June 30, 1950

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is the report of your Committee on Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare. It includes the findings on the several assignments carried out by the Committee, in accordance with the instructions you gave us in December. It is in form a summary report, largely confined to discussion and recommendations pertaining to significant gaps in thinking and programming.

Your Committee has seen and studied the pertinent information in the files of the Department of Defense. We have talked freely with those persons, both military and civilian, who are most familiar with these weapons and the plans and the state of military preparedness of the United States and certain other nations with respect thereto.

Your Committee does not believe that there is any likelihood of effective international control of these weapons prior to the settlement of the whole problem of armaments.

We do not believe that any useful distinction can be made between weapons on a moral basis.

If the United States or its allies were attacked, toxic chemical agents might be exceedingly important to us as a supplement to weapons now in general use for holding back the advance of enemy ground forces. Certainly, any nation which lacked these weapons or the will to use them would be at a great disadvantage in fighting against a nation prepared to use them.

We have, therefore, been disturbed to find that according to the best available information, Soviet military forces have substantial stockpiles of toxic chemical agents, together with production facilities for making them, operating or in condition to operate. In addition,
the Soviet Union took over at the end of the war the
german plants for making G-agents ("nerve gases"),
together with German technicians and scientists asso-
ciated with these plants. The U. S. Army Chemical Corps,
although it has done an outstanding job in developing
and improving the G-agent processes which were obtained
from the Germans at the end of the war, has but limited
stockpiles of toxic chemical agents, and has neither any
stockpiles of, nor even production facilities for, G-agents.

We believe that this situation is the inevitable
result of the United States policy of "use in retaliation
only". Such a policy has resulted in the assignment of
low priorities to the research, development, and produc-
tion of chemical weapons. The security of the United
States demands that the policy of "use in retaliation
only" be abandoned.

Biological warfare is a weapon which may become
exceedingly important. Present evidence indicates that
it could be an effective weapon of war, but the degree
of its effectiveness is unknown because it has never been
used on a large scale or subjected to adequate field tests.

There can be no doubt of the danger to the United
States from enemy use of biological agents in sabotage
or by other means of attack, either before or after a
declaration of war, if the United States is not adequately
prepared to protect itself. At present, not enough is
being done to explore the offensive potentialities of
this mode of warfare or otherwise to develop an adequate
defense against biological attack, whether anti-personnel,
anti-animal, or anti-crop.

Radiological warfare agents and atomic bombs compete
for the same raw materials and facilities, and the produc-
tion of radiological warfare agents in significant quantity
is now precluded. This situation, however, is subject to
change. Radiological warfare has potentialities sufficient
to warrant constant study of its military worth to determine
whether neutrons should be diverted from atomic projects for
the production of radiological warfare agents.
The United States is not prepared for biological warfare and, for all practical purposes, is not prepared for chemical warfare. This state of unpreparedness is the result of the indecision that, during the postwar years, has permeated the area of the Committee's investigation. We believe the recommendations that we make would, if accepted, serve to break the deadlock and produce action. To carry out these recommendations will require an outlay of additional funds, but the relatively small cost appears to be a sound investment.

Sincerely yours,

R. Gordon Amason

Eric G. Ball

Jacob L. Devers

Earl P. Stevenson

Chairman

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.