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U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM.
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FM MARLON E GATES MGR USAEC NV00 LAS VEGAS NEV
TO MAJ GEN FRANK A CAMM AGMMA USAEC WASHDC (PERSONAL)

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UNCLAS////EYES ONLY//// SECTION 1 OF 2

SINCE MARCH OF 1972, THE NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE HAS HAD INCREASING COMMITMENT TO AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIONS PERTAINING TO THE PROJECTED RETURN OF ENIWETOK - FIRST TO THE TRUST TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION AND LATER TO THE ENIWETOK PEOPLE THEMSELVES. BECAUSE OF THE REMOTE LOCATION, THE EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE POLITICAL SITUATION, AND THE NECESSITY FOR TIMELY AND DECISIVE ACTION, THE MANAGER, NV HAS FOUND IT NECESSARY TO PLACE HEAVY PERSONAL RELIANCE UPON THE ASSISTANT MANAGER FOR OPERATIONS, UNDER WHOSE COGNIZANCE ALL OF NV'S ACTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. MUCH OF THE TIME THAT ASSISTANT MANAGER, ROGER RAY, HAS FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ACT UNDER A BROAD CHARTER OF AUTHORITY WITHOUT THE SUPPORT WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE PROVIDED BY CONVENTIONAL STAFFING; ALTHOUGH, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, I HAVE FOUND HIS JUDGMENTS TO BE SOUND AND FULLY WARRANTED BY THE

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CIRCUMSTANCES AT HAND, I AM AWARE THAT AT TIMES THEY HAVE COME INTO QUESTION FOR STYLE, IF NOT FOR CONTENT.

I UNDERSTAND THAT FIVE SPECIFIC ACTIONS HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED BY THE DNA STAFF AND THAT THESE HAVE COME TO YOUR ATTENTION AS MATTERS OF CONCERN TO GEN. DUNN. FOUR OF THE FIVE HAVE OCCURRED DURING MY TENURE AS MANAGER, NV, AND I CAN ADDRESS THEM FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. THE REMAINING ONE, WHICH I SHALL ADDRESS FIRST, I HAVE CAREFULLY RESEARCHED IN THE RECORD AND MY COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE BASED UPON THAT RESEARCH AS WELL AS DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH MY DEPUTY, WHO AT THE TIME WAS ACTING AS THE MANAGER.

FIRST, THE SO-CALLED QUARANTINE OF RUNIT. IN MID-MAY, 1972, AS OUR PRELIMINARY RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY OF ENIWETOK WAS BEING COMPLETED, RAY LEARNED, INFORMALLY, OF A PLANNED VISIT OF ENIWETOK TRADITIONAL LEADERS TO ENIWETOK ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR LAWYERS AND BY A NUMBER OF TRUST TERRITORY OFFICIALS. KNOWING OF THE SERIOUS RADIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN IDENTIFIED AND BEING SENSITIVE ALSO TO THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE VISIT, HE JOINED THE PARTY AT KWAJALEIN AND RETAINED TWO MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AT ENIWETOK TO PROVIDE A RADIOLOGICAL

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ESCORT AND TO INTERPRET TO THE MARSHALLESE THE REQUIREMENTS WHICH WE THEN SAW FOR ACTIONS PRECEDENT TO ANY REHABILITATION EFFORT. UPON ARRIVAL AT ENIWETOK, RAY LEARNED THAT HIS RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY PARTY HAD RETRIEVED ON RUNIT ISLAND THREE PIECES OF DEBRIS WHICH IT WAS THEN BELIEVED MIGHT CONTAIN METALLIC PLUTONIUM. THESE FRAGMENTS WERE RETURNED BY SPECIAL COURIER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON FOR PRIORITY ANALYSIS, WITH A REQUEST THAT THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS BE REPORTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UPON COMPLETION OF THE MARSHALLESE VISIT TO ENIWETOK, THE PARTY RETURNED TO KWAJALEIN AND, WHILE THERE, ROGER RECEIVED THE REPORT HE HAD REQUESTED. IT CONFIRMED THAT THE PARTICLES WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY METALLIC PLUTONIUM. KNOWING THE PROBABLE SOURCE OF THIS MATERIAL AND, THEREFORE, THAT A LARGE QUANTITY OF PLUTONIUM PROBABLY REMAINED ON RUNIT, HE BECAME DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT NO MEASURES WERE BEING TAKEN OR WERE AVAILABLE TO PREVENT SERIOUS CONTAMINATION OF PEOPLE, EQUIPMENT, VEHICLES, AND MARINE CRAFT, AND, THROUGH THEM, PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION OF ENIWETOK ISLAND AND EVEN AIRCRAFT DEPARTING THEREFROM. HE IMMEDIATELY CONSULTED WITH THE DNA PACE PROJECT OFFICER AND WITH THE SAMTEC LIAISON OFFICER ON KWAJALEIN AND INFORMED THEM THAT HE FELT IT HIS

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RESPONSIBILITY TO CAUSE PREVENTIVE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN. TO THAT
END HE PREPARED AND COORDINATED WITH THE AFORENAMED INDIVIDUALS
A TELETYPE TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, SAMTEC, AT VANDENBURG
AFB, RECOMMENDING THAT THE CG, SAMTEC, MAJ. GEN. LOW, INVOKE
A QUARANTINE UNTIL APPROPRIATE CONTROLS COULD BE ESTABLISHED.
AS SOON AS HE REACHED HONOLULU AND WAS ABLE TO DISCUSS THIS
MATTER BY TELEPHONE, HE TELEPHONED THE ACTING MANAGER, NV TO
INITIATE THE NECESSARY FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS.

I FIND ROGER'S ACTIONS IN THE RUNIT MATTER TO BE ENTIRELY
CONSISTENT WITH THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF HIS OFFICE.
I FIND NO BASIS FOR QUESTIONING HIS TECHNICAL JUDGMENT OR
HIS APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IN GIVING PROMPT AND CLEAR ADVICE
TO THAT OFFICIAL WHO HAD BOTH THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
AUTHORITY TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION.

THE SECOND ISSUE, I UNDERSTAND, IS DESCRIBED AS A MEETING BETWEEN
ROGER RAY AND BRIG. GEN. BRICKEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AE). SOMETIME BEFORE THE SEPT. 7
INTERAGENCY MEETING, ROGER AND DR. WALT NERVIK OF LIVERMORE
DISCUSSED THE MATTER OF LABORATORY ANALYTICAL WORKLOAD SUPPORTING
THE ENIWETOK PROGRAM. RECOGNIZING THAT MOST OF THE AVAILABLE

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LABORATORY CAPACITY WHICH WAS THEN AVAILABLE TO US WAS ALREADY HEAVILY COMMITTED, WALT NERVIK SUGGESTED THAT MCCLELLAN HAD THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND HE UNDERSTOOD, INFORMALLY, WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE. RECOGNIZING THAT SUCH PARTICIPATION WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE A DIRECTIVE OR MISSION ASSIGNMENT FROM WASHINGTON, ROGER DECIDED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS THE FEASIBILITY OF SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT WITH SOMEONE FROM CARL WALSKE'S OFFICE BEFORE FORMALLY REQUESTING THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT. SINCE HE KNEW GEN. BRICKEL AND KNEW ALSO THAT BRICKEL WOULD BE AT THE INTERAGENCY MEETING, HE CALLED BRICKEL AND ASKED IF THEY MIGHT HAVE A BRIEF CONVERSATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE SEPT. 7 MEETING ON A SUBJECT WHICH HE FELT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO DISCUSS ON THE TELEPHONE. AS IT TURNED OUT, BRICKEL HAD A COMMITMENT BACK AT THE PENTAGON IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INTERAGENCY MEETING AND INVITED ROGER AND WALT NERVIK TO DROP BY HIS OFFICE FOR COFFEE AND CONVERSATION. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASK GEN. BRICKEL IF HE FELT THAT DR. WALSKE WOULD SUPPORT A REQUEST FOR MCCLELLAN LABORATORY ASSISTANCE, IF AND WHEN SUCH A REQUEST WERE MADE. SUBSEQUENTLY, AS YOU ARE AWARE, A FORMAL REQUEST ORIGINATED BY ME WAS PASSED THROUGH DMA

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TO DNA, WITH THE HOPED-FOR RESULT. SURELY ROGER HAD NO INTENTION OF BYPASSING ME OR YOU, OR THE DIRECTOR OF DNA OR ANYONE IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AT MCCLELLAN, IN SEEKING TO LEARN IN ADVANCE, AS A GOOD STAFF OFFICER SHOULD, WHAT WAS LIKELY TO BE THE REACTION TO A REQUEST HE ASKED HIS BOSS TO SIGN.

THE THIRD MATTER, I UNDERSTAND, HAS TO DO WITH THE SO-CALLED PULLOUT OF ENIWETOK AT THE TIME OF TYPHOON OLGA. THE TOTAL EVACUATION OF ENIWETOK ON OCT. 23 WAS DIRECTED BY CG, SAMTEC IN LIGHT OF A PREDICTION THAT THE TYPHOON WOULD DO SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE ATOLL. I ASSUME THAT THAT EVACUATION IS NOT IN QUESTION. THE RETURN TO ENIWETOK 36 HOURS LATER WAS INTENDED AS A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SURVEY PROGRAM COULD BE RESUMED. BY NOW YOU HAVE SEEN RAY'S TELETYPE REPORT TO ME ON THAT SUBJECT AND HAVE PERHAPS HEARD HIS ACCOUNT OF IT ON TAPE. THE DEPARTURE OF ALL AEC AND DNA PERSONNEL FROM ENIWETOK AT ABOUT 1300 LOCAL ON OCT. 25 WAS DICTATED BY A STATEMENT FROM THE SITE MANAGER THAT HE COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY PROJECT PERSONNEL AT THAT TIME. THE TIME OF DEPARTURE FROM ENIWETOK FOR KWAJALEIN WAS DICTATED BY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AT KWAJALEIN FOR THE EVACUATION AIRCRAFT. HAVING CONSULTED
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WITH THE SITE MANAGER IMMEDIATELY BEFORE DEPARTURE, ROGER WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS ESSENTIALLY NO LIKELIHOOD THAT THE AEC SURVEY COULD BE RESUMED FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. HE HAD AT THAT TIME APPROXIMATELY 20 SURVEY PERSONNEL ON KWAJALEIN WHO COULD DO NOTHING PRODUCTIVE AT THAT LOCATION. HE WAS AWARE OF SEVERE COMPETITION FOR SPACE ON MAC FLIGHTS FROM KWAJALEIN TO HONOLULU AND WAS AWARE ALSO OF THE FACT THAT A MAC PASSENGER FLIGHT WAS THEN AT KWAJALEIN DESTINED FOR HONOLULU WITH SEATS PROBABLY AVAILABLE. WITH TEN MINUTES AVAILABLE BEFORE TAKEOFF OF THE EVACUATION AIRCRAFT FOR ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO KWAJALEIN, HIS ONLY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION WITH KWAJALEIN WAS BY TELEPHONE TO THE COAST GUARD LORAN STATION AT ENIWETOK, THENCE BY COAST GUARD RADIO RELAY TO THE COAST GUARD STATION AT EBeye, THENCE TO THE AIR OPERATIONS OFFICE AT KWAJALEIN. OVER THIS CIRCUITOUS

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ROUTE, HE PASSED INSTRUCTIONS TO HAVE ALL MEMBERS OF HIS SURVEY TEAM WHO COULD BE ACCOMMODATED MANIFESTED ON THE MAC FLIGHT FOR HONOLULU -- THERE TO AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IN SOME WAY THIS INSTRUCTION WAS INTERPRETED TO APPLY ALSO TO THE HOLMES & NARVER PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN PARTICIPATING IN THE DNA ENGINEERING SURVEY AND THAT, AS A CONSEQUENCE, THEY TOO WERE ABOARD THE MAC FLIGHT TO HONOLULU.

ROGER'S JUDGMENT IN RETURNING HIS SURVEY PERSONNEL TO HONOLULU WAS ENTIRELY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY AT THE TIME. KNOWING THE FACTS THAT HE THEN HAD AT HAND, I ENDORSE HIS DECISION AS A WISE ONE. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS, OF COURSE, HAVE COMPLETELY SUPPORTED HIS ACTION. I REGRET, AS DOES HE, THE MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH CAUSED THE HOLMES & NARVER PEOPLE TO RETURN TO HONOLULU ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM OTHER THAN THEIR OWN PROJECT LEADER.

AS A FOURTH MATTER, I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM OF RAY'S "TALKING TO THE HELICOPTER PILOTS DIRECT". THE FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: UPON RETURN TO KWAJALEIN ON OCT. 25, ROGER RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM LT. COL. JOE ROBINSON OF MARINE AIR GROUP 36 ON OKINAWA, ADVISING THAT MAG 36 WAS COMMITTED TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER SUPPORT AT ENIWETOK COMMENCING ABOUT NOV. 1. COL. ROBINSON HAD HEARD THAT THE SURVEY WAS

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IN SOME DIFFICULTY DUE TO TYPHOON OLGA AND ASKED WHETHER MAG 36 SHOULD CONTINUE WITH ITS DEPLOYMENT PLANS. ROGER ADVISED THAT, IN HIS JUDGMENT,

IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MISSION COULD BE ACCOMMODATED AT ENIWETOK AS EARLY AS NOV. 1. LT. COL. ROBINSON INFORMED HIM THAT IT WAS FEASIBLE FOR THE CH-53 HELICOPTERS TO STAGE FROM KWAJALEIN AND ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE REASONABLE, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT, FOR THEM TO COME AHEAD ON APPROXIMATELY NOV. 1 AND REMAIN AT KWAJALEIN UNTIL ENIWETOK COULD RECEIVE THEM. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ASKED KWAJALEIN WHETHER THE NECESSARY SUPPORT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AND ASKED RAY TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT QUESTION. ROGER ADVISED LT. COL. ROBINSON THAT HE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT MODIFY THE EXISTING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT REQUEST BUT THAT HE WOULD SEE TO IT THAT AN APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION TO THE REQUEST WAS SENT TO CINCPAC. LATE THAT SAME EVENING, CAPT MCDYER OF THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING IN JAPAN TELEPHONED RAY AT KWAJALEIN

TO CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING WITH MAG 36. THESE TWO TELEPHONE CALLS, NEITHER OF WHICH WAS ORIGINATED BY ROGER RAY, WERE HIS ONLY DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE HELICOPTER RESOURCES. THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, HE RECEIVED AN INFORMATION COPY OF A FIRST MARINE AIR WING MESSAGE

TO COM, SEVENTH FLEET, WHEREIN HE, RAY, WAS BADLY MISQUOTED AS TO THE EXTENT OF STORM DAMAGE AT ENIWETOK. HE, THEREFORE, ORIGINATED A

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MESSAGE CORRECTING THAT INFORMATION. BY THIS TIME, I HAD ASKED ROGER TO COME TO HONOLULU TO MEET WITH ME, AND SO, IN THE MESSAGE CORRECTING THE STORM DAMAGE INFORMATION, HE REQUESTED A COORDINATING MEETING WITH APPROPRIATE CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES IN HONOLULU. DIRECTOR, DNA WAS MADE AN INFO ADDRESSEE ON THAT MESSAGE. ON THE SAME MORNING, RAY MET WITH LCDR BROWN AND EARL GILMORE AND, TOGETHER WITH THEM, DISCUSSED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF KMR THE PROPOSED REVISED HELICOPTER PROGRAM AND RELATED KMR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. DURING THIS PERIOD ON KWAJALEIN, THERE WERE FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS OF ALTERNATIVES WITH LCDR BROWN AND MR. GILMORE OF H&N; HOWEVER, EACH GROUP HAD ITS OWN DETAILED PROBLEMS TO DEAL WITH, THUS THE MESSAGE FROM RAY TO CINCPAC WAS NOT COORDINATED IN ADVANCE WITH THE DNA REPRESENTATIVE BUT WAS SHOWN TO HIM SOON AFTER IT WAS DISPATCHED.

THE FIFTH ITEM, I UNDERSTAND, HAS TO DO WITH WHAT IS SEEN TO BE A STRETCH-OUT IN THE AEC SURVEY PROGRAM. THE PROGRAM FOR THE FIELD SURVEY, AS YOU ARE AWARE, IS AN AEC PROGRAM PURSUANT TO YOUR DIRECTIVE TO ME. THE SCHEDULE WAS DEVELOPED BY NV TO OPTIMIZE THE USE OF THE RESOURCES WE HAD BEEN FURNISHED DURING A TIME WINDOW WHICH WAS CONSTRAINED BY SEVERAL EXTERNAL INFLUENCES. ITS REVISION WAS DICTATED BY THE IMPACT OF THE TYPHOON-RELATED DELAY AND OF CERTAIN

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LOGISTICS FACTORS OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN APPRISED. I ACCEPTED ROGER'S TELETYPE FROM KWAJALEIN AS A RECOMMENDATION BASED UPON HIS BEST JUDGMENT AND HIS SUPERIOR UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH THE JOB AT HAND AND THE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. IN EARLIER MESSAGES, I HAVE ADDRESSED THE DNA CONCERN OVER THE DELAY IN THE SOIL SURVEY PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT UPON DNA'S BUDGETARY ACTION. I HOPE THAT BY NOW IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EVEN IN THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE FOR THE FIELD SURVEY, IT WAS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT THE SOIL SURVEY RESULTS COULD HAVE ANY TIMELY AND MEANINGFUL IMPACT UPON DNA'S COST ESTIMATING IN THE FEB. 1973 TIME FRAME. THERE WERE, I AM INFORMED, NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS ON KWAJALEIN WITH THE DNA ENGINEERING SURVEY PERSONNEL. DNA WAS ASSURED AT THAT TIME THAT NV WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ENGINEERING SURVEY ON WHATEVER SCHEDULE DNA MIGHT ADOPT. THE REVISION OF THE SCHEDULE FOR THE RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY FOR WHICH I HAVE RESPONSIBILITY, HOWEVER, WAS A PROPER MATTER FOR ROGER TO RECOMMEND WITHIN HIS OWN COMMAND CHANNEL AND WAS, I THINK, NOT APPROPRIATELY SUBJECT TO EARLIER NEGOTIATION WITH ANY OUTSIDE ACTIVITY.

I HAVE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS HEARD AN ALLEGATION THAT ROGER RAY HAS **PICKED UP THE BALL AND RUN WITH IT**, HAS ACTED UNILATERALLY AND HAS BEEN **OUT AHEAD OF THE PACK** ON THE ENIWETOK MATTER. THE RECORD

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WILL SHOW THAT 16 MONTHS AGO HE WROTE A LETTER WHICH MY PREDECESSOR SIGNED, URGING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COORDINATED APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM; THAT HE HAS BEEN PERSONALLY AWARE OF THE BROAD IMPLI- CATIONS OF EVEN SEEMINGLY TRIVIAL ACTIONS. HE HAS ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION POINTED OUT TO ME THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL INTERAGENCY SUPPORT FOR ALL OF OUR ACTIONS. A FEW WEEKS AGO, WHEN THE INTERAGENCY GROUP DEVELOPED A PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE REGARDING THE SURVEY, ROGER HAD THE GOOD SENSE AND THE SENSITIVITY TO ASK THE RIGHT QUESTION AND DETERMINE THAT CARROLL DUNN HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED. HE WAS THE ONE WHO SUGGESTED THAT I CALL CARROLL, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE PRESS RELEASE WAS REWORKED SO AS NOT FURTHER AGGRAVATE CARROLL'S PROBLEMS IN THE HAWAII COURTS. AND, WHEN THE PRESS RELEASE WAS FINALLY SENT TO ROGER IN HONOLULU WITH INSTRUCTIONS (EMANATING FROM JOHN HARRIS' OFFICE) TO RELEASE IT TO THE HONOLULU NEWSPAPERS AND WIRE SERVICES, HE WAS AGAIN PERCEPTIVE ENOUGH TO REALIZE THE IMPLICATIONS TO THE TRUST TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION. HE PERSONALLY CLEARED WITH THE DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER A RELEASE WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN SIGNED OFF BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR IN WASHINGTON.

RAY HAS UNDOUBTEDLY MADE SOME MISTAKES IN ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP, FIELD AND DIRECT THIS MOST DIFFICULT EFFORT WHICH WAS AUTHORIZED LESS

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THAN TWO MONTHS AGO. BUT I WISH TO ASSURE YOU OF MY CONFIDENCE THAT AT NO TIME HAS HE DELIBERATELY OR EVEN KNOWINGLY DISREGARDED THE PREROGATIVES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CARROLL DUNN. IN HONOLULU I ASKED LCDR BROWN WHETHER HE FELT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. HIS ANSWER TO ME WAS THAT SOMETIMES WHEN THESE THINGS GET TO WASHINGTON THEY GET BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION. I HAVE NO RECOMMENDATION WITH WHICH TO END THIS MESSAGE, BUT I TRUST THAT IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN APPRAISING THE MANNER OF THE PROSECUTION OF THE WNIWETOK SURVEY TASK.

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