG 7.1.

(5) Operate and maintain backup facilities for:

- (a) The ENIWETOK-PARRY submarine cable circuits
- (b) The ENINMAN-ENYU submarine cable keying circuits.
- (c) Buoy cable circuits at ENIWETOK and BIKINI
- (d) On-line SIGTOT-SAMSON facilities at relay center, ENIWETOK and communications centers at PARRY ISLAND and BIKINI ATOLL, using standard teletypewriter equipment.

(6) Operate and maintain ENYU terminal facilities for the USS ESTES - ~~firing party~~ VHF cipher link. Be prepared to move, upon order of CJTF SEVEN, equipment and operations to PARRY ISLAND.

(7) Operate and maintain HF radio terminal facilities at ENYU for use on the ENIWETOK-BIKINI RATT duplex circuit.

(8) Operate and maintain theater facilities at ENIWETOK ISLAND and maintain motion picture projection facilities at PARRY ISLAND and BIKINI ATOLL.

(9) Operate a crystal grinding facility for emergency production of crystals for all elements of the task force.

(10) Furnish emergency power for communications facilities provided by TG 7.2, to include the joint transmitter building.

(11) Operate a battery charging plant for the maintenance of storage batteries.

(12) Provide maintenance for Special Service radio broadcast station WKLE and Special Service radio receivers.

(13) Provide personnel and equipment to operate and maintain Hqs, JTF SEVEN teleconferencing facilities on PARRY ISLAND.

(14) Provide a send circuit from Hqs, JTF SEVEN Communications Center (PARRY ISLAND) to central receiving point in Building 208-209, PARRY ISLAND, for delivery of teletype traffic for TG 7.1 and

TG 7.5.

(15) Provide such other electronic facilities, the operation and maintenance of which are normally considered a responsibility of the Signal Corps, which are within the capabilities of personnel and equipment available.

d. Naval Task Group (TG 7.3)

(1) Provide internal task group communications to include facilities for transmission of contact and amplifying reports and traffic of an administrative nature only between CTG 7.3 and the Navy commands and with naval operating forces not directly concerned with CASTLE.

(2) Provide space aboard USS ESTES for housing and operations of one (1) officer and six (6) enlisted men of the communications security monitoring detachment from approximately D-2 thru D+1.

(3) Operate and maintain shipboard command and control communications facilities for CJTF SEVEN and staff afloat to include on-line SIGTOT-SANSON facilities from the USS ESTES to Relay Center, ENIWETOK. Be prepared to provide, upon request of CJTF SEVEN, communications for CJTF SEVEN to Primary Relay Station, Pearl Harbor (RHF).

(4) Operate and maintain off-line SIGTOT facilities from Hqs, TG 7.3 afloat (CVE) to Relay Center, ENIWETOK.

(5) Provide radio teletype facilities to major relay stations at GCHU (UHF) and KWAJALEIN (JHK) in case of emergency evacuation of ENIWETOK ATOLL.

(6) Provide and operate electronic facilities for the detection of possible undesirable surface and underwater activity within the ENIWETOK area.

(7) Provide communications facilities required by the Joint Task Force Weather Central aboard the AGC.

(8) Provide standard teletype backup for ships using on-line SIGTOT-SANSON facilities.

(9) Provide communications and electronics facilities required for air control purposes in the CIC aboard the AGC.

(10) Provide and operate communication center and crypto guard facilities at Hqs, TG 7.3 ashore for internal task group communications.

(11) Provide communications facilities, including operation of a radio beacon, required for air control purposes aboard the control (homing) DDE.

e. Air Force Task Group (TG 7.4)

(1) Operate and maintain internal task group communications to include weather, aircraft movement, air-ground, air-air navigational communications and communications center (less code room)

serving as a tributary of Relay Center, ENIWETOK Telephone service on ENIWETOK will be provided by TG 7.2.

(2) Provide two channels of ENIWETOK-KWAJALEIN MUX circuit to Hqs, JTF SEVEN for termination in Relay Center, ENIWETOK.

(3) Operate and maintain communications facilities for AOC on ENIWETOK ISLAND and provide communications personnel as required for AOC aboard the command ship.

(4) Provide communications personnel as required for operation of task force weather central aboard the command ship.

(5) Provide airborne VHF simplex radio relay facilities for VHF radio relay between BIKINI and ENIWETOK ATOLLS.

f. AEC Base Facilities Task Group (TG 7.5)

(1) Operate and maintain telephone systems, except on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

(2) Provide and maintain wire circuits in the inter-island and buoy cable systems to meet timing telemetering and communications requirements of the scientific programs and to meet operational and administrative communications requirements of Hqs, JTF SEVEN.

(3) Operate and maintain the LOS ALAMOS terminal of the ENIWETOK-LOS ALAMOS RATT circuit.

(4) Provide alternate 21 relay facilities from Communications Center, LOS ALAMOS, for forward area task force traffic during operational periods.

(5) Operate and maintain TG 7.5 communication-electronic equipment and with the assistance of TG 7.2, military type radio equipment required for use by TG 7.1 and 7.5.

(6) Operate and maintain TG 7.5 boat pool communications facilities.

(7) Operate motion picture facilities at BIKINI and ENIWETOK ATOLLS (excluding those on ENIWETOK ISLAND).

(8) Prepare and distribute a consolidated atoll telephone directory in accordance with JTF SEVEN COI item 40-1.

(9) Provide a central receiving point for traffic (except TOP SECRET and RESTRICTED DATA) for TG 7.1 and TG 7.5 received from Hqs, JTF SEVEN Communications Center (PARRY ISLAND).

g. All Task Groups

(1) Submit telephone directory and subsequent changes thereto in accordance with JTF SEVEN COI item No. 40-1.

(2) Maintain a transmission security training program for all users of voice radio facilities and a message drafter improvement

**COMMUNICATIONS
COTF SEVEN NS**

program to insure the efficient use of limited operational communication facilities.

(3) Frequencies to be requested through J-5 Division, Hqs. JTF SEVEN. Also report to JTF SEVEN any interference problems to this same division.

(4) Before each shot and each rehearsal, test all communication facilities and circuits to be employed during the shot to insure their satisfactory operation.

(5) As indicated in paragraph 7, COI 10.3, task groups may submit requirements for additional COIs desired to Assistant Chief of Staff, JTF SEVEN.

(6) For those copies of SECDEF and Joint Authentication System necessary to carry out the above and/or activities.

7. Special Measures and Procedures

a. COI. Similar to the current issue with the current issue of COTF SEVEN. Refer to the current issue of Instructions (COI).

b. Time. The use of AM and FM will be eliminated within this command.

(1) Time for forward area activities.

(2) When using the time group for outgoing messages, JANAF 100 will be used for Greenwich Civil (ZEBRA) time for the purpose.

c. Weather. Weather communications available to the command.

(1) ENI

(a) Direct circuit between Weather Central or ENIWETOK and weather aircraft. (b) ENI MAJURO, PONAPE and KUSAIE.

(1) Direct circuit between Weather Central and weather aircraft.

(2) Direct circuit between weather central and weather aircraft.

(3) RETT

(a) Intercept of Pacific broadcasts.

(1) Direct circuit between weather aircraft between Weather Central, ENIWETOK and Weather Central, USS ESTES.

(2) YONGE

(a) Direct circuit between Weather Central, ENIWETOK and weather aircraft.

(b) Direct circuit between Weather Central, USS ESTES and weather aircraft.

END



(4) Facsimile. Intercept of Pacific-Weather Fox in ENIWETOK and USS ESTES weather centrals.

d. Special Communication Relay Information

(1) Upon approval of the supervisor at UWPJA, AEC Communication Center (UWPJA), LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO, will act as a relay point for traffic encrypted at point of origin (Relay Center, ENIWETOK).

(2) Task force traffic destined for KIRTLAND AFB, NEW MEXICO, (JWPKD) will be routed through SACOMNET facilities within the ZI.

(3) Direct on-line teletype service will be provided from Primary Relay Station (UHP) to Hqs, USARPAC (UHPB) and CINCPAC/CINCPAC-FLT (BHPB).

e. Search and Rescue. Communications for search and rescue will be provided in accordance with "Search and Rescue Joint Standard Operating Procedure, Pacific"; JANAP 300, The Air-Sea Rescue Manual, and JANAP 107, Joint Emergency Rescue Communication Procedure.

f. Jamming or Interference. Any jamming or serious interference should be reported immediately to the J-5 Division, Hqs, JTF SEVEN by the most expeditious means. In emergencies, such reports may be made over available VHF circuits or over the local ship-shore CW circuit (2836 kcs), using encrypted message.

8. Communications-Electronic Logistics Support

a. Logistics Support. Communications-electronics units and sections of this command will receive logistics support as indicated in CJTF SEVEN Administrative Order No. 2-53.

b. Standard Equipment. Each task group is responsible for providing logistic support for communications-electronic equipment procured or supplied by its respective Service. Sufficient spare parts will be maintained on hand to insure successful completion of the mission.

c. Non-Standard Equipment. Requests for communications-electronic supplies or equipment to be supplied by another Service or equipment non-standard to any of the military services requiring the use of task force funds will be submitted to Hqs, JTF SEVEN for approval.

d. Crystals. Each task group will procure crystals through normal channels so far as possible. Task Group 7.2 will operate a crystal grinding facility for emergency production of crystals for all elements of the task force. Task group communications officers desiring special crystals ground will submit requests for such crystals to the J-5 Division, Hqs, JTF SEVEN.

9. Administration. Joint task force and task group headquarters, except CTG 7.3, will be located at ENIWETOK ATOLL with commanders and key operations staff personnel moving to BIKINI so as to be on site two (2) days before and one (1) day after each shot. Hqs, TG 7.3 will be located on PARRY ISLAND until about one week prior to the first shot. Thereafter, it will be located afloat on board the CVE, unless otherwise directed. Administrative and logistic staffs

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Communications
CJTF SEVEN No 3-53

will remain on ENIWETOK ATOLL. The Commander, JTF SEVEN, task group commanders and key operations staff personnel will be located as follows:

	<u>DURING BIKINI SHOTS</u> <u>(D-2 to D plus 1)</u>	<u>AT OTHER TIMES</u>
CJTF SEVEN	AGC	PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.1	AGC	PARRY ISLAND
CTG 7.2	ENIWETOK ISLAND	ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.3	CVE	PARRY ISLAND or CVE
CTG 7.4	AGC	ENIWETOK ISLAND
CTG 7.5	AGC	PARRY ISLAND
Rear Echelon, Hqs JTF SEVEN	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.	WASH. 25, D. C.
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory	LOS ALAMOS, N. MEX.	LOS ALAMOS, N. MEX.
CTG 7.1, Rear Echelon	LOS ALAMOS, N. MEX.	LOS ALAMOS, N. MEX.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Appendix

- I - Principal Task Force HF Radio Circuits
- II - VHF Voice Radio Circuits, Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls
- III - JTF SEVEN Teletype Network

OFFICIAL:

for *Ellis J. Melton Jr.*
Capt. USAF
FRANCIS C. BOWEN
Colonel, U S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
 Washington 25, D. C.
 10 November 1953

Appendix I to Annex I
 Communications

VHF VOICE RADIO CIRCUITS

TABLE I OF PART I - COMMUNICATIONS												
LOCATION OF TRANSMITTERS												
PROJECT OR UNIT	DIAPH.	LCU	LCR	AIR CRAFT	REMARKS							
TU 7 Radio	X	X					X		X			Helicopters
TU 9 Documentary Photography	X											Various Photo Missions
7.1 Tech. Com.	X											
7.1 Admin. Net	X						X	X	X	X		
E. G. & G. Net	X		X	X			X	X		X		
TU 3	X			X						X		One (1) set on LCU
7.1 Comm. Net	X											
Project 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105	X											
TU 14 Comm.	X											Various Atoll Locations
Project 7	X	X										
Project 10	X											Various Atoll Locations
7.1 Comm. Net	X	X						X	X	X	X	

L-II-1

TASK GROUP 2.1 - BIKINI ATOLL

LOCATION OF TRANSMITTERS

PROJECT OR UNIT	CHARLIE	FOX	DOG	GEORGE	HOW	WAVE	ORION	TARA	WILLY	WALTER	PARROTT	CURTIS	LSJ	ATR- CRAFT	REMARKS
TV 1 AirSafe	X	X	X	X							X		X	X	
TV 2 Documentary Photography															Various Photo Missions Throughout Atoll
Pol 1 Admin. Net	X					X	X	A (3)	A		X	X	X		One (1) Set Located on Helicopter Barge
Pol 1 Technical Communications	X (6)	X	X	X	X	X		A (4)	A			X			
Es. Co. & Co. Net	X	X	X		X	X		A	A	X					
ESL Net	X						X	X	X						
Pro. 60L Drone Ships								A	A					X	Transmitters on Drone Ships and ATs (See 1.6. 1.7)
Pro. 1.2a, 1.3, 1.7		A						A							
TV 1.1 Comm.								A				X	X		Communications with NVA and I&O Project
TV 1.1 Joint Time Broadcast						A									Joint Time Warning to Ships, Planes and various atoll sites
Pro. 1.1 Test - Intro								A							Communications to Test Sites

L-11-2

PACK GROUP 13.1 (KIAI ATOLL)

LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTS

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>ATTN</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Project 13.1	13.1				(SEE REA. 13)		Various Atoll Locations
Project 13.2, 13.3, 23.2					(SEE REA. 13)		Various Atoll Locations
TU 13 Communications					(SEE REA. 13)		Various Atoll Locations
Project 18					(SEE REA. 13)		Various Atoll Locations
TU 7							

1-1-53

TASK GROUP 7.4 VHF CIRCUITS

LOCATION OF TRANSCIEVERS


<u>PROJECT OF UNIT</u>	<u>FRED</u>	<u>BIKINI</u>	<u>AGC</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Maintenance Control and Expediter Net	X				Six Vehicular and One (1) Fixed Station Radios
Operational Net	X			X	
Ship/Air			X	X	Seven (7) Channels. Six (6) for Aircraft Control & Positioning. One (1) for VHF Relay to FRED.
Control Tower	X			X	
Control Tower		X		X	
GCA	X			X	
Backup for Control and MCD Lines	X				Building 89 to Building 4 - FRED.
Ship/Shore	X		X		
Air/Ground	X			X	
Air/Ground	X			X	
Air/Ground	X			X	To Liaison Planes and Helicopters.
Radiosonde	X				Weather Islands

L-11-5

Appendix III to Annex I,
 Communications Plan, CJTF SEVEN Operations Plan No. 3-53

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
 Washington 25, D. C.
 30 October 1953, 1600 R

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN TELETYPE NETWORK



[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex M to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

WFATHER PLAN

1. Responsibility

a. Commander, TG 7.4 will administer and logistically support weather elements as indicated below to provide meteorological data and to perform radiological safety missions required by CJTF SEVEN for the conduct of operations in the forward area.

a. A task force weather central.

b. A weather reporting element.

 An aircraft weather reconnaissance element.

The weather reporting element and the aircraft reconnaissance element will function under the operational control of the Commander, TG 7.4. While the Commander, JTF SEVEN will retain operational control of the Task Force Weather Central.

b. Commander, TG 7.3 will place at the disposal of the CJTF SEVEN those aerological units which are assigned to ships of the Naval Task Group. Anti-submarine patrol aircraft assigned to CTG 7.3 will make special weather reconnaissance observations.

2. Mission and Concept

a. Weather Central

(1) The Task Force Weather Central will be located on ENIWETCK ISLAND until CJTF SEVEN transfers his command post to the command ship, at which time the Task Force Weather Central will be established aboard the USS ESTES (AGC-12). A forecasting and observing section will be maintained on ENIWETCK to provide the necessary weather service for that location during the time the Task Force Weather Central is afloat.

(2) Mission

(a) Collect, evaluate and present basic weather information.

(b) Prepare weather and upper air forecasts for the task force commander.

(c) Provide operational forecasts, flight clearances and such other weather information and services in the area as may be appropriate.

(d) Coordinate the operational effort of the outlying weather stations and weather reconnaissance aircraft.

(3) Requirements

(a) Collect, plot, analyze and display weather information covering the Pacific Ocean Area, with emphasis on the Central Pacific and MARSHALL ISLANDS

M-1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Weather Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

- (b) Prepare briefing charts and forecasts for use in the Joint Task Force Headquarters.
- (c) Issue operational forecasts to JTF SEVEN subordinate commands as required.
- (d) Coordinate the operational effort of the outlying land stations.
- (e) Coordinate the aircraft weather reconnaissance effort with respect to tracks to be flown.
- (f) Assume overall responsibility for informing participating units in Operation CASTLE of tropical storms and typhoons in accordance with procedures established by 2143rd Air Weather Wing Typhoon SOP. All observations, advisories and warnings transmitted will contain information addressees as follows: CINCPAC, AF Typhoon Warning Center at GUAM and Fleet Weather Centrals at GUAM and PEARL HARBOR.
- (g) Establish full scale operations on or before the first shot minus thirty five (35) days.
- (h) Plan to remain fully operational for a period of 150 days.

b. Weather Reporting Element

(1) In addition to the existing weather facilities in the Pacific Ocean Area completely self-contained weather stations will be established on the outlying islands of KUSAIE, MAJURO, PONAPE and RONGERIK.

(2) Mission

- (a) Provide surface and upper air weather data necessary to meet the peculiar demands of the operation.
- (b) Provide administrative and logistic support to the weather central.

(3) Requirements

- (a) Possess a capability to take hourly surface observations and four rawinsonde observations daily. The rawinsonde observations will attain a minimum height of 90,000 feet. All observations will be taken in accordance with current procedures and expeditiously transmitted to the Task Force Weather Central.
- (b) Assemble personnel and equipment at a central location in the ZI by the first shot minus eighty (80) days.
- (c) Insure that all outlying stations are in place and fully operational on or before the first shot minus thirty-five (35) days.

c. Aircraft Weather Reconnaissance Element

(1) The aircraft weather reconnaissance element will be based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

(2) Mission

(a) Obtain inflight weather observations in accordance with current procedures along tracks and at times requested by the Task Force Weather Central.

(b) Conduct radiological safety tracking missions.

(c) Conduct typhoon reconnaissance flights.

(d) Conduct post-shot heavy nuclide radioactive sampling missions.

(3) Requirements

(a) Possess a capability to perform the following missions for an on site operational period of approximately 100 days:

1. Two (2) weather missions each day of approximately twelve (12) hours duration, commencing on first shot minus twenty (20) days and continuing for the duration of the project.

2. Three (3) weather missions each day of approximately twelve (12) hours duration, commencing on first shot minus four (4) days and terminating on D-1 day or as otherwise specified by CJTF SEVEN.

3. Four shot missions in connection with radiological safety for forty-eight (48) hours starting at H+6 hours, scheduled specifically for cloud tracking purposes. Certain of these missions will satisfy a portion of the daily weather reconnaissance requirement.

4. One heavy nuclide sampling mission for each shot, approximately three (3) hours duration to penetrate the radioactive cloud at H+1 hour.

(b) Commencing on first shot minus twenty (20) days, assume typhoon reconnaissance responsibility in the area bounded by the Equator, latitude 25° N, the meridian of 180° and longitude of 157° 30' E. The Task Force Weather Central will coordinate this effort.

d. Aerological Units Afloat

(1) The USS ESTES will accommodate the Task Force Weather Central during the HIKINI phase of the operation. Command ship aerological personnel will augment and be assigned to duty in the Task Force Weather Central both ashore and afloat. These aerological personnel will be under the direction and control of the weather central commander.

(2) The USS ESTES will make normal hourly surface observations only, the USS CURTISS and USS RAIRKO will possess the capability of taking hourly surface and twice daily upper air soundings (rawinsondes). The aerological complement of these ships will be expected to make special weather observations when requested by CJTF SEVEN. All observations will be taken in accordance with current procedures and expeditiously transmitted to the Task Force Weather Central.

e. Anti-Submarine Patrol Aircraft Patrol aircraft (P2V) will

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Weather Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-83

make and transmit weather reconnaissance observations every half hour during their patrols, using special code (See Appendix III).

3. Instructions of General Application

a. Warning and advisories for typhoons or other storms will be assigned "EMERGENCY" (1) precedence.

b. For purposes of standardization, typhoon readiness conditions are defined in the Pacific Ocean Area as follows:

CONDITION III Winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within forty-eight (48) hours.

CONDITION II Winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within twenty-four (24) hours.

CONDITION I Winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within twelve (12) hours.

c. Relay of Station Reports Responsibility for prompt delivery of all weather reports from outlying stations and weather reconnaissance reports to AACS at ENIWETOK for transmission on the Pacific Ocean Area weather circuit and no work has been assigned to the Commander, Task Force Weather Central by CJTF SEVEN.

4. Weather Communications Available to the Joint Task Force

a. Radio Receivers Standard receiving equipment in the weather central at ENIWETOK and afloat, with 24 hour intercept of the TCMC broadcast circuit 01.

b. Radioteletype Broadcast Full time intercept of the GUAK blind weather broadcast (Circuit 01F1) in the weather central, both ashore and afloat.

c. Air-Ground ENIWETOK air-ground station will provide CW and Voice channels at specified times for the collection of reconnaissance data from WB-29 and P2V aircraft.

d. CW A CW net will be established between ENIWETOK and outlying stations for the collection of surface and upper air observations and weather record administration.

e. Radioteletype Point-to-Point Circuits

(1) Time will be authorized on installed point-to-point circuits to exchange a minimum selection of meteorological data.

(2) Existing point-to-point circuits will be utilized to relay certain weather data collected at CLARK AFB and HICKAM AFB which are not available on Circuit 01F1.

f. General Times, frequencies and contents of the Pacific Ocean Area weather broadcasts are available in current Navy and Air Force publications.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U. S. Army
Commander

M-4

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Weather Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-03

make and transmit weather reconnaissance observations every half hour during their patrols, using special code (See Appendix III).

3. Instructions of General Application

a. Warnings and advisories for typhoons or other storms will be assigned "EMERGENCY" () precedence.

b. For purposes of standardization, typhoon readiness conditions are defined in the Pacific Ocean Area as follows:

CONDITION III Winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within forty-eight (48) hours.

CONDITION II Winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within twenty-four (24) hours.

CONDITION I Winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within twelve (12) hours.

c. Weather Reports Responsibility for prompt delivery of all weather reports from all stations and weather reconnaissance aircraft to AACS at ENIMET K for transmission on the Pacific Area weather circuit. This work has been assigned to the Commander, Task Force Weather Central by CJTF SEVEN.

4. Weather Reconnaissance Facilities to the Joint Task Force

a. Receiving Equipment Standard receiving equipment in the weather center at ENIMET K and afloat, with 24 hour intercept of the Pacific Area weather circuit (PIF).

b. Radio teletype Broadcast Full time intercept of the GUAM blind weather broadcast circuit (BPI) in the weather center, both ashore and afloat.

c. Air-Ground Station ENIMET K air-ground station will provide CW and Voice circuits as specified times for the collection of reconnaissance data from WB-9 and P2V aircraft.

d. CW Net A CW net will be established between ENIMET K and outlying stations for the collection of surface and upper air observations and weather and administration.

e. Radio teletype Point-to-Point Circuits

(1) Time will be authorized on installed point-to-point circuits to exchange a minimum selection of meteorological data.

(2) Existing point-to-point circuits will be utilized to relay certain weather data collected at CLARK AFB and HICKAM AFB which are not available on Circuit PIF.

f. General Times, frequencies and contents of the Pacific Ocean Area weather broadcasts are available in current Navy and Air Force publications.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U. S. Army
Commander

K-2

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Weather Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

Appendix

- I - Location Chart of Weather Units
- II - Weather Organization
- III - Patrol Planes Weather Reporting Code

OFFICIAL:


W. S. Cowart, Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART, Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

M-5

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
20 October 1953, 1600 R

LOCATION CHART OF WEATHER UNITS JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

Appendix I to Annex M
Weather Plan, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53



LEGEND.


- JTF STATIONS
- EXISTING MILITARY STATIONS
- ★ EXISTING WEATHER STATIONS

NOTE:
RECON SQUADRON BASED
AT ENIWETOK

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
WASHINGTON 25, D C
20 OCTOBER 1953 1800R


WEATHER ORGANIZATION CHART JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

CJTFF SEVEN



APPENDIX II TO ANEX M
WEATHER PLAN, CJTF SEVEN OPERATION PLAN NO 3-53

M-11-1



HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
 Washington 25, D. C.
 10 November 1953

Appendix III to Annex M
 Weather Plan, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

**PATROL PLANES WEATHER REPORTING CODE
 OPERATION CASTLE**

POSITION	DISTANCE	TIME	W	W	P	D	D	F	F	V	A	A
<input type="text"/>												

POSITION- Bearing in Degrees (T) from Eniwetok Island.
 DISTANCE- In Nautical Miles.
 TIME- Zerba

- WW Comprehensive Weather Description (two numbers)
- P Precipitation; Sector of Visual or Scope Observation Covered by Rain, Reported Directly in Tenths from 0 to 9.
- DD Surface Wind Direction, 10's of Degrees, Estimated, (daylight only, transmit 99 at night).
- FF Surface Wind Speed, Knots, Estimated (daylight only; transmit 99 at night).
- V Visibility (table).
- AA Altitude, Hundreds of Feet.

TRANSMIT REPORT BY RADIO

M-III-1



Patrol Plane Weather Reporting Code
 CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

VISIBILITY TABLE

- 0 Under 50 YD.
- 1 50-200 YD.
- 2 200-500 YD.
- 3 500-1000 YD.
- 4 1000 YD-MILE
- 5 1-2 MILE
- 6 2-5 MILE
- 7 5-10 MILE
- 8 10-30 MILE
- 9 30 MILE OR OVER

COMPREHENSIVE WEATHER DESCRIPTION

		COMPREHENSIVE WEATHER DESCRIPTION									
		RANDOM C _u OR C _b	C _u OR C _b IN GROUPS, NO LINES	C _u OR C _b DEFINITE LINES	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, NOT MERGING	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, MERGING	RANDOM T _u OR C _b	C _u OR C _b IN GROUPS, NO LINES	C _u OR C _b DEFINITE LINES	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, NOT MERGING	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, MERGING
CLEAR (1-10)		0 0	0 1	0 2	0 3	0 4	0 5	0 6	0 7	0 8	0 9
SCATTERED 2 10-6 10	NO SHEAR	1 0	1 1	1 2	1 3	1 4	1 5	1 6	1 7	1 8	1 9
	MOD. SHEAR	2 0	2 1	2 2	2 3	2 4	2 5	2 6	2 7	2 8	2 9
	MARKED SHEAR	3 0	3 1	3 2	3 3	3 4	3 5	3 6	3 7	3 8	3 9
BROKEN 6 10-9 10	NO SHEAR	4 0	4 1	4 2	4 3	4 4	4 5	4 6	4 7	4 8	4 9
	MOD. SHEAR	5 0	5 1	5 2	5 3	5 4	5 5	5 6	5 7	5 8	5 9
	MARKED SHEAR	6 0	6 1	6 2	6 3	6 4	6 5	6 6	6 7	6 8	6 9
OVERCAST 9 10.	NO SHEAR	7 0	7 1	7 2	7 3	7 4	7 5	7 6	7 7	7 8	7 9
	MOD. SHEAR	8 0	8 1	8 2	8 3	8 4	8 5	8 6	8 7	8 8	8 9
	MARKED SHEAR	9 0	9 1	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 7	9 8	9 9
		SMALL TO MODERATE VERTICLE IN DEVELOP- MENT "IN C _u OR C _b ."					GREAT TO EXTREME VERTICLE DEVELOP- MENT "IN C _u OR C _b ."				

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex N to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 3-53

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY

1. Radiological safety of all task force military and civilian personnel is a command responsibility and radiological safety activities will be performed through normal command channels.
2. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN will:
 - a. Specify the measures necessary to insure the radiological safety of task force personnel and furnish technical advisory assistance to task group radiological safety officers
 - b. Inform CINCPAC of radiological hazards which may exist in areas outside the task force responsibility
 - c. Maintain an information center (RadSafe Office) with displays of current air and surface radexes, radiological situation maps of atolls and peripheral aerial and surface areas and such other allied data as may be appropriate
 - d. Arrange for the designation of monitors and couriers to accompany radioactive and special cargo shipments on sample return aircraft and to monitor loading and unloading of such cargo.
3. Task Group Commanders will
 - a. Provide radiological safety units within their task groups and insure that these units are in the required condition of readiness to carry out the radiological safety missions of their respective task groups.
 - b. Provide complete allowances of radiac equipment and special clothing. The requirements of CTG 7.5 will be included in the allowances of CTG 7.1 for necessary issue to TG 7.5 personnel during the operational phase and for subsequent loan or sale to CTG 7.5 for post-operational use at the Pacific Proving Ground
 - c. Prior to the first shot minus 10 days, forward to CTG 7.1 (for use of the RadSafe Center in conjunction with film badge radiation dosage control) a listing of task group personnel to whom film badges will be issued during the overseas phase of the operation. Within five days following each shot, provide CTG 7.1 with additions to previous lists. Lists will indicate full name, rank or rate, serial or service number if applicable and home station or laboratory as appropriate.
4. The Commander, TG 7.1, having the major technical radiological safety unit, will:
 - a. Perform all ground monitoring services associated with scientific missions except those in conjunction with aircraft and airborne collection of scientific data
 - b. Provide laboratory services and technical assistance to all task groups, to include:

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Radiological Safety
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

- (1) Provision of standard type film badges and specified supplementary items of personnel radiological safety equipment.
 - (2) Laboratory services to develop and interpret film badges.
 - (3) Records of exposures from film badges. (Duplicates will be furnished task group commanders).
 - (4) Laboratory services for the radiochemical analysis of water samples.
 - (5) Provision of primary facilities at PARRY ISLAND radiological safety building for calibration, repair and maintenance of instruments and storage of spare parts of radiac equipment. Similar limited facilities will be maintained at BIKINI during the operational phase at that atoll.
 - (6) Monitoring the removal and packaging of radioactive sources and samples except, as indicated in paragraph 4a above, removal operations from aircraft will remain the radiological safety responsibility of the task group to which the aircraft are assigned.
- c. Provide radiological safety surface situation maps after shot times to the task force and task group commanders.
 - d. Provide and issue special high density goggles to specified personnel of the task force.
 - e. Provide and maintain radiac equipment and protective clothing as necessary for TG 7.1, TG 7.5 and specified recovery personnel.
 - f. Provide technical personnel to assist task group commanders in the inspection of radiologically contaminated items and the certification of destruction, disposal or unserviceability of such items as required.
 - g. Maintain a radiological safety center (RadSafe Center) for the control of TG 7.1 radiological safety operations.
 - h. Provide personnel and equipment decontamination facilities for radiological safety survey and recovery operations.
 - i. Perform limited fall-out studies within the Pacific Proving Ground for radiological safety documentation only.
 - j. Assume radiological safety responsibilities of TG 7.5 during the overseas phase of the operation.
 - k. Integrate within TG 7.1 key radiological safety personnel made available by CTG 7.4. Such personnel will assist CTG 7.1 during the operational phase and will be assigned duties amenable to training in the fundamental radiological safety services to be assumed by CTG 7.5 upon completion of the overseas phase of the operation.
 - l. Assist CTG 7.3 to the extent of providing equipment, personnel and supervision for rough operational decontamination of aircraft ashore at BIKINI ATOLL. Decontamination will be limited to washdown of exterior and vacuum cleaning of interiors. No detailed decontamination will be attempted by TG 7.1 personnel. Aircraft crews

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Radiological Safety
CJTF SEVEN No 3-53

will assist in this operation

5. The Commander, TG 7.2 will.
 - a. Perform all ground monitoring services associated with ENIWETOK ISLAND except in those areas or activities assigned to other task groups.
 - b. Provide own radiological safety monitors, fifty (50) of which will be "C" cleared for emergency monitor support of TG 7.1 if required.
 - c. Provide own decontamination personnel, ten (10) of which will be designated for emergency decontamination support of TG 7.1 if required.
 - d. Provide own radiac equipment and protective clothing
 - e. Provide own repair, spare parts and calibration facilities for radiac equipment
 - f. Provide contaminated clothing laundry facilities for TG 7.1
 - g. Provide contaminated equipment storage area with the necessary security
6. The Commander, TG 7.3 will.
 - a. Provide own radiological safety monitors, including one airborne monitor for each multi-engine aircraft crew assigned to TG 7.3
 - b. Provide own radiac equipment and protective clothing.
 - c. Provide own repair, spare parts and calibration facilities for radiac equipment
 - d. Provide monitors and decontamination crews aboard each ship within the task group.
 - e. Provide facilities for personnel decontamination on the CVE
 - f. While the task force is embarked provide space for use of the radiological safety unit (RadSafe Center) of TG 7.1
 - g. Provide decontamination crews and facilities for all aircraft at EIKINI ATOLL. Limited assistance ashore will be furnished by CTU 7.1 in accordance with paragraph 4.2., as required.
 - h. Provide decontamination crews and facilities for own aircraft aboard the CVE at ENIWETOK ATOLL. Limited assistance ashore will be furnished by CTU 7.1, as required.
 - i. Provide necessary helicopter air service for radiological surveys and post-shot recovery operations (monitors furnished by TG 7.1).
 - j. Collect lagoon water samples
 - k. Provide water spray equipment aboard all vessels likely to be in the fall-out area

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Radiological Safety
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

1. During the BIKINI phase provide for air to ground reporting of approximate air radiation intensities encountered by all aircraft operating between ENIWETOK and BIKINI from H Hour to H plus 24 hours. It is not contemplated that aircraft should be scheduled for this specific requirement alone. Reports will be routed to the RadSafe Office at the task force command post by the most expeditious means. Reports will be prepared and coded in accordance with paragraph 7X, K below.

7. The Commander, TG 7.4 will:

a. Provide own radiological safety monitors, including one airborne monitor for each multi-engine aircraft crew assigned to TG 7.4.

b. Provide own radiac equipment and protective clothing.

c. Provide own repair, spare parts and calibration facilities for radiac equipment.

d. Provide facilities for personnel decontamination on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

e. Provide decontamination crews and facilities for own aircraft at ENIWETOK ATOLL.

f. At ENIWETOK ATOLL, assist TG 7.3 in aircraft decontamination with TG 7.4 equipment, as required.

g. Provide necessary helicopter and liaison air service for radiological surveys and post-shot recovery operations (monitors furnished by TG 7.1).

h. Provide monitoring services for the removal (by TG 7.1 personnel) of radioactive samples or data collected by aircraft.

i. Provide cloud tracking aircraft for post-shot radiological safety "situation data" up to radius of 500 miles in the significant quadrant for a period of 48 hours, starting at approximately H plus 6 hours. Reports will be prepared and coded in accordance with paragraph 7X, K below.

j. During the BIKINI phase, provide for air to ground reporting of approximate radiation (air) intensities encountered by all aircraft operating between ENIWETOK and BIKINI from H Hour to H plus 24 hours. It is not contemplated that aircraft should be scheduled for this specific requirement alone. Reports will be routed to the RadSafe Office at the task force command post by the most expeditious means. Reports will be prepared and coded in accordance with paragraph 7X, K below.

k. Employ simple codes (to be furnished separately by CJTF SEVEN) in conjunction with the periodic weather reconnaissance reports to report approximate air radiation intensities encountered on regularly established weather reconnaissance/ or cloud tracking flights and for reports required from aircraft operating during the BIKINI phase between ENIWETOK and BIKINI from H Hour to H plus 24 hours. Reports will indicate the approximate position, altitude and order of magnitude of radiation encountered.



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Radiological Safety
CTG SEVEN No. 3-53

1. Develop the air RADEX for each shot.
3. The Commander, TG 7.5 will:
 - a. Develop a schedule of requirements for radiological safety services required from CTG 7.1 and assist CTG 7.1 in decontamination of AEC facilities and equipment as necessary.
 - b. Provide key radiological personnel for integration into and training with the radiological safety organization of TG 7.1 during the overseas phase of the operation. The total number and qualifications of such personnel will be as determined necessary by CTG 7.5, commensurate with the assumption of responsibilities indicated in paragraph 8c, below.
 - c. Assume residual task force radiological safety functions at the Pacific Proving Ground upon completion of the overseas phase of the operation. Required equipment and supplies will be made available at that time to CTG 7.5 on a loan or sale basis from stocks provided by CTG 7.1.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Appendix

- I - Radiological Safety Regulations
- II - Radiological Safety Office and Center
- III - Hazards Resulting from Atomic Bomb Explosions

OFFICIAL:

W. S. Cowart, Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Appendix I to Annex N
Radiological Safety, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY REGULATIONS

1. General

- a. Radiological Defense (RadDefense) operations or Radiological Safety (RadSafe) operations, short term RadOps, are general terms. They are used to denote the means by which a unit can control and confine the damage and radiological effects of an atomic explosion or of radioactive material spread by other means, thereby preventing and avoiding health hazards to personnel. They are interpreted to include measures such as training, organization, distribution of radiological personnel, development of techniques and procedures, use of detecting equipment, protection or removal of exposed personnel and decontamination of personnel, structures and equipment.
 - b. Following each detonation there will be areas of surface radiological contamination and areas of air radiological contamination. These areas are designated as Radiological Exclusion Areas (RADEX). Prior to shot times, the forecast air and surface RADEX will be disseminated by CJTF SEVEN in the target area. These RADEXES will represent a forecast from H Hour until dissemination of a later surface and air RADEX at about H plus 4 hours. The later RADEXES will be based upon the master radiological "situation map" maintained in the RadSafe Office of CJTF SEVEN. Since the air RADEX after shot times will be based on monitored tracking by aircraft over significant large ocean areas, information promulgated from the forecast air RADEX may have to be extended beyond the originally anticipated 4 hour period.
 - c. The surface RADEX will be determined by actual survey with Radiation Detection, Indication and Computation (RADIAC) equipment after shot time. The most rapid method of accomplishing surface survey in the early stages will be by helicopter flight in and around the surface of contaminated areas. From the radiation intensities measured at a known altitude, it is possible to obtain an estimate of the radiation dosage rates which would be encountered on the surface of the ground or water. Actual water samples from the lagoon will also be utilized. Ground survey will follow these guides to determine definitely the contaminated regions and objects. Formal ground survey of the shot atoll, as feasible, will be accomplished on H plus 24 hours.
2. The Maximum Permissible Exposures (MPEs) and Maximum Permissible Limits (MPLs) as stated herein are applicable to a field experimental test of nuclear devices in peacetime wherein numbers of personnel engaged in these tests have been previously exposed or will be continuously exposed to potential radiation hazards. It may become necessary from a study of personnel records to reduce the MPE for certain individuals who have recently been over-exposed to radiation. Further, the MPEs and MPLs are subject to revision by waiver from the task force commander in individually designated cases when circumstances indicate the need and justification therefor.
 3. Due to the special nature of field tests it is considered that a policy of strict adherence to the radiological standards prescribed

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Radiological Safety Regulations
CJTF SEVEN No. 3 '93

- for routine work is not realistic. The regulations set forth herein have been designed as a reasonable and safe compromise considering conservation of personnel exposures, the international import of the test and the cost aspects of operational delays chargeable to excessive radiological precautions. In all cases other than emergencies or tactical situations the ultimate criteria will be limited by the MPEs for personnel. Special instances may arise such as in the case of an air-sea rescue within the RADEX or in the case of tactical situation in which operations will be carried out without regard to the MPEs and MPLs prescribed herein. For such emergency or tactical operations the criteria prescribed below for tactical situations will be used as a guide. Wherever possible, however, film badges will be carried and RadSafe monitors will accompany such operations to determine the extent of the actual radiation hazard experienced in order that appropriate medical action may be initiated.
4. Task force radiation dosage control will start on first shot minus fifteen (15) days and terminate upon departure of individuals from the forward area or on the last shot plus fifteen (15) days, whichever occurs first. All personnel will be considered to have arrived at the Pacific Proving Ground by first shot minus fifteen (15) days. Prior and subsequent to this period, radiation dosage control will be as prescribed by CTG 7.5.
 5. a. The MPE for personnel involved in this operation, as defined by paragraph 4, above, is 3.9 roentgens (gamma only). This exposure may be acquired at any time during a thirteen (13) week period of the operation. Provided no previous over-exposure remains for compensation, 3.9 roentgens may be acquired without regard to the individual's past radiation history. This MPE will be considered further augmented (without separate action) by 0.3 roentgens per week for each week in excess of thirteen (13) weeks required during the operational period defined by paragraph 4, above.
b. A special MPE of 20 roentgens (gamma only) is authorized for the operational period as defined by paragraph 4, above, for crew members of air sampling aircraft.
c. All exposure to external gamma radiation will be regarded as total body irradiation.
 6. Those individuals exposed to ionizing radiation in excess of the value computed by paragraph 5a, above, will be informed that appropriate remarks will be included in their medical records. Military personnel in this category will be advised that they should not be exposed to further radiation until sufficient time has elapsed in order to bring their average radiation dose down to 0.3 roentgens per week. Civilian personnel in this category will be informed that limitations on further radiation exposure will be as determined by the laboratory or agency having administrative jurisdiction over such personnel.
 7. All atoll land and lagoon areas in or near which a detonation takes place will be considered contaminated until cleared for operations by the task force commander. Entry to and exit from contaminated areas will be via RadSafe check points only.
 8. Contaminated land and water areas will be delineated as such. Personnel entering these areas will be subject to clearances by the

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Radiological Safety Regulations
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17. The MPLs listed herein are to be regarded as advisory limits for control under average conditions. All readings of surface contamination are to be made with Geiger counters, with tube walls not substantially in excess of 30 mg cm² with shield open unless otherwise specified. The surface of the probe should be held one (1) inch to two (2) inches from the surface that is under observation unless otherwise specified. For operational purposes the contamination MPLs presented below will not be considered applicable to spotty contamination provided such areas can be effectively isolated from personnel.

a. Personnel and Clothing MPLs

(1) Skin readings should not be more than 1.0 mr/hr. Complete decontamination by bathing will be utilized for readings in excess of this level. If the body is generally contaminated and especially if contamination is on the eyes or gonads, special efforts should be made to reduce the contamination level. In general, however, it is not considered profitable to abrade the skin or epilate the scalp in an attempt to reduce stubborn contamination below 1 mr/hr (about 1000 cpm). Beta radiation exposure to the hands should not exceed 30.0 rep for the operational period, as defined in paragraph 4, above.

(2) Underclothing and body equipment such as the internal surfaces of respirators should be reduced to 2 mr/hr.

(3) Outer clothing should be reduced to 7 mr/hr.

b. Vehicle MPLs The interior surfaces of occupied sections of vehicles should be reduced to 7 mr/hr. The outside surfaces of vehicles should be reduced to less than 7 mr/hr (alpha only) at five (5) or six (6) inches from the surface.

c. Ship and Boat MPLs

(1) It is desired to point out that the employment of the ships and units in TG 7.3, insofar as radiological safety is concerned, is not considered routine usage within the purview of NavMed P-1325, "Radiological Safety Regulations". Current revision of NavMed P-1325 indicates that its provisions do not apply for special operations such as field tests and that for such operations naval personnel will operate under regulations set forth by the task force commander as approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(2) In general, ships and boats operating in waters near shot sites after shot times may become contaminated. Monitors shall be aboard all such craft operating after shot time, either as passengers or members of the crew, until such time as radiological restrictions are lifted.

(3) Task group commanders will take necessary action to ensure that personnel of ships and boats are not over-exposed to radiation and that ships and boats are not contaminated excessively. The criterion in both cases is that no personnel will be over-exposed as defined by paragraph 4, above, except in emergencies or tactical operations, and that after the operational period no personnel will receive more than 0.3 roentgens per week from contaminated equipment.

(4) For ships and boats operating in contaminated waters, reasonable allowances will be made to differentiate between the relative

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Radicalogical Safety Regulations
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

contribution to the total flux from fixed contamination and that due to "Shine" from contaminated waters. Fixed alpha contamination should not exceed 2500 dpm (disintegrations per minute) per 150 cm² of area for enclosed areas (cabins, etc.) and 5000 dpm per 150 cm² area for open surfaces where ventilation is good.

(5) At the conclusion of the operation, final clearances will be granted by task group commanders or by commanding officers, if so ordered, to those ships and boats showing no point of contamination greater than 15 mr/day (beta and gamma) and no detectable alpha. Other ships and boats will be granted operational clearances by task group commanders or by commanding officers, if so ordered. An operational clearance implies that contamination exists and that special procedures as necessary are instituted aboard ship.

(6) Individuals on board ships of the task force shall be protected collectively from hazards of blast, heat and radioactivity by movement and positioning of the ships.

(7) No ships with personnel shall be permitted inside the 1.5 p.s.i. line unless specifically directed otherwise. Bearings of danger from immediate radioactive fall-out for ship operations will be established by CJTF SEVEN on the basis of forecast wind directions at the intended time of detonation. This danger section will be designated as surface RADEX. All ships of the task force shall be required to remain outside the RADEX - danger bearing, radial limitation and time restriction unless specifically directed otherwise. However, if ships are directed tactically into the surface RADEX, movement of ships shall be governed by tactical exposure guides.

d. Aircraft MPLs

(1) The interior surfaces of occupied sections of aircraft should be reduced to 7 mr/hr.

(2) No aircraft in the air at H Hour will be at slant ranges from ground zero less than as determined by the following effects unless specifically directed otherwise. (Based on maximum predicted yield and 20 mile visibility).

Elast (at predicted shock arrival): 0.5 p.s.i.
Thermal (H Hour). Fabric control surfaces: 1.0 cal/cm²
Metal control surfaces: 6.0 cal/cm²

(3) After detonation no aircraft shall operate inside the air RADEX or closer than 10 nautical miles from the rising or visible cloud unless specifically directed otherwise. Non-expected aircraft involved in routine operations encountering unexpected regions of aerial contamination will, immediately upon detecting such contamination, execute a turnout. Cloud tracking aircraft will execute turnout from contaminated areas at a level of not more than 3.0 r/hr. If a tactical or emergency situation arises where aircraft must enter the air RADEX or visible cloud, tactical exposure allowances shall apply.

(4) All multi-engine task force aircraft in the air at H Hour within 100 miles of the detonation point shall carry a person designated as radiological safety monitor, equipped with suitable radiac equipment and a RADEX plot. This monitor shall be capable of

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calculating allowable exposures under both tactical and operational conditions.

(5) All persons in aircraft at shot time or at subsequent times when engaged in operations in or near the cloud or RADEX track shall wear film badges.

(6) Crew members of aircraft in the air at zero hour will take special precautions to avoid (for at least 10 seconds) the direct and reflected light resulting from the burst. At the discretion of the airplane commander this could be done with protective high density goggles, by turning away from the burst with eyes closed, by covering the eyes with the forearm, by turning cockpit lights up to highest intensity or by any combination of the above

e. In air and water the following continuous levels of radioactivity are considered safe from the standpoint of personnel drinking and breathing (uc = microcurie):

	<u>Beta-Gamma Emitter</u>
Water	5×10^{-3} uc/cc (calculated to H / 3 days)

Air (24 hour average)

Particles less than 5 micron diameter 10^{-6} uc/cc

Particles greater than 5 micron diameter 10^{-4} uc/cc

18. In tactical situations the military commander must make the decision regarding allowable exposures. As military personnel are normally subject to only random exposure, health hazards are at a minimum. Current Department of Defense information on exposure to gamma radiation in tactical situations is indicated below:

a. Uniform acute (immediate) exposure of 50 roentgens to a group of Armed Forces personnel will not appreciably affect their efficiency as a fighting unit.

b. Uniform acute exposure of 100 roentgens will produce in occasional individuals nausea and vomiting but not to an extent that will render Armed Forces personnel ineffective as fighting units. Personnel receiving an acute radiation exposure of 100 or more roentgens should be given a period of rest and individual evaluation as soon as possible.

c. Uniform acute exposure of approximately 150 roentgens or greater can be expected to render Armed Forces personnel ineffective as troops within a few hours through a substantial incidence of nausea, vomiting, weakness and prostration. Mortality produced by an acute exposure of 150 roentgens will be very low and eventual recovery of physical fitness may be expected.

d. Field commands should, therefore, assume that if substantial numbers of their men receive acute radiation exposures substantially above 100 roentgens there is a grave risk that their commands will rapidly become ineffective as fighting units.

e. Internal radiation hazards caused by entry of radioactive substances through the mouth, through the lungs or through cuts or wounds do not exist after an air burst. Internal hazards following a contaminating surface explosion may be avoided if ordinary

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precautions are taken. Only under unusual circumstances will there be internal hazard from residual contamination. This eliminates the necessity for masking and consequent reduction of tactical efficiency.

19. The RadSafe Officer, TG 7.1, will maintain standard type film badge records of radiation exposures for all task force personnel. Records will indicate full name, rank or rate, serial or service number, if applicable, organization, home station or laboratory, date of exposure, approximate duration of over-exposure in hours and minutes (for Army personnel only) and remarks such as limitations on assignment because of over-exposure. Upon completion of the operation, disposition of these records will be as follows.
- a. A consolidated list of exposures listing military personnel and civilian personnel under military control by full name, rank or rate, serial or service number (if applicable), organization, home station or laboratory and exposure in milliroentgens, together with exposed film badges and control film badges, will be forwarded to the Chief, AFSWP.
 - b. A consolidated list of personnel and exposures as indicated in paragraph 19a, above, including all AEC personnel, will be forwarded to the Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC.
 - c. Individual records of Navy and Air Force military personnel and civilian personnel will be forwarded to their unit of permanent assignment for inclusion in the individual's health record (Medical History Sheets, NavMed H-8 and the Individual Health Record for Navy and Air Force personnel, respectively). For those military personnel exposed to ionizing radiation in excess of that defined in paragraph 5a, above, a statement will be included to the effect that the individual is not to be subjected to ionizing radiation before a specific date, the date to be computed by the RadSafe Officer, TG 7.1, to allow sufficient time to elapse in order to bring the average radiation dose down to 0.3 roentgens per week. Limitations on Navy and Air Force civilian personnel with reference to over-exposures will be as determined by the laboratory or agency having administrative jurisdiction over such personnel.
 - d. Individual records of Army military and civilian personnel will be forwarded in accordance with SR 40-1025-64 dated 21 April 1953 to their unit of permanent assignment for inclusion in the individual's field military 201 file or the civilian personnel 201 file (whichever is applicable). These records will indicate date of exposure, amount of exposure in milliroentgens, approximate duration of over-exposure in hours and minutes and a space for remarks such as limitations on assignment (as indicated in paragraph 19c, above) because of over-exposures.
 - e. Individual records of AEC controlled and administered civilian personnel will be processed in accordance with special instructions prescribed by the laboratory or agency having administrative jurisdiction over such personnel.
 - f. Upon completion of provisions of paragraph 19a, b, c, d and e, above, letter reports will be submitted through channels to the Surgeon General, USA; the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, USN; the Surgeon General, USAF and the Director, Division of Biology

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Radiological Safety Regulations
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

and Medicine, AEC, indicating, in general, the action taken to dispose of individual dose records, comments on over-exposures if applicable and any pertinent remarks considered of interest to the above offices.

20. Training. The inclusion of radiological safety organizations throughout the task force will require two general levels of training; basic indoctrination and technical training. The scope of instruction within each of these levels will vary in accordance with the requirements of different operational and staff levels. Basic indoctrination will include primary, non-technical instruction in radiological safety measures and techniques. This must be imparted to all personnel of the task force to enable them to perform their assigned duties efficiently within the allowable low exposures, regardless of the presence of radioactive contaminants. Technical training will include the training of the majority of the personnel who will be required to staff the task force radiological safety organizations and perform the technical operations involved. This will be accomplished through the utilization of existing Service courses and establishment of suitable courses at task group level. This instruction will be designed to train radiological defense monitors, decontamination personnel and radiological instrument repairmen.
21. These regulations have the concurrence of the Surgeon General, USA; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Surgeon General, USAF and the Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC.
22. This appendix has been designed for reduced security classification in order to facilitate wide dissemination and may be downgraded to RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION provided all references to Joint Task Force SEVEN and its subordinate units are deleted.

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Appendix II to Annex N
Radiological Safety, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY OFFICE AND CENTER

1. A JTF SEVEN radiological safety office (RadSafe Office) and a TG 7.1 radiological safety center (RadSafe Center) will be established for each shot. The RadSafe Office, manned by personnel of the Technical Branch of the task force Operations Division (J-3), will operate as the task force staff agency responsible for the dissemination of task force radiological directives, the presentation of radiological shot briefing material and the maintenance of displays of radiological information having an impact on the overall task force mission. The RadSafe Center will be established by CTG 7.1 and will serve as operations headquarters for the radiological safety activities of TG 7.1. Pertinent data collected at the RadSafe Center will be forwarded to the RadSafe Office at the task force command post.

2. Detailed Duties

a. RadSafe Office

(1) The RadSafe Office, in coordination with CTG 7.1 who will develop the air RADEX plot, will assemble the overall RADEX situation and disseminate the air and surface RADEX prior to shot time (forecast) and will originate messages from time to time after shot time announcing 9 (Reentry) Hour, radiological clearances of previously closed areas, radiological directives to task groups, advisories to commands external to the task force and revisions of the air and surface RADEX as required.

(2) The RadSafe Office will be responsible for the preparation of RadSafe forecast information for the shot briefings.

(3) The RadSafe Office will maintain displays of radiological information pertinent to the test area and having an impact outside this area to include radiation levels on atoll islands and lagoon, RADEX information, cloud trajectories and their relation to occupied atolls and air and surface routes contiguous to the danger area, ship movements in the danger area, results of water sampling and such other items of special radiological consideration as may be required by the operation or the scientific projects.

(4) Physical Locations of RadSafe Office

a. For BIKINI ATOLL shots: Command ship

b. For ENIWETOK ATOLL shots: Operations Division (J-3), JTF SEVEN Headquarters building, PARRY ISLAND.

b. RadSafe Center

(1) The RadSafe Center will maintain radiological situation data on lagoon waters and islands of the shot atoll, based on air and ground survey information, supplemented by monitor reports. This information will be the basis of periodic situation reports or maps and briefing information furnished to the task force and task group commanders.

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Radiological Safety Office and Center
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

(2) The RadSafe Center will provide information for the planning of TG 7.1 radiological safety operations and for the disposition of all working parties within the contaminated area. It will establish radiological safety check points. It will maintain an operations table giving details for all groups who plan to enter contaminated areas each day, including name of monitor, destination, general type of mission (program or project number) and time of departure and return.

(3) The RadSafe Center will provide special clothing to previously designated recovery personnel, have cognizance over working schedules of the radiochemical laboratory, photodosimetry developing facilities, contaminated laundry, personnel decontamination facilities, radiac repair, etc of TG 7.1. Personnel decontamination facilities afloat will be coordinated with existing ship facilities

(4) Physical Locations of RadSafe Center

a. For BIKINI ATOLL shots. The RadSafe Center will initially operate from the CVE facilities. At a later time, radiological conditions permitting, the center will provide a detachment at pre-prepared positions ashore to operate all its activities except radiochemistry and photodosimetry

b. For ENIWETOK ATOLL shots. The RadSafe Center will operate all of its facilities from the radiological safety building on PARRY ISLAND (Building 57).

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Appendix III to Annex N
Radiological Safety, CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

HAZARDS RESULTING FROM ATOMIC BOMB EXPLOSIONS

1. Nature of Hazards

a. When an atomic bomb explosion occurs, tremendous quantities of energy in a variety of forms are released. This energy is propagated outward in all directions.

b. The immediate reaction is intense emission of ultraviolet, visible and infrared (heat) radiation, gamma rays and neutrons. This is accompanied by the formation of a large ball of fire. A large part of the energy from the explosion is emitted as a shock wave. The ball of fire produces a mushroom-shaped mass of hot gases, the top of which rises rapidly. In the trail below the mushroom cap, a thin column is left. The cloud and column are then carried downward, the direction and speed being determined by the direction and speed of the wind at the various levels of air from the surface to base of mushroom cap. Part of the energy from the explosion results in an ocean surface wave which is considered of minor nature directly to the task force.

c. All personnel of the task force will be well outside of the range of all hazard at the time of detonation, except for the light from the fire ball. The light of explosion is so intense that permanent injury to the eye may result from viewing the ball of fire at close range with the naked eye or through binoculars. Ordinary dark glasses will not suffice and all personnel who do not have the special protective glasses, which will be issued in limited numbers by TG 7.1, must be facing 180 degrees from the detonation with the eyes closed.

d. The emission of dangerous nuclear radiation can be separated into two time periods. The primary radiation which occurs at the time of the flash is composed of gamma rays and neutrons. Casualties may result from this primary radiation if the exposure occurs within a certain range of ground zero. Secondary radiation is due to activation of the soil around ground zero and to fall-out.

e. Following the detonation, personnel entering shot areas will be exposed to beta particles and gamma rays coming from induced neutron activity in the soil and any fission products which might have been deposited on the ground. There may also be a potential alpha particle hazard from the unfissioned fissionable materials which may be deposited on the ground.

2. Protection

a. Against the primary radiological effects, distance will provide protection.

b. Against the secondary radioactivity hazards from radioactive fission products, induced radioactivity and unfissioned residue, detection and avoidance provide the best protection. Suitable instruments indicate both the presence and intensity of radioactivity at a given place. Area reconnaissance, the maintenance of contamination

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Hazards Resulting From Atomic Bomb Explosions
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-55

situation maps, the posting of areas of hazard and minimizing the spread of contaminated material into uncontaminated areas constitute the active measures for reducing the radiological hazard.

c. Personnel within an operational radius of ground zero who are to be facing in the direction of the flash will be required to wear special goggles to protect their eyes against excessive light. Personnel within the above operational radius who are not provided goggles will face, with eyes closed, in the opposite direction from the flash. After ten (10) seconds, such personnel may turn around and observe the phenomena.

3. Anticipated Hazard Areas

a. Immediately under the bomb burst there will be an area of intense radioactivity extending downwind and, to some extent, crosswind and upwind with gradually decreasing intensity.

b. Extending downwind, and to some extent, crosswind and upwind an airborne radioactive hazard will exist. Its characteristics will depend on the meteorological influences such as wind speed and direction at various altitudes up to the maximum height reached by the cloud.

c. Contaminated water in the lagoon adjacent to the shot site may be of consequence and will be analyzed by the radiological safety unit of TG 7 1 immediately after shot time and at other intervals.

d. Unless care is exercised, individuals or objects entering contaminated areas may transfer radioactivity to clean areas.

e. By means of instruments such as Geiger-Mueller counters and ion chambers it is possible to detect the area of contamination and to measure the intensity of the radioactivity. Radiation intensity will normally be measured and reported in roentgens per hour. Besides those instruments dosimeters and film badges will be used as indicators of the accumulated exposure to radioactivity. Only personnel involved in work near, or in, radioactive areas will wear film badges to provide a permanent record of exposure, except that film badges will be issued to ten (10) percent of ship crews to aid in estimating crew dosage in the event of heavy fall-out.

f. The intensity of the radioactive hazard tends to decrease with time due to decay of radioactive materials and dispersion and dilution, depending upon climatic conditions. As an approximation, the intensity of the surface contamination from the fission products decreases by radioactive decay inversely with the time after the detonation. As a further approximation, the intensity of water contamination decreases by radioactive decay and diffusion inversely with the square of the time after the detonation.

4. This appendix has been designed for reduced security classification in order to permit wide dissemination to all personnel of the command and may be downgraded to RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION provided all references to Joint Task Force SEVEN and its subordinate units are deleted.

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex O to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

SEARCH AND RESCUE

Reference: (a) Search and Rescue Joint Standard Operating Procedures, Pacific.

(b) JANAP 300, The Air-Sea Rescue Manual

1. Responsibilities

a. Responsibilities of commanders for search and rescue (SAR) operations within their respective commands are set forth in reference (1). Specifically, as relates to the area of primary concern to CJTF SEVEN, responsibility for search and rescue is assigned by CINCPAC to the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier (COMHAWSEAFRON).

b. Reference (a) further provides that:

"For tactical aircraft, operating on unit combat or training missions, the primary responsibility for SAR rests with the commander exercising operational control of the aircraft regardless of the area of operation. This responsibility may be delegated to subordinate commanders. Commanders holding SAR responsibility as defined above shall insure that their operating forces are familiar with the rescue facilities and procedures of the SAR area in which they are operating and shall request assistance as necessary from the appropriate area SAR commander. Once the area SAR commander has been requested to provide assistance he assumes SAR control".

The paragraph quoted is applicable to Operation CASTLE and places certain responsibilities on CJTF SEVEN.

2. Tasks For Subordinate Units

a. CTG 7.4 will:

(1) Have primary search and rescue responsibility for all JTF SEVEN air and surface units in the BIKINI-ENIWETOK area during Operation CASTLE.

(2) Take necessary measures to insure familiarity and compliance with the provisions of references (a) and (b).

(3) Conduct the necessary liaison with the area SAR commander and appropriate SAR coordination center to insure necessary exchange of information and effective integration of JTF SEVEN forces into area SAR plans.

(4) Forward requests to CJTF SEVEN for SAR coverage required in addition to own capabilities. Such requests will be made sufficiently in advance of proposed operations to allow for the positioning of the additional equipment required.

b. CTG 7.3 will:

(1) Require all units to familiarize themselves and comply with

Search and Rescue
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the provisions of references (a) and (b).

(2) Conduct training and have available suitable SAR equipment in order to provide assistance to CTG 7.4 and the area SAR commander as necessary.

(3) Have available a qualified officer for liaison with CTG 7.4 or his representative when that commander is carrying out his SAR functions.

3. Independent Action The responsibilities delineated above in no way affect the responsibilities of any commander to engage in operations upon his own initiative as the circumstances dictate. Independent action must be immediately reported to, and coordinated with, the appropriate SAR commander.

4. Command and Communication

a. JTF SEVEN SAR activities will be commanded by CTG 7.4 until such time as control is assumed by the area SAR commander.

b. Command Posts

CJTF SEVEN	PARRY ISLAND, M.I. (while ashore)
	USS ESTES (AGC-12) (while afloat)
CTG 7.3	USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)
CTG 7.4	ENIWETOK ISLAND, M.I.
CINCPACFLT (SAR Commander, Pacific Command)	PEARL HARBOR, T.H.
COMNAVSEAFRON (Area SAR Commander)	PEARL HARBOR, T.H.
CO, NAVSTA KWAJALEIN (SAR Coordination Center)	KWAJALEIN, M.I.

c. Communications as specified in reference (a).

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex P to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

BOAT PLAN

1. Following is the allocation of responsibility for normal operation of boats and harbor craft at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS during the operational phase of CATTLE:
 - a. At BIKINI ATOLL. As both CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.5 will provide large scale boat pool service for multiple using agencies, overall control of this activity by either task group commander is not considered feasible. Accordingly:
 - (1) A joint task force scheduling panel consisting of representatives from TG 7.3 and TG 7.5 will conduct boat pool operations directly under the supervision of CJTF SEVEN, who will have final responsibility for scheduling control and coordination.
 - (2) The scheduling panel will coordinate schedules. The TG 7.3 member will dispatch Navy boats and the TG 7.5 member will dispatch H&N boats to meet the requirements of using agencies. In order to permit proper scheduling and maximum utilization of small craft, using agencies will be required to plan movement activities well in advance and notify the scheduling panel. Normally, requirements will be submitted to the scheduling panel prior to the day transportation is required. Omnibus and combined trips will be used when practicable.
 - (3) During operations ashore, the scheduling panel will be located on ENINMAN ISLAND and when the task force goes afloat it will be in the LSD.
 - (4) Prior to Shot #4 (ECHO), certain elements of the TG 7.5 boat pool may be redeployed to ENIWETOK ATOLL. Prior to Shot #7 (KOON), the remaining elements of the TG 7.5 boat pool will be redeployed to ENIWETOK ATOLL.
 - b. At ENIWETOK ATOLL
 - (1) CTG 7.2 and CTG 7.5 will continue to operate their respective boat pools in accordance with existing procedures.
 - (2) Augmentation of TG 7.2 boat pool operations will be provided by CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.5 if CJTF SEVEN determines that capacity population on ENIWETOK ISLAND requires such augmentation.
2. All using agencies will coordinate in the establishment of a priority system for boat requirements and apply the system to their respective organizations.
3. A scheduling panel will be established at ENIWETOK ATOLL during the ENIWETOK phase of the operation, if required.
4. During periods of evacuation, CJTF SEVEN will establish priorities

Boat Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

for the movement of boats and harbor craft.

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex Q to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

AIRLIFT PLAN

1. General. The limited availability of aircraft to support inter-island and inter-atoll airlift operations will necessitate maximum utilization of all airlift equipment in the forward area. To assure maximum utilization and provide efficient service in support of the overall task force mission, aircraft will be centrally controlled and dispatched by the commander responsible for providing the service. Using agencies will be required to plan movement activities well in advance in order to permit proper scheduling. When combined task group lift requirements exceed the available lift, CJTF SEVEN (or his designated representative on site) will act as arbiter and determine priority in light of the overall joint task force mission. All using agencies will coordinate in the establishment of a priority system for airlift requirements and apply the system to their respective organizations. In addition to normal airlift operations these aircraft will be utilized to accomplish security patrol flights in support of CTG 7.2; assist in search and rescue activities, and accomplish insecticide spray flights as directed by CJTF SEVEN.
2. Inter Island Airlift Operations. The following allocation of responsibility is established for conducting inter-island airlift operations at ENIWETOK and HIKINI ATOLLS during the operational phase of CASTLE:
 - a. At HIKINI ATOLL
 - (1) CTG 7.3 will provide a helicopter airlift system, operating from the CVE and from ENINMAN ISLAND.
 - (2) As required by CJTF SEVEN, CTG 7.4 will place additional helicopters and personnel under the operational control of CTG 7.3 to augment the TG 7.3 helicopter lift system.
 - (3) CTG 7.3 will schedule and dispatch all helicopters.
 - (4) Normally requirements for helicopter use will be submitted to CTG 7.3 by using agencies prior to the day lift is required. Requirements will be detailed to include complete inter-island itinerary and lift load.
 - (5) Helicopter service for immediate reentry activities will be conducted from the CVE.
 - b. At ENIWETOK ATOLL
 - (1) CTG 7.4 will provide a liaison aircraft and helicopter lift system, operating from ENIWETOK ISLAND.
 - (2) CTG 7.2 will place the Army helicopter element under operational control of CTG 7.4.
 - (3) Upon completion of HIKINI operations, CTG 7.3 will place additional helicopters under the operational control of CTG 7.4, if required by CJTF SEVEN to augment the TG 7.4 helicopter lift system.

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(4) CTG 7.4 will schedule and dispatch all liaison and helicopter aircraft.

(5) Normally, requirements for liaison aircraft and helicopter use will be submitted to CTG 7.4 by using agencies prior to the day lift is required. Requirements will be detailed, to include complete inter-island itinerary and lift load.

3. Inter-Atoll Airlift Operations

a. CTG 7.4 will provide an inter-atoll airlift system between ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS, with flights to other atolls in the forward area as required to support joint task force elements.

b. Normally, requirements for personnel and cargo space will be placed with CTG 7.4 by using agencies prior to the day lift is required.

c. On KOON minus one day, all C-47 aircraft will be withdrawn from ENIWETOK-BIKINI service. Subsequent to KOON shot the ENIWETOK-BIKINI service will be provided by PBM aircraft, taking off from ENIWETOK ISLAND airstrip and landing in the BIKINI lagoon.

d. CTG 7.3 will place two (2) PBM aircraft under the operational control of CTG 7.4 to augment the ENIWETOK-BIKINI airlift system.

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex R to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

SHOT PHASE EVACUATION AND REENTRY PLAN

1. This plan envisages the employment of one (1) transport ship of the AP type to accommodate approximately fifty (50) percent of personnel to be evacuated during designated phases of the operation. The remaining personnel to be evacuated will be accommodated aboard assigned task force vessels.
2. The current concept as to effects of the BIKINI detonations on various islands and installations of BIKINI ATOLL necessitates that personnel evacuation be accomplished as follows:
 - a. Shot #1 (BRAVO), Shot #2 (UNION), Shot #3 (YANKEE), Shot #5 (NECTAR), Shot #6 (RCMEO)
 - (1) With the exception of the firing party on ENYU (and possibly a small maintenance party on ENINMAN), BIKINI ATOLL will be evacuated of all personnel. The number of personnel on ENYU (and ENINMAN) will be within the capability of helicopter lift.
 - (2) In the event of excessive contamination of the ENINMAN ISLAND camp, a limited capability will exist for indefinite operations from afloat.
 - (3) Boat pool craft, not accompanying the evacuation to sea, will either be anchored in deep water in the southern part of BIKINI lagoon or beached on the ENINMAN ISLAND group or ENYU ISLAND.
 - b. Shot #7 (KOCN). Total pre-shot evacuation of all personnel (less Firing Party on ENYU) will be necessary. Equipment not previously redeployed to ENIWETOK ATOLL will be relocated on ENYU (and/or BIKINI) ISLAND prior to shot time.
 - c. Shot #4 (ECHO). There will be no pre-shot evacuation of personnel from ENIWETOK ATOLL although all personnel will be moved from the northern islands to ENIWETOK and PARRY ISLANDS prior to time of shot.
3. Relocation of equipment and materiel during the various phases of the operation will be in conformity with plans formulated on site.
4. During the ENIWETOK phase of the operation, the task force will maintain a capability for emergency post-shot evacuation. Such an evacuation will be executed on order of CJTF SEVEN in the event radiological contamination conditions so dictate; will be for personnel safety only; and will not involve materiel or personal belongings other than toilet articles. Any such evacuation will be capable of accomplishment on four (4) hours notice. During shot phases at BIKINI, personnel at ENIWETOK ATOLL will be in an alert status. Although remote, there is a possibility that ENIWETOK ATOLL will be subjected to radioactive fall-out during BIKINI operations. In the event radioactive fall-out is detected at ENIWETOK ATOLL, a predesignated signal will be given at which time all personnel will proceed to covered areas (buildings and tents) and remain under cover until an all clear signal is sounded. Should over-contamination become apparent, CJTF SEVEN will order that an evacuation be

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Shot Phase Evacuation and Reentry Plan
CJTF SEVEN No 3-53

conducted, using available aircraft and sea-going vessels. Should it become necessary, specified task force vessels will proceed, on order of CJTF SEVEN, from BIKINI to ENIWETOK to assist in the emergency evacuation of all endangered personnel. Detailed instructions will be disseminated on site.

5. If reentry to either or both atolls is delayed beyond the period that the task force can reasonably sustain itself afloat, provisions will be made for an alternate destination landing.
6. Detailed instructions for evacuation and reentry will be contained in shot directives published in the forward area prior to each shot. The Assistant Chief of Staff, J-4, Headquarters, JTF SEVEN, will coordinate the preparation of all detailed evacuation and reentry plans on site. Each task group commander will designate an evacuation officer to assist in the preparation of these plans.
7. Tasks for Subordinate Units

a. CTG 7.1 will:

(1) Be responsible for the removal of all TG 7.1 personnel from the shot site danger area prior to each shot.

(2) When directed by CJTF SEVEN and with facilities made available by CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.5, evacuate TG 7.1 personnel from BIKINI ATOLL.

(3) Be prepared, on order of CJTF SEVEN, to conduct emergency post-shot evacuation of TG 7.1 personnel from ENIWETOK ATOLL (less ENIWETOK ISLAND).

b. CTG 7.2 will be prepared, on order of CJTF SEVEN, to conduct emergency post shot evacuation from ENIWETOK ATOLL of all personnel based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

c. CTG 7.3 will:

(1) Provide shipboard command, control and communications facilities for CJTF SEVEN and staff; also provide command and administrative space for Headquarters, TG 7.1 and TG 7.5.

(2) Provide facilities afloat to house elements of the joint task force while afloat at BIKINI. Augmentation of housekeeping personnel for TG 7.1 and TG 7.5 will be provided for by CTG 7.5.

(3) Provide capability for emergency post-shot evacuation of personnel when pre-shot evacuation has not been conducted.

(4) Direct the movement of the evacuation vessels at sea in accordance with on-site shot directives.

(5) Provide a helicopter lift system to support evacuation, recovery and reentry operations.

(6) Provide for the security of the task force afloat.

(7) Assist CTG 7.5 in the movement of BIKINI based personnel to designated vessels.

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Shot Phase Evacuation and Reentry Plan
CJTF SEVEN No. 3-53

d. CTG 7.4 will:

(1) By use of assigned aircraft, assist in the emergency evacuation of personnel from endangered areas.

(2) Assist TG 7.2 in the emergency evacuation of personnel based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

e. CTG 7.5 will:

(1) When directed by CJTF SEVEN and with facilities made available by CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.4, evacuate TG 7.5 personnel and supporting military personnel from BIKINI ATOLL.

(2) Be prepared, upon directive from CJTF SEVEN, to conduct emergency post-shot evacuation of TG 7.5 personnel from ENIWETOK ATOLL, less ENIWETOK ISLAND. Assume responsibility for the evacuation of TG 7.2 MP personnel from EBERIRU ISLAND.

(3) Augment the shipboard housekeeping personnel of CTG 7.3 with such personnel as necessary to support TG 7.1 and TG 7.5 elements afloat.

(4) Assist in reentry operations as required.

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HON), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
10 February 1954

Annex 3 to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 3-53

OFFICIAL OBSERVER PLAN

1. General. The AEC and the Department of Defense have indicated that "Official Observers" will be kept at a minimum and on a basis of "need to know". This statement is interpreted to mean those who are familiar with the technical issues involved in the experiments and whose current assignments include a genuine need for knowledge of the operation.
2. Number of Observers Authorized. The CJTF SEVEN has recommended that twenty (20) be the ceiling figure for the number of "Official Observers" to be present for any specified shot. This ceiling is imposed because of limited facilities and the intense activity preceding and following a shot.
3. Invitations. Invitations will be extended by the AEC and the Military Liaison Committee.
4. Security. Invitations will include pertinent security instructions pertaining to classification of the operation. With the acceptance of invitations, observers will be required to sign a security acknowledgement. Hqs, JTF SEVEN Security Memorandum No. 7, dated 22 October 1953, para 4a, applies. All observers will be "Q" cleared.
5. Policy. It is the policy of this headquarters that written requests for official observer space received by task group commanders or staff officers of this headquarters be forwarded to CJTF SEVEN, Attention: Chief of Staff. Individuals submitting verbal requests or inquiries will be informed that such requests should be submitted either to the AEC or the Military Liaison Committee.
6. Procedure. The names of observers who have been extended invitations will be submitted to CJTF SEVEN. CJTF SEVEN will delegate responsibilities for preliminary planning and conduct of the program. Details pertinent to the conduct of the program will include issuance of orders, suggested clothing and equipment, transportation, reception, quartering, messing, the issuance of necessary administrative instructions and briefings.

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REF ID: A66666
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Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex S to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

OFFICIAL OBSERVER PLAN

TO BE DISTRIBUTED AT A LATER DATE

S-1
REF ID: A66666
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex T to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53

PHOTOGRAPHY PLAN

1. General Situation

a. Operation CASTLE will be recorded on film, still and motion picture as a basis for:

(1) A task force commander's visual report to AEC and the JCS of Operation CASTLE.

(2) A short film (so called "quickies") to be available as soon after each shot as possible.

(3) Additional footage required in the production of a film depicting the history of weapons development.

(4) A technical report film (approximately 45 minutes) depicting Armed Forces participation in CASTLE.

(5) Required technical coverage.

(6) A photographic record for historical purposes.

(7) A short, unclassified version of (1) above (approximately 15 minutes).

b. The JCS have established a military requirement for the USAF Lookout Mountain Laboratory to support CASTLE and Hq, USAF has approved its employment to support a technical report photography unit in TG 7 2.

2. Technical Report Photography Requirements

a. Sufficient motion picture and still coverage of events will be accomplished to produce the following:

(1) The CJTF SEVEN visual report to the AEC and the JCS. This film, approximately forty-five (45) minutes in duration, will contain only a limited amount of technical details and will be classified not higher than SECRET. The extent of technical coverage will be governed by the classification conditions at the time the film is produced. It will be tailored for wide distribution to persons concerned with supporting the AEC but who do not require extensive technical information (Congressmen, Bureau of the Budget officials, etc.).

(2) A short film produced after each shot to provide quick visual information to Commissioners and other AEC personnel. These will be tailored to provide more detailed information than the customary post-shot statement of yield and degree of success normally provides. Speed of production will be the keynote. No classification limitation will be placed on these films.

(3) Additional footage required in the later production by AEC of a film depicting the entire history of weapons development. No classification limitation will be placed on this footage.

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(4) A technical report film (approximately 45 minutes) depicting Armed Forces participation in CASTLE.

(5) Complete still coverage of the operation, including photographs for reproduction in the narrative history of the operation, as required.

(6) A short, unclassified version of (1), above, (approximately 15 minutes). This film will be tailored for wide dissemination.

b. Distribution and Control will be as follows:

(1) Film (except first-run prints) produced in accordance with AEC requirements will be distributed and controlled by the Division of Military Application, USAEC, in conformity with existing AEC policies and procedures at the time the film is edited.

(2) Film (except first-run prints) produced in accordance with DOD requirements will be distributed and controlled by AFSWP in conformity with existing DOD policies and procedures at the time the film is edited.

(3) Complete cataloging and indexing of all film exposed in the operation, both still photographs and motion picture footage, will be accomplished. Cataloging will be accomplished by the microfilm process, with one (1) copy of the final catalog distributed to AEC, LOS ALAMOS and one (1) copy to AFSWP. The DMA and AFSWP will be the coordinating authority for additional prints required by AEC and DOD agencies, respectively, for any stock footage shown in the catalog.

c. Assignment of Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) CTG 7.1 will:

(a) Plan the technical report photography program for CASTLE to meet the aforementioned requirements.

(b) Prepare script for the motion picture requirements.

(c) Procure and store photographic supplies and equipment required to conduct the photography program.

(d) Execute the photography program in accordance with approved plans and produce required motion picture and still photography.

(e) Assign proper security classification to all operations, equipment, supplies and pictures of the photography program.

(f) Safeguard all exposed film in accordance with proper security classification. Original negatives and library prints of all technical report films will be stored at Lookout Mountain Laboratory.

(g) Coordinate technical report photography operations with technical photography operations as practicable, particularly in the common use of support services.

(h) Perform additional tasks as assigned by CJTF SEVEN.

(2) Other task groups will support TG 7.1 as required in photo-

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graphic recording of operations involving their respective task groups.

3. Technical Photography

a. General Situation By "Agreement Between Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and Atomic Energy Commission Regarding Exchange of Photography from Atomic Weapons Tests", details were formulated for the mutual exchange of photography accomplished at atomic weapons tests and methods designed for implementing the agreement, particularly as regards the selection, distribution, storage, classification, reproduction and funding thereof.

b. Technical Photographic Requirement - The photographic coverage as outlined in the above agreement will be made available to the respective agencies in accordance with the applicable portions of the agreement, except that advance prints of technical report photography produced under the provisions of paragraph 1. above, will not be furnished to any agencies prior to formal release of the entire coverage by CJTF SEVEN.

c. Distribution and Control. Photography coming within the purview of the above agreement (except as noted in paragraph 2b, above) will be distributed and controlled in accordance with the applicable portions thereof.

d. Assignment of Tasks to Subordinate Units

(1) CGO 2.1 will normally control the bulk of the technical photography, is charged with coordination of the mutual exchange of prints coming within the purview of the agreement and this annex.

(2) Other task groups will support CGO 2.1 as required in photographic recording of technical operations involving their respective task groups.

4. Commanders of all task groups will establish necessary procedures to assure that complete control accountability is maintained of all photographic equipment and supplies to protect them from damage, deterioration and waste. Strict economy will be practiced in the use of film and other photographic materials and critical supplies.

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

OFFICIAL

W. S. Cowart Jr.
WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

~~RESTRICTED~~

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.
10 November 1953

Annex U to CTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 2-53

RADIOACTIVE SAMPLES RETURN PLAN

RESTRICTED DATA

Limited Distribution At a Later Date

~~SECRET~~