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*DM*

DNA1.950404.002

20 MAY 1951

[Redacted]

**SUBJECT: Radiological Safety Activities - GEORGE Shot**

**TO: Commander**  
[Redacted]  
APO 187, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

1. Forwarded herewith for your information, is a report of radiological safety activities conducted by this unit during the period associated with GEORGE Shot, Project GREENHOUSE.
2. The inclosed report should be considered informal and supplements the summaries furnished your headquarters in letter, this headquarters, Subject: "Informal Report of Dog Shot Radiological Safety Activities", dated 20 April 1951, and letter, this headquarters, Subject: "Radiological Safety Activities - 'DOG' Shot", dated 9 May 1951.
3. Particular attention is invited to Part IV - "Report of Radsafe Technical Branch Activities - George Shot", in the attached report. Your comments are requested as pertain to action required to alleviate cited discrepancies in future tests.

1 Incl:  
Informal Rpt - [Redacted]  
George Shot

JEROME A. MCGANNAN  
Colonel, USAF  
Commanding

Declassified WITH DELETIONS by  
DNA, Chief, ISTS AND AF, 11 MISS/MSIBL  
M22ND 15 MAR 95 (494-5722-0060).

*[Signature]*  
Date: 3/23/95

[Redacted]

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INTERNAL REPORT

OF

PERSONNEL AND SERVICE ACTIVITIES

[REDACTED]

1954

INTERNAL REPORT - COMBAT COMMAND

CONTENTS

- Part I - Statistical report of transfer personnel within theater
- Part II - Report of air activities
- Part III - Aircraft recontactation activities
- Part IV - Report of radiological technical branch
- Part V - Summary of A-1 detachment activities

[REDACTED]

PART I

STATISTICAL ACCOUNT  
OF  
AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL MONITORING FINDINGS  
GEORGE SHOT

SECRET

STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF PERSONNEL MONITORING FINDINGS

\* 1. The following record includes only those missions where personnel contamination was detected. On all other missions, excepting those noted below, survey of crew members rendered background interstices only.

<u>Mission Desc.</u>	<u>Type A/c</u>	<u>Number of Crew Members</u>	<u>Highest G-M Counter Readings Noted</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u>
*Rose	WB-29	12	Background Off-Scale (20 $\mu$ mr/hr)	4 4

\*\*Four members of crew remained at Eniwetok and were not monitored by this organization.

*Pearl	WB-29	12	Background Off-Scale (20 $\mu$ mr/hr)	7 3
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\*\*Two members of crew remained at Eniwetok and were not monitored by this organization.

Jane	WB-29	11	Background Off-Scale (20 $\mu$ mr/hr)	7 4
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Tilly	WB-29	11	Background 2.0 mr/hr 3.0 mr/hr 7.0 mr/hr 10.0 mr/hr Off-Scale (20 $\mu$ mr/hr)	0 1 1 1 1 7
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\* 2. It is significant to note that all personnel on the Rose, Pearl and Tilly aircraft were monitored and decontaminated at Eniwetok prior to return to this station. Aircraft were also subjected to decontamination at Eniwetok, prior to returning to this station.

\* 3. In addition to those readings shown above, one person involved in a flight originating from Eniwetok returned as a passenger on Tilly. His person was radiating in excess of 20 mr/hr beta plus gamma on arrival at Kwajalein.

4. An aircraft engaged in routine weather reconnaissance over Gooney How Track on 11 plus one day encountered radioactivity during the course of the flight. No crew contamination was noted.

[REDACTED]

## Stat Account of Pers Monitoring Findings (Cont'd)

5. An aircraft of the 54th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, II; Weather, from Guam, reconnoitering the typhoon Jean on H plus one day, landed at this station and was found to have light contamination. No Contamination was found on the crew members.

X 6. All personnel with 5.0 mr/hr or higher readings were decontaminated to background in the decontamination center and clothing held. All personnel with readings of three (3) times background were decontaminated to background prior to release. Personnel with lower readings were released and advised of the portion of the body showing and reading. They were further advised to air their clothing for a period of forty-eight (48) hours prior to re-use.

7. Aircraft decontamination crews and personnel required to perform maintenance on aircraft having residual contamination were required to report to the decontamination center following their work. Only minor amounts of contamination were noted.

PART II

REPORTS OF AIR MONITORS

GEORGE SHOT

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COMMENTARY

Because of the presence of strong typhoon circulation at the time of George Shot detonation, the radiological reconnaissance program to be carried out by [REDACTED] was nullified to a great extent. The H plus twelve (12) and H plus twenty-four (24) hours high and low tracks along the Kwajalein meridian as required by [REDACTED] would have routed the aircraft to the east of any projected cloud or fall-out activity. The technical details of this matter are discussed to a fuller extent in the section of this report entitled "Activities Report of the Technical Branch".

Only two (2) flights were dispatched along the Kwajalein meridian; one at approximately H plus fifteen (15) hours (10,000 and 30,000) and one at approximately H plus twenty-five (25) hours (5,000 and 20,000). Both of these flights returned with negative results. A third flight was dispatched into the typhoon area at H plus forty (40) hours to find an area at 30,000 feet where B-91 samples could be obtained. This latter flight and the Jane flight were the only two (2) successful flights during the course of George Shot activities. The work "successful" is used rather loosely, however, since the negative results obtained from H plus fifteen (15) and H plus twenty-five (25) hours flights may be considered to have scientific value in a negative sense.

For the foregoing reasons, air monitor's reports for the Jane and H plus forty (40) hours flight are the only two (2) included in the George Shot activity.

\* As an additional note: The Pearl, Rose and Tilly flights were under the radiological control of personnel not a part of this organization and who were working on a separate program. Since the purpose, results and actual intent of the Pearl, Rose and Tilly flights is not within the cognizance of this unit, monitor's reports have not been included in this summary.

AIR MONITOR'S MISSION REPORT1. MISSION DESIGNATION: Jans

2. PURPOSE: To establish contact with fall-out from the atomic cloud; obtaining filter samples of the fall-out material, and measuring to a degree, the area of fall-out activity.

3. FLIGHT STATISTICS:

a. Aircraft: WB-39 45-21819

b. Take-off time: 1755Z, 8 May 1951

c. Landing time: 1020Z, 9 May 1951

d. Track: Take-off and climb to 5,000'; proceeded to orbit in accordance with [REDACTED] Remained in orbit until contact was made; proceeded to track cloud or fall-out area collecting filter samples reporting contact points. Proceeded to 14 degrees north and flew on easterly heading to position north of Kwajalein in hopes of obtaining additional information for directing of H plus twelve (12) hours high and low flights.

4. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT:

a. B-21 Conductivity equipment

b. B-35 Scintillation counter

c. Type C-1 airfoil filter box

d. Radiological Instruments:

(1) One (1) AN/PDR-T1B ion chamber

(2) One (1) Victoreen Model 263B G-M counter

(3) Two (2) 0-200 mr pocket dosimeters

(4) One (1) 0-10R pocket dosimeter

(5) One (1) film badge per crew member

## Air Monitor's Mission Rpt (Cont'd)

5. RESULTS - GENERAL:

Readings remained fairly steady at background from take-off until approximately H plus ten (10) minutes. Background increased to approximately five (5) mr/hr between H plus ten (10) minutes and H plus forty (40) minutes.

At H plus fifty-seven (57) minutes, it is believed that actual penetration of the atomic cloud was made as an intensity reading of approximately 500 mr/hr was obtained. A 180 degree turn was executed in an attempt to withdraw from the high intensity area and thus prevent premature contamination of the B-21 equipment which would render the instrument operationally useless. As the B-21 equipment remained operative throughout the flight, the evasive tactics were considered successful.

After emerging from the atomic cloud, tracking procedures were commenced and several contacts were made in the proximity of 11.9 degrees N latitude and 162.9 degrees E longitude. On changing from a north-south ladder search to an east-west ladder, the contact was lost. After some time spent in attempting to reestablish contact in the immediate vicinity of zero point, a course was taken due north to the 13th parallel to 163 degrees 26 minutes east longitude where a turn was made to a heading of 180 degrees. Two (2) minutes after the turn, the instrument indicated that we were encountering radiation. Continued north-south and east-west cuts were made in this area for approximately three (3) hours with fair results. (See attached plot) It was determined from these cuts that the main fall-out area at 5,000' at H plus six (6) hours was in the area outlined on the plot contoured at approximately 12.9 N Lat and 163.6 E Long.

Some time was then spent to determine if any other fall-out could be encountered in the surrounding area. After obtaining negative results, the aircraft was directed to proceed to 14 degrees N latitude and parallel that latitude to an area north of Kwajalein in an effort to detect any fall-out that might be picked up by the H plus twelve (12) hours low and high flights. No indicative readings were obtained.

6. COMMENTS:

a. On a mission of this type, the radiological safety officer, who is also responsible for vectoring the aircraft so as to obtain optimum results, cannot successfully pursue his assigned duties unless stationed in the immediate vicinity of the B-21 operator and the navigator.

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## Air Monitor's Mission Rpt (Cont'd)

b. Residual contamination following contacts appeared to affect the B-21 equipment and the T1B ion chamber to a greater extent than it did the B-35 equipment. Frequent observations indicated that partial decontamination incurred by flying through rain clouds was necessary to reduce readings on the B-21 and ion chamber whereas all indications on the B-35 equipment had previously ceased.

c. Very good correlation between the T1B ion chamber, the B-21 equipment and B-35 equipment was noted throughout the flight. It was apparent that the T1B was inadequate for detection purposes whenever the intensities were low. The 263B G-M counter was in close agreement with the rest of the instruments until its range was exceeded.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that records of experience and recommendations made on similar flights be maintained as a reference for required study by any radiological officer prior to participation in a flight of this nature.

b. A hard and fast understanding between the radiological officer and the B-21/B-35 equipment operator is mandatory. A thorough working knowledge of all the equipment employed, its capabilities and limitations, should be made available to the radiological officer assigned the responsibility of directing the flight.

c. The radiological officer should change his duty position within the aircraft during the course of this type flight, from the weather position, to a position next to the B-21/B-35 equipment and the navigators.

d. A positive plot of all indicated radiation should be maintained by the radiological officer in order to facilitate regain contact in the event it is lost during the tracking operation.

e. Amplitude of impulses measured by B-35 be increased to a greater degree than that used on this mission. Although B-35 equipment appeared to be highly satisfactory, ease of reading would be increased by greater track deflection.

8. AIR MONITOR:

Captain Charles R. Hoyle, Jr.

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THIS MESSAGE  
IS FOR THE USE OF THE  
RECEIVING OFFICE

JUNE 5  
9 1953



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PART III

AIRCRAFT DECONTAMINATION ACTIVITIES

GEORGE SHOT

SECRET

SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT DECONTAMINATION ACTIVITIESCONDUCTED BY [REDACTED] IN CONJUNCTION WITH GEORGE SHOT

1. A statistical compilation of George Shot aircraft decontamination and radiological findings pertaining to aircraft is contained in the attached sheet.

2. A general discussion of the pertinent findings associated with George Shot aircraft decontamination activities is presented in the following paragraphs.

3. All aircraft decontamination was conducted with a mixture of four (4) parts kerosene and one (1) part gunk, with the exception of RB-29 #1762, which was also partially washed with a mixture of water and trisodium phosphate in the Kerrick cleaner. The Kerrick cleaner was utilized because of the desire for an early departure of the aircraft for Travis Air Force Base, and because all other equipment was in use.

4. RB-29 #2202 and RB-29 #1762, (Ross and Tilly), had been previously subjected to decontamination at Eniwetok prior to return to this station. The initial contamination and amounts and types of materials used in the Eniwetok operation are not known.

5. Total materials used for the George Shot aircraft decontamination activities are:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Water	gal	5000
Kerosene	gal	400
Gunk	gal	110

6. Cowling was removed, as in previous operations, prior to washing. It was found that considerable scrubbing was necessary on some portions of the cowling, particularly the "orange-peel" cowling which has strips of rubber attached, in order to remove effectively the major portion of the contamination. Highest concentrations of radioactive materials were invariably found on the engines, with above average intensities on the deicer boots, turrets (in the case of the RB-29), and on the C-1 airfoils.

7. Long handled brushes were used in conjunction with the application of the gunk-kerosene mixture on the aircraft skin and all accessible engine parts. Fresh water, under pressure, was pumped from a decontamination truck for rinsing.

[REDACTED]

## Airt Decontan Activities (Cont'd)

8. The gunk machine and the decontamination truck have proven to be ideal for purpose of aircraft decontamination, with the exception that continuous minor breakdowns of both have hampered operations to some extent. There were no spare parts provided for either unit, nor are any parts available at this station. It has only been through the ingenuity and industry of the engineering section personnel involved, that the machines have been kept in operating condition. Continuous repair, as well as local manufacture of a number of parts has been necessary.

9. One (1) aircraft, WB-29 #335, flying on the Pearl mission, remained at Eniwetok for engine change and had not returned to this station at the time of this report. On 16 May however, the engine removed from #335, was returned to this station for tear-down. Readings on this engine were at a maximum of 20 mr/hr beta plus gamma.

10. While the point to be presented in this paragraph has been mentioned earlier in previous reports, it is believed worthy of reiteration. Carburetor air screens are not normally touched during decontamination operations because of their inaccessibility. It has been a practice of this unit however, to check the carburetor air screens for activity at the time of the next major inspection of the aircraft, when the screens are normally removed for cleaning. Even though considerable periods of time have elapsed between exposure of the aircraft and the next major inspection, contamination has invariably been found on the carburetor air screens at the time of removal; at the same time no other activity is detectable on the aircraft proper.


11. Prior to the initiation of radiological operations at this station, it was assumed that contamination of engine oil would present a major radiological safety problem. This assumption was enhanced by the fact that aircraft participating in Project Ranger did collect significant amounts of engine oil contamination. However consistent checks of the engine oil on each of the unit aircraft which was contemplated, has failed to reveal any activity whatsoever in the oil. It is possible that some correlation exists between engine oil contamination and condition of carburetor air filters, although no definite conclusion can be drawn at this time.

12. By observation, a rough correlation has been found to exist between the average activity remaining on an aircraft engine and the amount of activity to be found on the hands and clothing of aircraft mechanics working on contaminated engines. Normally, it has been found that the mechanic's person will indicate readings approximately 1/3 of the average intensities found on the engine, e.g., an engine radiating at approximately 20mr/hr, will result in contamination of the mechanic to the extent of about 6 or 7 mr/hr.



PART IV

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES - RADIOLOGICAL TECHNICAL BRANCH

  
GEORGE SHOT

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REPORT OF ACTIVITIESRADIOLOGICAL TECHNICAL BRANCH - GEORGE SHOT -

1. The following report of activities incident to George Shot covers subjects of radiac equipment and radiation area forecasts for the period 8 - 12 May 1951.

2. RADIAC EQUIPMENT AND FILM BADGE SERVICE:

a. No significant changes in the status of radiac equipment have occurred since the last report submitted on Easy Shot.

b. Film badge service remained at its normal state. A total of 125 badges were received from Niwotak prior to George Shot. To date no official report of film badge findings has been received despite the fact that this concludes the third test in the Greenhouse series. During previous tests, the film badges exposed on Rose and Pearl flights were hand-carried to Perry Island by Lt Colonel Cody or Master Trodler and results were obtained at that time, although no official report was rendered to this unit. On George Shot however, to the knowledge of this unit, results of the Pearl, Rose, Tilly and Jane flights film badges have not been received by any personnel at Kwajalein. Particular interest exists in the results obtained from these film badges because of the intensities encountered during the course of the aforementioned flights.

3. RADIATION AREA FORECASTS:

a. Briefings showing forecast areas of radiation, atomic cloud movements and fall-out were accomplished by means of Radax, cloud trajectories and vertical cross sections showing wind displacements along the east-west components. The tropical weather research office provided forecast wind movements for levels at each 5,000 feet up to 60,000 feet over point zero. Advice was received concerning forecast trajectories based on streamline analysis for the general area.

b. Standing operating procedure employed for Easy Shot was in effect for this period. One of the Radax "specialists", however, was not in position to perform this duty in that he was required to go on a reconnaissance to locate and obtain data on typhoon Joan. The absence of this officer posed a difficulty in the gathering, study and analysis of wind data required for a wide area of air operation in connection with George Shot. Approximately fifty (50) charts, i.e., radexes, cloud trajectories, and cross sections are required for each shot operation and record.

Rpt of Activities, Rad Tech Branch - George Shot - [REDACTED] (Cont'd)

c. The situation was further complicated with the nearness of typhoon Joan to the detonation area. The wind flow pattern was entirely different from systems incident to the previous shots. At all levels up to 60,000 feet the movement of air over Eniwetok was affected by the cyclonic circulation about the "eye" of "Joan", which was located 180 miles north-northwest of point zero at 1200Z, 8 May 1951. The movement of the center was to the northwest and west at 8 - 10 mph. Winds over point zero were from 20 to 35 knots moving to the northeast and curving counter clockwise. At first, it was believed that the movement of the A-cloud from point zero, below 20,000', would be north-northeast, curving in a path over the vicinity of 15 degrees to 22 degrees N and 160 degrees W. This is shown in the attached chart #5. The findings of the Jane, Pearl, Rose and Tilly missions verified the positions quite well for the first few hours after H hour. Very little information is available as to the actual position of the "clouds" and fall-out areas after H plus ten (10) hours and above 25,000 feet. Copies of the briefing charts, showing the forecast cloud positions and fall-out areas, are attached.

d. At the time that certain wind data was most needed in preparation of these forecast, radio and teletype communications were adversely affected by electrical storms in the area, resulting in non-reception of expected RAWIN data from the outlying [REDACTED] weather stations. It was further learned that certain scheduled upper air runs were not made and in consequence there was, at this station, a paucity of critical wind information. Without "fixes" and shot day winds (particularly over the area northeast of point zero), it was practically impossible to forecast the trajectory of the cloud above 25,000 feet. The H plus twelve (12) mission from Kwajalein proved that the 30,000' cloud forecast, (Chart #5), was erroneous as determined through a wide search in the area of forecast cloud. It was later determined that the circulation about the typhoon Joan was cyclonic for all levels up to at least 35,000', which is to say that the atomic particles were carried into the typhoon area, became thoroughly mixed through vertical motion and were diffusing and dispersing in all directions. Thus it became virtually impossible to actually "track" the cloud, even though laboratory analysis of filters exposed on routine weather reconnaissance flight for several days after George Shot, would tend to indicate that minute particles of radioactive materials were being collected at 10,000'.

e. It was obvious that the H plus twelve (12) and twenty-four (24) hours missions prescribed for execution by this unit were designed around wind flow patterns quite different from those associated with the

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Rpt of Activities, Rad Tech Branch - George Shot [REDACTED] (Cont'd)

typhoon Joan. It therefore becomes clear, as the overall picture of conditions shaped up, that the dispatch of the aircraft on the normal H plus twelve (12) and twenty-four (24) hour flights would have been a waste of aircraft, effort and money. The circulation as determined late on shot day, precluded the likelihood of contact with radioactivity from George Shot at any point along the Kwajalein meridian. The decision to alter and curtail the prescribed missions was based on the advice of professionally competent tropical meteorologists at this station, who utilized to our best advantage, the data on hand.

f. At this point it is stressed that meteorology and the study of radiation dispersion, along with the planning of aerial tracks for sampling and tracking, cannot be disassociated. Any set of instructions with respect to tracking and sampling should be commensurate with the general meteorological situation existing or anticipated at the time of the explosion. In this connection, it was found that streamline analysis afforded the most accurate means of forecasting A-cloud trajectories in this area.

g. The situation created by the presence of typhoon Joan, and the lack of critical wind data lowered the degree of confidence required in forecasting A-cloud movements at all levels. Though the presence of "Joan" opened new vistas of experimental knowledge in this phase of atomic tests, the resultant wind pattern was so unusual as to preclude the application of pre-drawn flight tracks which had been designed for meteorological conditions far different from those actually existing at George Shot time.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS born out of the experience with George Shot in forecasting radiation areas are as follows:

a. That wind data from all Task Force upper air stations be made available, each six (6) hours, and transmitted to this station by the most expeditious means. Such reports should be divided into Part One for data up to 400 millibars, and Part Two for data above that level and each part transmitted as soon as available.

b. That at least two (2) trained Radex "specialists" be considered as necessary for radex duty at all times from shot time minus twelve (12) hours to shot time plus twenty (20) hours if proper value is to be gained from the use of such data in the conduct of this type operation.

Rpt of Activities, Rad Tech Branch - George Shot - [REDACTED] (Cont'd)

c. That the times planned for future tests (11-hour) be predetermined with due consideration of the general area weather situation and where such extreme variations from the normal are anticipated, that previously established instructions for tracking and sampling of clouds and fall-out areas be modified accordingly.

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

163°

162°

13°

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11°



HUSBY

ALICE KAWA

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Cloud

FAVOUR

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#2

164°E



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162°

13°N

12°N

11°N



164°E  
163°

164°E

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The A. Lietz Co., San Francisco  
Made in U. S. A.

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The A. Lietz Co., San Francisco  
Made in U. S. A.


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162

163

164

13



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41165

Alm Radar  
2-3000 FT

Cloud  
Fall out

117 13-133

Capt. Bradley 11

17002 8/10/51

117  
13-133

13

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162

163

164

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160  
25N

170


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20°N

15°

10°

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The A. Lietz Co., San Francisco  
Made in U. S. A.



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RADIX


CLOUD TRAJECTORY

FORECASTS


for

  
GEORGE SHOT

Period: 0800Z 8 May 1951 to 0300Z 10 May 1951

By: Captain H.G. Dradbury, Rad Safe, 

Wind and Streamline Forecasts by Prof. T.M. Palmer



~~SECRET~~

N.B. The charts showing A-cloud positions, fall-out and movement of radioactive particles were based on forecast wind data and prepared in time for crew briefings. Time of issuance to the Air Monitors (on Jane, Pearl, Rose, Billy, H plus 15 and H plus 25 flights) is shown on each chart. "H" refers to exact time of detonation. "PZ" refers to point of detonation.

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PART V

SUMMARY OF ISRAJALIN AND DETACHMENT ACTIVITIES

GEORGE'S SHOT

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KWAJALEIN AMC DETACHMENT ACTIVITIES - GEORGE SHOT

1. Inasmuch as two (2) B-50A's assigned to the AMC detachment at Kwajalein were under the operational control of [REDACTED], a brief resume of their activities in conjunction with George Shot is presented in the following paragraphs.

2. B-50A #6017, (H plus 2 a/c), departed this station at 2330Z, 8 May to engage in cloud tracking activities. The aircraft climbed to 25,000' covering a general area to the WNW of Kwajalein and to the south of Eniwetok. Precipitation and icing were encountered thus rendering the special instrumentation on the aircraft ineffective. The flight was therefor abandoned; aircraft landed at Kwajalein, 0255Z, 9 May. Flight results were negative.

3. B-50A #6023, departed this station at 2335Z, 9 May, (H plus 26), for the purpose of cloud tracking. The flight track taken by this aircraft was north from Kwajalein to Bikini, thence in a wide arc to the north, thence south to Johnson Island. The aircraft initially proposed flying to Hickam, but upon losing an engine 700 miles WNW of Johnson Island, it landed at Johnson. No cloud or fall-out interceptions were made by this aircraft and flight results were negative.

4. B-50A #6017 was scheduled for a cloud tracking mission at H plus 50 hours with intended flight track toward the area NW of Eniwetok where previous interceptions and air radar studies indicated the presence of cloud activity. This aircraft attempted two (2) starts on this mission and aborted because of mechanical failure both times. Prior to any further attempts, however, authority to discontinue any further B-50A cloud tracking was received from [REDACTED]. The B-50A requirement was therefor closed down with negative results in all respects.

5. Operational control of the B-50A aircraft was dropped by this organization at the following noted times, upon arrival of the cited aircraft at Travis Air Force Base, California:

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TIME AND DATE OF ARRIVAL AT TRAVIS</u>
B-50A #6023	1700Z, 12 May 1951
B-50A #6017	0500Z, 14 May 1951

[REDACTED]