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Special Rereview
Final Determination
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/4/81

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MR&A 7 - Tumbler-Snapper, Vol. 2

This document consists of 3 pages

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DETERMINED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY, DOE, OPC
BY R. A. Carpenter DATE 7-9-85

April 2, 1952

Dear General Loper:

Reference is made to letter of March 7, 1952 from Brigadier General A. R. Luedecke to the Director of Military Application on troop participation in Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER.

The proposals you outline for this troop participation program appear to be in general agreement with the principle of limited troop participation which the Atomic Energy Commission accepted by letter of December 28, 1951. Accordingly, we confirm as a working principle for TUMBLER-SNAPPER the Services' desire for the ground troops to:

a. Occupy a position at the time of detonation which is safe but not beyond a distance from ground zero which is reasonably sound from a tactical standpoint, and

b. Maneuver on foot in the vicinity of ground zero as soon as practicable after the explosion.

We also note and concur with the intent of the Department of Defense to designate an Exercise Director to represent the three Services in matters requiring coordination with Test Command AFSWP, and the Test Manager.

While we agree that details of the participation program can only be worked out satisfactorily between the Test Manager and the Exercise Director on the ground, we feel that these detailed arrangements must remain within an area bounded by a broad understanding reached between the Commission and the Department of Defense. Accordingly, our general agreement is qualified as follows:

a. AEC policy is, and will continue to be, to allow no civilian-manned stations closer than five to six miles to ground zero or to a bomb run because of the possibility of bombing error.

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b. There are three possible hazards to troops stationed at a distance of 7000 yards from the calculated ground zero. One is that the energy yield would be greater than that assumed in the pre-shot calculations, a problem only for Shot No. 3. The second is that because of human or mechanical error the bomb would be dropped closer to the troops than ground zero. If the troops are permitted to be as close as 7000 yards to ground zero, as you have requested, this means that they may be as close as from two and one-half to three miles to a bomb run depending on what bomb run is used. The third is that because of failure of discipline, troops would expose themselves to blast, heat or light to a greater degree than contemplated by the instructions.

c. We are assured that the yield on Shot No. 3 will not exceed that of calculations by more than 10 percent. Therefore, injury from this cause is not likely to troops stationed as proposed who follow an adequate safety procedure. The Commission takes it for granted that the Exercise Director and his superiors assume the responsibility in their placing and management of troops for protection against the second and third causes of extra hazard.

d. We realize the value and urgency of obtaining quantitative information on close tactical support of troops as well as the value of psychological indoctrination. If officials of the Department of Defense, after review of the hazards involved, still feel that a military requirement justifies the maneuver, the Commission would enter no objection to stationing troops at not less than 7000 yards from ground zero, provided that the Exercise Director prepares a safety plan to minimize risk of injury which is acceptable to the Test Manager. The responsibility for troop compliance with this safety plan rests, of course, with the Exercise Director.

e. Troops may participate and maneuver in connection with Shot Nos. 3, 4, and 8.

f. Maneuvers in connection with these shots will be limited to the procedure you have suggested. This envisions an advance on foot at a time, and through a zone of advance, prescribed by the Test Manager. In connection with radiological monitoring of this advance, it is assumed that monitoring teams will be provided from the troops and that no requirement whatever will be placed on the monitoring group of the test organization, since the latter will be otherwise occupied at shot time.

g. Troop observers, as such, may participate in Shot Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8, the others being considered unsuitable for the accommodation of large bodies of observers. We concur with your requirement for stationing these observers at approximately seven miles from ground zero.

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h. Participating troops and troop observers not to exceed in the approximate numbers specified in your letter are acceptable, since you also state that the Exercise Director will be responsible for providing for their control, administration and support, coordinating with the Test Manager as necessary. Final determination of numbers of troops and observers is a detail left for agreement between the Exercise Director and the Test Manager.

i. If any AEC expenditures are required in connection with this program, working funds should be transferred in advance from the Department of Defense to the Santa Fe Operations Office.

Within the above general areas of understanding, the details of how the troops will participate in TUMBLER-SNAPPER should be arranged between the Exercise Director and the Test Manager. Should there be need for expanding the scope of the program approved herein, we would consider it appropriate that the proposal be presented to the Commission.

Sincerely yours,

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Gordon Dean
Chairman

Brigadier General R. E. Loper, Chief
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Washington 25, D. C.