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FILE NO.

SUBJECT:

G4/F2 5805 (SF)

Radiological Warfare

TO: Chief Chemical Officer FROM: G-4 DATE: 30 Jun 54 COMMENT NO. 1

1. References:

a. WSEG Report No. 9, "An Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities in 1956 and 1960 for Employment of Radiological Warfare (RW) Weapons Systems in Air and Ground Operations."

b. G-3 385 Radl TS (6 Oct 53), Memo ACofS, G-3 for CofS, U. S. Army, subject as in para 1a above, dated 13 Oct 1953, w/1 Incl. (Incl No. 1)

c. G-3 385 Radl TS (23 Feb 54), Memo ACofS, G-3, for CofS, U. S. Army, subject as in para 1a above, (SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES). (Incl No. 2)

d. "Army Research and Development Work on Radiological Warfare."

e. G-3 385 Radl TS (29 Sep 53), Memo ACofS, G-3 for Chief of Army Field Forces, subject: "JCS _____" w/Incl (copy furnished Chief Chemical Officer).

f. G-3 385 Radl TS (17 Sep 53), Memo ACofS, G-3 for CofS, U. S. Army, subject: "Army Research and Development Work on Radiological Warfare." (Incl No. 3)

2. Based upon the decisions made and actions taken, referenced in paragraph 1 above, the following research and development guidance on Radiological Warfare is forwarded:

a. Manned Strategic Aircraft Delivery Systems. There is, at present, no stated requirement for the development of RW agent-munition systems for delivery by strategic manned aircraft. The WSEG has concluded, and the JCS agreed that the currently programmed U. S. capability to produce RW agent material during the period 1956 to 1960 is not sufficiently promising to prompt acceptance of this weapon system. The state of munition and agent formulation development art, although subject to some refinement and improvement, is sufficiently advanced to allow resumption and completion of the necessary research and development effort prior to the time that production facilities for RW agents could be completed.

In view of the above, no further development of RW agent-munition systems for delivery by strategic manned aircraft should be planned or programmed.

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b. Strategic Guided Missile Delivery Systems. There is, at present, no stated requirement for the development of RW agent - warhead systems for delivery by strategic guided missiles. Guided missile delivery of RW offers certain distinct advantages over manned aircraft delivery and could constitute a logical extension of RW munition development into delivery systems likely to replace manned aircraft. However, the limited foreseeable availability of agent material coupled with the poor competitive position of RW for warhead space of guided missiles of the class likely to become operational by the end of this decade, precludes acceptance of this system. In the event the agent supply situation should substantially improve and over-all considerations rule in favor of acceptance of this system, sufficient time would be available to marry the necessary R&D effort to an agent production and missile delivery capability.

In view of the above, no development of RW agent - warhead systems for delivery by strategic guided missiles should be planned or programmed.

c. Tactical Guided Missile Delivery System. There is, at present, no stated requirement for the development of RW agent - munition systems for delivery by tactical guided missiles. It is conceivable that a limited RW capability could be achieved by this system at a much earlier date than in paragraph 2b, above, should a favorable decision be rendered in this regard. An operational capability is subject to the same production limitations in time as mentioned above and the achievement of an acceptable munition system for guided missile delivery in this range. It is recognized that less time would be available for the required additional research and development for a suitable munition system should a favorable decision be made.

In view of the above, a minimum effort should be devoted toward planning studies involving concepts of delivery and outlining the phased requirements of a munition development program for this delivery system. Development work beyond the planning stages should not be undertaken.

d. Ground Delivery System for RW Agents. Although there is, at present, no stated requirement for ground delivery systems for RW agents, the Operations Research Office has been actively considering the potential of RW in the contamination of roads and other retardation operations. In general, the WSEG study indicates that the tactical advantage of RW on roads is uncertain, while the ORO report indicates that this weapon may have considerable military worth. Studies thus far undertaken have been based on a limited number of selected target systems. The unique potential of RW in land combat has not been fully explored.

In view of the above, research and development on ground delivery systems for RW will support ORO requirements for data and consider conceptual planning studies of land combat situations where RW is

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uniquely capable of accomplishing a task more effectively than other systems. Development of prototype delivery systems should not be undertaken at this time.

e. Agent Development. Research and development on RW agents should accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Support the agent requirements for ground delivery systems as outlined in paragraph 2d, above.

(2) Monitor the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission program to maintain currently accurate estimates of future availability of RW agents.

(3) Monitor technological developments in fission product RW agent recovery processes which might influence the production time factors referred to in paragraph 2a, above.

f. Countermeasures. The defensive requirements of RW should consider the probable capacity and disposition to employ RW by potential enemies of the U.S. Countermeasures for RW should be undertaken as a minimum enlargement of the radiological defensive program for atomic weapons. Emphasis for RW countermeasures studies should not exceed that which is assigned to AW radiological defense.

3 Incls (Cys 1 of 3, Series B)

1. G3 Memo for CofS, (TS),
13 Oct 53, w/1 Incl
2. G3 Memo for CofS, (TS),
23 Feb 54, w/1 Incl
3. G3 Memo for CofS, (S),
22 Sep 53, w/1 Incl

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